State v. Sykes ( 2017 )


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  • IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    STATE OF DELAWARE,
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    v. : Kent County
    AMBROSE L. SYKES,
    Defendant.
    Submitted: October ll, 2017
    Decided: December 7, 2017
    ORDER
    Upon Defendant’s Amended Second Motion
    for Postconviction Relief.
    Dem'ed.
    John Williams, Esquire and Stephen R. Welch, Jr., Esquire of the Department of
    Justice, Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the State.
    Herbert W. Mondros, Esquire of Margolis Edelstein, Wilmington, Delaware and
    Samuel J.B. Angell, Esquire of the Federal Community Defender Offlce,
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; attorneys for the Defendant.
    WITHAM, R.J.
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    Bef``ore the Court is the Petitioner, Ambrose L. Sykes’, Amended Second
    Motion for Postconviction Relief. Sykes raises a number of grounds for relief from
    his 2006 conviction for Murder in the First Degree, Rape in the First Degree, and
    other related offenses, and relief from this Court’s subsequent imposition of a life
    sentence. The majority of Sykes’ claims for relief are based on allegations of
    ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel against Sykes’ two postconviction
    attomeys, Patrick Collins and Albert J. Roop, V (hereinafter, “Rule 61 Counsel”).
    Afcer careful consideration of the parties’ filings and review of recent Delaware
    precedent, the Court concludes that Sykes’ Amended Second Motion for
    Postconviction Relief must be summarily DENIED pursuant to Superior Court
    Criminal Rule 61(d)(2).
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDl
    The facts of this case have been thoroughly set forth on a variety of occasions
    by this Court, as Well as the Delaware Supreme Court.2 The following is the
    statement of facts contained in the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion on direct
    appeal and its opinion affirming this Court’s denial of postconviction relief:
    On November 8, 2004, sixty-eight-year-old Virginia Trimnell Was
    scheduled to fly from Washington, D.C. to Detroit to visit her daughter.
    l The facts are taken from the record, the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Sykes’ direct
    appeal, Sykes v. State (Sykes I), 
    953 A.2d 261
     (Del. 2008), this Court’ s postconviction opinion, State
    v. Sykes (Sykes II), 
    2014 WL 619503
     (Del. Super. Jan. 21, 2014), and the Delaware Supreme Court’ s
    opinion affirming this Court’ s denial of`` postconviction relief, Sykes v. State (Sykes III), 
    147 A.3d 201
    (Del. 201 5).
    2 
    Id.
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7 , 2017
    When Trimnell did not arrive as scheduled, her daughter contacted the
    Dover Police Department. Officer Jeffrey Gott went to check on
    Trimnell. Gott testified that when he arriv[ed] at Trimnell’s apartment,
    it was tidy and undisturbed and he observed no signs of forced entry.
    He also testified that he saw two shopping bags sitting on the bed.
    However, he could not locate Trimnell’s car or purse.
    At approximately 3:30 a.m. on November 10, 2004, Dover Police
    Sergeant Timothy Mutter saw Trimnell’s car traveling on Kings
    Highway in Dover. The driver, later identified as Sykes, got out of the
    vehicle, and Mutter asked him for his license and registration Sykes
    initially complied but then fled after Mutter asked about Trinmell. The
    police could not apprehend Sykes that night.
    Police found Sykes’ fingerprints on a shovel and a rubber glove inside
    Trimnell’s car. The police also found three gas cans and women’s
    clothing that matched what others saw Trimnell wearing on the day she
    disappeared In the trunk of the vehicle, police found a large green
    suitcase with Trimnell ’ s name and Trimnell ’ s purse inside a green duffel
    bag. Police found Trimnell’s body stuffed into the large green suitcase.
    An autopsy indicated that Trimnell died by strangulation. A sexual
    assault kit detected sperm in Trimnell’s vagina. The autopsy did not,
    however, reveal any defense wounds on Trimnell. DNA testing was
    conducted Sykes’ saliva reference sample was ultimately determined
    to match all sixteen loci from Trimnell’s vaginal swab. Sykes’ DNA
    also matched the sperm located on a comforter found in Trimnell’s
    trunk.
