Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP ( 2021 )


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  •      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    INTERMEC IP CORP., and                  )
    INTERMEC TECHNOLOGIES CORP., )
    )
    Plaintiffs- )
    Counterclaim Defendants, )
    )       C.A. No. N20C-03-254
    v.                                )                PRW CCLD
    )
    TRANSCORE, LP, and TRANSCORE )
    HOLDINGS, INC.,                         )
    )
    Defendants- )
    Counterclaim Plaintiffs. )
    )
    Submitted: August 5, 2021
    Decided: August 16, 2021
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Upon Plaintiffs-Counterclaim Defendants Intermec IP Corp. and
    Intermec Technologies Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss,
    GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
    Upon Plaintiffs-Counterclaim Defendants Intermec IP Corp. and
    Intermec Technologies Corp.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
    DENIED.
    Upon Defendants-Counterclaim Plaintiffs TransCore, LP and
    TransCore Holdings, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
    GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
    Steven L. Caponi, Esquire, Matthew B. Goeller, Esquire, K&L GATES LLP,
    Wilmington, Delaware; Michael S. Nelson, Esquire, Jessica L.G. Moran, K&L
    GATES LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Counterclaim
    Defendants Intermec IP Corp. and Intermec Technologies Corp.
    Jason A. Cincilla, Esquire, Howard P. Goldberg, Esquire, Tye C. Bell, Esquire,
    MANNING GROSS + MASSENBURG LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Stephen E. Baskin,
    Esquire, Peter Schmidt, Esquire, KING & SPALDING LLP, Washington, D.C.
    Attorneys for Defendants-Counterclaim Plaintiffs TransCore, LP and TransCore
    Holdings, Inc.
    WALLACE, J.
    Plaintiffs Intermec IP Corp. and Intermec Technologies Corp. (collectively,
    “Intermec”) and defendants TransCore, LP and TransCore Holdings, Inc.
    (collectively, “TransCore” or the “Company”) are counterparties to a cross-license
    (the “License”). The License permits each party to commercialize the other’s
    intellectual property without fear of infringement claims. In exchange, TransCore
    agreed to pay Intermec royalties on its sales revenue quarterly at fixed percentages.
    Intermec may verify the accuracy of TransCore’s payments through an independent
    audit of the Company’s quarterly reports. For those rights, Intermec agreed not to
    deploy TransCore’s intellectual property in certain markets. This dispute concerns
    TransCore’s payments and quarterly reports and Intermec’s audit and the limits
    imposed on Intermec’s use.
    Following an audit, Intermec learned TransCore had been underpaying. So
    Intermec demanded the deficiency. The Company disagreed with the auditor’s
    analysis and refused. Intermec let the discrepancy slide for almost three years and
    then sued. Now, it seeks breach-of-contract damages and certain declarations. The
    Company attacks the breach allegations as time-barred and unsupported, and insists
    the controversies underlying the proposed declarations are moot.
    Though Intermec maintains TransCore has paid too little, the Company
    contends it has paid too much. Intermec’s audit prompted TransCore to investigate
    its own records more closely. After that, TransCore determined it had been making
    -1-
    royalty payments on non-royalty-bearing assets. As a separate result of its search,
    TransCore discovered Intermec allegedly has been using the Company’s intellectual
    property in a contractually-forbidden manner. Now, invoking express, implied, and
    quasi-contractual theories, the Company counterclaims for its mistaken debits,
    which Intermec says it has no duty refund, and for misuse, which Intermec denies.
    The parties have cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings as to Intermec’s
    claims and Intermec has moved to dismiss TransCore’s counterclaims. Resolution
    of those motions turns on the proper interpretation of various License provisions.
    Based on the License’s terms, TransCore can’t pursue an express breach-of-contract
    or unjust enrichment claim for overpayment, or an implied covenant claim for
    misuse. To that extent, Intermec’s dismissal motion is GRANTED. But TransCore
    can pursue an implied covenant claim for overpayment and an express
    breach-of-contract claim for misuse. Intermec’s dismissal motion against those is
    DENIED.
    Turning to the parties’ cross-motions, the Court concludes, at this stage, the
    provisions undergirding Intermec’s breach-of-contract claim are subject to more
    than one reasonable interpretations. At the pleadings stage of a contract dispute, the
    Court can’t choose between reasonable, but differing, interpretations of ambiguous
    language. Discovery that may illuminate the parties’ mutual intent is therefore
    warranted. Accordingly, the Court DENIES both parties’ motions as to Intermec’s
    -2-
    breach-of-contract claim. As a result, the Company’s statute of limitations defense
    must be deferred until the parties establish the only reasonable reading of the License
    provisions governing that defense’s viability.
    Intermec’s declaratory count can be decided now, however. Two of the
    proposed declarations must be dismissed as moot and the last, as duplicative.
    Accordingly, TransCore’s motion against Intermec’s declaratory count is
    GRANTED and Intermec’s cross-motion thereon is DENIED.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    A. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION.
