Furman v. Delaware Department of Transportation ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
JEFFREY FURMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) C.A. No. N10C-10-164 CLS
DELAWARE )
DEPARTMENT OF )
TRANSPORTATION, )
)
Defendant, )
)
v. )
)
SCOTTSDALE )
INDEMNITY COMPANY, )
)
Third-Party )
Defendant.
Date Submitted: January 2, 2015
Date Decided: March 23, 2015
On Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. GRANTED.
ORDER
Frederick H. Schranck, Esq., Delaware Attorney General, Delaware Department of
Justice, Dover, Delaware 19903. Attorney for Defendant Delaware Department of
Transportation.
Anthony A. Figliola, Jr. Esq., Figliola & Figliola, Wilmington, Delaware 19810.
Attorney for Plaintiff.
Bruce C. Herron, Esq., Losco & Marconi, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney
for Third-Party Defendant Scottsdale Indemnity Company.
Scott, J.
Introduction
Before the Court is Defendant Delaware Department of Transportation’s
(“Defendant” or “DelDOT”) Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Jeffrey
Furman’s (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint. The Court has reviewed the parties’
submissions. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was grossly negligent in failing to maintain
Pennsylvania Avenue at Pasture Street, and that Defendant violated 11 Del. C. §
4001.
On October 24, 2008, Plaintiff stepped into an uncovered maintenance box
while crossing Pennsylvania Avenue at Pasture Street in Wilmington, Delaware.
Plaintiff alleges there were no warning signs. As a result, Plaintiff claims to have
suffered permanent injuries, including a tear of his left Achilles tendon, bilateral
ankle strain, right rotator cuff syndrome, right wrist sprain, right should strain and
instability.
On December 20, 2010, DelDOT filed a motion to dismiss asserting the
defense of sovereign immunity and attaching the affidavit of Debra Lawhead (“Ms.
Lawhead”), Insurance Coverage Officer for the State of Delaware, to show that
neither the State nor DelDOT had waived immunity because neither purchased
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insurance coverage applicable to Plaintiff’s injuries. 1 The Court granted the
motion based on statements contained in Ms. Lawhead’s affidavit. 2 On October
19, 2011, the Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that, in order for this
Court to rely on the affidavit, it was required to formally convert the motion into a
summary judgment motion and provide notice to the parties.3 The Supreme Court
found that the trial court erred by ruling prematurely without giving Plaintiff an
opportunity to discover whether an insurance policy existed. 4 Therefore, the
Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case to allow the trial court to reconsider
the motion and provide a reasonable opportunity for the parties to present factual
material. 5
On remand, this Court allowed DelDOT to add Scottsdale Indemnity
Company’s (“Scottsdale”) as a party to this lawsuit. 6 On November 22, 2013,
Plaintiff asserted a third-party claim against Scottsdale alleging that Scottsdale was
liable for DelDOT’s damages because it provided insurance coverage to DelDOT.7
On March 26, 2014, DelDOT filed its Third-Party Complaint against Scottsdale. 8
On April 2, 2014, Scottsdale moved to dismiss DelDOT’s Third-Party
Complaint under Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the
1
D.I. 3.
2
Order dated Mar. 29, 2011.
3
Furman v. Delaware Dep't of Transp., 30 A.3d 771, 774 (Del. 2011).
4
Id. at 774.
5
Id. at 775.
6
DelDOT Mot. to Add a Party, D.I. 23; Order dated Aug. 19, 2013.
7
Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 19-20.
8
D.I. 45.
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unambiguous terms of the its policy (the “Scottsdale Policy”) do not provide
DelDOT coverage for Plaintiff’s injuries. On July 9, 2014, this Court granted
Scottsdale’s Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint, finding that the Scottsdale
Policy was unambiguous and did not provide coverage to DelDOT for the type of
injury claimed by Plaintiff in this action. 9
Defendant filed a renewed Motion to Dismiss on August 1, 2014, based on
the Court’s July 9 ruling. The Court sent a letter on October 28, 2014, informing
the parties that Defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss must be converted to a
motion for summary judgment as Defendant asked the Court to consider evidence
outside the scope of the pleadings.
On December 14, 2014, Defendant filed this Motion for Summary Judgment
of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
Standard of Review
The Court may grant summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” 10 The moving party
bears the initial burden of showing that no material issues of fact are present.11
Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
9
Order dated July 9, 2014.