    Police seized a computer during a search of Trimnell’s apartment An
    examination of that computer revealed that it had been used to access
    pornographic websites on November 7, 2004. Trimnell’s credit cards
    had been used to access the website[s]. That computer had not been
    3
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    previously used to visit similar websites. Police also seized two
    pornographic magazines and four computers from Sykes’ mobile home.
    Files on two of those computers contained “similar images of adult
    pomography” to those found on Trimnell’s computer. Additionally,
    police found a leather bag containing silver dollars in the home of
    Sykes’ girlfriend, Jenny St. Jean. Trimnell’s daughter later identified
    the bag as Trimnell’s.
    Trimnell’s telephone records revealed that a cell phone registered to
    Sykes made three calls to her home on the morning of November 7,
    2004. Sykes, a night shift restaurant custodian at Dover Downs, did not
    work on November 7, 2004. He quit this job on November 8, 2004 due
    to alleged transportation problems. Af``ter he quit his job, Dover Downs
    security cameras showed him leaving the parking lot on November 8,
    2004 in Trimnell’s car.
    Police arrested Sykes on November 29, 2004 and the State later indicted
    him on two counts of Murder First Degree and other felony and
    misdemeanor charges. The State later re-indicted him and added two
    counts of Rape First Degree.3
    On June 27, 2006, Sykes was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to
    death on September 20, 2006.
    On January 24, 2008, after a brief remand to this Court, the Delaware Supreme
    Court affirmed Sykes’ conviction and sentence to death.4
    On October 24, 2008, Sykes, represented by Rule 61 Counsel, timely filed his
    First Motion for Postconviction Relief. On October 19, 2009, Sykes filed an
    3 Sykes III, 147 A.3d at 206-07 (quoting Sykes I, 
    953 A.2d at 264-65
    ).
    4 Sykes I, 
    953 A.2d 261
     (Del. 2008).
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    Amended First Motion for Postconviction Relief in which he raised twenty-three
    separate claims for relief. Beginning October 10, 201 1 and concluding on November
    7, 2012, the Court held an extensive evidentiary hearing over the course of eleven
    days.5 Twenty-one witnesses, including trial counsel, testified during the hearing. An
    additional three witnesses, who did not testify, were deposed. And, the Court
    admitted more than forty exhibits into evidence. Post hearing briefing concluded on
    August 12, 2013.
    On January 21, 2014, the Court issued its ninety-eight page decision denying
    Sykes’ Amended First Motion for Postconviction Relief. The Delaware Supreme
    Court affirmed the denial of relief on January 30, 2015.
    On January 1 1, 2016, Sykes filed his Second Motion for Postconviction Relief.
    Sykes amended the motion on May 10, 2017, after the Court re-sentenced Sykes
    pursuant to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in Raufv. State and Powell v.
    Delaware.6
    On July 7, 2017, the State filed its Answer to Sykes’ Amended Second Motion
    for Post-Conviction Relief and Motion for Summary Dismissal pursuant to the
    provisions of Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(5).
    On October 10, 2017, Sykes filed a Reply to the State’s Answer.
    5 The hearing was punctuated by extensions of time, discovery matters, conferences, and
    witness scheduling, effecting the available hearing dates.
    6 Raufv. State, 
    145 A.3d 430
     (Del. 2016); Powell v. Delaware, 
    153 A.3d 69
     (Del. 2016).