    Intermec and TransCore produce Radio Frequency Identification (“RFID”).1
    RFID originated during World War II.2 Then, standard issue radar could not
    distinguish allied planes from enemy ones. So, to avoid friendly fire, military
    scientists created prototypical RFID: a call and response system.3 Using this system,
    pilots communicated an identifying signal through an airborne transmitter to a
    transponder back at base that, in turn, decoded the greeting and noted false alarms.4
    1
    Compl. ¶ 15, Mar. 25, 2020 (D.I. 1).
    2
    See generally History of RFID Technology, TRACE ID, www.trace-id.com/history-rfid-
    technology/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2021).
    3
    Id.
    4
    Id.
    -3-
    In other words, vintage RFID functioned like barcode, scanning aircraft and
    classifying its allegiance.
    RFID survived the battlefield with its barcode function intact. But its primary
    purpose has been retooled. Now, RFID manufacturers offer tracking solutions to
    shipping, healthcare, security, and pharmaceutical industries.5 End users purchase
    modern RFID to monitor portable assets, to authorize personnel, to manage supply
    chains, and to ferret out counterfeit inventory and other contraband.6
    Together with technological advancements, today’s RFID also consists of
    parts more valuable than the whole. That means RFID’s symbiotic components,
    5
    See generally What Is RFID and How Does RFID Work?, AB&R (AM. BARCODE & RFID),
    https://www.abr.com/what-is-rfid-how-does-rfid-work/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2021).
    6
    See generally Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
    https://www.fda.gov/radiation-emitting-products/electromagnetic-compatibility-emc/radio-
    frequency-identification-rfid (last updated Sept. 17, 2018); Radio Frequency Identification
    (RFID): What Is It?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/radio-frequency-
    identification-rfid-what-it (last updated July 6, 2009).
    -4-
    known as “ASICs,”7 “Inserts,”8 “Printers,”9 “Readers,”10 and “Tags,”11 are
    individually-patentable. That also means RFID is controlled by private patent
    owners. Hewing to a competitive market, patent holders have an economic incentive
    to exclude rivals and often press, to that end, infringement litigation. But because
    monopolism could have the counterproductive effect of deadlocking RFID’s
    innovation, competitors have entered into cross-licensing agreements through which
    they share patent ownership in exchange for royalties and related privileges.12 As a
    result, cross-license counterparties bargain for the right to infringe each other’s
    7
    Compl., Ex. A, RFID Cross-License at Additional Definitions (hereinafter “License”)
    (defining “RFID ASIC” as “application specific integrated circuit . . . designed to be used in
    conjunction with an antenna for the purpose of creating a RFID Insert or RFID Tag”).
    The License is divided into two substantive “exhibits,” with the second replicating section numbers
    enumerated in the first. So, for clarity, the Court refers to the License’s provisions using
    “§ [X No.]-[Provision No.]” as shorthand where appropriate.
    8
    Id. (defining “RFID Insert” as “any RFID product or device that at a minimum is capable of
    communicating wireless radio frequency with a RFID Reader, and includes an RFID ASIC, an
    antenna, and with or without a substrate” (enumeration omitted)).
    9
    Id. (defining “RFID Printer” as “a printing or encoding/decoding apparatus which includes the
    capability to communicate by wireless radio frequency communication with an RFID ASIC, an
    RFID Insert or an RFID Tag”).
    10
    Id. (defining “RFID Reader” as “any radio frequency device . . . that . . . is capable of
    communicating by wireless radio frequency communication to read, encode or decode RFID
    Inserts or RFID Tags” (enumeration omitted)).
    11
    Id. (defining “RFID Tag” similarly to an RFID Insert and observing that an RFID Tag “may
    or may not” have RFID Inserts built into them and “may include other functionality . . . [e.g.,] a
    source of power, . . . information storage and retrieval” capabilities).
    12
    See generally Sanyo Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Intel Corp., 
    2021 WL 747719
    , at *1 & nn.1–4 (Del. Ch.
    Feb. 26, 2021) (explaining cross-licensing arrangements and collecting industry background).
    -5-
    patents and agree, thereby, to replace federal remedies with contractual ones.13
    B. THE LICENSE.
    Against this background, Intermec and TransCore executed the License about
    thirteen years ago.14 The License covers hundreds of the parties’ RFID patents
    (collectively, “Licensed Patents” and where appropriate, “Intermec Licensed
    Patents” or “Company Licensed Patents”)15 and contains definitions and terms
    governing royalty payments, quarterly reports, audits, and market restrictions.
    1. Licensed Patents; Licensed Products; Royalty Payments.
    Under the License, the parties’ Licensed Patents are defined as those “that are
    owned by or licensed . . . to [Intermec or the Company and] that are necessary or
    useful for designing, developing, processing, manufacturing or selling RFID”
    ASICs, Inserts, Printers, Readers, and Tags.16 Those components are defined
    collectively as “[Intermec or Company] Licensed Products.”17 More important,
    13
    See id. at *1 (“Generally, a cross license . . . allow[s] each contracting party to participate in
    what otherwise would amount to patent infringement. Competitors in a common field come
    together and agree in advance that neither will be precluded by the other’s patents from introducing
    new products or adopting new processes. As a result of the cross license, [counterparties] are
    effectively unable to use patents against one another.” (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted)); see also License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
    14
    Compl. ¶¶ 1, 15; see generally License.
