State v. Mayfield ( 2021 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 2009008259
v. )
)
TAHKAI MAYFIELD, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: March 25, 2021
Decided: September 14, 2021
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Defendant, Tahkai Mayfield (“Mayfield”) has filed a Motion to Suppress to
challenge the admissibility of evidence resulting from a traffic stop of a vehicle that
he was a passenger in resulting in his arrest. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
On September 10, 2021, the Court held a hearing on the Motion to Suppress
at which time Officer Mann (“Mann”) testified. His testimony reveals the following
facts which the Court finds were proven by the State by a preponderance of the
evidence.
On September 19, 2020, around 10:54 am, Mann was on patrol parked on the
east side of North Church Street in Wilmington Delaware when he noticed a blue
Nissan pass him at a high rate of speed, causing his vehicle to sway as the car passed.
Based on Officer Mann’s training and experience, the car was traveling above the
posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour. Mann activated his emergency lights to
initiate a traffic stop and the suspect vehicle pulled over. Mann approached the
driver side of the vehicle and requested the driver’s license, registration and proof
of insurance. The driver identified herself as Diamond Shaw (“Shaw”) and told
Mann that she did not have a driver’s license. Mann then asked the passenger,
Mayfield, the same and he responded that he also did not have a driver’s license.
Due to the car bearing temporary out of state registration, Mann obtained the VIN
from the front of the windshield to confirm the vehicle’s status. By this point, Senior
Corporal Cain (“Cain”) and Patrolmen Cooper (“Cooper”) arrived on scene.
Mann then returned to his vehicle where he performed a DELJIS inquiry
check for Shaw and Mayfield. As to Shaw, no results were found but as for
Mayfield, results showed that Mayfield was on probation and had a history of
firearm charges. A DATA inquiry1 was conducted for the car and Mann was
informed that the car was not likely registered. The results of the DATA inquiry
took several minutes. At some point Mann was waived down by Shaw and Mayfield
regarding the status of the stop. Mayfield told the officers that he had a probation
1
This inquiry took some time as the Wilmington Center DATA Center had to call the appropriate Pennsylvania
authorities for them to check about the temporary tag.
2
meeting at about 11:30 am that he had to attend. Office Cooper returned to Mann’s
patrol car where he then told Mann that Mayfield appeared nervous, his hands were
shaking, and he had labored fast breathing. Again, Mayfield and Shaw looked back
at the patrol vehicles.
At this point Mann left his patrol car along with Cooper and they both
approached the passenger side of the car. They approached the passenger side of the
car primarily to ensure officer safety. Mann wanted to advise the driver of the next
step in the traffic stop and attempt to get permission to search the car. Mann
attempted to speak to Shaw about the next step in the traffic stop and to get her
permission to search the car. Mann was unable to communicate with Shaw as
Mayfield continued to interrupt Mann’s attempt to speak to Shaw. Because of the
interruptions, which hindered Mann’s ability to communicate with Shaw, Mayfield
was asked to step out of the car, which he did. When Mayfield stepped out of the
car, he left the passenger side door open. At this point, while no portion of his own
body was within the confines of the car, Mann observed the handle of a firearm
underneath the passenger side of the car. The firearm was seized. The defendant
has been charged with possession of the Firearm By a Person Prohibited and
Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon along with a misdemeanor and a violation. It
is the seizure of this firearm which forms the basis of the instant motion.
3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a Motion to Suppress evidence in a warrantless search or seizure, “the
State bears the burden of proof.”2
Police officers are permitted to stop a motor vehicle based on a police officer’s
reasonable suspicion that the operator or occupant of the vehicle has committed or
is committing a violation of the law, which includes traffic laws.3
A determination of reasonable suspicion is “evaluated in the context of the
totality of circumstances to assess whether the detaining officer had a particularized
and objective basis to suspect criminal activity.”4 The totality of the circumstances
of the surrounding situation is “viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained
police officer in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with
such an officer’s subjective interpretation of those facts.”5 Thus, when determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a detention, the court “defers to the
experience and training of law enforcement officers.”6
2
Daniel Hunter v. State, 783 a.2d 558, 560 (Del. 2001).
3
Heather Juliano v. State of Delaware, 2020 WL 6815414 (Del. 2020); State of Delaware v. William J. Prouse, III,
382 A.2d 1359, 1361 (Del. 1978), aff’d 448 U.S. 647 (1979).
4
Jose Lopez-Vazquez v. State of Delaware, 956 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Del. 2008).
5
Id., Uriel C. Harris v. State of Delaware, 806 A.2d 119, 127 (Del. 2002); Joseph Jones v. State of Delaware, 45
A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999); Josiah Woody v. state of Delaware, 765 A.2d 1257, 1263 (Del. 2001).
6
Josiah Woody, 765 A.2d at 1263 (Del. 2001).
4
Since the motion challenges an officer’s actions in ordering an occupant of a
vehicle out of it during a traffic stop, the burden is on the State to show the stop was
reasonable by a preponderance of the evidence.7
The initial purpose of a traffic stop determines the duration and execution of
the stop.8 Any investigation beyond the initial purpose of the stop “must be
supported by independent facts sufficient to justify the additional intrusion.” 9 An
officer must let a car go after issuing a citation or warning, and running routine
computer checks, unless he obtains voluntary consent from the driver or unveils
independent facts to justify the encounter.10 “Whether a given detention is
unreasonably attenuated necessarily involves a fact-intensive inquiry in each case.”11
An officer who initiates a lawful traffic stop may order the occupants of the
vehicle out of it and does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 12
ANALYSIS
Neither party challenges the initial traffic stop. The question before the court
is the officers’ action in removing Mayfield from the car.
