Vessels v. Rent-A-Center East, Inc. ( 2019 )


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  • IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    CLARICE VESSELS, :C.A. No. S18C-10-031
    Plaintiff, :
    V.
    RENT-A-CENTER EAST, INC.
    Defendant.
    Submitted: October 9, 2019
    Decided: October 23, 2019
    Upon Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
    DENIED
    ORDER
    Edward C. Gill, Esquire, Law Office of Edward C. Gill, P.A., 16 North Bedford
    Street, P.O. Box 824, Georgetown, DE 19947, Attorney for Plaintiff.
    Kimberly L. Gattuso, Esquire, The Bifferato Firm, P.A., 1007 North Orange Street,
    4" Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defendant.
    Elizabeth B. Sandza, Esquire (admitted pro hac vice), Wilson Elser Moskowitz
    Edelman & Dicker LLP, 1500 K Street NW, Suite 330, Washington DC 20005,
    Attorney for Defendant.
    KARSNITZ, J.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On October 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court against
    Defendant for damages allegedly resulting from injuries she sustained on June 12,
    2017 when she slipped and fell in Defendant’s rental business in Seaford, Sussex
    County, Delaware. The Complaint sounds in negligence. Defendant filed its
    Answer on January 30, 2019 and Commissioner Howard issued a Scheduling Order
    on March 28, 2019.
    On June 11, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration in lieu of
    litigation in this Court, based upon an arbitration clause contained in a Lease-
    Purchase Agreement entered into on June 9, 2017 for an unrelated transaction, the
    purchase and sale of a washing machine from Defendant by Plaintiff (the
    “Agreement”). I held a hearing on September 6, 2019, and gave the parties twenty
    days to file Letter Memoranda in support of their positions. Both parties filed Letter
    Memoranda on September 30, 2019. Plaintiff asserted that she returned the washing
    machine to Defendant because it did not fit in her home, and terminated the
    Agreement, on June 12, 2017, before she slipped and fell. On October 1, 2019,
    Defendant filed a letter containing /egal arguments concerning Plaintiffs assertion
    that she terminated the Agreement. However, this letter did not contain factual
    contentions concerning the validity of the Agreement. Thus, on October 2, 2019, I
    directed Defendant to provide such facts to me by October 17, 2019. On October 9,
    2019, Defendant responded, “an eyewitness to Plaintiff's fall, who works for the
    Rent-A-Center store in Seaford, will testify that she fell on June 12, 2017, before she
    terminated her contract on June 12, 2017.” Other than that assertion, Defendant
    presented no facts. However, Defendant presented further legal arguments,
    primarily relying on Vice Chancellor Slights’ recent decision in the Court of
    Chancery, The Innovation Institute, LLC v. St. Joseph Health Source, Inc., et al.,
    C.A. No. 2019-0156-JRS.
    II. DISCUSSION
    I cannot determine the appropriate disposition of this case without more facts
    on the record. Although I am making no ruling of law, I am not persuaded that
    arbitration is required in lieu of litigation for an altogether unrelated claim regardless
    of whether the Agreement was or was not terminated. If the Agreement was not
    terminated, then arbitration may be required. On the other hand, if the Agreement
    was terminated, then arbitration may not be required and we would proceed as usual
    with litigation in this Court.
    The Agreement upon which Defendant relies gives Plaintiff the ability to
    reject the arbitration clause by notifying Defendant’s agents in Texas in writing. In
    my view, the termination of the entire Agreement by notifying Defendant’s agents
    in Seaford, Delaware would accomplish the same result. I find it incongruous that
    the validity of the arbitration clause may turn on the timing of the termination of the
    Agreement vis-a-vis Plaintiff's slip and fall, but it probably does.
    Defendant also relies upon a “zombie” provision in its arbitration clause; i.e.,
    the clause survives termination of the Agreement. For me, the zombie clause in the
    context of an arbitration clause which purports to cover conduct unrelated to the
    purposes of the Agreement! is a bridge too far.
    J am denying Defendant’s motion. A fuller record should allow me to make
    a sounder decision.
    Hil. CONCLUSION
    I deny Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration without prejudice to filing
    a similar motion after the record has been supplemented.
    IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of October, 2019.
    ce: Prothonotary’s Office
    Counsel of Record
    ' Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 
    817 A.2d 149
    (Del. 2002).
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S18C-10-031 CAK

Judges: Karsnitz J.

Filed Date: 10/23/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/23/2019