Damiani v. Gill. ( 2015 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
    PABLO A. DAMIANI,                           )
    Plaintiff,                    )
    v.                                )       C.A. No. N14C-05-186-ALR
    GEORGE GILL (Sergeant)                      )
    Defendant                     )
    Submitted: January 23, 2015
    Decided: January 26, 2015
    Upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel
    DENIED
    Self-represented litigants in civil proceedings have no legal or equitable
    right to appointed counsel.1 Moreover, when the Court applies the analysis set
    forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for appointment of counsel, the Court
    finds that appointment of counsel is neither necessary nor appropriate, as follows:
    (i) plaintiff has demonstrated the ability to present his own case; (ii) plaintiff is in
    the nest position to develop the facts on his own behalf; (iii) significant factual
    investigation is not necessary as plaintiff is likely is own main witness; (iv) the
    case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; (v) expert testimony will not be
    1
    Montgomery v. Pinchak, 
    294 F.3d 492
    , 498 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Indigent civil litigants possess
    neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to appointed counsel.”); Parham v. Johnson, 
    126 F.3d 454
    , 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997); Boulware v. Battaglia, 
    344 F. Supp. 889
    , 903 (D. Del. 1972).
    required; and (vi) plaintiff’s inability to afford counsel is not significant under the
    circumstances presented.2
    NOW, THEREFORE, this 26th day of January, 2015 Plaintiff’s Motion
    for Appointment of Counsel is hereby DENIED.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Andrea L. Rocanelli
    _____________________________
    Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
    2
    
    Parham, 126 F.3d at 457
    (delineating the criteria under which an indigent litigant is entitled to
    have counsel appointed as developed in Tabron v. Grace, 
    6 F.3d 147
    , 155-56, 157 n.5 (3d Cir.
    1993)).