    5
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
    According to Sykes, he was deprived of his constitutional rights at his capital
    trial and his right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel under Guy v. State,
    
    82 A.3d 710
     (Del. 2013), in his First Amended Rule 61 proceeding. Specifically,
    Sykes pleads the following:
    First, Sykes contends that Rule 61 Counsel were ineffective for failing to
    properly appeal all of the twenty-three issues considered by this Court in Sykes’
    Amended First Motion for Postconviction Relief. Apparently, Rule 61 Counsel
    abandoned certain issues on appeal due to space constraints7 Sykes claims Rule 61
    7 Sykes identified sixteen claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that Rule 61
    Counsel failed to raise on appeal. The claims include that: (1) trial counsel failed to meet with Sykes
    for sixteen months, until shortly before trial; (2) trial counsel failed to interview Jenny St. Jean; (3)
    trial counsel failed to investigate and present information regarding St. Jean’s mental health and
    anger problems; (4) trial counsel failed to investigate and present information regarding St. Jean’s
    history of assaults; (5) trial counsel failed to investigate and present information regarding St. Jean’ s
    criminal history involving abuse of the elderly; (6) trial counsel failed to investigate and present
    information regarding St. Jean’s former live-in paramour, Mike McClements; (7) trial counsel failed
    to investigate and present information regarding St. Jean’s use of Sykes’ computer to access
    pornographic sites; (8) trial counsel failed to investigate and present testimony from Douglas Dyer,
    Carla Randall, and J ames Thomas; (9) trial counsel failed to properly investigate the rape charges
    against Sykes; (10) trial counsel failed to retain, consult, and call as a witness at trial an expert
    forensic pathologist; (11) it was improper for trial counsel’s opening statement to include an
    unauthorized admission of guilt to burglary; (12) trial counsel failed to challenge suitcase drag mark
    testimony; (13) trial counsel failed to object to the State’s improper remarks during the guilt phase
    of Sykes’ trial, where the State argued multiple facts not in evidence; (14) trial counsel failed to
    object to the inclusion in evidence of an electronic key card reader, steak knife, lockbox and two
    photos of a handgun, gruesome photos, and pornographic magazines; (15) trial counsel failed to
    request a D.R.E. 609 instruction as to Jenny St. Jean; and (16) trial counsel failed to object to the
    Court’s reasonable doubt instruction at Sykes’ trial.
    6
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    Counsel’s decision Was improper and could have been prevented.8
    Second, Sykes contends that Rule 61 Counsel failed to present relevant
    testimony from Andrew Lash, an expert in computer forensics. According to Sykes,
    Rule 61 Counsel never elicited testimony, found in Mr. Lash’s report, that
    demonstrates that only one of the search terms - “bigbutts” - is found on both
    Trimnell and Sykes’ computers, but was never typed the same way on the Trimnell
    computer as it was in various forms on Sykes’ computer. Moreover, there are
    apparently several search terms that appear only on the Trimnell computer but not on
    Sykes’ computer. For instance, Sykes alleges that “phat+asses” appears on the
    Trimnell computer but never appears on Sykes’ computer. Sykes believes these
    differences demonstrate that it was less likely that he was the person who typed the
    terms into the Trimnell computer.
    Third, Sykes contends that Rule 61 Counsel failed to elicit testimony from
    witnesses who could have testified that Sykes had a relationship with the victim.
    According to Sykes, Douglas Dyer and Carla Randall could have testified that, on
    separate occasions, they both saw Sykes in a car matching the description of
    Trimnell’s car weeks before her body was found. This information was not presented
    during the evidentiary hearing for Sykes’ Amended First Motion for Postconviction
    Relief because Rule 61 Counsel failed to call Ms. Randall as a witness and counsel
    8 Sykes faults Rule 61 Counsel for filing a page extension motion too early in the appeal
    process. Sykes contends that if Rule 61 Counsel had waited to file the motion, they Would have had
    a better understanding of how long the brief needed to be. Sykes also faults Rule 61 Counsel for
    failing to adequately explain why such additional space was needed.
    7
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 04110()8300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    never asked Mr. Dyer about seeing Sykes in a white car that matched the description
    of Trimnell’s vehicle. Rule 61 Counsel also apparently failed to call J ames Thomas
    as a witness at the evidentiary hearing for Sykes’ Amended First Motion for
    Postconviction Relief. Mr. Thomas would have testified that he was driving with
    Sykes near Trimnell’s apartment, in another car, a week or two before the victim
    disappeared Evidently, a white woman in a big white car drove past them; Mr.
