State v. Reed ( 2019 )


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  • SUPERIOR COURT
    OF THE
    STATE OF DELAWARE
    E. SCOTT BRADLEY 1 The Circle, Suite 2
    JUDGE GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
    May 13, 2019
    N443 - STATE MAIL
    Mr. Jerome Reed
    SBI No. 00318410
    James T. Vaughn Correctional
    1181 Paddock Road
    Smyrna, DE 19977
    Re; State of Delaware v. Jerome B. Reed
    Crim. No. 0101023931
    Dear Mr. Reed:
    This is my decision on your tenth motion for postconviction relief. Your
    motion contains two arguments. First, you assert that the failure by your attorney to
    suppress a statement at trial that was allegedly elicited in an illegal manner constitutes
    ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, you argue that, under Martinez v. Ryan,'
    I should allow you to reargue claims contained in your initial postconviction motion
    with the assistance of appointed counsel.
    When faced with a claim for postconviction relief I must first determine
    whether any procedural bars prevent a consideration on the merits of any underlying
    arguments.” Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, governing postconviction relief, states
    ' 
    566 U.S. 1
    (2012).
    * Younger v. State, 
    580 A.2d 552
    , 554 (Del. 1990).
    that all such motions beyond the first must be summarily dismissed unless the movant
    was convicted after a trial and either (1) pleads that new evidence exists showing that
    the movant is actually innocent in fact, or (2) pleads that a new, retroactive
    constitutional rule applies to the movant’s case thereby rendering the conviction
    invalid. I find that neither of your arguments satisfy the conditions necessary to
    survive summary dismissal.
    Your first argument is a barely perceptible deviation from the numerous
    ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in your previous motions for
    postconviction relief. This argument neither includes a claim that you are actually
    innocent of the crimes for which you were convicted nor implicates a new
    constitutional rule. Further, I have already extensively addressed the issues raised in
    this argument in my decisions on your previous motions.’
    Your second argument misconstrues Martinez v. Ryan.’ Martinez permits a
    federal court to review a “substantial” ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
    federal habeas review.” The United States Supreme Court made clear that its decision
    * See State v. Reed, 
    2003 WL 22853417
    (Del. Super. Aug. 6, 2003), aff'd, 
    843 A.2d 696
    (Del. 2004); State v. Reed, 
    2006 WL 1067273
    (Del. Super. Mar. 21,
    2006), aff'd, 
    907 A.2d 146
    (Del. 2006).
    * 
    566 U.S. 1
    (2012).
    ° State v. Jones, 
    2013 WL 5372415
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 24, 2013) (citing
    
    Martinez, 566 U.S. at 13-17
    ).
    did not establish a constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings.°
    When this Court amended Rule 61 to provide an indigent defendant the right to
    counsel in his or her first postconviction motion, it clarified that this right was not
    retroactive.’ This Court was explicit in that the amendment only applied to initial
    postconviction motions pending as of May 6, 2013, or such motions filed after May
    6, 2013.° You filed your first motion for postconviction relief on March 5, 2003.’
    After a careful review and consideration of your claims therein I denied that motion
    by order dated August 6, 2003.'° Thus, the Rule 61 amendment at issue here is not
    relevant to your case as your first postconviction motion had long since been decided
    by May 6, 2013. Accordingly, I find that your second argument also fails to satisfy
    the Rule 61 conditions necessary to survive summary dismissal.
    This is your tenth motion for postconviction relief. Rule 61 explicitly states
    that all subsequent postconviction relief motions beyond the first are procedurally
    barred and must be summarily dismissed unless they fall under certain exceptions
    discussed above. I do not find that you have plead facts sufficient to qualify for any
    of these exceptions.
    ° 
    Id. (citing Martinez,
    566 U.S. at 8-9).
    ” State v. Rosen, 
    2013 WL 4744681
    , at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 2013).
    * Td. (emphasis added).
    ’ DI. 68.
    '° State v. Reed, 
    2003 WL 22853417
    (Del. Super. Aug. 6, 2003), affd, 
    843 A.2d 696
    (Del. 2004).
    CONCLUSION
    Your tenth motion for postconviction relief is DENIED.
    Very truly yours,
    E. Scott Bradley
    ESB/jwe
    cc:
    Prothonotary
    IS 2 cd CI AVA BIOL:
    NNO X4SSAS
    AUdLONOHLOud gas
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0101023931

Judges: Bradley J.

Filed Date: 5/13/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/14/2019