State of Delaware v. Davenport. ( 2014 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
V. ) ID No. 1401014417
)
FRANK DAVENPORT, )
)
Defendant. )
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice — DENIED
Submitted: December 17, 2014
Decided: December 31, 2014
Defendant Frank Davenport is charged with murder in the first degree and
associated charges in connection with allegations arising from the death of Holly
Wilson on or about January 16, 2010. On January 21, 2014, the grand jury
returned an indictment against Defendant. The State is not pursuing the death
penalty. Trial is scheduled to begin on January 12, 2015, with jury selection
scheduled to begin on January 8, 2015.
On November 19, 2014, this Court granted Defendant’s motion to compel,
over the State’s objection, and ordered the State to provide Defendant with a copy
of an internal Department of Justice memorandum that the State provided to its
expert witness. The State complied with the Order that day. Upon review of the
internal memorandum, Defendant filed this motion to dismiss on the grounds that
the State willfully suppressed Brady material. Defendant argues that the State “sat
on” exculpatory evidence for four years and, more specifically, withheld the
exculpatory evidence for the ten months that this case has been pending. The State
opposes Defendant’s motion to dismiss. It is the State’s position that that contents
of its internal memorandum were not willfully suppressed, and instead, were
protected attorney work product. Furthermore, the State asserts that it offered to
furnish its internal memorandum to the Court for in camera review, which is
“diametrically opposite to an effort to willfully suppress of conceal the information
contained within the memorandum.” 1
Upon consideration of Defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice and the
State’s opposition thereto, the Court finds as follows:
1. It is well-settled law that a Brady violation occurs where there is
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . .
[that] violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”2
2. The Brady requirements promote the fair administration of justice and
prevent the miscarriage of justice by requiring prosecutors to “turn over all
favorable evidence to the accused” in order to “ensure a fair trial.” 3
3. The Delaware Supreme Court has identified the three components of a
Brady violation as “‘(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused,
1
Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss.
2
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
3
Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 987 (Del. 2014).
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because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is
suppressed by the State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the defendant.’” 4
4. Delayed disclosure of exculpatory evidence can result in a Brady violation if
the evidence is not disclosed “within a sufficient amount of time for the
defense to be able to use it.” 5 It is not a Brady violation if, after delayed
disclosure, the defendant can effectively present the evidence at trial and if
the delay does not hinder the defendant’s ability to investigate the evidence. 6
5. It is the defendant’s burden to show that the nondisclosure, or delayed
disclosure, of favorable evidence prejudiced the defendant by denying the
opportunity to use the evidence effectively. 7
6. Defendant argues that the State committed a Brady violation because the
State knowingly suppressed exculpatory evidence contained in an internal
memorandum. Specifically, Defendant refers to a portion of the internal
memorandum in which the State recounts a dispute between two medical
examiners regarding the victim’s cause of death. Within that same
paragraph, the State concedes that the medical examiner’s dispute “would
surely create Brady material for [the State].” 8 Accordingly, the Court finds
4
Id. at 988 (citing Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005)).
5
State v. Braden, 2009 WL 10244069, at *2 (Del. Super. May 21, 2009).
6
Id.
7
Wright, 91 A.3d at 988.
8
State’s Internal Memo. at 4.
3
that the State’s delayed disclosure of information surrounding a dispute over
the victim’s cause of death implicated Brady.
7. However, the Court finds that Defendant has not suffered prejudice because
of the delayed disclosure. Defendant received the information sufficiently in
advance of trial. Defendant sought relief from the State’s delay in the form
of a motion for an extension of time to review the memorandum and retain a
defense expert, which the Court granted. Defendant has not requested other
relief, including a trial continuance, which could be considered.
8. For the aforementioned reasons, the State’s delay in disclosing Brady
material has not prejudiced Defendant. Defendant has had sufficient time to
use the information effectively and has the ability to request other relief,
including continuance of trial, from this Court. Accordingly, dismissal of
the indictment is inappropriate under these circumstances.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED on this 31st day of
December 2014, Defendant Frank Davenport’s Motion to Dismiss with
Prejudice is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
____________________________________
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
4