State v. Craig ( 2019 )


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  • IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    STATE OF DELAWARE
    Vv. ID# 1206022379
    CHRISTOPHER E. CRAIG,
    Defendant
    SS ae ee ee
    Submitted: August 1, 2019
    Decided: August 29, 2019
    On Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
    On Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel. DENIED.
    ORDER
    Barzilai K. Axelrod, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware,
    Attorney for the State.
    Christopher E. Craig, Sussex Correctional Institution, Georgetown, Delaware, pro
    Se.
    COOCH, R.J.
    This 29th day of August, 2019, upon consideration of Defendant’s motions, it
    appears to the Court that:
    1. On November 5, 2012, Christopher E. Craig (“Defendant”) pled nolo
    contendere to one count of Promoting Prison Contraband.! Defendant
    was sentenced to twelve months at level five incarceration. At the time
    of the plea and sentencing, Defendant was serving consecutive level
    five sentences of twenty years for Possession of a Deadly Weapon
    ' Sentencing Order, State v. Craig, ID# 1206022379, D.I. 9 (Nov. 5, 2012).
    1
    During the Commission of a Felony (““PDWDCF’’), and eighteen years
    for Murder Second Degree. Defendant was sentenced on the PDWDCF
    and the Murder Second Degree charges on May 16, 1997. Defendant
    now has a total consecutive sentence of thirty-nine years at level five
    incarceration. As a consequence of his 2012 plea, Defendant lost all
    accumulated prison good time pursuant to 
    11 Del. C
    . § 4382(a). On July
    22, 2019, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief and
    Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
    In his Motion for Postconviction Relief, Defendant raises two grounds
    for relief. First Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective
    for allegedly not informing Defendant that a plea to a criminal charge
    while Defendant was incarcerated would result in the forfeiture of
    accumulated good time.* Defendant argues that his lack of knowledge
    of the “direct and automatic consequence” of his plea renders it
    unknowingly made and invalid.? Second, Defendant claims that
    forfeiture of his accumulated good time pursuant 
    11 Del. C
    . §.4382(a)
    without an order by the Court violated his right to due process.*
    Rule 61 is the remedy for defendants “in custody under a sentence of
    this court seeking to set aside the judgment of conviction[.]”° Rule 61
    delineates certain “bars to relief’ which prevent a defendant from
    seeking relief in certain circumstances.° Under Rule 61(i)(1), a motion
    for postconviction relief “may not be filed more than one year after the
    judgment of conviction is final[.]’’ Defendant filed his motion nearly
    seven years after his sentencing. His motion is not timely, and therefore
    procedurally barred. The Court cannot consider the substantive merits
    of his untimely motion.
    Additionally, Defendant’s request for appointment of counsel is denied.
    The Court “may appoint counsel for an indigent movant's first timely
    postconviction motion and request for appointment of counsel if the
    2 See Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 1, D.I. 12 (July 22, 2019).
    3 
    Id. 4 See
    id. at 4—5.
    
    > Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
    6 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
    7 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
    motion seeks to set aside a judgment of conviction that resulted from a
    plea of guilty or nolo contendere only if’ the Court determines that:
    (1) the conviction has been affirmed by final order upon direct
    appellate review or direct appellate review is unavailable; (ii) the
    motion sets forth a substantial claim that the movant received
    ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the plea of guilty or
    nolo contendere; (ii1) granting the motion would result in vacatur of
    the judgment of conviction for which the movant is in custody; and
    (iv) specific exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of
    counsel.”
    Defendant’s motion is not timely, and does not meet any of the
    enumerated requirements in Rule 61(e)(1)-(iv). Thus, Defendant is not
    entitled to appointment of counsel.
    For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is
    DENIED. Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Richard R. Cooch, R.J.
    cc: Prothonotary
    Investigative Services
    8 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3) (emphasis added).
    ? 
    Id. Oo
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1206022379

Judges: Cooch R.J.

Filed Date: 8/29/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/30/2019