    Thomas thinks it was a Buick LeSabre. Mr. Thomas claims that he could tell from
    the way Sykes and the woman looked at each other, that they knew one another.
    Sykes contends that this evidence would have countered the State’ s argument, and the
    Court’s finding, that there was no evidence that Trimnell and Sykes knew each other.
    Moreover, the evidence would have cast significant doubt on the State’s theory that
    this was a random, violent act, and put the case in a much different light. Therefore,
    Sykes contends that Rule 61 Counsel were ineffective under Guy v. State for failing
    to present key witnesses and failing to ask pertinent questions of the witnesses they
    did present.
    Fourth, Sykes contends that Rule 61 Counsel failed to appropriately consult
    with their expert forensic pathologist, Jonathan Arden, M.D. Apparently Rule 61
    Counsel failed to obtain available testimony from Dr. Arden that challenged the
    State’s assertion that Trimnell did not consent to sexual contact with Sykes. If Rule
    61 Counsel had asked Dr. Arden, he would have explained: (1) that there were no
    injuries diagnostic or suggestive of forced, non-consensual penetration; and (2) that
    such testimony could have been given at the time of trial by a qualified expert. Sykes
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    believes that if this testimony was presented at trial there would have been a
    reasonable probability of a different outcome as to the rape conviction(s), and the
    burglary conviction that relied on the rape conviction. Therefore, Sykes claims that
    he was prejudiced
    Fifth, Sykes submits that the cumulative effect of the errors set forth in his
    Amended Second Motion for Postconviction Relief entitle him to relief in the form
    of a new trial.
    In response to Sykes’ Amended Second Motion for Postconviction Relief the
    State alleges the following:
    First, the State contends that Sykes’ motion must be summarily dismissed
    pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). The State does not believe that
    Sykes qualifies for either exception under Rule 61(d)(2).
    Second, assuming that Sykes can satisfy the procedural requirements of Rule
    61, the State contends that Guy v. State does not provide Sykes relief because Sykes
    relies upon dicta that has never been expressly affirmed9 Moreover, the State alleges
    that, in light of the substantial amendment of Rule 61 on June 4, 2014, Guy is no
    longer applicable because the amended rule did not specifically provide defendants
    with a right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel.10
    9 The State also contends that Coles v. State, supports the State’s contention that Guy does
    not provide Sykes the right to effective postconviction counsel. Coles v. State, 
    2017 WL 3259697
    (Del. July 31, 2017).
    10 On June 4, 2014, the Superior Court amended several subsections of Rule 61. Rule
    61(i)(2)(i) was amended to provide that “[n]o second or subsequent motion is permitted under this
    Rule unless that second or subsequent motion satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs
    9
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    DISCUSSION
    The Delaware Supreme Court recently reiterated in Durham v. State that,
    before reaching the merits of a Motion for Postconviction Relief, this Court must
    consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 .“ As this is Sykes’ second motion
    for postconviction relief under Rule 61, it is a successive motion and Sykes must
    show that either (1) “new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the
    movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was
    convicted” or (2) “a new rule of constitutional law, made applicable to cases on
    collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court,
    applies to the movant’s case and renders the conviction . . . invalid.”12 If Sykes
    cannot satisfy the exceptions to the procedural bar set forth by Rule 61 (d)(2), then his
    motion must be denied without consideration of the merits.13
    Sykes contends that the following constitutes “new evidence” that creates a
    (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule.” Rule 61 (d)(2) provides that a “second or subsequent
    motion under this rule shall be summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted ajer a trial
    and” the motion either pleads that new evidence exists of the movant’s innocence in fact or that a
    new retroactive rule of constitutional law render the movant’s conviction invalid Super. Ct. Crim.