    15
    License at Attachs. 3, 4 (Schedules of Royalty-Bearing Patents).
    16
    Id. §§ X1-1.2, X1-1.6.
    17
    Id. § X1-1.8.
    -6-
    Licensed Products are Licensed Products only to the extent that, “but for” the
    License, their sale or transfer “would infringe one or more . . . [Intermec or
    Company] Licensed Patents.”18
    That matters, for two reasons.            First, Intermec granted the Company
    permission to integrate “Intermec Licensed Patents, . . . [in order] to make, . . . use,
    lease, offer to sell, sell, service, export and import Licensed Products.”19 So
    Intermec allowed the Company to appropriate Intermec Licensed Patents in a way
    that, without the License, would amount to patent infringement. Consistent with the
    infringement disclaimer’s purpose, and cooperative innovation generally, the parties
    declared the Company’s authority to do so would terminate, in pertinent part, “upon
    the expiration” of Intermec Licensed Patents.20
    Second, the Company’s royalty obligations are tied to Licensed Products.
    Under Section 3.0 (the “Payment Provision”), the Company must pay Intermec:
    a running royalty of [(i)] 2.5% on the Net Sales Value of any Licensed
    RFID ASICs . . .; [(ii)] 3.0% on the Net Sales Value of any Licensed
    Tags [and/or] Inserts . . .; and [(iii)] 7.0% on the Net Sales Value of any
    Licensed Readers.21
    18
    Id.; id. § X1-1.19.
    19
    Id. § X1-2.1.
    20
    Id. at Recitals; see id. (defining “Term” as “January 8, 2008” until “the expiration of the last
    to expire of the Intermec Licensed Patents and the Company Licensed Patents”).
    21
    Id. § X1-3.1(i)–(iii).
    -7-
    Those royalty duties accrue as soon as the Company “becomes entitled to receive
    consideration for Licensed Product[s]”22 and must be discharged no later than “30
    days following the end of the quarter in which such royalties accrue.” 23 So the
    Company must pay Intermec royalties quarterly and at fixed percentages only on the
    Net Sales Value of intellectual property transactions that would have, but for the
    License, infringed Intermec Licensed Patents.
    2. Quarterly Reports; Audits.
    Given the quarterly deadlines, TransCore must submit quarterly reports to
    Intermec “30 days after the close of each quarter” “whether or not there are any
    royalties due.”24 The quarterly reports must, among other things, reflect TransCore’s
    financial performance, disclose its royalty calculation methodologies, and show, in
    balance-sheet form, how TransCore computed the aggregate Net Sales Value on the
    Licensed Products it sold or transferred.25 “[F]ailure to provide” timely and
    adequately-detailed reports, the License warns, results in “a material breach.”26
    22
    Id. § X2-2.1.
    23
    Id. § X2-2.2.
    24
    Id. § X2-3.3.
    25
    Id. § X2-3.2.
    26
    Id. § X2-3.3.
    -8-
    TransCore calculates its own royalty payments.27 So Intermec:
    . . . has the right, . . . through an independent Third Party, . . . to audit
    [TransCore’s records] to verify any representations made (in quarterly
    reports or otherwise) by [TransCore] to Intermec about the matters
    described in [the provisions describing what a quarterly report must
    contain].28
    The License further holds TransCore liable for any deficiency “demonstrate[d]” by
    the Third Party auditor and imposes a deadline for settling the bill.
    Should the results of any . . . audit by Intermec’s [Third Party]
    representative demonstrate that any representations or payments made
    by Company resulted in an underpayment that exceeded more than one
    percent (1%) in any period, then Company will within 30 days after
    notice of such underpayment, pay Intermec such amount. . . .29
    3. “Transportation Markets” Restrictions.
    Though broad, the rights the License confers are not unlimited. Relevant here
    are restrictions on the “Transportation Markets,” which the License defines as
    electronic toll and traffic management . . ., public sector vehicle
    registration and inspection programs, airport based ground
    transportation management systems and taxi dispatch, railroad
    locomotion and wagon tracking, revenue based parking, [and] vehicle
    initiated mobile payment services.30
    27
    Id. § X2-3.2.
    28
    Id. § X2-3.5 (the “Audit Provision”).
    29
    Id.
    30
    Id. § X1-1.18.
    -9-
    TransCore granted Intermec “royalty-free” access to Company Licensed Patents and
    Products for “use” and sale everywhere but the Transportation Markets.
    Company hereby grants . . . to Intermec a personal, world-wide . . .
    royalty-free right and license [to] Company Licensed Patents . . . solely
    outside the Transportation Markets, including the right to make, . . .
    use, lease, offer to sell, sell, export and import . . . Company Licensed
    Products.31
    To reinforce TransCore’s intent to seal the Transportation Markets, the parties
    drafted another provision titled as “No Rights Inside the Transportation Markets.”
