Zenith Energy Terminals Joliet Holdings LLC v. CenterPoint Properties Trust ( 2023 )


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  •              IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    ZENITH ENERGY TERMINALS                       )
    JOLIET HOLDINGS LLC, a Delaware               )
    Limited Liability Company, JOLIET             )
    BULK, BARGE & RAIL LLC, a                     )
    Delaware Limited Liability Company,           )
    )
    Plaintiffs,              ) C.A. No.: N19C-10-054 EMD CCLD
    )
    v.                              )
    )
    CENTERPOINT PROPERTIES TRUST,                 )
    a Maryland Real Estate Investment Trust,      )
    )
    Defendant.               )
    Submitted: October 28, 2022
    Decided: January 23, 2023
    Upon the Motion of Plaintiffs Zenith Energy Terminals Joliet Holdings, LLC and Joliet Bulk,
    Barge & Rail LLC for Summary Judgment
    DENIED
    Upon Defendant CenterPoint Trust’s Motion for Summary Judgment
    DENIED
    Christopher Viceconte, Esquire, Gibbons P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, Patrick J. Lamb, Esquire,
    J’Aimee Crockett, Esquire, ElevateNext Law, Chicago, Illinois. Attorneys for Plaintiffs Zenith
    Energy Terminals Joliet Holdings LLC and Joliet Bulk, Barge & Rail LLC.
    F. Troupe Mickler IV, Esquire, Randall J. Teti, Esquire, Ashby & Geddes, P.A., Wilmington,
    Delaware, James D. Dasso, Esquire, Jennifer S. Park, Esquire, Mason D. Roberts, Esquire, Foley
    & Lardner LLP, Chicago, Illinois. Attorneys for Defendant CenterPoint Properties Trust.
    DAVIS, J.
    I.     INTRODUCTION
    This is a breach of contract action assigned to the Complex Commercial Litigation
    Division of this Court. Plaintiffs Zenith Energy Terminals Joliet Holdings LLC (“Zenith”) and
    Joliet Bulk, Barge & Rail LLC (“JBBR”) (collectively, “Zenith” or the “Plaintiffs”) filed an
    Amended Complaint on September 10, 2021, against Defendants CenterPoint Properties Trust
    (“CenterPoint” or the “Defendant”) for breach of contract.1
    CenterPoint previously owned JBBR.2 CenterPoint, through JBBR, entered into
    contracts to design and build a crude-by-rail off-loading terminal in Joliet, Illinois (the
    “Terminal”).3 CenterPoint planned that the Terminal would receive, off-load, store, and
    distribute crude oil from the Mojo Pipeline.4
    CenterPoint and Arc Terminals Joliet Holdings LLC (now known as Zenith Terminals
    Joliet Holdings LLC) entered into a Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase
    Agreement”).5 Under the Purchase Agreement, CenterPoint sold JBBR and, in effect, the
    Terminal to Zenith before the construction project on the Terminal was completed.6 Thereafter,
    Zenith, on behalf of JBBR, and CenterPoint negotiated a Construction Management Agreement,
    whereby CenterPoint was to continue to manage the construction project.7 Ultimately, the
    construction project was incomplete, not meeting alleged key requirements under the design and
    build plans.8
    Zenith filed suit, believing CenterPoint breached the Purchase Agreement and the
    Construction Management Agreement. CenterPoint believes no such breaches occurred. The
    parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment: (i) Motion of Plaintiffs Zenith Energy
    Terminals Joliet Holdings, LLC and Joliet Bulk, Barge & Rail LLC for Summary Judgment (the
    “Zenith Motion”); and (ii) Defendant CenterPoint Trust’s Motion for Summary Judgment (the
    1
    Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), Sept. 10, 2021 (D.I. 89).
    2
    See id. ¶ 4.
    3
    Id. ¶ 3.
    4
    Id. ¶ 1.
    5
    Id. ¶ 4.
    6
    Id.
    7
    Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
    8
    Id. ¶ 6.
    2
    “CenterPoint Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court is DENYING both the Zenith
    Motion and the CenterPoint Motion.
    II.     RELEVANT FACTS
    A. THE PARTIES
    “Zenith Energy Terminals Joliet Holdings LLC is a Delaware limited liability company
    formerly named Arc Terminals Joliet Holdings LLC.”9 Arc Terminals contracted with
    CenterPoint under the Purchase Agreement to purchase JBBR.10 As stated above, JBBR controls
    the Terminal.
    CenterPoint is a “Maryland real estate investment trust” that “acquires, develops,
    manages and leases warehouse, distribution and manufacturing facilities near major
    transportation nodes and is an expert in large rail infrastructure assets.”11 CenterPoint was the
    owner of the Terminal prior to the execution of the Purchase Agreement.12 Additionally,
    CenterPoint managed the continuing construction of the Terminal post-sale under the
    Construction Management Agreement.13
    JBBR is a Delaware limited liability company formed by CenterPoint on or around
    November 9, 2011.14 CenterPoint, through JBBR, negotiated contracts to design and construct
    the Terminal.15 JBBR has owned the Terminal and, by extension, the construction project at all
    9
    Id. ¶ 8. Hereafter, Arc Terminals Joliet Holdings LLC will be defined as “Arc Terminals.”
    10
    Id.
    11
    Id. ¶ 10.
    12
    Id. ¶¶ 2-4; see also Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J.”) at 2, Aug 5, 2022 (D.I.
    131).
    13
    Am. Compl. ¶ 4.
    14
    Id. ¶ 9; Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.
    15
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 3; Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.”) at 5, Aug.
    5, 2022 (D.I. 139).
    3
    relevant times.16 On May 14, 2015, CenterPoint sold JBBR to Zenith (still known as Arc
    Terminals at the time) under the Purchase Agreement.17
    There are two additional relevant non-parties—Wilson & Company, Inc. Engineers &
    Architects (“Wilson”) and Ragnar Benson Construction LLC (“Ragnar”). On April 16, 2014,
    Wilson and JBBR entered into a Master Services Agreement (“MSA”).18 The MSA tasked
    Wilson with providing design, engineering, and construction oversight on the construction
    project.19 Additionally, Wilson entered into various task orders that provided details on the
    scope of work for the construction project.20 On August 26, 2014, Ragnar and JBBR entered
    into a Construction Contract, where Ragnar was assigned to be the engineering, procurement,
    and construction contractor on the construction project.21 Ragnar purportedly “agreed to
    construct the Terminal in conformity with [s]pecifications and the provisions of the Construction
    Contract.”22
    B. THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
    In 2014, while the Terminal was under construction, CenterPoint began negotiations with
    Arc Terminals (later known as Zenith) regarding the sale of JBBR.23 Zenith sought to acquire
    JBBR because there was a guaranteed cash flow associated with the Terminal.24 On February
    19, 2015, Zenith and CenterPoint entered into the Purchase Agreement. Zenith purchased JBBR
    from CenterPoint for $216 million, plus $27 million in deferred payments, for an aggregate
    16
    Am. Compl. ¶ 9.
    17
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5; Am. Compl. ¶ 11.
    18
    Am. Compl. ¶ 12, Ex. C (MSA).
