State v. Wescott ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) ID No. 2011008215
)
ALFRED WESCOTT, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: May 19, 2022
Decided: May 23, 2022
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Reargument
DENIED
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Lindsay Taylor, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 13 The Circle,
Georgetown, DE 19947, Attorney for State of Delaware.
Tasha M. Stevens-Gueh, Esquire, Andrew & Stevens-Gueh, LLC, 115 South
Bedford Street, Georgetown, DE 19947, Attorney for Defendant.
KARSNITZ, R.J.
On April 7, 2022, I denied a motion by Alfred Wescott (“Movant” or
“Westcott”) to suppress certain evidence (the “Suppression Motion”). My decision
was based in part on the Delaware statutory declaration that nothing in the law
decriminalizing possession of less than one ounce of marijuana “shall be construed
to repeal or modify any law or procedure regarding search or seizure.”1 On May 16,
2022, Movant filed a letter requesting that I reconsider that ruling. Although the
letter is captioned as a Request for Reconsideration of Motion to Suppress, I will
treat it as a Motion for Reargument since it asks me to revisit m y prior decision on
the Suppression Motion.2 Moreover, “an application to the court for an order shall
be by motion,”3 not by a letter, but I will treat the letter as if it were a Motion for
Reargument.
The Superior Court Criminal Rules do not address a Motion for
Reargument. The Criminal Rules provide that "[i]n all cases not provided for by
rule or administrative order, the court shall regulate its practice in accordance
with the applicable Superior Court civil rule."4 Under the Superior Court Civil
Rules, a party must submit a motion for reargument within five days following
1
16 Del. C. § 4764(h).
2
A motion for reconsideration is the procedural vehicle by which a party may seek a review of a
commissioner's ruling by a judge. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(4), (b).
3
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 47.
4
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 57(d).
1
the Court's decision.5 The time allotted for a motion for reargument cannot be
extended.6 If a motion for reargument is untimely, the Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider any substantive argument.7 Movant’s Motion for Reargument was filed
well beyond five days following my April 7, 2022 decision. Thus, I do not have
jurisdiction to consider the Motion for Reargument.
Even if the Motion for Reargument had been timely filed, I would deny it. "A
motion for reargument 'will be denied unless the Court has overlooked a controlling
precedent or legal principles, or the Court has misapprehended the law or facts such
as would have changed the outcome of the underlying decision."'8 "The party
seeking reargument has the burden to demonstrate newly discovered evidence, a
change in the law, or manifest injustice."9 Movant has not provided any newly
discovered evidence, a change in the law, or shown manifest injustice. M o v a n t
argues that a change in federal law should cause me to reconsider my prior ruling.
However, the change in federal law occurred well before the Suppression Motion
5
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e).
6
Dickens v. State, 852 A.2d 907, 2004 WL 1535814, at *1 (Del. 2004) (Table).
7
Id. at *2 (citing Preform Building Components Inc. v. Edwards, 280 A.2d 697, 698 (Del. 1971));
Boyer v. State, 919 A.2d 516, 2007 WL 452300, at *2 (Del. 2007) (Table) (citing Preform Building
Components Inc., 280 A.2d at 698).
8
Kennedy v. Invacare Corp., 2006 WL 488590, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2006) (quoting
Bd. Of M'grs of the Del. Crim. Just. Info. Sys. v. Gannet Co., 2003 WL 1579170, at *1 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2003)).
9
State v. Williams, 2019 WL 248895, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2019) (citing Reid v. Hindt,
2008 WL 2943373, at *1 (Del. Super. July 31, 2008)).
2
was filed. Movant could have made this argument during the hearing on the
Suppression Motion since the federal law relied on in the Motion for Reargument
existed at the time of that hearing.
Were I to address the substance of the Motion for Reargument, my decision
of April 7, 2022, would still stand. Movant asserts that, based on federal law, the State
would have to show that it was able to distinguish the THC concentration of the
alleged “shake” as between marijuana and hemp. Movant is essentially trying to posit
an innocent explanation for small leaves consistent with marijuana. However, there
is no presumption of innocence when determining probable cause.10 The "possibility
that there may be a hypothetically innocent explanation for each of several facts
revealed during the course of an investigation does not preclude the determination
that probable cause exists."11 The possibility that the small leaves in the vehicle were
hemp rather than marijuana does not vitiate probable cause in this case. There is
nothing to suggest the small leaves were not marijuana. Moreover, the officer's
training and experience, as well as a positive K-9 alert, certainly suggest that the
small leaves were marijuana.12
10
State v. Arnold, 2006 WL 488619, at *4 (Del. Super. Feb. 17, 2006); see generally State v.
Schl ei f er , 2004 WL 343967, at *7 (Del. Super. Feb. 19, 2014).
11
State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926,930 (Del. 1993) (citing Jarvis v. State, 600 A.2d 38, 41-42
(Del. 1991)).
12
See United State v. Bignon, 813 F. App'x 34, 37 (2d. Cir. 2020) (finding probable cause
existed based on the officer's training, experience, and observations despite defendant
claiming substance was hemp and subsequent test results confirmed hemp).
3
Delaware law has "long recognized that '[p]robable cause is an elusive
concept which avoids precise definition . . . It lies somewhere between suspicion
and sufficient evidence to convict. "'13 "[O]bjective facts 'when used by trained
law enforcement officers ... can be combined with permissible deductions from
such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person and for
action on that suspicion."' 14 "While probable cause is a determination only
courts can ultimately make, we give deference to the 'on-the-scene conclusion[s]'
of officers. In reviewing these conclusions, we must consider the demands
officers face, in which they may 'draw inferences and make deductions ... that
might well elude an untrained person."'15
The question is not whether the small leaves were marijuana beyond a
reasonable doubt, or by a preponderance of the evidence, but rather, whether there
was a reasonable basis for the officer to believe, given the totality of the
circumstances, with his training and experience, that the small leaves were
marijuana. The officer testified at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress about
marijuana “shake.” Shake is the byproduct of manipulating dried marijuana buds,
13
Maxwell, 624 A.2d at 929 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Hovington v. State,
616 A.2d 829,833 (Del. 1992) and citing State v. Cochran, 372 A.2d 193, 195 (Del. 1977)).
14
Coleman v. State, 562 A.2d 1171, 1176 (Del. 1989) (omission in original) (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981)).
15
United States v. Fernandez, 652 F. App'x 110, 113 (3d. Cir. 2016) (alteration and omission
in original) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Jackson, 682 F. App'x 86 (3d.
Cir.2017).
4
which happens when doing such things as rolling a marijuana cigarette. In my view,
there was probable cause to search Movant’s vehicle.
For the reasons stated above, I DENY Defendant’s Motion for Reargument.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
cc: Prothonotary
5