State of Delaware v. Davenport. ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
V. ) ID No. 1401014417
)
FRANK DAVENPORT, )
Defendant. )
Submitted: February 10, 2015
Decided: March 4, 2015
Upon Defendant’s Motion in Limine
(as to statements by Holly Wilson in October 2009)
DENIED
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion in Limine.
Defendant seeks to exclude certain evidence on the grounds that it is inadmissible
hearsay. The underlying case concerns the death of Holly Wilson, which occurred
on January 16, 2010. The State has charged Defendant Frank Davenport with
Wilson’s murder. In connection with the murder trial scheduled for June 2015, the
State seeks to admit evidence of an alleged incident involving Defendant and Ms.
Wilson in October 2009.1 Defendant’s pending Motion seeks to limit the State’s
use of such evidence at the June 2015 murder trial.
Specifically, Defendant moves to exclude: (i) a letter to Defendant allegedly
hand-written by Ms. Wilson in October 2009; (ii) statements by Ms. Wilson to her
1
Defendant is facing separate charges arising from the alleged October 2009 incident.
son about the alleged October 2009 incident; and (iii) statements to police officers
by Ms. Wilson and her son related to the alleged October 2009 incident.2
Defendant concedes that the evidence at issue is non-testimonial. Moreover,
Defendant emphasizes that his challenge does not implicate his Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses. Rather, Defendant seeks a ruling in advance of trial to
exclude the State’s evidence as inadmissible hearsay. 3 The State opposes
Defendant’s Motion on the grounds that the challenged evidence is admissible and
should be presented for the jury’s consideration. This is the Court’s decision on
Defendant’s Motion in Limine.
1. Statements by Ms. Wilson’s Son
It is expected that Stephen McElwee, Ms. Wilson’s son, will testify as a
witness at trial and will be subject to examination and/or cross-examination by
Defendant’s lawyers. Accordingly, to the extent that Defendant objects to
testimony by police officers about what Mr. McElwee told police, those objections
are OVERRULED. To the extent that the State intends to present Ms. Wilson’s
statements to her son through the testimony of Mr. Elwee, then the admissibility of
those statements by Ms. Wilson is governed by the analysis set forth below.
2
Defendant must specifically identify what evidence he seeks to exclude as hearsay.
Defendant’s Motion in Limine, as submitted to the Court, challenges “other hearsay testimony,
including, but not limited to testimony by police officers about what the decedent or the
decedent’s son told police.” Def.’s Mot. in Limine 2. To the extent that Defendant seeks a
ruling before trial, the Court will limit its consideration to the statements enumerated above.
3
The Court will limit its ruling to the parameters of Defendant’s legal challenge.
2
2. Ms. Wilson’s Statements
Defendant challenges the admissibility of certain out-court-statements made
by Ms. Wilson. Specifically, Defendant challenges: (i) the hand-written letter
found by police in October 2009, which the State claims Ms. Wilson wrote at the
time of the October 2009 incident; (ii) Ms. Wilson’s statements to her son, made at
the time of the October 2009 incident; and (iii) Ms. Wilson’s statements to police
about the October 2009 incident.
Under the Delaware Rules of Evidence (“D.R.E.”), an out-of-court written
or verbal statement by someone other than the declarant testifying offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted qualifies as hearsay. 4 Hearsay is
generally inadmissible unless the statement is privy to a recognized exception to
the hearsay rule.5 There are three hearsay exceptions applicable to Ms. Wilson’s
out-of-court statements.
(a) D.R.E. 803(2) – Excited Utterance
An excited utterance qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule because it
is a spontaneous statement made in reaction to an exciting event rather than the
result of a reflective thought.6 The statement is therefore considered reliable
4
D.R.E. 801(a), (c).
5
D.R.E. 802, 803, 804; Culp v. State, 766 A,2d 486, 489 (Del. 2001).
6
Culp, 766 A.2d at 490-91.