    That provision states:
    This Agreement does not expressly, by implication or otherwise, confer
    on Intermec . . . any license or other right, title or interest in or under
    any [of] Company Licensed Patents . . . in the Transportation Markets.32
    C. INTERMEC’S ALLEGATIONS.
    1. The Audit.
    In the summer of 2016, Intermec sought to verify the accuracy of TransCore’s
    Q3 2012 through Q2 2016 quarterly reports (the “2012–16 Reports”).33 Intermec
    retained Ernst & Young LLP, an accounting firm, as its independent third-party
    auditor (the “Auditor”).34 Working from one of the Company’s facilities and in
    31
    Id. § X1-2.3(ii).
    32
    Id. § X2-1.13.
    33
    Compl. ¶ 23.
    34
    Id. ¶¶ 4, 23.
    -10-
    consultation with the Company’s management, the Auditor completed quantitative
    “fieldwork” for three days and then “follow up procedures” that lasted another five
    months—until March 27, 2017.35 That day, the Auditor delivered a “findings report”
    (the “FR”) to Intermec’s parent company that summarized and explained the
    Auditor’s analysis of the 2012–16 Reports.36
    2. The Audit’s Results.
    The Auditor concluded the Company had underpaid Intermec approximately
    $1.64 million (including late fees and the audit’s cost) during the examined period.37
    As support for that conclusion, the FR cited misstatements and miscalculations in
    the 2012–16 Reports. According to the FR, the 2012–16 Reports: (1) underreported
    five quarters’ worth of royalties; (2) omitted three royalty-bearing line items;
    (3) used a Net Sales Value formula that deviated from the License’s terms; and
    (4) inappropriately depressed the Company’s overseas earnings by applying
    foreign-exchange losses to Net Sales Value derived from cross-border transactions.38
    35
    Compl., Ex. B at §§ 2.1, 2.3, Mar. 27, 2017 Ernst & Young LLP Findings Report (the “FR”).
    36
    FR at 1.
    37
    FR § 1.
    38
    Id. §§ 1, 3.1–3.5. The Company disputed the Auditor’s formula for calculating Net Sales
    Value. Id. § 3.3. The Auditor used the formula expressed in the License’s definition of Net Sales
    Value. See License at Additional Definitions (defining Net Sales Value, i.e., gross invoice price,
    to compute earnings derived from “multiprotocol products,” FR § 3.3.). The Company asserted
    that it had been using an “adjusted unit price” calculation instead of gross invoice price because
    gross invoice price “was not consistent with the” License and failed to account for “non-royalty
    bearing protocols.” FR § 3.3. According to the Company, an adjusted unit price obviated these
    -11-
    3. The Company’s Dispute and the Parties’ Post-Audit Relationship.
    A month later, Intermec sent the FR to TransCore for the Company’s review.
    TransCore, in response, disputed the Auditor’s analysis.39 As it had during the
    Auditor’s examination, TransCore claimed the Auditor achieved its figures by
    relying on a model that was inconsistent with the parties’ course of performance.40
    Apparently forgetting about it, the parties’ relationship continued normally until
    August 2019, at which time Intermec alleges, in one sentence, the Company abruptly
    stopped sending it quarterly reports.41 Intermec also intimates a “continual[]” failure
    by TransCore to stay current on its royalty obligations.42 It says nothing more.
    issues and represented a course of performance. See id. (“[TransCore] communicated that the
    adjusted price is the correct price to use for the royalty calculation. . . . [TransCore] indicated that
    [it] has not received any contrary feedback from Intermec since the inception of the contract.”).
    See also Defs.’ Am. Ans. & Countercls. at Countercls. ¶¶ 26–33, Feb. 1, 2021 (D.I. 26) (hereinafter
    “Am. Ans.”) (explaining background on calculations further).
    39
    Compl. ¶¶ 28–30; id., Ex. C, Apr. 28, 2017 Letter from Stephanie Schwencer, Intermec’s Dir.
    Of Fin., to George McGraw, Transcore’s Exec. Vice President.
    40
    See supra note 39.
    41
    Compl. ¶ 31 (“After August 16, 2019, TransCore stopped providing Intermec with the
    quarterly reports required by the License Agreement.”).
    42
    Id. ¶ 32 (“Upon information and belief, TransCore has continually failed to pay all royalties
    owed to Intermec. . . .”).
    -12-
    D. TRANSCORE’S ALLEGATIONS.
    1. The Company’s Overpayments.
    In addition to disputing the FR on the merits, TransCore found the Auditor’s
    analysis to prove too much. The FR determined the Company: (1) made duplicate
    payments 28 times; and (2), separately, overpaid for “products and . . . services . . .
    not subject to royalty payment.”43 The latter conclusion led the Company to believe
    it mistakenly overpaid Intermec approximately $1.94 million in royalties.44 As
    support for its figure, TransCore identified royalties paid on specific Licensed
    Products that either did not integrate Intermec Licensed Patents or erroneously
    integrated Intermec Licensed Patents that were expired at the time the underlying
    Licensed Product had been transacted.45 According to TransCore, Intermec has
    refused to reimburse these overpayments.46
    2. Misuse in the Transportation Markets.
    In the spirit of investigation, TransCore, at this time, also looked more closely
    at Intermec’s operations. In doing so, TransCore learned Intermec allegedly had
    been using Company Licensed Patents, Products, or both, in violation of the
    43
    FR §§ 3.5–3.6.
    44
    Am Ans. ¶¶ 55, 69.
