White v. Court of Chancery ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DONNA WHITE, )
Claimant-Below/Appellant, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N18A-05-001 ALR
)
THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF )
THE STATE OF DELAWARE, )
Employer-Below/Appellee, )
)
and the )
)
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE )
APPEAL BOARD, )
Appellee. )
Submitted: September 24, 2018
Decided: December 13, 2018
On Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board
AFFIRMED
ORDER
This is an appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (“UIAB”).
Upon consideration of the facts, arguments, and legal authorities set forth by the
parties; statutory and decisional law; and the entire record in this case, the Court
hereby finds as follows:
1. Appellant Donna White (“Employee”) was employed by the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware (“Court of Chancery”) from August 9, 2010 until
her termination on November 11, 2017.
2. Court of Chancery enforces a Code of Conduct for Judicial Branch
Employees which prohibits use of an employee’s official position to obtain personal
privileges. The Code of Conduct permits disciplinary action up to and including
dismissal. Employee conceded that she received a copy of the Code of Conduct
when she was hired by Court of Chancery.
3. On October 6, 2017, Employee sent an e-mail message to Mark
Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook CEO”), using the State of Delaware
e-mail system. At the time, Facebook was a party in active litigation pending before
the Court of Chancery, and Facebook CEO was expected to testify as a witness.
Employee’s e-mail message to Facebook CEO sought to solicit assistance and
guidance regarding Employee’s personal business venture. Concerned for the
integrity of the Court of Chancery, Facebook CEO’s attorney alerted the presiding
Chancellor that Facebook CEO had received an e-mail message from Employee.
4. Court of Chancery conducted an investigation. Following a period of
suspension with pay and a pre-termination hearing, Employee was terminated for
violating the Code of Conduct. Although Court of Chancery has a progressive
discipline policy, Employee’s conduct was considered by Court of Chancery to be
so egregious that Employee was terminated immediately.
5. Employee filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Division of
Unemployment. By decision dated November 12, 2017, a Claims Deputy found that
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Employee was terminated for just cause in connection with her employment and was
therefore disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits pursuant to 19 Del.
C. § 3314(2).
6. Employee appealed the Claims Deputy’s decision to an Appeals
Referee. By decision dated February 14, 2018, the Appeals Referee affirmed the
decision of the Claims Deputy that Employee was disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits on the grounds that Employee was terminated for just cause.
7. Employee appealed the Appeals Referee’s decision to the UIAB. By
decision dated April 25, 2018, the UIAB affirmed the Appeals Referee’s decision
disqualifying Employee from unemployment benefits (“UIAB Decision”).
8. Employee filed a timely appeal of the UIAB Decision to this Court.
9. This Court reviews the UIAB Decision for an abuse of discretion.1 This
Court’s review is limited to determining whether the UIAB’s findings and
conclusions are free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence on the
record.2 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person could
1
Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991).
2
PAL of Wilmington v. Graham, 2008 WL 2582986, at *3 (Del. Super. June 18,
2008).
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accept as adequate to support a conclusion.3 If the record contains substantial
evidence to support the UIAB’s conclusion, the decision will not be disturbed.4
10. Delaware’s unemployment statute provides for “the compulsory setting
aside of an unemployment reserve to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed
through no fault of their own.”5 An employee who is discharged for “just cause” is
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.6 “Just cause” is “a willful or
wanton act or pattern of conduct in violation of the employer’s interest, the
employee’s duties, or the employee’s expected standard of conduct.”7 In the context
of unemployment benefits, the Court has held that “‘wilful’ [sic] implies actual,
specific, or evil intent, while ‘wanton’ implies needless, malicious or reckless
conduct, but does not require actual intent to cause harm.” 8 A single incident of
3
Histed v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del. 1993).
4
See Funk, 591 A.2d at 225; Williams v. Brandywine Counseling, 2016 WL
3660570, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 27, 2016).
5
19 Del. C. § 3301.
6
19 Del. C. § 3314(2).
7
Dep’t of Corr. v. Toomey, 1997 WL 537294, at *2 (Del. Aug. 20, 1997) (quoting
Avon Prods., Inc. v. Wilson, 513 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Del. 1986)).
8
Jackson v. Christian Care, 2008 WL 555918, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 29, 2008)
(internal citations omitted). See also Brown v. First State Fabrication, LLC, 2015
WL 7747127, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 17, 2015) (quoting Coleman v. Dep’t of Labor,
288 A.2d 285, 288 (Del. Super. 1972)) (“A willful or wanton act requires the
employee to be ‘conscious of his conduct or recklessly indifferent to its
consequences.’”); McCaffrey v. City of Wilmington, 2014 WL 6679176, at *8 (Del.
Super. Nov. 3, 2014) (citing Morris v. Blake, 552 A.2d 844, 847 (Del. Super. 1988))
(holding that wantonness is demonstrated by a conscious indifference that evidences
an ‘I-don’t-care’ attitude).
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misconduct can be sufficient to establish just cause for termination. 9 An employer
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an employee
was terminated for just cause.10
11. UIAB concluded that there was just cause for Employee’s termination
on the grounds that Employee’s e-mail message to Facebook CEO violated Court of
Chancery’s Code of Conduct.11 Substantial evidence supports the UIAB Decision.
In addition, the UIAB Decision is free from legal error.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board which found that Donna White was terminated for just cause and is not
entitled to unemployment benefits is supported by substantial evidence, and is
free from legal error.
9
See Mack v. RSC Landscaping, 2011 WL 7078291, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 22,
2011) (citing Peninsula United Methodist Homes v. Crookshank, 2000 WL
33114324 (Del. Super. Sep. 28, 2000)).
10
Murphy & Landon, P.A v. Pernic, 121 A.3d 1215, 1222 (Del. 2015) (citing
Edmonds v. Kelly Servs., 2012 WL 4033377, at *2 (Del. Sept. 12, 2012)).
11
Employee and Court of Chancery also reference the Delaware Department of
Technology and Information Acceptable Use Policy (“Acceptable Use Policy”) in
their submissions to this Court. The Acceptable Use Policy provides that limited
personal use of state systems is permitted so long as such use does not involve
interests in personal or outside business, activities such as selling or soliciting
personal property, or the promotion of commercial ventures. While UIAB did not
reference the Acceptable Use Policy in its UIAB Decision, there is substantial
evidence in the record to conclude that Employee’s use of state e-mail to send a
personal message soliciting a litigant’s assistance with Employee’s personal
business venture violated the Acceptable Use Policy as well as the Code of
Conduct.
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NOW, THEREFORE, this 13th day of December, 2018, the decision of the
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is hereby AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
______________________________
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
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