State v. Massey ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
) Def. I.D. # 2108001587A
v. )
)
)
RHANDY D. MASSEY, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: March 1, 2023
Decided: March 7, 2023
Upon Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial
DENIED
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rebecca E. Anderson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 13
The Circle, Georgetown, DE 19947; Attorney for State of Delaware.
John R. Garey, Esquire, 48 The Green, Dover, DE 19901; Attorney for Defendant
Rhandy Massey.
KARSNITZ, R. J.
1
I. Background
Rhandy D. Massey (“Defendant”) was charged with multiple criminal
offenses stemming from allegations made by his two minor daughters, M.M. and
L.M., of sexual abuse. At the conclusion of a week-long jury trial, on January 27, 2023
Defendant was convicted of most of the charges.1 Defendant has not been sentenced.
On February 6, 2023, Defendant filed a motion requesting a new trial (the “Motion”)
pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 33. In support of the Motion,
Defendant argues two grounds: (1) that I used an incorrect legal standard in denying
Defendant's request for an in camera proceeding under 11 Del. C. § 3508, and (2)
that I failed to find a substantial need that would allow one of the alleged victims to
hold a stuffed animal during her testimony.
II. Analysis
A. The § 3508 Motion
On Friday, January 20, 2023 (the Friday before trial was to begin), Defendant
submitted a motion pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3508, requesting an in camera hearing
to determine the admissibility of prior sexual conduct pertaining to the alleged
victims in this matter, L.M. and M.M..2 Defendant's motion initially addressed three
1
He was acquitted of a Rape in the Second Degree regarding L.M., but convicted of the lesser included offense of Unlawful Sexual
Conduct First Degree.
2
The filing of the motion was not in accordance with our case management plan. See Superior Court Sussex County Case
Management Plan, Pre-trial motions. Defendant had been supplied the information which he contended supported the motion a year
before trial. Defendant’s delay in presenting the motion placed unnecessary stress on the Court and its processes, as well as the
Prosecutor. While the delay could have been considered a waiver of the issues Defendant presented, in an effort to be fair the Court
considered the motion on its merits.
2
prior allegations: (1) an allegation made by both girls against their half-brother,
N.M.,3 (2) statements by a babysitter about discussions of sexual issues between the
girls themselves, and (3) an allegation made by the girls against Defendant unrelated
to the current charges. A reading of the information Defendant supplied in his filing
showed this third incident to consist of horseplay between him and M.M. where
Defendant’s elbow struck M.M.’s crotch area and caused her injury. No claim of sex
abuse appears in the police report supplied by Defendant. The key issue prior to trial
became allegation (1). The State filed its response via email on Sunday, January 22,
2023. I addressed the motion on Monday, January 23, 2023, in a pre-trial hearing
before jury selection began. I denied the motion for an in camera § 3508 hearing.
Defendant now argues that I applied the wrong legal standard when denying
Defendant's motion prior to trial. Defendant cites Bryant v. State4 as the proper
legal standard. However, the Delaware Supreme Court in Bryant specifically notes,
"The Superior Court did not consider the Rape Shield Statute in its ruling and in this
appeal the State has not relied upon the statute as a basis for exclusion." 5 The
decision instead focuses on the ability of counsel to cross-examine a witness
concerning prior specific incidents of untruthfulness.6 Defendant, in the Motion,
argues that the Delaware Supreme Court created a standard when it stated: "Even
where the evidence is inconclusive as to falsity, prior allegations of sexual assault
3
Initials are used throughout to provide some protection for the minors.
4
734 A.2d 157 (Del. 1999).
5
Id. at *2 n.2.
6
Id. at *2.
3
may be admitted to challenge credibility.”7 The Supreme Court went on to
say:
Given the minimal corroborative evidence in this case and the unusual
social history of the complaining witnesses the issue of credibility
looms large. Any attempt to restrict cross-examination under these
circumstances must proceed on a complete record with a full
appreciation of the relevance of such testimony. We conclude that, on
this record, the trial court's ruling regarding the five excluded
allegations, without further effort to determine their falsity, was an
abuse of discretion. Because we cannot with confidence assess the
impact of the excluded evidence, we must reverse and remand for a
new trial.8
The Massey case is distinguishable from Bryant. Bryant notes that "the precise issue
is not before us...."9 Furthermore, the allegations in the Bryant case included two
allegations which were demonstrably false because the alleged victims recanted their
statements. Such recantation evidence o r o t h e r e v i d e n c e o f f a l s i t y does
not exist here. M o r e o v e r , Bryant did not address 11 Del. C. § 3508 and how that
specific statute would affect the admissibility or inadmissibility of supposed prior
false allegations.
Rather, I relied upon State v. Bailey,10 a § 3508 case. The Delaware Superior
Court in that case found that prior allegations of sexual assault may be admissible
at trial only if Defendant makes a showing that the witnesses' prior allegations of
7
Id. at *3.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
1996 WL 587721 (Del. Super. Sept. 12, 1996).
4
sexual assault were false.11 Here, Defendant failed to make any showing of falsity,
only self-serving assertions that the prior allegations were false accusations. There
have been no recantations of any prior allegations against either N.M., the half-brother
to both alleged victims, or against Defendant. In fact, both alleged victims referenced
N.M. in their forensic interview at the Children's Advocacy Center following their
allegations of abuse against Defendant. During that interview, both girls maintained
that something had occurred with N.M. previously.