    45
    Id. ¶¶ 55–69.
    46
    E.g., id. ¶ 78.
    -13-
    License’s territorial restrictions.47 According to TransCore, Intermec has been
    deploying the Company’s intellectual property in “the Western Hemisphere Travel
    Initiative, Land Border Integration, and Integrated Travel Initiative projects,” all of
    which, in the Company’s view, meet the Transportation Markets definition.48 As
    further evidence of misuse, TransCore alleges Intermec’s “marketing materials,
    including [its] websites and data sheets, fail to exclude Transportation Markets.”49
    E. THIS LITIGATION.
    1. Intermec’s Complaint and the Company’s Opposition.
    Intermec sued on March 25, 2020—two days shy of the FR’s three-year
    anniversary and almost four years since the last quarter included in the 2012–16
    Reports closed.50 Its complaint comprises two counts: (1) breach-of-contract, and
    (2) declaratory judgment.
    Through its breach-of-contract count, Intermec seeks damages representing
    “the current outstanding balance . . . for the audited period” plus interest on that
    principal (i.e., approximately $2.6 million).51 Incorporating numerous paragraphs
    47
    Id. ¶¶ 70–76.
    48
    Id. ¶¶ 73–74.
    49
    Id. ¶ 73.
    50
    See generally Compl.
    51
    Compl. ¶ 44.
    -14-
    by reference, Intermec purports to separate a breach of the Audit Provision from an
    independent failure by TransCore “to pay . . . ongoing royalties” (for which Intermec
    does not allege damages).52            And—in its briefs—Intermec seeks damages for
    TransCore’s alleged refusal to prepare quarterly reports since August 2019.53
    Intermec’s       declaratory    count     largely     reasserts     the    issues    in    its
    breach-of-contract count. The declaratory count seeks three54 declarations as to
    TransCore’s contractual duties. Specifically, Intermec requests declarations that the
    Company must: (1) pay past royalties; (2) continue paying present royalties; and
    (3) continue issuing quarterly reports.55 On all this and its breach allegations
    Intermec has moved for judgment on the pleadings, citing the License’s plain
    language as support.56
    52
    Id. ¶¶ 41, 44–45.
    53
    Pls.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. for J. on Pleadings at 12–14, Feb. 25, 2021 (D.I. 30)
    (hereinafter “Intermec JP Br.”); cf. Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶ B (limiting relief based on quarterly
    reports to a declaration).
    54
    The Court notes Intermec’s pending motion to amend its declaratory count to include a fourth
    declaratory request related to the License’s termination. D.I. 51. Because Intermec’s proposed
    amendment would have no effect on the disposition of the motions decided here, the Court does
    not address that requested amendment here.
    55
    Compl. ¶¶ 33–39.
    56
    Intermec JP Br. (D.I. 30).
    -15-
    TransCore answered. And in its answer, the Company denied almost every
    allegation.57 Relevant here, it denied a duty to provide Intermec quarterly reports.58
    Later in its answer, however, the Company inserted a screenshot of the parties’
    quarterly report “portal” that indicates Intermec has “received” all the quarterly
    reports it claims are missing.59 And, in its opposition briefs, TransCore conceded it
    currently has a duty to pay royalties and provide quarterly reports.60
    Having answered and asserted counterclaims, TransCore cross-moved for
    judgment on the pleadings against Intermec’s entire complaint. The Company
    contends Intermec’s breach-of-contract allegations are barred by Delaware’s
    three-year, contractual statute of limitations because, TransCore maintains, those
    allegations rest on royalty payments that were due five years ago.61 And (through
    related briefing), TransCore continues, to the extent Intermec claims for breach of
    the Audit Provision, the Audit Provision does not empower the Auditor to make a
    “binding determination” that imposes on TransCore an unappealable duty to imburse
    57
    Am. Ans. at Ans. ¶¶ 15–38.
    58
    Id. at Ans. ¶ 31.
    59
    Id. at Countercls. ¶¶ 38–39.
    60
    E.g., Defs.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. for J. Pleadings at 19–21. Feb. 25, 2021 (D.I. 29)
    (hereinafter “TransCore JP Br.”); Defs.’ Opp’n Br. to Pls. Mot. for J. Pleadings at 13–16, Mar. 18,
    2021 (D.I. 35) (hereinafter “TransCore JP Opp’n Br.”).
    61
    TransCore JP Br. at 7–17.
    -16-
    corrective payments.62            As to the declaratory counts, TransCore argues its
    concessions that it must pay royalties and provide quarterly reports should be enough
    to moot the underlying controversies.63
    2. The Company’s Counterclaims and Intermec’s Opposition.
    The Company levels five counterclaims comprising three contractual theories
    that cover two subjects: overpayment and misuse.64 As to overpayment, TransCore
    pleads breach-of-contract, breach of the implied covenant, and unjust enrichment.
    Using these express, implied, and quasi-contractual theories, TransCore contends,
    one way or another, Intermec is liable for refusing to refund the royalties the
    Company overpaid. As to misuse, TransCore pleads a second set of
    breach-of-contract and implied covenant counterclaims.                   In both counts, the
    Company alleges Intermec’s participation in the Transportation Markets violates the
    License.
