Fierro v. Board of Adjustment fo the City of Newark, Delaware ( 2018 )


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  • IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    FRANCIS J. FIERRO and CAROLYN )
    F. FIERRO,
    Appellants,
    C.A. N0. Nl 7A-02-010 RRC
    BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE
    CITY OF NEWARK, DELAWARE,
    CITY OF NEWARK, DELAWARE and )
    TIMOTHY M. CHOPKO and CECILIA )
    J. CARROLL, also known as CECILIA )
    J. CHOPKO. )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    Appellees.
    Submitted: October 25, 2017
    Decided: January 18, 2018
    On Appeal From a Decision of the Board of Adjustment. AFFIRMED.
    M
    J ames P. Curran, Jr., Esquire, Law Offlce of J ames P. Curran, Jr., Newark, Delaware,
    Attorney for Appellants Francis J. Fierro and Carolyn F. Fierro.
    Bruce C. Herron, Esquire, Losco & Marconi, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney
    for Appellees Board of Adjustment of the City of Newark, Delaware, City of
    Newark, Delaware.
    COOCH, R.J.
    This 18th day of January, 2018, upon consideration of Appellant’s appeal
    from the decision of the Board of Adjustment of the City of Newark, Delaware, it
    appears to the Court that:
    l.
    Francis J. Fierro and Carolyn F. Fierro (“Appellants”) have appealed a
    decision of the Board of Adjustment of the City of Newark, Delaware
    (“the Board”) granting Timothy M. Chopko and his wife Cecilia J.
    Carroll (“the Chopkos”) a variance from a Newark Zoning Code
    provision to build a garage in their front yard. On appeal, Appellants
    argue that the Board should not have granted the variance because the
    relief obtained was essentially a rezoning of the area, which is beyond
    the scope of a variance. Alternatively, Appellants argue that the Board
    committed an error of law in granting the Chopkos’ variance request
    because the Chopkos failed to demonstrate that they would suffer a
    hardship if the variance request was denied. However, the Court finds
    that the decision by the Board is supported by substantial evidence and
    is free from legal error. Accordingly, this Court AFFIRMS the decision
    of the Board.
    The Chopkos are owners of property at 250 Dallam Road in Newark,
    Delaware. They applied for a permit to construct a four-car detached
    garage in the front of their property in early 2016. The proposed
    dimensions of the garage were 42 feet by 36 feet. The City of Newark
    denied the Chopkos’ application for a building permit in a letter dated
    April 28, 2016. The letter set out that, “[a] private garage constructed
    as an accessory use in a residential district shall be subject to the
    following special provisions in regard to its location: it may be
    constructed within a rear yard provided it is distant at last three feet
    from any lot line[,]” pursuant to Newark Zoning Code Section 32.48.
    The Chopkos then sought a Newark Zoning Code variance from the
    Board in order to construct a four-car garage in the front yard of their
    property.l
    In their variance request, the Chopkos explained the claimed unique
    characteristics of their property that they believed supported their
    request, They stated that their front yard comprises 85% of the total lot
    space, which, they stated, is the only property in Newark with such a
    uniquely large front yard. The Chopkos contend that construction of a
    l Appellees’ Answ. Br. at 3-4.
    garage in their back, or side, yards is not feasible given the minimal
    remaining lot space. They also stated in their variance request that the
    location of storm drains and electric easements prevented the
    construction of the garage on other areas of their property. The
    Chopkos’ plan for the garage was to use it to store their antique car
    collection.2
    4. The Board held a hearing on the Chopkos’ variance request on October
    20, 2016. The Board entered into evidence three letters from neighbors
    of the Chopkos, all of whom supported the variance request, The
    Chopkos’ next door neighbors, Appellants, testified in opposition of the
    variance request, stating that the garage would negatively affect
    Appellants’ property value.3 The Board granted the Chopkos’ variance
    request in a 4-0 vote.4 Appellants now appeal that decision to this
    Court.5
    5. On appeal, Appellants argue that the Board should not have granted the
    variance because, by granting the variance, the Board has, in effect,
    amended the Newark Zoning code.6 In the alternative, Appellants argue
    that the Chopkos failed to demonstrate “hardship or exceptional
    practical difficulty” consistent with the law as stated in the seminal case
    of Bd. OfAdjustmem of New Castle Cty. v. sz``k-Check Really, Inc.7
    The failure to do so, Appellants contend, is an error of law.8
    6. In response, the Board maintains that its decision should be affirmed
    because substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Board’s
    findings of fact and conclusions of law and because the Board
    committed no error of law.9
    7. In reviewing the decision of the Board, “[t]he function [this] Court is
    limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the
    2 Ia'. at 3.
    3 Appellants’ Op. Br. at 5-6.
    4 Appellees’ Answ. Br. at 4-5.
    5 The Chopkos did not participate in this appeal.
    6 Appellants’ Op. Br. at 11.
    7 Id. at 7-8 (citing 
    389 A.2d 1289
    , 1290-91 (Del. 1978)).
    8 Appellants’ Reply Br. At 5-6.
    9 Appellees’ Answ. Br. at 6 (citing Janaman v. New Castle Cty. Ba'. oan’justment, 
    364 A.2d 1241
    ,
    1242 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976), ajj‘"d, 
    379 A.2d 1118
     (Del. 1977)); id. at 8.
    3
    Board’s decision regarding findings of fact and conclusions of law and
    is free from legal error.”10 Substantial evidence is such relevant
    evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.ll If the Board’s decision is supported by substantial
    evidence, this Court must sustain the Board’s decision even if this Court
    would have decided the case differently if it had come before it in the
    first instance.12 This Court does not sit as trier of fact, nor should this
    Court replace its judgment for that of the Board.13 “The burden of
    persuasion is on the party seeking to overturn a decision of the Board
    to show that the decision was arbitrary and unreasonable.”'4 In this
    process, “the Court will consider the record in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.”15
    8. The Board decision below was supported by substantial evidence and
    thus will be affirmed. The Board applied the Kwik-Check test to
    determine that the Chopkos’ Zoning board variance request should be
    granted.'6 The Kwik-Check test requires that the Board consider four
    factors in deciding whether to grant a zoning variance:
    the nature of the zone in which the property lies, the character of
    the immediate vicinity and the uses contained therein, whether, if
    the restriction upon the applicant's property were removed, such
    removal would seriously affect such neighboring property and uses;
    whether, if the restriction is not removed, the restriction would
    create unnecessary hardship or exceptional practical difficulty for
    the owner in relation to his efforts to make normal improvements
    in the character of that use of the property[.]17
    9. The Record shows that the Board conducted a thorough
    examination of the Kwik-Check test. As such, substantial evidence
    10 Holowka v. New Castle Cty. Ba'. of Adjustment, 
    2003 WL 21001026
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr.
    15, 2003) (citing 29 Del. C. § 10142).
    :; Forrey v. Sussex Cly. Ba’. ofAdjustment, 
    2017 WL 2480754
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 7, 2017).
    Ia’.
    13 Holowka, 
    2003 WL 21001026
    , at *4.
    '4F0rrey, 
    2017 WL 2480754
    , at *3 (quoting Mellow v. Bd. of Aa'justment of New Castle Cly., 
    565 A.2d 947
    , 955 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988)).
    '5 Holowka, 
    2003 WL 21001026
    , at *4 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Guy, No. C.A. 90A-JL-5,
    
