State v. Knauer ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE , )
Respondent, ) ID No. 2105001642
)
v. )
)
LARRY KNAUER, JR., )
Movant. )
Submitted: February 21, 2022
Decided: March 29, 2022
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
DENIED
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rodney Don Sweet, Esquire, 32901 Mount Pleasant Road, Laurel, DE 19956;
Attorney for Movant.
Michael Tipton, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 13 The
Circle, Georgetown, DE 19947; Attorney for Respondent.
KARSNITZ, RJ.
1
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Larry E. Knauer, Jr. (“Knauer,” “Defendant” or “Movant”)
is charged with four offenses: Driving a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence
of Alcohol and/or Drugs (“DUI”) (Third Offense), Failure to Have Insurance
Identification in Possession, Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device, and
Improper Lane Change. Trial is scheduled for May 5, 2022.
On January 18, 2022, Movant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence (the
“Motion”). The Motion requested an evidentiary hearing and asserted six
grounds for suppression of all evidence relating to the stop of Movant’s
vehicle and Movant’s arrest, summarized as follows:
(1) No probable cause to arrest Movant for DUI;
(2) No reasonable articulable suspicion to perform a traffic stop of
Movant’s vehicle and search of vehicle;
(3) Improper questioning of Movant while in custody without Miranda1
warnings;
(4) Inadequate evidence with respect to blood draw;
(5) Improper reference to two prior DUIs in Pennsylvania; and,
(6) Invalid chain of custody with respect to blood evidence.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
On February 21, 2022, the State of Delaware (the “State”) filed its
Response to the Motion.
This is my ruling on the Motion.
FACTS
On May 4, 2021, a witness reported to the Delaware State Police that
the witness observed Movant passed out behind the wheel of a motor vehicle
as it rolled into a row of trees, eventually crashing into a tree.
Trooper Wilson of the Delaware State Police (“Wilson”) responded and
found Movant unresponsive behind the wheel of the vehicle. Wilson
observed that Movant was sweaty and did not answer questions. Shortly
thereafter, emergency medical services arrived to treat Movant who, although
at first combative, eventually got into an ambulance and was transported to
the hospital. No law enforcement officers accompanied Movant during his
trip to the hospital.
Wilson took an inventory of the contents of the vehicle and noted an
unopened beer and nearly empty bottle of vodka.
While Movant was on the way to the hospital, Wilson obtained a search
warrant to obtain a sample of Movant’s blood. He then went to the hospital
where movant was being treated and obtained a sample of Movant’s blood.
Movant has no recollection of the incident.
3
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, I note that grounds (4) and (6), relating to the
facts surrounding the blood draw itself, and the chain of custody of the blood
which was drawn, are evidentiary matters for trial, and not appropriate for a
suppression motion. With respect to Ground (5), Wilson stated in his request
for a search warrant to obtain a sample of Movant’s blood that a “Larry E.
Knauer” had two prior DUI convictions in Pennsylvania. Movant argues that
the magistrate could not tell whether this was Movant, Larry E. Knauer, Jr.,
or his father, Larry E. Knauer, Sr. I find that the reference to “Larry E.
Knauer,” although not perfect, was sufficient for purposes of the blood draw
warrant. Moreover, there is a plethora of other evidence supporting the blood
draw warrant, so any error is harmless. Thus, I will focus on Grounds (1),
(2), and (3).
Probable Cause to Arrest Movant for DUI
Movant argues that Wilson did not have probable cause to arrest him for
DUI. The State has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence
that Movant’s arrest was supported by probable cause.2 "Probable cause exists
when the officer possesses information which would warrant a reasonable man
2
State v. Anderson, 2010 WL 4056130, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct 14, 2010).
4
to believe that a crime has been committed."3 "To establish probable cause that
the defendant was driving under the influence, the police need only present facts
suggesting, in the totality of the circumstances, that a fair probability exists that
the defendant had committed a crime."4 A traffic violation combined with an
odor of alcohol, standing alone, do not constitute probable cause to arrest the
driver for a DUI offense.5 On the other hand, where the defendant caused a traffic
accident, and the investigating officer personally smelled an odor of alcohol on
the defendant's breath, probable cause was found to exist to believe that the
defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, and
evidence of alcohol consumption could be obtained from a test of the defendant's
blood.6
In this case, Wilson found that Movant had crashed into a row of trees, was
passed out behind the wheel of his vehicle, and was unresponsive and drenched
in sweat. A witness h a d observed M o v a n t passed out behind the wheel of his
vehicle during the collision. Wilson found an unopened can of beer and a nearly
empty bottle of vodka in the vehicle.
