State of Delaware v. Sweeney. ( 2014 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
)
v. ) I.D. 1102019121
)
)
SEAN K. SWEENEY, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
1. Defendant robbed a TD Bank. He was arrested and charged
with Robbery in the first degree. On August 27, 2012, he entered a plea
of guilty to a single count of the lesser included offense of Robbery in the
second degree. On the same day, the court imposed the sentence
recommended in the Plea Agreement of 5 years at Level 5, suspended
after 18 months, followed by 18 months at Level 3.
2. Defendant’s discontent arises out of a period of incarceration he
is currently serving in New Jersey. At the time he entered his plea and
was sentenced in this court, Defendant was in the midst of a five-year
sentence for a crime he committed in the Garden State. Not surprisingly
after Defendant was sentenced in this court, the State of Delaware lodged
a detainer with New Jersey officials so that Defendant would be returned
here after completing his New Jersey sentence. Defendant complains
that, because of the detainer lodged against him in New Jersey, prison
officials will not transfer him to a prison farm to serve the remainder of
his New Jersey sentence.
3. Defendant filed a pro se Rule 61 motion in which he sought to
withdraw the guilty plea he entered in this court. The gist of his motion
is that it was his understanding at the time he entered his plea that,
upon completion of his New Jersey incarceration, he would be returned
to Delaware to serve his Level 5 period of incarceration. Upon
completion of Defendant’s Level 5 sentence in Delaware, Defendant was
to be returned to New Jersey where he would serve both his New Jersey
and Delaware probations concurrently.
4. Another judge of this court granted Defendant’s motion for
appointment of counsel, and Theopalis Gregory, Esq. was appointed to
represent him in connection with his Rule 61 motion. Later, Thomas
Donovan, Esq. was appointed to replace Mr. Gregory as Defendant’s
counsel. Mr. Donovan has now moved to withdraw because he can find
no meritorious issue to pursue on Defendant’s behalf.
5. Criminal Rule 32(d) of this court permits the court to allow
withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to the imposition of sentence “upon a
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.” Once a sentence
is imposed, however, “[a] judge should permit withdrawal of a plea only if
the judge determines that the plea was not voluntarily entered or was
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entered because of misapprehension or mistake of defendant as to his
legal rights.” 1
6. Defendant contends that he should be permitted to withdraw
his plea because it was his understanding at the time he entered his plea
that “I would be transported back to Delaware to commence my level 5
incarceration once I became eligible for minimum custody (farm) status
in New Jersey.” The basis for Defendant’s understanding is not entirely
clear. During the plea colloquy Defendant acknowledged that the Plea
Agreement contained the entire agreement between him and the State.
That agreement contains no mention of returning Defendant to Delaware
to serve his Level 5 status once he achieved minimum custody status
during his New Jersey incarceration. Defendant expressly acknowledged
that he had no side deals with the State which were not written down in
the Plea Agreement, and that no one had made any promises to him prior
to the entry of his guilty plea.
7. Defendant was made aware that he would not be returned to
Delaware until 2016, when he completed the incarceration portion of his
New Jersey sentence. During the plea hearing the prosecutor recited:
The State and the defendant are requesting
immediate sentencing and the State and the
defendant agree to recommend 5 years at Level
V, suspended after 18 months for 18 months at
Level III. This is an IAD case so he is not
1 Collins v. State, 2012 WL 3984545, at *2 (Del. Sept. 11, 2012).
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entitled to his credit to the Delaware sentence as
he is currently serving a sentence out of New
Jersey.
Later, after the entry of the plea, but before imposition of the sentence,
Defendant expressed some confusion about when his Delaware
incarceration would begin. The prosecutor then reiterated that
Defendant would be required to complete his New Jersey incarceration
before returning to Delaware to serve his Level 5 time:
[L]ike I said, his max—his early release date, I
guess, is March 25, 2016 then he’ll come back
here, serve his 18 months
The following exchange took place shortly after the prosecutor’s
statement:
THE DEFENDANT: Are you saying after I’m
done in New Jersey, I come back?
THE COURT: You come back.
The Court told Defendant at the hearing that it would allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea in light of his previous confusion. The Court
also told Defendant that, if he wished to withdraw his plea and discuss it
further with his attorney, it would be willing to place Defendant’s matter
on an afternoon calendar that same day should he decide to re-enter his
guilty plea. Defendant decided not to withdraw his plea and asked to
proceed with sentencing. As mentioned earlier, the Court then imposed
the sentence specified in the Plea Agreement.
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8. Defendant alleges that a note in his sentencing order supports
his contention that he would be returned to Delaware once he was
classified to minimum custody in New Jersey. That note says nothing
about minimum custody status in New Jersey. Rather, it recites only
that “[a]fter defendant’s level-5 time in New Jersey, defendant is to be
brought back to Delaware to do his level-5 time, before starting his
probationary period in New Jersey.”
9. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, during the plea
colloquy Defendant acknowledged that he was aware that the Court
could sentence him for up to five years in prison. He also acknowledged
that no one had promised him what sentence the Court would impose.
In short, he acknowledged that he had no expectation about the sentence
the court would impose beyond the expectation that it would not exceed
the statutory limit of five years.
10. The Court therefore concludes that Defendant’s plea was
knowing, intelligent and voluntary and that Defendant was under no
misapprehension or mistake about his legal rights when he entered his
plea.
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Wherefore, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s counsel’s motion to
withdraw is GRANTED and Defendant’s motion pursuant to Rule 61 is
DENIED.
John A. Parkins, Jr.
Date: October 29, 2014 Superior Court Judge
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Sean K. Sweeney, SBI 00717966, Bayside State Prison, Leesburg
New Jersey
James K. McCloskey, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Wilmington, Delaware
Thomas D. Donovan, Esquire, Thomas D. Donovan, P.A., Dover,
Delaware
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