    19
    Id.
    20
    Id. ¶ 12.
    21
    Id. ¶ 13, Ex. E (Construction Agreement), Ex. G (laying out the “Scope of Work & Specifications”).
    22
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 8-9.
    23
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.
    24
    Id.
    4
    amount of $243 million.25 Because Zenith was allegedly unwilling to assume responsibility for
    completion of the Terminal, the parties agreed that CenterPoint would “see the project through to
    completion.”26 The parties memorialized this in Section 6.15(a) of the Purchase Agreement,
    titled “Final Completion,” which states:
    After Closing, on and subject to the terms of the Construction Contract [with
    Ragnar] and the Construction Management Agreement, [CenterPoint] shall use its
    reasonable best efforts to achieve, and to cause the EPC Contractor [Ragnar] (and
    any other applicable third party contractors or service providers) to achieve, Final
    Completion in accordance with the Approved Cost Plan and the Project Schedule
    and otherwise in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Construction
    Contract and the Construction Management Agreement in all material respects.27
    In the Purchase Agreement, “Final Completion” is defined as “the meaning given in the
    Construction Contract.”28 The Construction Contract between JBBR and Ragnar, dated August
    26, 2014, defines “Final Completion” as:
    [T]hat point in time in the progress of the Work after Mechanical Completion when
    (a) the Work has been completed and is operational; (b) all testing (including
    hydrotesting) and coating is complete; (c) all pipe, valves, and Equipment
    installation and tie-ins are complete; (d) all essential Equipment and lines have been
    hydrotested and had a geometry tool run through them; (e) the Work is capable of
    transporting refined products in a safe uninterrupted manner 24 hours per day,
    seven days per week without further anticipated shutdowns, except for preventative
    maintenance; (f) and all other requirements of this [Construction Contract] with
    respect to Final Completion ([including those set forth in Construction Contract
    Exhibit A]) have been satisfied.29
    Exhibit A of the Construction Contract sets out the “Minimum Requirements for Final
    Completion” and defines them as:
    (a) Final Completion includes, at a minimum, the following: (i) any liquidated
    damages payable by [Ragnar] to [JBBR] pursuant to th[is Construction Contract]
    25
    Am. Compl. ¶ 4.
    26
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 6
    27
    Id., Ex. N (Purchase Agreement) § 6.15(a) (emphasis added).
    28
    Id., Ex. N at Annex I.
    29
    Am. Compl., Ex. E (Construction Contract) § 1.1; see also id. (“’Work’ shall mean all of [Ragnar’s] obligations,
    duties and responsibilities under this [Construction Contract], including the design, engineering, procurement,
    manufacturing, supply, installation, erection, construction, commissioning, and testing of the Facilities, all work and
    services described in Exhibit A and all Warranty Work.”) (underlining in original).
    5
    have been paid and/or satisfied; (ii) [Ragnar] has completed all the Work required
    by this [Construction Contract]; (iii) [Ragnar] has executed and delivered to [JBBR]
    and [JBBR] has accepted the lien waiver . . .; (iv) [Ragnar] has provided the final
    close-out report to [JBBR]; (v) there are no outstanding claims or disputes as
    between [Ragnar and JBBR]; and (vi) [administrative].30
    On May 14, 2015, the parties closed the sale of JBBR to Zenith, and Zenith became
    JBBR’s parent company.31 Additionally, as part of the closing, Zenith, on behalf of JBBR, and
    CenterPoint executed the Construction Management Agreement on May 14, 2015.32
    C. THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
    In tandem with the Purchase Agreement, Zenith and CenterPoint executed the
    Construction Management Agreement.33 The Construction Management Agreement made
    CenterPoint the agent of JBBR,34 and it states that “[JBBR] has requested that [CenterPoint]
    provide certain construction management services to [JBBR] . . . for a limited period following
    the Closing Date, and [CenterPoint] has agreed to provide such services.”35
    The Zenith Motion and the CenterPoint Motion rely on certain sections of the
    Construction Management Agreement. The motions both reference Section 2(a), titled
    “Construction Management Services,” which states:
    Subject to the terms of this Agreement, [CenterPoint] agrees to provide to [JBBR]
    and [JBBR] agrees to accept from [CenterPoint], the construction management
    services described on Schedule A . . .. [JBBR] hereby (i) [appoints CenterPoint as
    its agent for all purposes] under the Construction Contract [and CenterPoint
    accepts], and (ii) authorizes [CenterPoint] to take all actions on behalf of [JBBR]
    that [CenterPoint], in [CenterPoint]’s sole and good faith discretion, considers
    reasonably necessary to provide the Services, including all invoices, payments,
    change orders and certifications under the Construction Contract; provided that
    [CenterPoint] shall (A) obtain [JBBR]’s prior written consent (which shall not be
    unreasonably withheld, conditioned or delayed) before (1) issuing the Final
    30
    Id., Ex. E at Exhibit A to Construction Contract.
    31
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 11; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.
    32
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 19.
    33
    See Am. Compl., Ex. B (Construction Management Agreement).
    34
    See id. ¶ 34.
    35
    Id., Ex. B at Recitals.
    6
    Completion Certificate (as defined in the Construction Contract) and making
    payment therefor.36
    Construction Management Agreement Schedule A states that “[CenterPoint] shall
    manage EPC Contractor’s [Ragnar’s] performance and completion of the Work under the
    Construction Contract until the Final Completion Certificate is issued and accepted by [JBBR]
    thereunder and payment is made therefor.”37
    Construction Management Section 2(b) is also referenced. Section 2(b) provides:
    [CenterPoint] shall perform the Services with substantially the same standard of
    care (including quality) as the Services were performed by or on behalf of [JBBR]
    prior to the Effective Date, including, without limitation, by performing the
    Services, at all times, as would a reasonably prudent construction manager in the
    construction management industry.38
    Construction Management Agreement Section 2(h) limits the obligations under Section 2,
    and it provides that “except as expressly set forth in Section 2, no representations, warranties or
    guaranties of any kind, express or implied . . . are made by [CenterPoint] with respect to the
    services provided under [the Construction Management Agreement],” and that all representations
    and warranties are waived and disclaimed to the fullest extent of the law.39
    D. EVENTS AFTER EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENTS AT THE TERMINAL
    On May 19, 2015, CenterPoint sent Ragnar’s “punchlist” to Zenith’s Terminal manager,
    Doug Haduch.40 The “punchlist” was a “list of all of the items on a particular contract that need
    to be addressed before the project is completed.”41 Originally, the punchlist contained more than
    seventy (70) items, but, by September 4, 2015, only six remained.42 On October 16, 2015,
    36
    Id., Ex. B § 2(a) (underlining in original).
    37
    Id., Ex. B at Schedule A.
    38
    Id., Ex. B § 2(b).
    39
    Id., Ex. B § 2(h).
    40
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 20.
    41
    Id.
    42
    Id. at 20-21.