10
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991).
11
Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).
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demonstrate that there are material issues of fact in dispute.12 In considering a
motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. 13 “Summary judgment will not be granted
when a more thorough inquiry into the facts is desirable to clarify the application
of the law to the circumstances.” 14
Discussion
Defendant did not waive sovereign immunity in this case. The Eleventh
Amendment prohibits suits against the individual state in federal courts. 15 In
Delaware, “[s]uits may be brought against the State, according to such regulations
as shall be made by law.” 16 In other words, unless explicitly waived by the
General Assembly, sovereign immunity is an absolute bar to liability claims
against the State. 17 The General Assembly must express clear intent to waive
sovereign immunity. 18 However, the defense of sovereign immunity is waived
when the risk of loss is covered by the state insurance program. 19 The purpose of
the Insurance for the Protection of the State Act 20 is “to protect the public from
12
Id. at 681.
13
Burkhart, 602 A.2d at 59.
14
Phillip-Postle v. BJ Prods., Inc., 2006 WL 1720073, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 26, 2006).
15
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
16
Del. Const. Art. I, § 9.
17
Turnbull v. Fink, 668 A.2d 1370, 1374 (Del. 1995) (citing Wilmington Housing Authority v.
Williamson, 228 A.2d, 782, 786 (Del. 1697).
18
Pauley v. Reinoehl, 848 A.2d 569, 573 (Del. 2004) (citations omitted).
19
18 Del. C. § 6511.
20
18 Del. C. § 6501 et. seq.
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wrongful acts committed by governmental officials by waiving the State’s
sovereign immunity up to a legislatively imposed ceiling.” 21
In order for Plaintiff to prevail in a suit against the State brought under the
State Torts Claims Act, 22 he must show that: “(1) the State has waived the defense
of sovereign immunity for the actions mentioned in the complaint; and (2) the State
Torts Claims Act does not bar the action.” 23 The State Torts Claims Act bars the
action when:
(1) The act or omission complained or arose out of and in connection
with the performance of an official duty requiring a determination of
policy, the interpretation or enforcement of statutes, rules or
regulations, the granting or withholding of publicly created or
regulated entitlement or privilege or any other official duty involving
the exercise of discretion on the public officer, employee or member
shall have supervisory authority;
(2) The act or omission complained of was done in good faith and in
the belief that the public interest would best be served thereby; and
(3) The act or omission complained of was done without gross or
wanton negligence[.] 24
However, when the General Assembly enacted 10 Del. C. § 4001, it did not
intend “to waive sovereign immunity in all cases where a ministerial act was
performed with gross or wanton negligence or in bad faith.” 25 On interlocutory
appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held “10 Del. C. § 4001, part of the State Tort
Claims Act, does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity where the State
21
Pauley, 848 A.2d at 573 (citation omitted).
22
10 Del. C. § 4001-4005.
23
Pauley, 848 A.2d at 573.
24
10 Del. C. § 4001.
25
Doe v. Cates, 499 A.2d 1175, 1180 (Del. 1985).
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has not provided insurance coverage, even where a party alleges gross
negligence.” 26 Therefore, if there is no insurance available to cover the type of
loss or risk alleged in the complaint, then sovereign immunity is a bar to recovery.
In this case, Plaintiff is unable to prove a set of facts that could entitle him to
relief because Defendant does not have insurance to cover the type or risk or loss
alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. As Ms. Lawhead 27 indicated in her
affidavit, she is responsible for administering the Insurance Determination
Committee policies for the State and has personal knowledge of those policies.
She also stated that neither the State nor DelDOT has purchased insurance for the
type of circumstances listed in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Moreover, upon
the addition of Scottsdale as a party to the case and discovery to determine whether
its insurance policy for DelDOT was applicable to this case, the Court determined
that the Scottsdale Policy unambiguously did not provide coverage to DelDOT for
the type of risk or loss alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 28 Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s allegation in his complaint that Defendant acted with gross negligence is
not sufficient to overcome the bar to recovery under sovereign immunity because
there is no insurance available to cover that type of risk or loss.
26
State of Delaware Dep't of Health & Soc. Services v. Sheppard, 864 A.2d 929 (Del. 2004).
27
The Insurance Coverage Administrator for the State of Delaware.
28
See Order dated July 9, 2014.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Calvin L. Scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
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