Graham v. Delaware Golf & Travel, LLC ( 2017 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
L‟TANYA GRAHAM, and )
MARLAINE S. WILSON, as next )
friend of GABRIEL NIEEM )
WILSON, )
)
Plaintiffs, ) C.A. No. N15C-12-245 CLS
)
v. )
)
DELAWARE GOLF & TRAVEL, )
LLC, d/b/a a Limited Liability )
Company and GOLDCLUB )
PARTNERS, LTD., a Delaware )
Corporation, MICHAEL ROSE, )
PML CLUBS, INC. and MICRO )
MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
Date Submitted: August 23, 2016
Date Decided: January 20, 2017
On Defendant Michael Rose‟s Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6).
GRANTED.
ORDER
Beverly L. Bove, Esquire, and Vincent J.C. Hendrick, II, Esquire Wilmington,
Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiffs L‟Tanya Graham and Marlaine S. Wilson.
Michael Rose, pro se Defendant.
SCOTT, J.
Defendant, Michael Rose, moves this Court to dismiss him as a Defendant in
the present action pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6). For the
following reasons, Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiffs L„Tanya Graham is the mother of decedent William O. Brown
(hereinafter “Mr. Brown”) and Plaintiff Marlaine S. Wilson is the parent of Gabriel
Nieem Wilson, Mr. Brown‟s minor child respectively. On November 16, 2015,
Mr. Brown was an invitee at The Gold Club located at 1031 South Market Street,
Wilmington, Delaware 19802. Mr. Brown was shot in the bathroom by an
unknown patron. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint with this Court on December 30,
2015. Plaintiffs plead intentional, willful and wanton, reckless, and negligent
conduct against all Defendants, as well as a wrongful death action against all
Defendants, including Defendant, Michael Rose (hereinafter “Mr. Rose”).
Plaintiffs plead that Kent Manor, Inc., a Delaware corporation owned the property
where the incident occurred, 1031 South Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware
19802.1 Similarly, Defendant PML Clubs, Inc. is the owner of Defendant
Delaware Golf and Travel, LLC, d/b/a The Gold Club. Consequently, Mr. Rose is
the owner and operator of Kent Manor, Inc. and Defendant, PML Clubs Inc. In
1
Kent Manor, Inc. was dismissed from the case sub judice without prejudice.
2
March 2016 this Court entered a Final Abatement Order and The Gold Club was
closed.
Standard of Review
The test for sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss is whether a plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set
of circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint. 2 In making its
determination, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint
as true and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.3 The complaint must be without merit as a matter of fact or law to be
dismissed.4 Therefore, if the plaintiff can recover under any conceivable set of
circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint, the motion to dismiss will
not be granted.5
Discussion
Defendant Michael Rose contends that a Motion to Dismiss is proper
because Plaintiffs seek to pierce the corporate veil and hold Mr. Rose individually
liable for the wrongful death of Mr. Brown. Mr. Rose argues that Plaintiffs have
2
Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (1978); see Cambium Ltd. v. Trilantic Capital Partners III
L.P., 2012 WL 172844, at *1 (Del. Jan. 20, 2012) (citing Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley
Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 2011)).
3
Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034-36 (Del.1998); Nix v. Sawyer, 466 A.2d 407, 410
(Del. Super. Ct.1983).
4
Diamond State Tel. Co. v. University of Delaware, 269 A.2d 52 (Del.1970).
5
Ramunno, 705 A.2d at 1034; see Cambium, 2012 WL 172844, at *1 (citing Cent. Mortg., 27
A.3d at 537).
3
not plead facts to demonstrate that he was present at the time of the incident or
participated in the events which caused Mr. Brown‟s death. Plaintiffs seem to
argue that Mr. Rose is liable for the wrongful death of Mr. Brown under two
theories. First, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Rose himself acted willfully, recklessly,
and intentionally because at the time of Mr. Brown‟s death he operated illegal
activities through his business PML Clubs, Inc.6 Second, Plaintiffs argue that Mr.
Rose is liable under the theory that Mr. Rose willfully, recklessly, and intentionally
failed to train, supervise and monitor The Gold Club staff and premises, fully
aware of the unremitting criminal activity and previous injured patrons prior to Mr.
Brown‟s death.
Mr. Rose‟s Motion to Dismiss is proper. Plaintiffs failed to plead facts in
either their original Complaint or Amended Complaint demonstrating that Mr.
Rose participated in, or was involved with, the incidents surrounding Mr. Brown‟s
death. Mr. Brown was shot by an unknown invitee in the bathroom of The Gold
Club, and even accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs, no evidence
exists demonstrating that Mr. Rose was a party involved in this shooting. To
address Plaintiffs‟ second argument, as a matter of law this Court does not have
6
Plaintiffs cite to three online news articles stating that Mr. Rose plead guilty to racketeering,
money laundering, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine in an action in the Northern District of
California.
4
jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil of Defendant, PML Clubs, Inc. to hold Mr.
Rose personally liable for his alleged tortious conduct. Under Delaware Law,
“[t]he personal participation doctrine stands for the idea that, in certain situations,
an officer in a corporation can be held liable for his own wrongful acts.”7 Thus, a
court may impose liability on “corporate officers for torts which they „commit,
participate in, or inspire, even though the acts are performed in the name of the
corporation.‟”8 Furthermore, “individual liability attaches only where an officer
„directed, ordered, ratified, approved, or consented to‟ the tortious act in
question.”9 However, “only the Chancery Court may preside over an action to
pierce the corporate veil.”10 Thus, this Court may not determine whether Mr. Rose
is individually liable for Mr. Brown‟s wrongful death through alleged tortious acts
performed in the name of the corporation. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant
Michael Rose‟s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Calvin L. Scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
7
Brasby v. Morris, 2007 WL 949485, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2007) (citing Brandt v.
Rokeby Realty Co., 2004 WL 2050519, at *26 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2004)).
8
Brasby, 2007 WL 949485, at *8 (quoting Heroemus v. Ulrick, 1997 WL 524127 (Del. Super.
Ct. July 9, 1997)).
9
Brasby, 2007 WL 949485, at *8 (citing Brandt, 2004 WL 2050519, at *26); see also Feeley v.
NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 667 (Del. Ch. 2012) (stating that “Courts also may use piercing to
benefit tort claimants, who additionally can recover from the individuals who committed the
tort.”).
10
Vepco Park, Inc. v. Custom Air Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 1613654, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 25,
2016); see also Sonne v. Sacks, 314 A.2d 194 (Del. 1973) (stating that “piercing the corporate
veil may be done only in the Court of Chancery, when the purpose of the action is to obtain a
judgment against individual stockholders or officers”).
5