    7
    Ragnar contacted CenterPoint, JBBR’s agent pursuant to the Construction Management
    Agreement, and requested the issuance of a Final Completion Certificate.43 CenterPoint
    forwarded the request to JBBR and Zenith the same day.44
    On October 29, 2015, JBBR denied Ragnar’s request to issue a Final Completion
    Certificate.45 Construction Contract Section 12.3 required JBBR to “list[] the items of Work that
    remain to be completed, remedied or reperformed before Final Completion is achieved.”46 On
    October 29, 2019, and in compliance with Section 12.3, JBBR notified CenterPoint and Ragnar
    that only three (3) of six (6) railcar-unloading pumps operated simultaneously, whereas the Work
    required five (5) of six (6) to operate.47 Ragnar agreed to address the unloading deficiencies.48
    In February 2016, “efforts were made to test/commission the unloading system when the
    weather was sufficiently cold and rail cars with crude oil were delivered to the facility.”49 On
    February 24, 2016, Ragnar monitored the unloading of rail cars and determined all pumps “met
    or exceeded all performance[] specifications” and requested a Final Completion Certificate.50
    Zenith states that during the February testing, JBBR “discovered additional deficiencies with the
    steam/condensate and hot oil systems” and on March 7, 2016, notified Ragnar that these
    deficiencies precluded achievement of Final Completion.51 Zenith also states there were
    additional deficiencies regarding: non-conforming boilers, inadequate steam traps, improper
    valves, lack of hydraulic analysis, among other alleged deficiencies.52 It appears that from
    43
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 11; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 21.
    44
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 21.
    45
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 12-13, Ex. T at 8-10.
    46
    Am. Compl., Ex. E § 12.3(b).
    47
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 28 (Final Completion Rejection from JBBR to CenterPoint).
    48
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 13.
    49
    Id.
    50
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 22, Ex. 29
    51
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 13, Ex. T at 28 (Letter from JBBR to Ragnar, dated March 7, 2016).
    52
    Id. at 14-16.
    8
    around December 2016 through January 2017 there were attempts to fix these deficiencies.53
    However, they were not resolved.54
    By February 2017, Zenith says “CenterPoint abandoned all efforts to obtain Final
    Completion.”55 CenterPoint counters and states that the letter Zenith relies on to make that claim
    actually “confirms CenterPoint’s intention to continue to comply with its obligations.”56 In
    March 2017, Zenith hired the engineering firm, Ambitech, “to diagnose the deficiencies with the
    [Terminal] and undertake mitigation/remediation efforts.”57 Ambitech found deficiencies.58 In
    essence, these deficiencies related to the Terminal’s alleged inability to operate in cold weather,
    and the failure to engage in allegedly required testing procedures.59 Zenith admits that these
    “deficiencies resulted from the failures of Wilson and Ragnar,” but Zenith also believes
    “CenterPoint . . . was responsible under the [Construction Management Agreement] for the
    [Terminal] reaching Final Completion.”60
    E. RELATED LITIGATION
    On January 23, 2017, Ragnar filed a lawsuit against JBBR in Will County, Illinois
    seeking $992,990.40 (the “Illinois Action”).61 Ragnar seeks payment due upon Final
    Completion under the Construction Contract.62 JBBR filed a counterclaim against Ragnar for
    53
    Id., Ex. T at 137-51
    54
    Id. at 17.
    55
    Id.
    56
    Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Opp’n”) at 28-29, Sept. 6, 2022
    (D.I. 145); see also Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. T at 152-53. This is a letter from CenterPoint to JBBR, in which
    CenterPoint states “[CenterPoint] would also ask [JBBR] to consider whether [JBBR is] acting reasonably in
    withholding and conditioning consent to the issuance of the Final Completion Certificate [based on the enumerated
    issues].” Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. T at 152. The same letter also kept lines of communication open. See id. (“If
    [JBBR] would like to discuss the matter further, please feel free to contact [CenterPoint].”).
    57
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 17; see also id., Ex. Y (Ambitech Engagement Report).
    58
    Id. at 17-18; see also id., Ex. Y.
    59
    Id. at 19-22.
    60
    Id. at 18.
    61
    Am. Compl. ¶ 49; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 23.
    62
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 23.
    9
    breach of the Construction Contract.63 On July 23, 2017, JBBR filed a third-party complaint
    against Wilson for breach of the MSA (Master Services Agreement).64
    F. THIS LITIGATION
    On October 7, 2019, Zenith filed its original Complaint, asserting (1) breach of contract
    against CenterPoint under the Purchase Agreement between Zenith and CenterPoint, and (2)
    breach of contract against CenterPoint under the Construction Management Agreement between
    JBBR and CenterPoint.65 On November 9, 2019, CenterPoint filed its first Motion to Dismiss,
    or, in the Alternative, Motion to Stay the Action Pending Resolution of the Related Litigation
    (the Motion to Dismiss”).66 On January 28, 2020, the Court heard argument on the Motion to
    Dismiss.67 On February 14, 2020, the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss.68 On February 21,
    2020, CenterPoint filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses.69
    On August 27, 2021, Zenith filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint under Delaware
    Superior Court Civil Rule 15(a),70 which the Court granted on September 9, 2021.71 Zenith filed
    the current Amended Complaint on September 10, 2021, which asserts the same two breach of
    contract counts as the original Complaint.72 CenterPoint thereafter filed its Answer and
    Affirmative Defenses on September 24, 2021.73 CenterPoint then filed a Motion to Amend the
    Answer (the “Motion to Amend”) to assert counterclaims on the same day.74 The Court heard
    63
    Am. Compl. ¶ 49 (noting the filing occurred on April 26, 2017); Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 23 (noting the filing
    occurred on March 23, 2017).
    64
    Am. Compl. ¶ 49; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 23.
    65
    See Original Complaint (“Original Compl.”), Oct. 7, 2019 (D.I. 1).
    66
    See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss (“First Mot. to Dismiss”), Nov. 19, 2019 (D.I. 9).
    67
    See Judicial Action Form, Jan. 28, 2020 (D.I. 25).
    68
    See Order, Feb. 14, 2020 (D.I. 27).
    69
    See Answer, Feb. 21, 2020 (D.I. 28).
    70
    See Motion to Amend Complaint, Aug. 27, 2021 (D.I. 86).
    71
    Order, Sept. 9, 2021 (D.I. 88).
    72
    See Am. Compl.
    73
    See Answer, Sept. 24, 2021 (D.I. 90).
    74
    See Motion to Amend Answer, Sept. 24, 2021 (D.I. 91).
    10
    argument on the Motion to Amend on October 18, 2021,75 and denied the Motion to Amend on
    January 7, 2022.76
    On August 5, 2022, Zenith filed the Zenith Motion, seeking judgment in its favor on both
    counts as it relates to liability and requesting a trial as to damages.77 Also on August 5, 2022,
    CenterPoint filed the CenterPoint Motion, requesting judgment in its favor on both counts in the
    Amended Complaint.78 The Court heard argument on the Zenith Motion and the CenterPoint
    Motion on October 28, 2022. At the end of the hearing, the Court took the motions under
    advisement.
