State of Delaware v. Massas. ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. ) ID. No. 1410014987
)
LAMAR MASSAS. )
)
ORDER
On this 24th day of April, 2015, IT IS ORDERED as follows: Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
Daniel B. McBride, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for State of Delaware.
Kathryn Van Amerongen, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, Public Defender’s
Office, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant.
Scott, J.
Introduction
Before the Court is Defendant Lamar Massas’ (“Defendant”) Motion to
Suppress, brought by counsel. Defendant argues that his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure was violated as a result of an improper
pre-textual stop that exceeded the scope of a traffic stop. The Court has reviewed
the parties’ submissions, held a suppression hearing and reviewed the parties’
supplemental submissions on the issue of standing. For the following reasons, the
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
Findings of Fact
On October 21, 2014, Officer Dirocco of the Wilmington Police Department
was on patrol when he observed a teal Nissan Altima fail to stop completely at a
stop sign at the intersection of West 29th Street and Tatnall Street, after which he
activated his emergency equipment and stopped the vehicle.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Dirocco noted that he had seen this same
vehicle earlier that day around noon, but did not call it in because the vehicle was
parked and unoccupied. Officer Dirocco took notice of the vehicle because of an
officer safety alert that had been distributed by Wilmington Detectives that
morning, and provided a description of the vehicle and its license plate number.
The officer safety alert also noted that detectives wanted to speak with occupants
of interest associated with that vehicle, Tasia Richmond (“Richmond”) and Lamar
Massas, regarding them being potential witnesses to a homicide, and instructed
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officers to call Detective Fox should they encounter the vehicle. Officer Dirocco
also recalled an earlier officer safety alert sent in September for that same vehicle,
which provided a description of the vehicle and its license plate number, and stated
that the vehicle had been seen fleeing several recent shooting scenes.
Officer Dirocco testified that, while he was aware that Richmond and
Defendant were occupants of interest associated with that vehicle, he was not
aware of the identities of the vehicle’s occupants when he initially pulled the
vehicle over for the moving violation. Due to the officer safety alerts on that
vehicle, which Officer Dirocco was aware of at the time of the stop, he
immediately radioed for additional units when he called in the traffic stop at
1:51p.m. Officer Dirocco approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and asked the
driver – subsequently identified as Richmond – for her license, registration and
insurance. Richmond immediately produced the requested information. At that
time, Officer Dirocco also asked Richmond a few standard questions asked during
traffic stops such as, where are you were going to and coming from. Officer
Dirocco testified that Richmond appeared extremely nervous in response to routine
questions that would not trigger such unusual nervousness, to the extent that it
made Officer Dirocco nervous. He testified that he observed Richmond’s hands
shaking or trembling, and that he could hear in Richmond’s voice her breathing
very heavily and fast as she answered his questions.
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Officers Cannon and Tiberi of the Wilmington Police Department arrived at
the scene to assist at 1:53p.m. At that time, Officer Cannon approached the
passenger side of the vehicle and made contact with Defendant, who was in the
passenger seat. In response to Richmond’s unusually nervous demeanor, Officer
Dirocco asked Richmond to step out of the vehicle. Officer Cannon then observed
Defendant suddenly become extremely nervous and jittery when Richmond was
removed from the vehicle. For that reason, Officer Cannon asked Defendant to
step out of the vehicle as well.
Both Richmond and Defendant were cooperative and complied with the
officers’ instruction to sit on the curb while Officer Dirocco called Det. Fox.
Officer Dirocco spoke with Det. Fox, who instructed him to transport Richmond
and Defendant to the Wilmington Police Department. Richmond and Defendant
were then patted down for weapons and placed in custody, pursuant to department
procedure when transporting persons in a marked patrol vehicle. As they were
being moved to the patrol vehicles for transport, Officer Tiberi overheard
Defendant say to Richmond, “yo, make sure the vehicle is locked.”
In response to Defendant’s statement to Richmond, Officer Tiberi went back
to the vehicle. Upon peering through the rear driver’s side window, Officer Tiberi
saw in plain view a handgun sticking out from underneath the back of the driver’s
seat. Officer Dirocco testified that, while the rear window was tinted, he could still
see through it and into the vehicle when he was at the window.
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Richmond and Defendant were placed in separate patrol vehicles to be
transported to Wilmington Police Department. The call detail report, which was
submitted at the hearing and notes the timing of radio transmissions related to the
stop, shows that one patrol vehicle departed the scene at 2:00p.m. and the other
patrol vehicle departed the scene at 2:05p.m. At the hearing, Officer Dirocco
could not recalled which vehicle departed first, but testified that he transported
Richmond in his vehicle. The call detail report shows that the entire duration of
the traffic stop lasted between 9 and 14 minutes.
Officer Dirocco also testified that a routine traffic stop for a moving
violation where an e-ticket is issued takes approximately 15 to 20 minutes. He
concluded that the duration of the actual stop here was the same duration as, if not
shorter than, it would have been had he merely conducted the traffic stop and
issued Richmond an e-ticket. Officer Dirocco added that while Richmond was not
issued an e-ticket at the scene, she was ultimately charged for the moving violation
together with her other charges.