    1991 WL 190491
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1991)) (internal brackets omitted).
    16 Appellants’ Op. Br. at 7-8 (citing Kwik-Check, 
    389 A.2d at 1291
    ).
    '7 Kwik-Check, 
    389 A.2d at 1291
    .
    10.
    11.
    12.
    exists that support the Board’s decision to grant the Chopkos’ variance
    request,
    First, the “nature of the zone where the property lies” and “the character
    of the immediate vicinity” were both reviewed in detail at the Board
    hearing.18 One of the Board members stated, “[t]he nature of the zone
    in which the property is located _ is residential RS[]” and “[t]he
    character of the immediate vicinity of the subject property and the uses
    of the property within that immediate vicinity - is residential and the
    Oakland’s community and is a very nice area.”19
    Second, the Board also specifically asked Mr. Chopko about the effect
    the garage construction would have on his neighbors’ properties.20
    Also, given that three of the Chopkos’ neighbors supported the
    construction of the garage, substantial evidence exists in the Record that
    support the Board’s finding that “removal of the restriction on [the
    Chopkos’] property would seriously affect the neighboring propert[ies]
    and [their] uses.”21 The letters written by the three neighbors were
    received by the Board and acknowledged during the hearing.22 One of
    the Board members stated, “[granting the variance] would not be an
    issue and would not adversely affect the character of the neighborhood
    . . . [I]t would enhance the neighborhood.”23
    Finally, the Board addressed the “unnecessary hardship or exceptional
    practical difficulty” for the Chopkos if the Board did not grant the
    variance request.24 One of the Board members stated, “the [Chopkos]
    would have considerable difficulty if the variances were not granted.”25
    Another Board member commented that the Chopkos’ “lot is oddly
    shaped and preceded modern zoning requirements for setbacks.”26
    18 App. of Appellants’ Op. Brief at 28-29.
    19 ld. at 23.
    20 Id. at 29.
    211d. at 15-18.
    22 Ia'. at 25.
    23 Ia’. at 23.
    24 Ia’. at 29.
    25 Id. at 24.
    26 Id
    13.
    14.
    The role of this Court in review of a decision the Board is limited to
    determining whether the Board’s decision is supported by substantial
    evidence and is free from legal error. The Board’s decision to grant the
    Chopkos’ variance request is supported by substantial evidence in the
    Record. Further, the Court finds no legal error in the Board’s analysis
    of the Kwik-Check test. The Board’s minutes reflect that the Board
    considered all four factors of the sz``k-Check test.27 When it reviews a
    Board decision on appeal, this Court will consider the record in the light
    most favorable to the prevailing party below. The Court does not weigh
    the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual
    findings.28 Therefore, this Court does not review the sufficiency of
    evidence in the Board hearing.
    This Court will not disturb the decision of the Board below absent a
    showing of legal error or that the Board’s decision was unsupported by
    substantial evidence, As there was no legal error and the findings below
    were supported by substantial evidence in the record, the decision of
    the Board is AFFIRMED.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Richard R. Cooch
    cc: Prothonotary
    Board of Adjustment of the City of Newark, Delaware
    27 Id. at 23-24.
    28 Holowka, 
    2003 WL 21001026
    , at *3.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: N17A-02-010 RRC

Judges: Cooch R.J.

Filed Date: 1/18/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/23/2018