    III.      PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
    A. THE ZENITH MOTION
    Zenith seeks summary judgment on Count I (breach of the Purchase Agreement between
    Zenith and CenterPoint) and Count II (breach of the Construction Management Agreement
    between JBBR and CenterPoint) “as to liability . . . and that the case be set for a trail as to
    [Zenith]’s damages.”79 Zenith’s overarching argument is that CenterPoint failed to achieve Final
    Completion under the contracts.80
    Zenith does not make distinct arguments under the various agreements and, instead,
    combines the two together and seemingly argues as if the contracts are one. First, Zenith claims
    that the Court may interpret both the Purchase Agreement and the Construction Management
    Agreement because “they are clear and unambiguous.”81 Zenith provides that both contracts
    “unambiguously require” CenterPoint to cause Ragnar and any other contractor to achieve Final
    75
    See Judicial Action Form, Oct. 18, 2021 (D.I. 94).
    76
    See Order, Jan. 27, 2022 (D.I. 105).
    77
    See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J.
    78
    See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
    79
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 32.
    80
    See id. at 31-32.
    81
    Id. at 23.
    11
    Completion.82 Zenith relies on the language in the Purchase Agreement that requires
    CenterPoint to “use its reasonable best efforts to achieve, and to cause [Ragnar] (and any other
    applicable third party contractors or service providers) to achieve, Final Completion.”83 Zenith
    also points to the language of the Construction Management Agreement that requires
    CenterPoint to “manage [Ragnar’s] performance and completion of the Work under the
    Construction Contract until the Final Completion Certificate is issued and accepted by
    [JBBR].”84 As such, Zenith claims that the contracts’ language is clear and unambiguous, and
    the only remaining issue is “whether there is any factual dispute that CenterPoint failed to
    achieve Final Completion.”85
    Second, Zenith argues that it is undisputed that CenterPoint failed to achieve Final
    Completion for several reasons.86 Zenith states that the Terminal had to operate in cold weather
    to satisfy the requirements of the ExxonMobil contract with the Terminal, and the installations
    relating to cold-weather operations were not completed.87 Zenith, anticipating CenterPoint’s
    argument, contends that simply completing the items on the “punchlist” does not equate to Final
    Completion.88 As a final point, Zenith argues that CenterPoint failed to use its “reasonable best
    efforts” to achieve Final Completion and failed to act as a “reasonably prudent construction
    manager in the construction industry.”89
    82
    Id. at 24.
    83
    Id. at 24, Ex. N (Purchase Agreement) § 6.15(a).
    84
    Id. at 24, Ex. O (Construction Management Agreement) at Schedule A.
    85
    Id. at 25.
    86
    See id. at 26.
    87
    Id. at 26-27. On May 28, 2014, JBBR and ExxonMobil entered into a “Terminal Services Agreement,” whereby
    ExxonMobil was to supply minimum amounts of crude oil to the Terminal or make monthly payments if the target
    amounts of oil were not supplied. See id. at 3, Ex. F (Terminal Services Agreement). ExxonMobil was the only
    customer of the Terminal. See id. at 3.
    88
    See id. at 27-28.
    89
    See id. at 29-31; see also id., Ex. N (Purchase Agreement) § 6.15(a) (providing the “reasonable best efforts”
    language), Ex. O (Construction Management Agreement) § 2(b) (providing the “reasonably prudent construction
    manager” language).
    12
    In sum, Zenith says no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists relating to
    CenterPoint’s alleged failure to achieve Final Completion such that summary judgment should
    be granted in its favor on liability, plus there should be a trial for damages.90
    B. THE CENTERPOINT MOTION
    CenterPoint seeks summary judgment on Count I (breach of the Purchase Agreement
    between Zenith and CenterPoint) and Count II (breach of the Construction Management
    Agreement between JBBR and CenterPoint). CenterPoint contends that it is entitled to summary
    judgment because: (1) there was no breach of either contract;91 (2) the statute of limitations bars
    the claims;92 and (3) Zenith failed to submit evidence that it suffered damages resulting from
    CenterPoint’s conduct.93
    First, with respect to the Purchase Agreement, CenterPoint argues it complied with all
    obligations under the Purchase Agreement, and the alleged deficiencies of which Zenith now
    complains are not required to achieve Final Completion.94 CenterPoint maintains that it
    completed all items on the punchlist sufficient to achieve Final Completion.95 Moreover,
    CenterPoint claims the later-discovered issues with steam/condensate and hot oil systems are the
    fault of Wilson’s design, not any construction work supervised by CenterPoint, and Zenith never
    listed these deficiencies on its letter that formed the basis for its refusal to issue the Final
    Completion Certificate.96
    On the Construction Management Agreement, CenterPoint advances largely the same
    arguments as it did for the Purchase Agreement. Specifically, CenterPoint says it properly
    90
    See id. at 31-32.
    91
    See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 24-30.
    92
    See id. at 30-31.
    93
    See id. at 31-34.
    94
    Id. at 25.
    95
    Id. at 25-26.
    96
    Id. at 26-27.
    13
    supervised Ragnar’s punchlist work, and nothing more was required to achieve Final
    Completion.97 In addition, CenterPoint notes that the Construction Management Agreement did
    not place any obligations on CenterPoint for Wilson’s design of the Terminal.98 As such,
    CenterPoint achieved Final Completion and is not responsible for Wilson’s deficiencies.
    Second, CenterPoint argues Zenith’s claims are barred by Delaware’s three-year statute
    of limitations on contract claims.99 CenterPoint states that Zenith discovered the alleged
    deficiencies no later than March 2016; the limitations period ran by March 2019; and Zenith did
    not file this lawsuit until October 2019.100
    Finally, CenterPoint claims that Zenith “has not adduced any evidence that it suffered any
    damages as a proximate cause of any contract breach by CenterPoint.”101 CenterPoint says that
    any issues with the steam/condensate and hot oil systems, and the lack of testing of those
    systems, goes to the liability of Ragnar and Wilson, which have been asserted in the related
    litigation in Illinois.102 Moreover, the “submission of a request for issuance of a Final
    Completion Certificate [by CenterPoint] in October 2015 did not prejudice Zenith’s claims
    against Ragnar[] and Wilson.”103
    IV.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The standard of review on a motion for summary judgment is well-settled. The Court’s
    principal function when considering a motion for summary judgment is to examine the record to
    determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, “but not to decide such issues.”104
    97
    Id. at 29.
    98
    Id. at 29-30.
    99
    Id. at 30.
    100
    Id. at 31.
    101
    Id.
    102
    Id. at 32-33.
    103
    Id. at 33.
    104
    Merrill v. Crothall-American Inc., 
    606 A.2d 96
    , 99-100 (Del. 1992) (internal citations omitted); Oliver B.
    Cannon & Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 
    312 A.2d 322
    , 325 (Del. Super. 1973).