3
State v. Laface, 2016 WL I 637960, at *3 (Del. Super. March 3, 2016) citing State v.
Bells, 2015 WL 2066602, at * 1 (Del. Super. Apr. 1, 2015).
4
Miller v. State, 4 A.3d 371 (Del. 20 I 0).
5
Esham v. Voshell, 1987 WL 8277 (Del. Super. March 2, 1987).
6
State v. Rybicki, 2014 WL 637004 (Del. Super. Jan. 14, 2014).
5
I find that, based on the totality of the circumstances, sufficient facts were
presented in this case to support the fair probability that Movant had been
driving under the influence. Wilson had probable cause to arrest Movant, based
on Wilson’s training and experience.
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion for Stop and Search
Movant argues that the stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional because
the officer did not possess a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime was or
was about to be committed. However, this Court has held that an officer's
investigation of an automobile already stopped does not constitute a seizure.7
In fact, the Court held that the trial court (the Court of Common Pleas) erred by
holding that the officer needed reasonable articulable suspicion to approach the
defendant's vehicle.8
The Delaware Supreme Court has also held that "it is well established that
certain police questioning of individuals in parked automobiles does not
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure."9
In this case, Wilson encountered Movant after he had crashed his vehicle.
7
State v. Arterbridge, 1995 WL 790965 at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 7, 1995).
8
Id at *4.
9
Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1351 (Del. 1991).
6
M o v a n t was not even aware of Wilson’s presence until Wilson woke him up.
Movant’s own actions caused his vehicle to stop.
Assuming arguendo that Wilson needed to have a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to perform a traffic stop of Movant, in my view he had it.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
Delaware Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures.10 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops, such as the
traffic stop in this case, when a law enforcement officer has "a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity."11 The "reasonable suspicion" necessary to justify such a stop "is
dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its
degree of reliability."12 Although a mere "hunch" does not create reasonable
suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is "considerably less than
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence," and "obviously less"
than is necessary for probable cause.13 Once a reasonable suspicion of drunk
driving arises, "[t]he reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a suspect
10
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Del. Const. Art. I, § 6.
11
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 417-418 (1981).
12
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 330 (1990).
13
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 7 (1989).
7
does not tum on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques."14
In Delaware, the court can "combin[e] objective facts with such an
officer's subjective interpretation of those facts."15 When considering the
objective facts, the limited consideration of an officer's subjective thoughts
allows the court to accord weight to an officer's training and experience in
detecting criminal activity.16 In other words, the objective facts are viewed
through the lens of a reasonable, trained police officer.17
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that an anonymous tip containing
specific details of a vehicle, its location, and the driver's illegal actions was
sufficiently reliable to establish reasonable suspicion.18 In this case, a witness
reported that an individual was passed out in the driver's seat of a vehicle which
had just crashed into a row of trees and gave the location of the vehicle. Wilson
observed Movant passed out behind the wheel and his vehicle crashed into the
trees. Based on the witness’ information as well as Wilson's personal
observations, in my view Wilson had a reasonable articulable suspicion that
Movant was driving under the influence.
14
Id. at 11.
15
Jones v. State, 745 A. 2d 861 (Del. 1999).
16
Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1287 (Del. 2008).
17
West v. State, 143 A.3d 712, 716-17 (Del. 2016).
18
Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212 (Del. 2004).
8
Even if Wilson’s actions constituted a seizure, in my view it was justified
under the “community caretaker” or “public safety” doctrine, which is an
exception to the warrant requirement. Delaware, like many other jurisdictions,
recognizes this doctrine, which recognizes that the role of police is not limited
to the detection and prevention of criminal activity, but also encompasses the
role of ensuring the public safety and the welfare of citizens.19
In this case, the Delaware State Police received a report that an individual
was passed out and involved in a collision with trees. Not only did Wilson respond
to the location; he also contacted emergency medical services to respond as well.
W i l s o n w a s fulfilling his duty to ensure the safety and welfare of Delaware
citizens.