3
because the declarant is not in a position to fabricate the statement.7 To determine
if a statement qualifies as an excited utterance under D.R.E. 803(2), the Delaware
Supreme Court explained that:
a statement must satisfy the following three requirements: ‘(1) the
excitement of the declarant must have been precipitated by an event;
(2) the statement being offered as evidence must have been made
during the time period while the excitement of the event was
continuing; and (3) the statement must be related to the startling
event.’8
The Court further explained that the declarant must have personally perceived the
startling event for a statement to be admissible under this exception. 9
In the case before the Court, the State intends to present evidence that
Defendant threatened Ms. Wilson in October 2009 and that Ms. Wilson was
frightened. According to the State, at or about the time of Defendant’s threats, Ms.
Wilson wrote a note to Defendant describing his threats and then contacted her son
and expressed her fear. The Court finds that Ms. Wilson personally perceived the
startling event and that Ms. Wilson’s statements concerning the October 2009
incident are inherently reliable as excited utterances. Accordingly, Ms. Wilson’s
hand-written letter, statements to her son, and statements to the police are
admissible in consideration of D.R.E. 803(2) and Defendant’s objections are
OVERRULED.
7
Id. at 490.
8
Id. at 489-90 (citing Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272, 274 (Del. 1998)).
9
Id. at 490.
4
(b) D.R.E. 803(3) – Then-Existing State of Mind
Statements offered to show the “present intention or an existing state of
mind the deceased,” qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule. 10 According to the
Delaware Supreme Court, there are five requirements to establish the necessary
foundation to admit statements reflective of a declarant’s then-existing state of
mind. 11 The five factors required for the admissibility of such statements are: (1)
the statements must be relevant and material; (2) the statements must relate to the
declarant’s existing state of mind at the time the statements were made; (3) the
statements must have been made in a natural manner; (4) the statements must have
been made under circumstances dispelling suspicion; and (5) the statements must
not contain suggestion of sinister motives.12
In this case, the out-of-court statements made by Ms. Wilson satisfy the five
factors for admissibility as a hearsay exception. The statements at issue include a
hand-written letter by Ms. Wilson to Defendant while Ms. Wilson was in a state of
distress and fear, wherein she explained her feelings, described Defendant’s
actions, and explained why she was ending her relationship with Defendant. While
experiencing that same distress and fear, Ms. Wilson called and spoke to her
son. Accordingly, the Court finds the first four factors are satisfied. Moreover,
10
D.R.E. 803(3); Derrickson v. State, 321 A.2d 497, 503 (Del. 1974).
11
Derrickson, 321 A.2d at 503.
12
Id.
5
there has been no suggestion by Defendant that Ms. Wilson had sinister motives to
make such statements and thus, the fifth factor is satisfied. The Court finds that
Ms. Wilsons’s statements in the hand-written letter and as expressed verbally to
her son and the police are inherently reliable as describing her then-existing state
of mind. Accordingly, Ms. Wilson’s statements are admissible in consideration of
D.R.E. 803(3) and Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED.
(c) D.R.E. 807 – Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness
Moreover, even if Ms. Wilson’s out-of-court statements were not admissible
as excited utterances or as statements reflective of her then-existing state of mind,
the Court is satisfied that Ms. Wilson’s statements meet the test for circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness. Specifically, consistent with D.R.E. 807: (1) Ms.
Wilson’s statements are offered as evidence of a material fact; (2) the statements
are more probative on the point for which the statements are offered than any other
evidence which the State can procure through reasonable efforts because Ms.
Wilson is unavailable as a witness; and (3) the general purposes of the rules of
evidence and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statements into evidence. The Court is “satisfied that there is a guaranty of
trustworthiness associated with the proffered hearsay statement that is equivalent
to the guaranties of trustworthiness recognized and implicit in the other hearsay
6
exceptions.”13 Accordingly, Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED in
consideration of D.R.E. 807.
NOW, THEREFORE, on this 4th day of March, 2015, Defendant’s
Motion in Limine is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
_____________________________________________
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
13
Purnell v. State, 979 A.2d 1102, 1107 (Del. 2009) (citations omitted).
7