    Instead of answering, Intermec has moved to dismiss all TransCore’s
    counterclaims under Rule 12(b)(6).65 Against the overpayment counts, Intermec
    62
    TransCore JP Opp’n Br. at 17–20.
    63
    TransCore JP Br. at 17–21.
    64
    Am. Ans. at Countercls. ¶¶ 77–113.
    65
    Pls.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Defs.’ Countercls., Feb. 25, 2021 (D.I. 31)
    (hereinafter “Intermec Dismissal Br.”); see also Defs.’ Ans. Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to Dismiss
    Defs.’ Countercls., Mar. 18, 2021 (D.I. 36) (hereinafter “TransCore Dismissal Opp’n Br.”).
    -17-
    argues the Company: (1) fails to plead an express breach because the License does
    not require Intermec to refund overpayments; (2) fails to plead a gap the implied
    covenant must fill and, in any event, implying the covenant would be tantamount to
    rewriting the License; and, (3) cannot recover on an unjust enrichment theory
    because the License itself governs the parties’ relationship.66 And against the misuse
    counts, Intermec contends: (1) the License does not prohibit Intermec from engaging
    all activity in the Transportation Markets, as Intermec thinks TransCore has alleged;
    and (2) there is no room for the implied covenant because the Transportation Markets
    restrictions expressly govern the breach TransCore has inadequately alleged.67
    II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    A. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM.
    A party may move to dismiss under this Court’s Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
    to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.68 In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion, the Court: (1) accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
    complaint; (2) credits vague allegations if they give the opposing party notice of the
    claim; (3) draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant; and,
    66
    Intermec Dismissal Br. at 10–18.
    67
    Id. at 18–23.
    68
    Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).
    -18-
    (4) denies dismissal if recovery on the claim is reasonably conceivable.69 The Court,
    however, need not “accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts or
    . . . draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”70 The Court
    will reject “every strained interpretation of the allegations proposed by the
    plaintiff.”71
    Delaware’s pleading standard is “minimal.”72 Dismissal is inappropriate
    unless “under no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could the complaint
    state a claim for which relief might be granted.”73 As a general rule, a claim or
    counterclaim’s reasonable conceivability cannot be determined using “matters
    outside the pleadings.”74 But, “for carefully limited purposes,”75 the Court “may
    69
    Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 
    27 A.3d 531
    , 535 (Del. 2011).
    This is so, and the analysis engaged is the same, whether the Court is examining an initiating
    plaintiff’s claim or a defendant’s counterclaim. Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co.,
    
    2021 WL 537117
    , at *4 n.64 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2021).
    70
    Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
    26 A.3d 162
    , 166 (Del. 2011), overruled on other
    grounds by Ramsey v. Ga. S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 
    189 A.3d 1255
    , 1277 (Del. 2018).
    71
    Malpiede v. Townson, 
    780 A.2d 1075
    , 1083 (Del. 2001).
    72
    Cent. Mortg., 
    27 A.3d at
    536 (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 
    812 A.2d 894
    , 895 (Del. 2002)).
    73
    Unbound Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Invoy Holdings Inc., 
    251 A.3d 1016
    , 1023 (Del. Super. Ct.
    2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Cent. Mortg., 
    27 A.3d at
    537 n.13 (“Our governing
    ‘conceivability’ standard is more akin to ‘possibility. . . .’”).
    74
    In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 
    669 A.2d 59
    , 68 (Del. 1995).
    75
    
    Id. at 69
    .
    -19-
    consider matters outside the pleadings when the document is integral to . . . a claim
    and incorporated into the complaint.”76
    B. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
    The Court cannot grant judgment on the pleadings unless, after drawing all
    reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, no material factual dispute
    exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.77 In resolving a
    Rule 12(c) motion, the Court accepts the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draws all
    reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant.78
    “The standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is almost identical
    to the standard for a motion to dismiss.”79 The Court thus accords the party opposing
    a Rule 12(c) motion the same benefits as a party defending a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.80
    Given that resemblance, the Court engages certain 12(b)(6) procedures during a
    76
    Windsor I, LLC v. CWCap. Asset Mgmt. LLC, 
    238 A.3d 863
    , 873 (Del. 2020) (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see also Malpiede, 
    780 A.2d at 1083
     (“[A] claim may be dismissed if
    allegations in the complaint or in the exhibits incorporated into the complaint effectively negate
    the claim as a matter of law.”).
    77
    Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c).
    78
    Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund II, L.P., 
    624 A.2d 1199
    , 1205
    (Del. 1993).
    79
    Silver Lake Off. Plaza, LLC v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 
    2014 WL 595378
    , at *6 (Del. Super.
    Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    80
    E.g., Alcoa World Alumina LLC v. Glencore Ltd., 
    2016 WL 521193
    , at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb.
    8, 2016), aff’d sub nom., Glencore Ltd. v. St. Croix Alumina, LLC, 
    2016 WL 6575167
     (Del. Nov.
    4, 2016).