    14
    Summary judgment will be granted if, after viewing the record in a light most favorable to a
    nonmoving party, no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.105 If, however, the record reveals that material facts are in dispute,
    or if the factual record has not been developed thoroughly enough to allow the Court to apply the
    law to the factual record, then summary judgment will not be granted.106 The moving party bears
    the initial burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts support its claims or defenses.107 If
    the motion is properly supported, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate
    that there are material issues of fact for the resolution by the ultimate fact-finder.108
    “These well-established standards and rules equally apply [to the extent] the parties have
    filed cross-motions for summary judgment.”109 Where cross-motions for summary judgment are
    filed and neither party argues the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the Court shall
    deem the motions to be the equivalent of a stipulation for decision on the merits based on the
    record submitted with the motions.”110 But where cross-motions for summary judgment are filed
    and an issue of material fact exists, summary judgment is not appropriate.111 To determine
    whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the Court evaluates each motion
    105
    See Merrill, 
    606 A.2d at 99-100
    .
    106
    Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 
    180 A.2d 467
    , 470 (Del. 1962); see also Cook v. City of Harrington, 
    1990 WL 35244
    , at
    *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 22, 1990) (citing Ebersole, 
    180 A.2d at 467
    ) (“Summary judgment will not be granted under
    any circumstances when the record indicates . . . that it is desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order
    to clarify the application of law to the circumstances.”).
    107
    Moore v. Sizemore, 
    405 A.2d 679
    , 680 (Del. 1970) (citing Ebersole, 
    180 A.2d at 470
    ).
    108
    See Brzoska v. Olsen, 
    668 A.2d 1355
    , 1364 (Del. 1995).
    109
    IDT Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 
    2019 WL 413692
    , at *5 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2019) (citations omitted); see
    Capano v. Lockwood, 
    2013 WL 2724634
    , at *2 (Del. Super. May 31, 2013) (citing Total Care Physicians, P.A. v.
    O'Hara, 
    798 A.2d 1043
    , 1050 (Del. Super. 2001)).
    110
    Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(h).
    111
    Motors Liquidation Co. DIP Lenders Tr. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 
    2017 WL 2495417
    , at *5 (Del. Super. June 19,
    2017), aff’d sub nom., Motors Liquidation Co. DIP Lenders Tr. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    191 A.3d 1109
     (Del. 2018);
    Comet Sys., Inc. S’holders’ Agent v. MIVA, Inc., 
    980 A.2d 1024
    , 1029 (Del. Ch. 2008); see also Anolick v. Holy
    Trinity Greek Orthodox Church, Inc., 
    787 A.2d 732
    , 738 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[T]he presence of cross-motions ‘does
    not act per se as a concession that there is an absence of factual issues.’” (quoting United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v.
    TakeCare, Inc., 
    693 A.2d 1076
    , 1079 (Del. 1997))).
    15
    independently.112 And again, where it seems prudent to make a more thorough inquiry into the
    facts, summary judgment will be denied.113
    V.       DISCUSSION
    A. DELAWARE’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR THE CLAIMS.
    “The statute of limitations [under] 10 Del. C. § 8106 requires a plaintiff to bring a breach
    of contract claim within three years of the accrual of the cause of action.”114 “The cause of
    action for a breach of contract accrues at ‘the moment of the wrongful act,’”115 and “not when
    actual damage results or is ascertained.”116
    CenterPoint argues that Zenith discovered the alleged deficiencies with the
    steam/condensate and hot oil systems no later than March 2016, but Zenith did not file this
    action until October 2019.117 Thus, CenterPoint claims the three-year statute of limitations bars
    the claims.118 Zenith counters that the events of March 2016 “merely triggered CenterPoint’s
    obligations under Section 6.15 of the [Purchase] Agreement to cause the [steam/condensate and
    hot oil system] deficiencies to be fixed and to pay for the repairs.”119 Zenith argues that
    throughout 2016 Ragnar and Wilson made repairs and alterations to the Terminal.120 Zenith
    maintains that, at the earliest, it was not until January 2017 that Ragnar and Wilson refused to
    112
    Motors Liquidation, 
    2017 WL 2495417
    , at *5; see Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 
    829 A.2d 160
    , 167 (Del.
    Ch. 2003).
    113
    Ebersole, 
    180 A.2d at 470-72
    ; Pathmark Stores, Inc. v. 3821 Assocs., L.P., 
    663 A.2d 1189
    , 1191 (Del. Ch. 1995).
    114
    AM Gen. Hldg.’s LLC v. The Renco Grp., Inc., 
    2016 WL 4440476
    , at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2016); see also 10
    Del. C. § 8106(a) (laying out the types of claims subject to a three-year statute of limitations period).
    115
    AM Gen. Hldg.’s LLC, 
    2016 WL 4440476
    , at *7 (quoting Fike v. Ruger, 
    754 A.2d 254
    , 260 (Del. Ch. 1999);
    AssuredPartners of Virginia, LLC v. Sheehan, 
    2020 WL 2789706
    , at *12 (Del. Super. May 29, 2020) (“For breach
    of contract claims, the wrongful act is the breach, and the cause of action accrues at the time of the breach.” (internal
    quotations omitted)).
    116
    Davis, Bowen & Friedel, Inc. v. Disabatino, 
    2016 WL 7469691
    , at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 27, 2016).
    117
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 31.
    118
    
    Id.
    119
    Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pls.’ Opp’n”) at 22, Sept. 6, 2022 (D.I.
    146).
    120
    Id. at 22-23.
    16
    take further measures.121 Zenith further contends that CenterPoint did not abandon its
    contractual obligations until June 9, 2017, when “CenterPoint sent a letter to Zenith telling it to
    pursue Ragnar and Wilson for the [T]erminal defects, and refusing to indemnify JBBR as
    required by Section 10 of the [Purchase] Agreement.”122
    The Court finds that the statute of limitations does not bar the claims. CenterPoint
    appears to have chosen a date and claim it was the date of the alleged breach. On March 7, 2016,
    JBBR notified Ragnar that deficiencies existed relating the steam/condensate system’s
    functioning and asked Ragnar to remedy them.123 Throughout the remainder of March 2016,
    JBBR and Ragnar went back and forth regarding the deficiencies, with Ragnar stating it was
    “prepared to remedy, as a warranty item, deficiencies of [Ragnar]’s work to the extent its work
    does not comply with the Scope of Work found in the Construction Contract.”124 Moreover, in
    April 2016, Wilson contacted Zenith to discuss improving the “steam system.”125 This does not
    seem to be “the moment of the wrongful act” to trigger the breach.126
    CenterPoint’s own letter to JBBR proves there was no breach until January 2017 or later.
    On January 24, 2017, CenterPoint wrote to JBBR and stated that “as [JBBR] is aware, with
    CenterPoint’s support, [Ragnar] and Wilson have been onsite [at the Terminal] seeking to
    address the issues raised in the [letter from JBBR on January 20, 2017].”127 The Court notes that
    CenterPoint told JBBR in January 2017 that Ragnar and Wilson were continuing to address
    issues raised by Zenith and JBBR. This means that, at that time, a breach had not yet
    121
    Id. at 23.
    122
    Id.
    123
    See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. T at 28-29.
    124
    See id., Ex. T at 30-32.
    125
    See id., Ex. T at 33-34.
    126
    See Fike, 
    754 A.2d at 260
    .
    127
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. T at 152.