Defendant was subsequently charged with Possession of a Firearm by a
Person Prohibited, Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, Carrying a
Concealed Deadly Weapon and Possession of a Stolen Firearm. On January 16,
2015, Defendant filed this Motion to Suppress.
On April 13, 2015, the Court held a suppression hearing on this motion. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the Court instructed the parties to submit
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supplemental briefing on the issue of whether Defendant, as a passenger in the
vehicle, had standing to challenge the stop of the vehicle and discovery of the
handgun.
Parties’ Contentions
Defendant contends that the evidence found in the vehicle should be
suppressed because it was found in violation of his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Defendant argues that the traffic stop was
invalid because it was purely pretextual in order for the officer to detain him and
search the vehicle. Defendant also argues that, regardless of pretext, his detention
was unlawful because exceeded both the reasonable scope and duration permitted
under Terry.
The State contends that the evidence found in the vehicle should not be
suppressed. The State argues that the traffic stop was valid and not pretextual
because Officer Dirocco conducted the traffic stop in response to Richmond’s
failure to stop completely at a stop sign. The State also argues that Defendant’s
detention as a result of the traffic stop was both reasonable in duration and within
the scope permitted under Terry because the entire detention lasted approximately
ten minutes. Moreover, the State argues that Defendant’s detention was within the
scope permitted under Terry because the handgun was found in plain view on the
floor of the vehicle, and not pursuant to a search of the vehicle. In other words, the
discovery of the handgun was within the scope of the traffic stop because it was
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not found as a result of a separate investigation. Finally, the State argues that
Defendant does not have standing to contest the search of the vehicle.
Discussion
A person only has standing to challenge evidence seized as a result of a
violation of one's own constitutional rights. 1 The petitioner must demonstrate his
own “legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place” before he may
challenge the validity of a search or seizure. 2 For purposes of protection under the
Fourth Amendment, automobiles are treated differently than houses. 3 A passenger
who does not own or exercise control over a vehicle does not possess a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the vehicle in which he is traveling. 4 Therefore, a mere
passenger in a vehicle does not have standing to challenge a search. 5
Defense counsel references only a footnote in Jarvis v. State 6 in asserting
that, even as a mere passenger, Defendant has standing to challenge the
admissibility of the handgun found in the vehicle. However, defense counsel
offers no argument for its application to this case. 7 Upon its own review, the Court
finds Jarvis inapplicable to this case. Importantly in Jarvis, the Delaware Supreme
Court recognized that as the passenger in the vehicle who did not own the vehicle
1
Mills v. State, 2006 WL 1027202 (Del. Apr. 17, 2006).
2
Wilson v. State, 812 A.2d 225 (Del. 2002) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128(1978)).
3
Rakas, 439 U.S. 128.
4
See Mills, 2006 WL 1027202; see Rakas, 439 U.S. 128.
5
Id.6
600 A.2d 38, n.1 (Del. 1991).
7
See D.I. 14 (Def. Supplemental Briefing on Issue of Standing).
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or exercise control over it, Jarvis did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the vehicle under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).8 The Supreme Court
noted only that Jarvis had standing in the narrow context of objecting to the seizure
of her person.9 This Court finds Jarvis inapplicable to this case because Defendant
here does not seek suppression of evidence found as a result of a search incident to
his seizure. Defendant only seeks suppression of a handgun which was found in
plain view, and not pursuant to a search, in the vehicle. Thus, even under Jarvis,
Defendant is not extended a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he
did not own or exercise control over, or for evidence found in that vehicle in plain
view.
Instead, the Court finds the more recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion in
Mills v. State more appropriate. In Mills, the defendant argued that he was illegally
detained at the time of the motor vehicle stop and that the fruits of that detention
should have been suppressed. 10 The court in Mills held that the defendant lacked
standing to seek suppression of the fruits discovered as a result of the driver’s
arrest because the defendant did not own or exercise control over the vehicle, and
therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle’s trunk where the
evidence was found.11 Furthermore, the court in Mills specifically acknowledged
8
Jarvis, 600 A.2d at n.1.
9
Id.10
Mills, 2006 WL 1027202, at *1.
11
Id.8
that, while the defendant had “no standing with respect to the stop and search of
the vehicle, he [had] standing to object to the circumstances under which his
person was seized.” 12
Similarly in this case, the Court finds that while Defendant has standing to
object to the circumstances under which his person was seized, Defendant has no
standing with respect to the stop of the vehicle and discovery of the handgun in
plain view. The vehicle was driven by and registered to Richmond. There is no
evidence that Defendant owned the vehicle or exercised control over it. Moreover,
the handgun was not found pursuant to a search of the vehicle; it was found by
Officer Tiberi in plain view upon looking through the rear driver’s side window of
the vehicle. Therefore, Defendant, as a passenger in the vehicle, had no reasonable
expectation of privacy inside the vehicle where the handgun was found.4 “Absent
other factors that are not present here, any reasonable expectation of privacy in the
car belongs to its owner or driver, but not a passenger.”13 Accordingly, Defendant
has no standing to suppress evidence obtained from Richmond’s vehicle and
pursuant to the traffic stop.
12
Id. at *2.
13
See Id.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Calvin L. Scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
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