    -20-
    12(c) review. For example, the Court can consider, limitedly, documents outside the
    pleadings81 but integral to and incorporated referentially into them.82
    Cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings are analytically similar to
    cross-motions for summary judgment.83 As a result, “where cross-motions for
    judgment on the pleadings are filed on a particular issue and no material facts are in
    dispute thereon[,] the Court shall deem the motions to be the equivalent of a
    stipulation for decision on the merits based on the record submitted with the
    motions.”84 But the mere presence of cross-dispositive motions “does not act per se
    as a concession that there is an absence of factual issues.”85 Accordingly, the Court
    will deny a cross Rule 12(c) motion if the cross-movant fails to show no material
    factual issue exists.86
    81
    See Jiménez v. Palacios, 
    250 A.3d 814
    , 827 (Del. Ch. 2019) (“The pleadings to which this
    Court may look [on Rule 12(c) review] are not limited to complaints or counterclaims, but also
    include answers and affirmative defenses.”), aff’d, 
    2020 WL 4207625
     (Del. July 22, 2020).
    82
    See McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 
    768 A.2d 492
    , 500 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“In analyzing a motion
    to dismiss, the court may consider, for carefully limited purposes, documents integral to or
    incorporated into the complaint by reference. The same standard logically applies on a Rule 12(c)
    motion as well.” (citation omitted)).
    83
    E.g., Silver Lake, 
    2014 WL 595378
    , at *6; see generally Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(h).
    84
    Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. SharkNinja Operating LLC, 
    2020 WL 6795965
    , at *3 (Del. Super.
    Ct. Nov. 19, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also V&M Aerospace LLC
    v. V&M Co., 
    2019 WL 3238920
    , at *3–4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 18, 2019) (concluding that the
    difference between judgment on the pleadings standard and the summary judgment standard was
    “immaterial” because a “question of law” alone was involved).
    85
    United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. TakeCare, Inc., 
    693 A.2d 1076
    , 1079 (Del. 1997).
    86
    Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c).
    -21-
    III. DISCUSSION
    The parties’ motions require the Court to interpret the License. Delaware law
    governs the License,87 and in Delaware, a contract’s proper construction is a question
    of law.88 The goal of contract interpretation “is to fulfill the parties’ expectations at
    the time they contracted.”89 To that end, the Court “will give priority to the parties’
    intentions as reflected in the four corners of the agreement, construing the agreement
    as a whole and giving effect to all its provisions.”90                In all this, “clear and
    unambiguous terms” must be accorded “their ordinary meaning.”91 “If a writing is
    plain and clear on its face, i.e., its language conveys an unmistakable meaning, the
    writing itself is the sole source for gaining an understanding of intent.”92
    “A court must accept and apply the plain meaning of an unambiguous term
    . . . in the contract language . . ., insofar as the parties would have agreed ex ante.”93
    “Absent some ambiguity, Delaware courts will not destroy or twist [contract]
    87
    License § X2-6.3.
    88
    Exelon Generation Acquisitions, LLC v. Deere & Co., 
    176 A.3d 1262
    , 1266–67 (Del. 2017).
    89
    Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Renewables LLC, 
    210 A.3d 688
    , 696 (Del. 2019) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    90
    In re Viking Pump, Inc., 
    148 A.3d 633
    , 648 (Del. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    91
    Leaf Invenergy, 210 A.3d at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    92
    City Investing Co. Liquidating Tr. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 
    624 A.2d 1191
    , 1198 (Del. 1993).
    93
    Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 
    903 A.2d 728
    , 740 (Del. 2006).
    -22-
    language under the guise of construing it.”94 But a contract “is not ambiguous simply
    because the parties disagree on its meaning.”95 No, ambiguity exists only if disputed
    contract language “is fairly or reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning.”96
    As a question of law, a contract’s proper interpretation can be resolved on a
    pleadings-stage motion.97 But, at the pleadings stage, the movant must show the
    terms supporting its motion are indeed unambiguous.98 At the pleadings stage of a
    contract dispute, the Court “cannot choose between two differing reasonable
    interpretations of ambiguous” contract language.99 So, to succeed, the movant’s
    94
    Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 
    616 A.2d 1192
    , 1195 (Del. 1992).
    95
    E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    693 A.2d 1059
    , 1061 (Del. 1997);
    see Sunline Com. Carriers, Inc. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 
    206 A.3d 836
    , 847 n.68 (Del. 2019)
    (explaining that, because a contract’s meaning is a question of law, a court, not the parties, must
    decide whether the contract is ambiguous or not); cf. Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care,
    Inc., 
    702 A.2d 1228
    , 1231 (Del. 1997) (“We are not bound, and the trial court was not bound, by
    the parties’ present claim that the provision is unambiguous.”).
    96
    Alta Berkeley VI C.V. v. Omneon, Inc., 
    41 A.3d 381
    , 385 (Del. 2012).
    97
    See, e.g., Allied Cap. Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, L.P., 
    910 A.2d 1020
    , 1030 (Del. Ch. 2006)
    (“Under Delaware law, the proper interpretation of language in a contract is a question of law.
    Accordingly, a motion to dismiss is a proper framework for determining the meaning of contract
    language.”); Aveanna Healthcare, LLC v. Epic/Freedom, LLC, 
    2021 WL 3235739
    , at *12 (Del.
