State v. Broomer ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) I.D. No. 1504010863A
)
MICHAEL BROOMER, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: October 5, 2022
Decided: October 27, 2022
Upon Defendant Michael Broomer’s Second Motion for Postconviction Relief
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
Sean P. Lugg, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State of
Delaware.
Michael Broomer, SBI# 696466, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, l181
Paddock Road, Smyrna, DE 19977, pro se.
WHARTON, J.
The 28th day of October, 2022, upon consideration of Defendant Michael
Broomer’s (“Broomer”) Second Motion for Postconviction Relief (“SMPCR”) and
the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:
1. Broomer was convicted at trial of Murder in the Second Degree, two
counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”),
and one count of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree. He appealed his
convictions to the Delaware Supreme Court. That Court affirmed the judgment of
this Court in part and remanded in part for this Court to a complete a Batson analysis.
This Court, over Boomer’s objection, completed its Batson analysis on the record as
it existed at trial without holding an evidentiary hearing or allowing additional
briefing. The Court found that that Broomer had not carried his burden of proving
purposeful discrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision. 1 Broomer’s
first attempt at postconviction relief in this Court was unsuccessful.2 This Court’s
decision was affirmed on appeal.3
2. Broomer now brings a second Motion for Postconviction Relief.4 In it
he raises claims of: (1) purportedly “newly discovered evidence” involving a
“double Brady violation”; (2) several instances of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.
1
Broomer v. State, 2017 WL 5900084 (Del. Nov. 28, 2017).
2
State v. Broomer, 2021 WL 4987625 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2021).
3
Broomer v. State, 2022 WL 3581111(Del. Aug. 22, 2022).
4
D.I. 139.
2
3. The purported “newly discovered evidence” and “double Brady
violation” relates to a redacted interview given to police by Dorothy Mangrum, the
grandmother of homicide victim, Raekwon Mangrum. Dorothy Mangrum did not
testify at trial. Broomer has attached an unredacted transcript of that interview
prepared by O’Rourke Investigative Services and provided to Broomer’s trial
counsel on April 27, 2016, approximately four months prior to trial.5
4. The first ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleges that trial counsel
ignored allegedly exculpatory information in the Dorothy Mangrum interview.6 The
second claim is that trial counsel to effectively present arguments related to gunshot
residue (“GSR”) and the State’s failure to preserve evidence related to GSR
evidence.7 The third claim alleges that Broomer’s trial counsel failed to challenge
supposed prosecutorial misconduct in coercing false testimony from an eyewitness
police officer and misrepresenting the officer’s testimony in summation.8
Broomer’s his final claim Broomer argues that trial counsel “should have challenged
Carl Rone’s testimony regarding the pictures of a gun seized from the phone and the
gun that was seized” because “the search warrant was overly broad and all of the
messages and photos should have been suppressed.”9
5
Id.6
Id.7
Id.8
Id.9
Id.3
5. Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction
relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i).10 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the
postconviction claim.11 Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a motion for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations,
repetitive motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications. A motion exceeds
time limitations if it is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final
or if it asserts a newly recognized, retroactively applied right more than one year
after it was first recognized.12 A second or subsequent motion is repetitive and
therefore barred.13 The Court considers a repetitive motion only if the movant was
convicted at trial and the motion pleads with particularity either: (1) actual
innocence;14 or (2) the application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied rule
of constitutional law rendering the conviction invalid.15 Grounds for relief “not
asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as
procedurally defaulted unless the movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice
from [the] violation.”16 Grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case,
including “proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-
10
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
11
Id.12
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
13
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
14
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i).
15
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii).
16
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
4
conviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.17 Here, the
SMPCR is barred because it is untimely and repetitive. Additionally, some claims
are procedurally defaulted because they assert grounds not raised previously, while
another ground is barred because it raises an issue previously adjudicated.
6. Broomer’s claim of newly discovered evidence revealing a “double Brady
violation” presents neither anything new, nor a Brady violation, much less a double
Brady violation. The O’Rourke Investigative Services cover letter to Broomer’s
counsel enclosing an unredacted transcript of Dorothy Mangrum’s statement is dated
approximately four months prior to trial.18 It obviously is not “newly discovered.”
Further, whether the statement contains exculpatory information or not, it just as
obviously was not withheld from Broomer by the State, the sine qua non of Brady
violation, because Broomer’s trial counsel had it well before trial.
7. Broomer raised 21 allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel against
trial and appellate counsel in his first postconviction relief motion.19 Those 21
allegations included an allegation that counsel was ineffective with respect the
preservation of GSR,20 but did not include allegations that: (1) trial counsel was
ineffective with respect to Dorothy Mangrum’s statement to the police; (2) the
prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by coercing false testimony from an
17
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
18
D.I. 139.
19
State v. Broomer, at *1.
20
Id., at *4-5.
5
eyewitness police officer and mischaracterizing his testimony in summation; or (3)
the scope of the search warrant as it relates to Carl Rone’s testimony.21 Thus,
Broomer’s claim regarding GSR is barred as previously adjudicated , while the other
claims are barred as procedurally defaulted because they were not asserted earlier.
8. Broomer has failed overcome Rule 61’s bars to relief. He has failed to
show cause for relief or prejudice from a violation of his rights.22 Further, he has
not overcome the bar of procedural default because he has not claimed that the Court
lacked jurisdiction or pled with particularity actual innocence or a newly recognized,
retroactively applied, rule of constitutional law that renders his conviction invalid.23
9. Summary dismissal is appropriate if it plainly appears from the motion for
postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant
is not entitled to relief.24 Here, it is plain to the Court from the Motion and the record
in this case that Broomer is not entitled to relief.
THEREFORE, Defendant Michael Broomer’s Second Motion for
Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.
21
Id., at *1, 8, 33-34.
22
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
23
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5); 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).
24
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).
6