    17
    occurred.128 Moreover, Zenith filed this lawsuit in October 2019.129 Without even reaching
    Zenith’s contention that the real breach occurred in June 2017, it is clear that Zenith’s October
    2019 filing was well within the three-year limitations period based on CenterPoint’s January
    2017 letter. Therefore, Zenith’s claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.
    B. BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS
    The elements of a breach of contract claim are: “(1) the existence of a contractual
    obligation; (2) a breach of that obligation; and (3) damages resulting from the breach.”130
    1. The language of both contracts is unambiguous.
    “Delaware adheres to the ‘objective’ theory of contracts, i.e.[,] a contract’s construction
    should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable third party.”131 “Contract
    terms themselves will be controlling when they establish the parties’ common meaning so that a
    reasonable person in the position of either party would have no expectations inconsistent with the
    contract language.”132
    “When the issue before the Court involves the interpretation of a contract, summary
    judgment is appropriate only if the contract in question is unambiguous.”133 Thus, the threshold
    inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the contract is ambiguous.”134 When a contract is
    128
    See Fike, 
    754 A.2d at 260
     (stating that the breach is the “moment of the wrongful act”). Neither party
    persuasively argues one, specific moment that constitutes the “wrongful act” leading to the alleged breaches. See
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 30-31; Pls.’ Opp’n at 22-23. However, the breach claims are premised on CenterPoint’s
    failure to use its “reasonable best efforts” to achieve Final Completion, (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-70), which, in
    essence, means that the heart of the breach claims goes to the moments that CenterPoint stopped working with
    Zenith on the Terminal. In January 2017, all parties were still working together. See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. T
    at 152.
    129
    See Original Compl.
    130
    Buck v. Viking Hldg. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 
    2021 WL 673459
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 22, 2021) (citing VLIW Tech.,
    LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
    840 A.2d 606
    , 612 (Del. 2003)).
    131
    Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 
    991 A.2d 1153
    , 1159 (Del. 2010) (citing NBC Universal v. Paxson Commc’ns,
    
    2005 WL 1038997
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005)).
    132
    Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 
    702 A.2d 1228
    , 1232 (Del. 1997).
    133
    United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Hldgs., Inc., 
    937 A.2d 810
    , 830 (Del. Ch. 2007).
    134
    
    Id.
    18
    “clear and unambiguous,” the Court “will give effect to the plain-meaning of the contract’s terms
    and provisions.”135 “Ambiguity does not exist simply because the parties disagree about what
    the contract means.”136 Instead, contracts are ambiguous “when the provisions in controversy
    are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more different
    meanings.”137
    a. The Purchase Agreement is unambiguous.
    Purchase Agreement Section 6.15(a) is especially relevant. Section 6.15(a) is labeled
    “Final Completion,” and it states:
    After Closing, on and subject to the terms of the Construction Contract [with
    Ragnar] and the Construction Management Agreement, [CenterPoint] shall use its
    reasonable best efforts to achieve, and to cause the EPC Contractor [Ragnar] (and
    any other applicable third party contractors or service providers) to achieve, Final
    Completion in accordance with the Approved Cost Plan and the Project Schedule
    and otherwise in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Construction
    Contract and the Construction Management Agreement in all material respects.138
    There appears no serious dispute that Section 6.15(a) is ambiguous.139 The Court finds
    that Section 6.15(a) is subject to only one reasonable interpretation—CenterPoint was required to
    use its “reasonable best efforts” to achieve, and cause any contractor to achieve, Final
    Completion. “The determination of ambiguity lies within the sole province of the court,”140 and
    the Court finds that Section 6.15(a) unambiguous.
    While the parties argue whether CenterPoint used its “reasonable best efforts” to achieve
    “Final Completion,” that goes to the facts surrounding CenterPoint’s efforts, not the language of
    135
    Osborn, 
    991 A.2d at 1159-60
    .
    136
    United Rentals, Inc., 
    937 A.2d at 830
    .
    137
    Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 
    616 A.2d 1192
    , 1196 (Del. 1992).
    138
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. N (Purchase Agreement) § 6.15(a).
    139
    See id. at 23-24 (stating Section 6.15(a) is unambiguous); Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 25 (stating that Section
    6.15(a) required CenterPoint to use its best efforts to cause Ragnar to achieve Final Completion).
    140
    Osborn, 
    991 A.2d at 1160
    .
    19
    Section 6.15(a) setting out the expectations of the parties. As such, Section 6.15(a) of the
    Purchase Agreement is unambiguous.
    b. The Construction Management Agreement is unambiguous.
    Construction Management Agreement Section 2(b), titled “Construction Management
    Services,” states:
    [CenterPoint] shall perform the Services with substantially the same standard of
    care (including quality) as the Services were performed by or on behalf of [JBBR]
    prior to the Effective Date, including, without limitation, by performing the
    Services, at all times, as would a reasonably prudent construction manager in the
    construction management industry.141
    Construction Management Agreement Section 2(h) limits Section 2, and it provides that
    “except as expressly set forth in Section 2, no representations, warranties or guaranties of any
    kind, express or implied . . . are made by [CenterPoint] with respect to the services provided
    under [the Construction Management Agreement],” and that all representations and warranties
    are waived and disclaimed to the fullest extent of the law.142
    The Court finds that the language of the Construction Management Agreement is
    unambiguous and subject to only one reasonable interpretation. The Court finds that CenterPoint
    was required to oversee the construction project in the same way it did when it owned the
    Terminal, and in the same way a “reasonably prudent construction manager in the construction
    industry” would oversee the project.
    Here, the parties argue whether CenterPoint fulfilled its duty to act as a “reasonably
    prudent construction manager.”143 The Court notes that goes to the facts surrounding
    141
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. O § 2(b).
    142
    Id., Ex. O § 2(h).
    143
    See id. at 30-31 (arguing that if CenterPoint continued as owner of the Terminal, it would not have accepted a
    facility “that did not perform at the level required by the contracts”); Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 19-20 (arguing that
    JBBR knew that “CenterPoint was not a professional provider of these services, and that CenterPoint personnel
    would not spend full time on providing” services outside the alleged scope of the contracts).
    20
    CenterPoint’s efforts, not the language of the Construction Management Agreement Section
    2(b). Thus, Section 2(b) is unambiguous.
    2. Genuine issues of material fact exist for the Purchase Agreement.
    As to Count I, the difficulty is to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists
    with respect to Purchase Agreement Section 6.15(a). The key language is “reasonable best
    efforts,” i.e., whether CenterPoint used “reasonable best efforts” to achieve, and cause any
    contractor to achieve, Final Completion.144
    Zenith argues that the Purchase Agreement “unambiguously require[s]” CenterPoint to
    cause Ragnar and any other contractor to achieve Final Completion.145 Moreover, Zenith
    complains that CenterPoint “did not use reasonable best efforts”146 and “failed to achieve Final
    Completion.”147 Conversely, CenterPoint maintains it complied with all obligations under the
    Purchase Agreement, and the alleged deficiencies were not required to achieve Final
    Completion.148 Interestingly, in its Opposition, CenterPoint seems to concede that “[a]t the very
    least, a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether CenterPoint used its ‘reasonable best
    efforts.’”149 In the CenterPoint Motion’s Opening Brief, however, CenterPoint argues that it
    used its reasonable best efforts to cause Ragnar to achieve Final Completion when it oversaw
    Ragnar’s completion of the “punchlist” items.150 These arguments seem to contradict.
