Johnson v. Student Funding Group, LLC ( 2015 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
    CURTIS JOHNSON,                               )
    Plaintiff,          )
    v.                               )
    )
    STUDENT FUNDING GROUP,                        )    C.A. No. N14C-08-098 ALR
    LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability             )
    Company, & SERGIO SOTOLONGO,                  )
    Individually,                                 )
    Defendants.            )
    Upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss — DENIED
    Submitted: December 1, 2014
    Decided: January 26, 2015
    Curtis Johnson, Plaintiff, filed this action in August 2014 alleging that
    Sergio Sotolongo and Student Funding Group, Defendants, breached the Deferred
    Compensation Agreement (“DCA”) and alleging violations of the Delaware Wage
    Payment & Collection Act (“WPCA”).            Defendants have moved to dismiss
    Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and on statute of limitations grounds.
    Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss.
    Upon consideration of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s
    opposition thereto, the Court finds as follows:
    1. “A motion to dismiss must be decided solely upon the allegations in the
    complaint.”1 The Court shall accept all “well-pleaded” allegations as true
    and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.2
    Factual allegations, even if vague, are “well-pleaded” if they provide notice
    of the claim to the other party. 3 The Court should deny the motion if the
    claimant “may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of
    circumstances susceptible of proof.”4
    2. Generally, the Court will not consider matters outside of the pleadings when
    considering a motion to dismiss.5 However, if a party presents extraneous
    documents in support of its motion to dismiss, it is within the Court’s
    discretion to include or exclude the extraneous documents from its
    consideration.6 If the Court excludes the extraneous documents from its
    consideration, the motion to dismiss remains preserved. 7 On the other hand,
    1
    Am. Bottling Co. v. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P., 
    2009 WL 3290729
    , at *2 (Del. Super.
    Sept. 30, 2009).
    2
    Spence v. Funk, 
    396 A.2d 967
    , 968 (Del. 1978); Ramunno v. Cawley, 
    705 A.2d 1029
    , 1034
    (Del. 1998).
    3
    
    Spence, 396 A.2d at 968
    .
    4
    
    Id. 5 Super.
    Ct. Civ. R. 12(b); In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 
    669 A.2d 59
    , 68 (Del.
    1995).
    6
    Doe 30’s Mother v. Bradley, 
    58 A.3d 429
    , 444 (Del. Super. 2012) (explaining that the trial
    court has “full discretion to accept and consider extraneous submissions when adjudicating a
    motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6).”). See also Vanderbilt Income & Growth Assoc., L.L.C. v.
    Arvida/JMB Managers, Inc., 
    691 A.2d 609
    , 612-13 (Del. 1996).
    7
    Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) (“If on a [12(b)(6)] motion . . . matters outside the pleadings are
    presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
    judgment.”) (emphasis added).
    2
    if the Court considers the extraneous documents, the Court shall treat the
    motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, unless an exception
    applies. 8
    3. There are two instances where the Court’s consideration of extraneous
    documents will not require conversion of the motion to dismiss to a motion
    for summary judgment.          “The first exception is when the document is
    integral to the plaintiff’s claim and incorporated into the complaint . . . [t]he
    second exception is when the document is not being relied upon to prove the
    truth of its contents.”9
    4. In presenting the motion to dismiss, Defendants have relied upon matters
    outside the pleadings, including a copy of the Executive Employment
    Agreement (“EEA”) and an affidavit by Defendant Sergio Sotolongo.
    Defendants argue that the Court should review the EEA upon consideration
    of the motion to dismiss because the EEA is “incorporated by reference” in
    the DCA and is therefore “integral to Plaintiff’s claims and Complaint.” 10 In
    opposition, Plaintiff takes the position that the documents appended to
    8
    In re Santa Fe Pac. 
    Corp, 669 A.2d at 69
    .
    9
    Vanderbilt Income & Growth Assoc., 
    L.L.C., 691 A.2d at 613
    (citing In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp.
    S’holder Litig., 
    669 A.2d 59
    , 70 (Del. 1995)).
    10
    Defs.’ Reply at 4.
    3
    Defendants’ motion are matters outside the pleadings and that Court should
    not consider any reference to the documents by Defendants. 11
    5. Here, consideration of the extraneous documents requires conversion of the
    motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because neither
    exception applies. While Plaintiff’s complaint does incorporate the EEA by
    reference, the Court finds that the EEA is not integral to Plaintiff’s claim
    because Plaintiff’s claim alleges breach of the DCA, the contract succeeding
    the terminated EEA.          Likewise, Defendants submitted an affidavit of
    Defendant Sergio Sotolongo, seeking to verify the contents and the truth of
    the EEA.12
    6. Accordingly, the Court shall exclude the extraneous documents from its
    consideration of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. If Defendants want the
    Court to consider the extraneous documents, Defendants may file a motion
    for summary judgment.
    7. Plaintiff’s complaint is “well-pleaded” and states a claim upon which relief
    may be granted.        As a result, dismissal for failure to state a claim is
    inappropriate.
    11
    Pl.’s Answer at 3.
    12
    In re Santa Fe Pac. 
    Corp., 669 A.2d at 70
    (permitting consideration of outside documents
    when “the documents are the very documents that are alleged to contain the various
    misrepresentations or omissions and are relevant not to prove the truth of their contents but only
    to determine what the documents stated.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    4
    8. Next, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is inappropriate because the DCA
    includes a choice of law provision and provides Delaware as the exclusive
    forum to resolve disputes arising out of the DCA. Generally, Delaware
    courts will honor such choice of law provisions “so long as the jurisdiction
    selected bears some material relationship to the transaction.” 13 A material
    relationship exists here because Defendant Student Funding Group is a
    Delaware limited liability company.
    9. Finally, it is premature for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim as time-
    barred because, without discovery, it is unclear when Plaintiff’s claim
    accrued and/or if the alleged violation by Defendants is ongoing and may
    trigger new causes of action. Under these circumstances, Defendants are not
    entitled to dismissal as a matter of law for lack of jurisdiction or on the basis
    of statute of limitations.
    NOW, THEREFORE, this 26th day of January, 2015, Defendants’ Motion
    to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Andrea L. Rocanelli
    __________________________________
    The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
    13
    J.S. Alberici Constr. Co. v. Mid-West Conveyor Co., 
    750 A.2d 518
    , 520 (Del. 2000).
    5