    R. 61(d)(2) (2014) (emphasis added).
    ll See Durham v. State, 
    2017 WL 5450746
    , at *1 (Del. Nov. 13, 2017) (citing Younger v.
    State, 
    580 A.2d 552
    , 554 (Del. 1990)).
    12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (d)(2)(i-ii).
    13 See Durham, 
    2017 WL 5450746
     at *2 (holding that “even if [the petitioner] did not have
    a prior opportunity to raise his ineffective assistance of postconviction claims, and even if, under
    Guy v. State, he raised the claims in a timely fashion, [the petitioner] was still required to satisfy the
    requirements of Rule 61(d)(2) to avoid the summary dismissal of his second postconviction
    motion.”).
    10
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    strong inference of actual innocence:
    (1) Mr. Lash’ s discovery that a specific pornographic search term - “bigbutts” -
    was typed differently on Trimnell’s computer than it was on Sykes’ computer. And,
    several of the pornographic search terms that appeared on Trimnell’s computer did
    not appear on Sykes’ computer.
    (2) Never elicited testimony from Mr. Dyer and Ms. Randall that they observed
    Sykes driving in a car similar to Trimnell’s car, weeks before her body was found
    (3) Never elicited testimony from Mr. Thomas that he was driving with Sykes
    near Trimnell’s apartment, in another car, a week or two before the victim
    disappeared, when Mr. Thomas observed a white woman in a big white car drive past
    them. Mr. Thomas claims that he could tell from the way Sykes and the woman
    looked at each other, that they knew one another.
    (4) Dr. Arden’s testimony that there were no injuries on Trimnell, diagnostic
    or suggestive, of forced, non-consensual penetration, and that such testimony could
    have been given at the time of trial by a qualified expert.
    Af``ter an extensive review of state and federal precedent, the Court finds that
    it is necessary to discuss what constitutes “new evidence” that creates a strong
    inference of actual innocence. The Court has previously applied two similar
    standards. On one hand, in State v. Fogg, the Court defined “new evidence” as,
    “evidence that was not available at the time of trial but has since been discovered.”14
    14 State v. Fogg, 
    2016 WL 6556430
    , at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 4, 2016) (citing State v. Wright,
    
    2006 WL 1685821
    , at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 29, 2006)).
    11
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    The Court adopted this definition from State v. Wright, defining “new evidence” in
    the context of Superior Court Criminal Rule 33.15 On the other hand, the Court in
    State v. Phlipot adopted the federal standard for defining “new evidence.”16
    Although the standard is similar to that applied in Fogg, the Court finds that the
    federal standard is relevant for two reasons: (1) federal courts have more thoroughly
    defined “new evidence”; and (2) federal courts have applied “new evidence” in the
    context of demonstrating the “actual innocence” of a petitioning prisoner. The Court
    recognizes that the federal standard is an equitable exception, rather than a procedural
    rule for postconviction relief, used to overcome the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
    Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) limitations period for the filing of a habeas petition by
    state petitioners.17 Nonetheless, the federal standard is helpful under these
    circumstances, as the Court has found little guidance for interpreting the precise
    meaning of new evidence in relation to a claim of actual innocence pursuant to Rule
    61(d)(2)(ii).
    The district court in Phlipot v. Johnson, 
    2015 WL 1906127
    , at *4 (D. Del.
    2015), provides that a claim of actual innocence requires the petitioner to:
    “persuad[e] the [court] that, in light of the new evidence, no juror acting
    reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt.”18 An actual innocence claim must be based on “new reliable
    15 
    Id.
    16 State v. Phlipot, 
    2017 WL 2266836
    , at *3 (Del. Super. May 24, 2017).
    17 Ia'.
    18 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 
    133 S.Ct. 1924
    , 1928 (2013)).