    Under Delaware law, “reasonable best efforts” means a party is “obligat[ed] to take all
    reasonable steps to solve problems and consummate the transaction.”151 However, “it cannot
    144
    See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J, Ex. N § 6.15(a).
    145
    Id. at 24.
    146
    Id. at 29.
    147
    Id. at 26.
    148
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 25.
    149
    Def.’s Opp’n at 28-29.
    150
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 25-26.
    151
    Williams Cos., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 
    159 A.3d 264
    , 272 (Del. 2017) (citing Hexion Specialty
    Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp, 
    965 A.2d 715
    , 755-56 (Del. Ch. 2008)).
    21
    mean everything possible under the sun.”152 In the context of merger agreements, the Court of
    Chancery has “looked to whether the party subject to the clause (i) had reasonable grounds to
    take the action it did and (ii) sought to address problems with its counterparty” in determining
    whether the “reasonable best efforts” standard was met.153 “Determining whether a party used
    reasonable best efforts is an inherently factual inquiry.”154
    The Court finds that there exists a factual question as to whether CenterPoint took “all
    reasonable steps to solve problems.” For instance, after JBBR denied the request for a Final
    Completion Certificate in October 2015,155 CenterPoint oversaw Ragnar to finish the items on
    the punchlist, which was completed in February 2016.156 The correspondence between the
    parties from December 2016 to January 2017 appears show there was engagement to construct
    the Terminal and achieve Final Completion.157 However, it appears Final Completion was never
    achieved. For example, under the definition of “Final Completion,” “all testing (including
    hydrotesting) and coating” must be completed.158 Gavin Palmer, “JBBR’s engineering expert,”
    testified during his deposition that there was no evidence the steam system was hydrotested.159
    CenterPoint does not address this alleged defect in its briefing. While Final Completion was not
    achieved, it is not clear whether CenterPoint made “reasonable best efforts” to achieve Final
    152
    AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels & Resorts One LLC, 
    2020 WL 7024929
    , at *91 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020)
    (citing Alliance Data Sys. Corp. v. Blackstone Cap. P’rs V L.P., 
    963 A.2d 746
    , 763 n.60 (Del. Ch. 2009)).
    153
    Menn v. ConMed Corp., 
    2022 WL 2387802
    , at *35 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2022) (citing Akron, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi
    AG, 
    2018 WL 4719347
    , at *91 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018)).
    154
    In re WeWork Litig., 
    2020 WL 6375438
    , at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2020). The Chancery Court stated this rule in
    the context of a motion to dismiss, noting that whether a party used reasonable best efforts is an inquiry “not readily
    amenable to resolution at the pleadings stage.” 
    Id.
     Nonetheless, the inquiry is still “inherently factual.” See 
    id.
    155
    See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. T at 8-10.
    156
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 22, Ex. 29 (displaying the letter from Ragnar to JBBR requesting Final Completion
    Certificate).
    157
    See Pls’. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. T at 137-53.
    158
    See Am. Compl., Ex. E (Construction Contract) § 1.1.
    159
    See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. Z (Palmer Dep.) at 45:22-48:2.
    22
    Completion because the Court is not clear on whether hydrotesting, for example, was a necessary
    and “reasonable step to solve [a] problem[] and consummate the transaction.”160
    CenterPoint, in essence, attempts to sidestep the deficiency issues by placing blame on
    Ragnar and Wilson and claiming CenterPoint has no responsibility for them.161 However, the
    Court notes that the plain language of the Purchase Agreement requires CenterPoint to achieve,
    and cause any third party contractor to achieve, Final Completion.162 Thus, CenterPoint could be
    responsible for the contractors’ deficient performances, if any, in failing to achieve Final
    Completion.
    CenterPoint was responsible for Ragnar’s and Wilson’s work. Moreover, there exists a
    genuine issue of material fact as to whether CenterPoint used its “reasonable best efforts” to
    achieve Final Completion. Due to this dispute of fact, the Court DENIES both the Zenith
    Motion on Count I, and the CenterPoint Motion on Count I.
    3. Genuine issues of material fact exist for the Construction Management Agreement.
    On Count II, the Court notes that the issue for each party is whether CenterPoint
    performed its services “as would a reasonably prudent construction manager in the construction
    management industry.”163 Largely, the parties make similar arguments for the Construction
    Management Agreement and the Purchase Agreement.
    Zenith argues, again, that the Construction Management Agreement “unambiguously
    require[s] CenterPoint to cause Ragnar or any other contractor to achieve Final Completion.”164
    Zenith points to Schedule A of the Construction Management Agreement, which requires
    160
    Williams Cos., Inc., 159 A.3d at 272.
    161
    See, e.g., Def.’s Opp’n at 21-25 (arguing that CenterPoint is not responsible for the design of the Terminal).
    162
    See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. N § 6.15(a).
    163
    See id., Ex. O § 2(b).
    164
    Id. at 24.
    23
    CenterPoint to “manage [Ragnar’s] performance and completion of the Work under the
    Construction Contract until the Final Completion Certificate is issued and accepted by [JBBR]
    and payment is made therefor.”165 Zenith complains that CenterPoint breached the Construction
    Management Agreement because, inter alia, the proper cold-weather installations were not made
    at the Terminal, and completing the punchlist, alone, was insufficient to achieve Final
    Completion.166
    CenterPoint argues it properly supervised Ragnar’s punchlist work, and nothing more
    was required.167 Moreover, CenterPoint says that “[n]othing in the Construction Management
    Agreement required CenterPoint to manage any work by Wilson,” such that CenterPoint is not
    responsible for Wilson’s design deficiencies.168 To CenterPoint, the punchlist was enough, and
    Zenith’s “complaints” regarding cold weather installations are outside the scope of the
    Construction Management Agreement.169
    The Court notices that the parties do not really address the factual arguments of the other.
    The issue regarding the Construction Management Agreement is the “reasonably prudent
    construction manager” language in Section 2(b). The “reasonably prudent person” standard “is
    an objective standard” and a “fact-intensive inquiry.”170
    Section 2(b) of the Construction Management Agreement states:
    [CenterPoint] shall perform the Services with substantially the same standard of
    care (including quality) as the Services were performed by or on behalf of [JBBR]
    prior to the Effective Date, including, without limitation, by performing the
    Services, at all times, as would a reasonably prudent construction manager in the
    construction management industry.171
    165
    Id., Ex. O at Schedule A. It also argues CenterPoint did not act as a “reasonably prudent construction manager”
    as required by Section 2(b). See id. at 31, Ex. O § 2(b).
    166
    See id. at 26-28.
    167
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 29.
    168
    Id. at 19-20.
    169
    Id. at 29-30.
    170
    CMS Inv. Hldgs., LLC v. Castle, 
    2015 WL 3894021
    , at *11 (Del. Ch. June 23, 2015).
    171
    Am. Compl., Ex. B § 2(b).