7
State v. Dillard, No. 1710003809, at *23 (super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2018) (citing State v. Abel, 2011 WL 522126, at *2
(Del. Super. 2011), aff’d, 68 A.3d 1228 (Del. 2012), as amended (Jan. 22, 2013).
8
Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Del. 2001) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
9
Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1047 (Del. 2001).
10
Id.11
Id. at 1048.
12
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (extending the holding of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 435 U.S. 106 (1977),
that an officer may order the driver out of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop, to passengers.); Loper v. State, 8.3d
1169, 1174 (Del. 2010) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107-111 (1977).
5
During the stop, Mann discovered that the car had temporary out of state
registration, prompting him to obtain the car’s VIN number and perform a DATA
inquiry. The DATA inquiry informed Mann that the car was likely not registered.
Mann had been advised by Cooper that Mayfield appeared nervous. Mann was also
aware that Mayfield was on probation and had a history of firearm related charges.
After discovering this information, Mann approached the passenger side of the car.
The plan was to ask for permission to search the car and advise Shaw of the next
steps in the traffic stop. Mann subsequently asked Mayfield to get out of the car.
Mann noted that when Mayfield opened the door to get out of the car he left the front
passenger side open. It was at that point that Mann, while completely out of the car,
observed the handle of a firearm underneath the passenger side of the car in plain
view.
Mayfield points this Court to the decisions in State v. Caldwell and Murray v.
State and argues that any and all evidence should be suppressed because Mann’s
order that Mayfield get out of the car constituted a second independent investigative
and that Mayfield’s nervousness, glancing back at the patrol car, and probationary
status did not form an independent basis for Mann to prolong the stop.
Like the instant case, Caldwell involved a stop of a car where the defendant
was subsequently ordered out of the car. The officer initiated the stop based on a
parking violation by the defendant. After making the stop, the officer asked the
6
defendant for his credentials and then immediately ordered him out of the car,
frisking and handcuffing him. The Court recognized that the officer had authority
to question the defendant based on the parking violation, but that the authority did
not extend to frisking and handcuffing him.13 The Court concluded that the officer’s
action were “entirely unrelated” and exceeded the scope of the stop.14
Mayfield argues the instant case is like Caldwell because Mann approached
the passenger side of the car and immediately ordered Mayfield out of it, even though
the DATA inquiry showed that Shaw was the one who had likely committed
numerous traffic violations. The State argues the instant case is not like Caldwell
because Mann had approached the passenger side various times throughout the stop
and did not order Mayfield of the car until he became disruptive of the conversation
Mann was trying to have with Shaw about the DATA results, issuing a citation, and
obtaining consent to search the car. In other words, the State argues the traffic stop
was not yet complete.
This Court finds Mann’s suppression hearing testimony very credible and
does not find the inconsistencies argued by Mayfield of Mann’s prior testimony in
his Affidavit of Probable Cause, police report or preliminary hearing testimony to
be as inconsistent as argued by the defense. Even if the testimony was inconsistent,
13
Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1049.
14
Id.7
the Court accepts Mann’s suppression hearing to be more credible. Because Mann
was actively attempting to discuss with Shaw the results of the DATA inquiry and
about issuing a citation, the purpose of the stop was not completed at the time
Mayfield was ordered out of the car.15
Mayfield also argues, citing Caldwell and Murray in support, that his
nervousness, glancing back at the patrol car, and probationary status was not enough
to justify reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity. It
is clear to this Court based on the decisions in Caldwell and Murray that the
behaviors cited by Mayfield are not sufficient to justify reasonable suspicion that he
was involved in criminal activity. However, because this Court finds that the stop
was not completed at the time Mann ordered Mayfield out of the vehicle, it is not
necessary for the State to show additional independent facts to justify Mann’s actions
because Mann’s order did not constitute a second independent investigative
detention. Also, the officers had authority to order Mayfield out of the car during
the lawful traffic stop, and such an order did not constitute a seizure. Therefore,
Mayfield’s argument to this point is moot.
When Mayfield was ordered out of the car, he left the passenger side door
open. It was then that Mann observed the handle of a firearm underneath the
15
The fact that Mann was also attempting to obtain permission to search the car does not change the fact that the
traffic stop was not complete does not trigger additional Fourth Amendment protections.
8
passenger side of the vehicle in plain view. Under the “plain view” doctrine, “the
mere observation of an item in plain view does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search.”16 An officer may, without a warrant, seize the contraband in plain view if
“(1) the officer is lawfully in a position to observe the contraband, (2) the item’s
evidentiary value is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of
access to the item.”17 Mann was lawfully in a position to observe the firearm because
the stop of the car was lawful. The firearm’s evidentiary value was immediately
apparent, especially based on the DELJIS search performed by Mann showing
Mayfield’s history of firearm related charges. Mann had a lawful right of access to
the firearm where he had prior justification for his access to the firearm – the lawful
traffic stop. Therefore, the plain view doctrine applies in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, for all the reasons stated herein, the Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/S/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge
cc: Original to Prothonotary
Alanna Farbert, Esquire
Anthony Hill, Deputy Attorney General
Investigative Services
16
Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 985 (Del. 2004) (citing Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 258 (Del. 1998)).
17
Id. (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); Williamson, 707 A.2d at 358.
9