    12
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
    eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence [ ] that was not
    presented a trial.”19 In the Third Circuit, evidence is “new” for the
    purposes of the Schlup standard only if it was not available at the time
    of trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise
    of due diligence,20 except in situations where that evidence was not
    discovered due to the ineffective assistance of trial counse1.21 In turn,
    when determining if a petitioner’ s new evidence shows it is “more likely
    than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him,” a court
    must consider “all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and
    exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted
    under rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.”22 Finally, a court
    “may consider how the timing of the submission [of actual innocence]
    and the likely credibility of the affiant[] bear on the probable reliability
    of that evidence.”23
    In light of this standard, even if the Court assumes that all of Sykes’ purported
    new evidence was not presented to the jury, Sykes has failed to show that it is more
    likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of the Rape and
    Murder of Trimnell. The Court relies upon the overwhelming evidence already
    identified in this case. For instance, even if witnesses had seen Sykes driving
    19 Schlup v. Delo, 
    513 U.S. 298
    , 324 (1995).
    20 The circuits addressing the issue are split over what constitutes “new” evidence for Schlup
    purposes. The Eight Circuit’ s interpretation of “new” evidence corresponds with the Third Circuit’ s,
    whereas the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits do not require the exercise of due diligence, and view
    “new” evidence as evidence that was not “presented” at trial. See Kia'd v. Norman, 
    651 F.3d 947
    , 953
    (8th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases).
    21 See HOuCk v. Stickman, 
    625 F.3d 88
    , 93-94 (3d Cir. 2010).
    22 House v. Bell, 
    547 U.S. 518
    , 538 (2006).
    23 Schlup, 
    513 U.S. at 332
    ; see also McQuiggin, 
    133 S.Ct. at 1935
    .
    13
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    Trimnell’s vehicle previously, that fact does little to explain why he was driving her
    vehicle while her dead body was bound and stuffed into a suitcase in the trunk. Thus,
    it is not unreasonable for a juror to find Sykes guilty of Trimnell’s Murder. In
    addition, even if Sykes knew Trimnell socially, the Court finds that it is too large a
    step to presume, based on Dyer, Randall, and Thomas’ limited testimony, that Sykes
    had a prior sexual relationship with Trimnell. As Sykes has not presented more
    definite evidence of such a relationship, it would not be unreasonable for a juror to
    find Sykes guilty of Rape as well. Moreover, Dr. Arden’s testimony does not alter
    this holding because there was ample other evidence to establish the lack of
    Trimnell’s consent. The Court identified the following evidence in Sykes II:
    the presence of [Sykes’] semen in the victim; the reddening of her
    vaginal area; . . . the fact that the victim was strangled to death; the
    injuries inflicted upon the victim in regards to the trauma and
    hemorrhages to her head and scalp; and the fact that the victim’s body
    was naked from the waist down.24
    As it is not unreasonable for a juror to find these facts sufficient to convict Sykes of
    Rape, Sykes has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate actual innocence. Finally,
    the Court finds that the evidence regarding pornographic search terms is insignificant
    Again, considering the overwhelming evidence presented against Sykes, it would not
    be unreasonable for a juror to convict Sykes of the crimes charged
    24 Sykes II, 
    2014 WL 619503
    , at *36 (The Court also held that a lack of prior relationship
    between the victim and Sykes was si gnificant. That fact is still si gnificant, although the Court would
    now clarify that Sykes has presented some minimal evidence of a prior social relationship.
    Therefore, the Court would specify that it is significant that there is no evidence that Sykes and the
    victim had a prior sexual relationship.).
    14
    State v. Ambrose L. Sykes
    I.D. No. 0411008300 WLW
    December 7, 2017
    CONCLUSION
    ln sum, Sykes’ Amended Second Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED
    because Sykes failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 61(d)(2) to avoid the
    summary dismissal of his motion,
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Hon."william L. witham, Jr.
    Resident Judge
    WLW/dmh
    oc: Prothonotary
    cc: Herbert W. Mondros, Esquire
    Samuel J.B. Angell, Esquire
    John Williams, Esquire
    Stephen R. Welch, Jr., Esquire
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0411008300

Judges: Witham R.J.

Filed Date: 12/7/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/7/2017