Additionally, I continue to believe that an appropriate purpose for introduction
of this evidence was not shown by Defendant. Defendant wanted to make the
contradictory arguments that the alleged victims were lying about N.M., but that they
were previously abused by N.M. None of the police reports provided to Defendant
during pre-trial discovery show that either alleged victim provided false information
or lied about the prior allegations against N.M. or anyone else.
At the pre-trial hearing, I observed that Defendant had not met the standard of
"clear and convincing" evidence, or even a lesser standard, to allow for introduction
of this evidence at trial. I did not want the trial to turn into a trial within a trial.
Because I applied the applicable standard, I deny this ground for a new trial.
B. The Stuffed Animal
11
Id. at *6.
5
Defendant's second ground is based upon one of the alleged victims, M.M.,
holding a stuffed animal during her trial testimony. This was addressed at trial prior to
M.M. taking the stand and outside the presence of the jury. The State notified
Defendant that the children wanted to hold a stuffed animal while testifying.
Initially, both children indicated that they would feel more comfortable with a
stuffed animal. This information was relayed to me. However, only M.M. brought
a stuffed animal to the stand during trial. Defendant then raised the issue with me,
and I asked the State to make a motion as to the necessity of the stuffed animals.
In doing so, the State motioned that the stuffed animals were recommended to
them by their counselor to help them feel more comfortable at trial. The State also
indicated that the stuffed animals were small.
I allowed the stuffed animals but noted the children were not to hold them
up or wave them around, and that they could hold the animals close to them. The
children were informed about my instructions by the State. No further objections
were made by Defendant during trial that would indicate M.M. was holding up
the animal, waving it around, or otherwise making it noticeable to the jury.
I observed M.M. as she testified. The bear clutched in her hand was barely
visible. The minor witness was a small child obviously distressed to be in a
courtroom testifying.
6
In support of the Motion on this ground, Defendant relies upon Czech v.
State.12 This case deals with "special accommodations" for child witnesses as
set forth in 11 Del. C. § 5131. The Czech Court specifically addressed the
appropriateness of a support person for a child witness. In that case, the child's
mother was allowed to sit behind the child as she testified before a jury.13 The
trial judge in Czech suggested this sua sponte, which the Delaware Supreme
Court found to be inappropriate. The Court concluded that special
accommodations should be made only if the requesting party has demonstrated a
"substantial need" for their implementation.14 The Court found that, while the use
of the support person may have been prejudicial, any prejudice was harmless.15
The Court noted that the child's testimony in Czech was not particularly helpful
to the State's case and that the prosecution presented the substance of its case through
the forensic interviews shown to the jury.16
Similarly, in the Massey trial, the State presented its case as it pertained to
M.M.'s allegations in part through M.M.'s forensic interview at the Children's
Advocacy Center ("CAC"). M.M.'s testimony during trial was limited in detail or
specific recollection of events; therefore, her statement made at the CAC was
12
945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008).
13
Id. at 1093.
14
Id. at 1094.
15
Id. at 1095.
16
Id.7
admitted under 11 Del. C. § 3507 and 11 Del. C. § 3513.
In further support of the Motion on this ground, Defendant also relies upon
Gomez v. State.17 Defendant in that case did not object to the child witness holding a
teddy bear during trial, so it was never addressed by the trial judge. In providing
guidance for the new trial, the Supreme Court stated, "It would have been appropriate
for the trial judge also to have required the prosecutor to demonstrate a substantial
need for the additional special accommodation of a teddy bear." 18 However, the
Supreme Court did not reverse or remand the case on this ground.
In the this case, the State told me that M.M. and L.M.'s counselors had
recommended that the girls be able to have stuffed animals to make them feel more
comfortable during trial. M.M. was just nine years old at the time that she testified
against her father during trial. I allowed it but only under the condition that the child
be instructed not to put the stuffed animal on display, which she did not. M.M. and
L.M. were always going to be sympathetic witnesses and for me the bear added
nothing. I instructed the jury to not allow sympathy to in any way guide their verdict.
The jury was discerning as shown by its verdict. The State justified the use of the
teddy bear, and it was barely visible and added nothing to the sympathy factor the
minor witness created.
17
25 A.3d 786 (Del. 2011).
18
Id. at 799.
8
C. Rule 33
Superior Court Criminal Rule 33 permits me to grant a new trial if it is
“required in the interest of justice.” I find no showing by Defendant that a new
trial is required under this standard and the cases decided under Rule 33. In
addition to the testimony of the two girls, the State presented physical evidence
in the form of a blanket and t-shirt that were tested by the Division of Forensic
Sciences; Defendant's semen was found on both items. This physical evidence
corroborates the alleged victims' statements as to Defendant's conduct.
Additionally, the State presented evidence of Defendant's consciousness of guilt,
in that he fled following the allegations and admitted to the lead detective that he
regretted doing so.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Rhandy Massey’s Motion for a New Trial
is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
Craig A. Karsnitz
cc: Prothonotary
9