Miranda Violation
Movant argues that Wilson unconstitutionally20 questioned Movant after
Movant was in custodial detention without reading Movant his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona.21 Miranda procedural safeguards are expressly limited to
interrogation in a custodial setting.22 However, "custodial interrogation" is not
19
Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 2008).
20
U.S. Const. amend. V.
21
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22
Id. at 445.
9
limited to a formal police interview or questioning after an arrest.23 Custody is
defined as "otherwise depriving [a defendant] of his freedom of action in any
significant way"24 or whether "under the totality of circumstances, a reasonable
man in the suspect's position would feel a restraint on his freedom of movement
fairly characterized as that 'degree associated with a formal arrest' to such an
extent that he would not feel free to leave."25 The initial determination of custody
depends on the "objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective
views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being
questioned."26
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that initial investigatory statements
do not require Miranda warnings:
[T]he practicalities of effective police investigation at the scene,
immediately after the commission of a crime, require the police to
have an unrestricted scope of general interrogation as to those found
there. It is unreasonable to expect the police to perform their initial
investigatory function at the scene of the crime under the restrictions
of the Miranda rules. Neither the Miranda case, nor its progeny,
require such restriction and we decline to extend the Miranda rules
to the routine, initial, on-scene investigation by the police. To do so
would amount, in our opinion, to an unwarranted “constitutional
23
Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989).
24
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
25
Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1193 (Del. l 992) (citing U.S. v. Phillips, 812 F.2d 1355,
1360 (11th Cir.1987); see California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); De.Jesus v.
State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del. 1995)).
26
De.Jesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del. 1995) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511
U.S. 318, 323 (1994)).
10
straight-jacket” on law enforcement. The Miranda rules are first
applicable at the accusatory stage or during custodial
interrogation.27
The United States Supreme Court has similarly held that "a person
temporarily detained for an ordinary traffic stop is not 'in custody' for the
purposes of Miranda."28 In so holding, the Court noted that a routine traffic
stop is usually temporary and brief, is usually in a public place, and usually
involves only one or two officers, making it less police-dominated than typical
custodial situations.29 In Delaware, questioning during a routine traffic stop,
even when the defendant is placed in the back seat of the patrol car, has been
held to be non-custodial for the purposes of Miranda warnings.30 Investigation at
the scene immediately following an accident is considered routine initial
investigation, and such a finding can even exist where questioning continues at the
hospital. There is no “bright line” test as to whether an interrogation that occurs
in a hospital is custodial; rather, there is a case-by-case determination based on
the unique facts which are presented in a particular case.31
27
Laury v. State 260 A.2d 907, 908 (Del. 1969).
28
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984).
29
Id.30
Fuentes v. State, 2002 WL 32071656, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec 30, 2002) (citing State v.
Bonner, 1995 WL 562162, at *3 (Del. Super. Aug. 30, 1995).
31
Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 93-94 (Del. 1990); see DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180,
1191 (Del. 1995).
11
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that a defendant is not in custody for
the purposes of Miranda when he is interviewed in his hospital room and his
freedom of movement is restrained by his own physical condition, and not by police
action.32 In the DeJesus case, the police never handcuffed the defendant, never
placed a guard outside his door, and never attempted to physically restrain him in
any way. Further, the hospital eventually discharged the defendant, and he left
unhindered.
This Court has held that a defendant is not in custody for the purposes of
Miranda where she was not formally arrested, and her freedom was limited only
by her physical incapacity, not police compulsion.33 The police officer was
unable to obtain statements at the scene because the persons involved were
being treated by medical personnel and transported to the hospital. Upon
arriving at the hospital, the officer made contact to make his own assessment of
the defendant and to determine what happened at the scene of the collision. The
officer was the only officer in the room and people were freely moving about
the area.
Similarly, in this case, Movant was not in police custody while at the
32
DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1191 (Del. 1995).
33
State v. Mauk, 20 I 4 WL 4942 I 77, at *4 (Del. Super. Sept. 29, 2014).
12
hospital. Movant was transported to the hospital by emergency medical services
unaccompanied by any law enforcement officer. Wilson sought a blood search
warrant while Movant was transported and then responded to the hospital in
order to obtain a sample of Movant's blood. Movant was not in handcuffs or
under the constant presence of law enforcement. In my view, these facts do not
establish a custodial situation for purposes of the Miranda warnings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I DENY Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
cc: Prothonotary
13