    24
    The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether CenterPoint
    acted as a reasonably prudent construction manager. For its part, CenterPoint says that
    overseeing Ragnar’s punchlist completion is enough for a Final Completion Certificate and
    enough to meet its duties under the Construction Management Agreement.172 Zenith says that
    completing the punchlist was not enough for Final Completion, and it was not enough for
    CenterPoint to satisfy its duties. Zenith points to Schedule A of the Construction Management
    Agreement, requiring CenterPoint to manage Ragnar and other contractors until JBBR issues a
    Final Completion Certificate.173 Zenith even tells the Court that it “need not consider the
    standard of care issue” because Final Completion was not achieved.174
    While it is true that Final Completion was not achieved, as explained supra, in section
    V(B)(2), that does not end this inquiry. Lack of Final Completion does not, per se, constitute a
    breach resulting in damages, especially considering the Purchase Agreement’s language
    requiring CenterPoint to use “reasonable best efforts” to achieve Final Completion.175 Similarly,
    a crucial determination is whether CenterPoint acted as a “reasonably prudent construction
    manager” in performing its duties under the Construction Management Agreement. CenterPoint
    says it did and provides factual support.176 Zenith says CenterPoint did not and provides factual
    172
    See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 29-30.
    173
    See Pls.’ Opp’n at 19-20; Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. O at Schedule A.
    174
    Pls.’ Opp’n at 19.
    175
    See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. N § 6.15(a). Here, Purchase Agreement between Zenith and CenterPoint
    required CenterPoint to use “reasonable best efforts” to achieve Final Completion. See id. The Construction
    Management Agreement between JBBR and CenterPoint required CenterPoint to oversee contractors’ work until
    Final Completion was achieved. See id., Ex. O at Schedule A. Final Completion was not achieved, but there exists a
    question of fact regarding whether CenterPoint oversaw the contractors until the contractors stopped performing,
    and a question of fact regarding whether damages were suffered if CenterPoint failed to oversee the contractors. The
    two agreements at the center of this litigation are tied together in many respects, and at some points they appear to
    conflict. Cf. id., Ex. N § 6.15(a) (requiring CenterPoint to use reasonable best efforts to cause contractors to achieve
    Final Completion), with id., Ex. O at Schedule A (requiring CenterPoint to manage the contractors’ performance
    until Final Completion was achieved).
    176
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 19-20.
    25
    support.177 When such conflicting arguments are given regarding a “reasonably prudent”
    standard, and the evidence is not persuasive to one side, “[i]t is for a [factfinder] to reconcile the
    conflicting [arguments and evidence] of” Zenith and CenterPoint.178
    Therefore, while it is likely that Final Completion was not achieved, the Court finds that
    there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether CenterPoint acted as a “reasonably
    prudent construction manager” as required by the Construction Management Agreement.
    Accordingly, the Court must DENY the Zenith Motion and the CenterPoint Motion as to Count
    II.
    4. CenterPoint’s argument for lack of damages fails.
    CenterPoint’s final argument is that Zenith has produced no evidence that it suffered
    damages as a proximate cause of any contract breach by CenterPoint.179 CenterPoint argues that,
    at most, Zenith suffered damages relating to the steam/condensate and hot oil systems, and that
    those damages will be assessed against Ragnar and Wilson in the Illinois Action.180
    Zenith counters that its damages arise from CenterPoint’s breaches relating to
    CenterPoint’s failure to: (i) cause Ragnar to achieve Final Completion; (ii) remedy defects at the
    Terminal relating to cold weather installations; (iii) cause liquidated damages to be paid; and (iv)
    indemnify Zenith. Zenith also seeks damages for fees and cost incurred in the Illinois Action.181
    Zenith argues that all the damages arise from CenterPoint’s breach of the Purchase Agreement
    and breach of the Construction Management Agreement.182
    177
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 31.
    178
    See Garcia-Trujilio v. Atl. Bldg. Assocs., Inc., 
    2020 WL 4816343
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Aug. 13, 2020) (finding, in
    the context of the “reasonably prudent” standard, that when the parties disagreed regarding the construction
    manager’s control over a work site, and conflicting evidence existed, summary judgment was improper).
    179
    Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 31.
    180
    Id. at 33-34.
    181
    Pls.’ Opp’n at 24. Zenith provides money damages figures for all of the alleged deficiencies, which come from an
    engineering report. See id. at 26-27; see also Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. Y (Ambitech Report).
    182
    Pls.’ Opp’n at 24-25.
    26
    “Contract damages are designed to place the injured party in an action for breach of
    contract in the same place as [the party] would have been if the contract had been performed.”183
    The non-breaching party is “entitled to recover damages that arise naturally from the breach or
    that were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made.”184
    The Court finds that Zenith has demonstrated a factual issue on damages. CenterPoint
    essentially blames Ragnar and Wilson, and attempts to avoid wrongdoing at the Terminal.185
    Zenith pled damages resulting from the various deficiencies at the Terminal, as highlighted in its
    argument above.186 Zenith has also implicitly conceded that the actual damages sum is a fact
    issue because Zenith requests a trial for damages in the Zenith Motion.187 The Court finds that
    there is a fact issue as to whether CenterPoint breached the Purchase Agreement and/or the
    Construction Management Agreement.188 If CenterPoint breached either, Zenith likely suffered
    damages from CenterPoint’s breach; namely, in failing to properly oversee Ragnar, which would
    be “damages that arise naturally from the breach or that were reasonably foreseeable at the time
    the contract was made.”189 Ultimately, CenterPoint’s claim that Zenith suffered no damages
    cannot be determined at this time because there exist factual disputes regarding whether a breach
    occurred. Zenith has set forth circumstances that will lead to money damages if a breach is later
    determined to have occurred.
    Therefore, the Court is DENYING the CenterPoint Motion on the issue of whether
    Zenith has suffered damages.
    183
    Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 
    974 A.2d 140
    , 146 (Del. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
    184
    
    Id.
     (internal quotations omitted).
    185
    See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 33-34 (arguing that CenterPoint only forwarded Ragnar’s Final Completion
    request to JBBR, and that CenterPoint suffered no damages from such a request).
    186
    See Pls.’ Opp’n at 26-27; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-70, Prayer for Relief.
    187
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 32 (“Plaintiffs respectfully request that summary [j]udgment as to liability be entered
    against CenterPoint, and that the case be set for a trial as to Plaintiffs’ damages.”).
    188
    See supra sections V(B)(2)-(3).
    189
    Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 
    974 A.2d at 146
     (internal quotations omitted).
    27
    VI.     CONCLUSION
    The Court finds there are genuine issues of material fact on CenterPoint’s performance
    and liability under both the Purchase Agreement and the Construction Management Agreement.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Zenith Motion and the CenterPoint Motion.
    IT IS SO ORDERED
    Dated: January 23, 2023
    Wilmington, Delaware
    /s/ Eric M. Davis
    Eric M. Davis, Judge
    cc: File&ServeXpress
    28
    

Document Info

Docket Number: N19C-10-054 EMD CCLD

Judges: Davis J.

Filed Date: 1/23/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/24/2023

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