    Super. Ct. July 29, 2021) (“‘[J]udgment on the pleadings is a proper framework for enforcing
    unambiguous contracts,’ which only have one reasonable meaning and therefore do not create
    ‘material disputes of fact.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Lillis v. AT & T Corp., 
    904 A.2d 325
    ,
    329–30 (Del. Ch. 2006))).
    98
    E.g., VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
    840 A.2d 606
    , 615 (Del. 2003); see also GMG
    Cap. Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 
    36 A.3d 776
    , 783 (Del. 2012) (“[W]here two
    reasonable minds can differ as to the contract’s meaning, a factual dispute results. . . . In those
    cases, [judgment as a matter of law] is improper.” (citations omitted)).
    99
    Vanderbilt Income & Growth Assocs., L.L.C. v. Arvida/JMB Managers, Inc., 
    691 A.2d 609
    ,
    613 (Del. 1996); see also Appriva S’holder Litig. Co., LLC v. EV3, Inc., 
    937 A.2d 1275
    , 1292 (Del.
    -23-
    interpretation must be “the only reasonable construction as a matter of law.”100
    Otherwise, “for purposes of deciding” the motion, the language must be resolved in
    the non-movant’s favor.101
    A. TRANSCORE’S BREACH-OF-CONTRACT COUNT FOR OVERPAYMENT FAILS
    TO STATE A CLAIM.
    To state a breach-of-contract claim, a claimant must allege: “(1) the existence
    of a contractual obligation; (2) a breach of that obligation; and (3) damages resulting
    from the breach.”102 The complaint supports a reasonable inference that TransCore,
    at times, overpaid Intermec. But this counterclaim still fails. The Company hasn’t
    pleaded an express contractual obligation requiring Intermec to refund the surplus.
    2007) (“Even if [the] Court consider[s] the [movant’s] interpretation more reasonable than the
    [non-movant’s], on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion it [is] error to select the ‘more reasonable’
    interpretation as legally controlling.”).
    100
    VLIW Tech., 
    840 A.2d at 615
    ; see also Khushaim v. Tullow Inc., 
    2016 WL 3594752
    , at *3
    (Del. Super. Ct. June 27, 2016) (“[W]hen parties present differing—but reasonable—
    interpretations of a contract term, the Court must examine extrinsic evidence to discern the parties’
    agreement; such an inquiry cannot proceed on a motion to dismiss.” (alteration and internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    101
    VLIW Tech., 
    840 A.2d at 615
    ; see CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC v. Resorts Grp., Inc., 
    2021 WL 1292792
    , at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2021) (“Faced with a question of contract interpretation
    on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the contractual language is
    unambiguous. If so, the Court must give effect to its meaning. If, however, the contractual
    language is [ambiguous], the Court must resolve the ambiguity in favor of the non-moving party.”
    (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Veloric v. J.G. Wentworth, Inc., 
    2014 WL 4639217
    , at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2014) (“At the motion to dismiss stage, ambiguous contract
    provisions must be interpreted most favorably to the non-moving party.”).
    102
    Buck v. Viking Holding Mgmt. Co. LLC, 
    2021 WL 673459
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 22,
    2021).
    -24-
    Citing the Payment Provision, TransCore alleges the License imposes an
    obligation on Intermec to return payments that exceed that Provision’s fixed
    percentages. But the Payment Provision unambiguously applies to TransCore, not
    Intermec, and so does not mention refunds at all.          Indeed, the fixed royalty
    percentages, when read naturally, dictate how much TransCore must pay,
    proscribing anything less. They do not, conversely, address a situation in which
    TransCore pays more. By consequence, the License’s plain language does not
    expressly require Intermec to refund TransCore’s overpayments or to ensure
    TransCore hasn’t overpaid. To the contrary, the Payment Provision simply affords
    Intermec recourse when TransCore underpays. It is not reasonably conceivable that
    a provision specifying precisely how much a payor must pay also silently compels
    the payee to inform the payor whenever it inadvertently forwards extra funds.
    The Company resists this conclusion by faulting Intermec for not citing a case
    in which a court held “a contract must expressly provide for return of overpayments
    to create an action for breach if a party accepts more than the stated amount owed.”103
    Ironically, the Company didn’t cite a case holding the opposite.
    But no matter. “Contract terms themselves will be controlling when they
    establish the parties’ common meaning so that a reasonable person in the position of
    103
    TransCore Dismissal Opp’n Br. at 14.
    -25-
    either party would have no expectations inconsistent with the contract language.”104
    And here, no reasonable person would expect a provision that governs payments
    also, without saying, imposes obligations to issue refunds.105 TransCore, a
    sophisticated counterparty, did not obtain an express term addressing overpayments
    at the bargaining table.106 It cannot now use litigation and the Court to rewrite the
    deal.107
    TransCore’s breach-of-contract counterclaim for overpayment fails to plead a
    recognizable contractual obligation. Accordingly, Intermec’s motion against this
    counterclaim for failure to state a claim is GRANTED.
    104
    Salamone v. Gorman, 
    106 A.3d 354
    , 368 (Del. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    105
    See Active Asset Recovery, Inc. v. Real Est. Asset Recovery Servs., Inc., 
    1999 WL 743479
    , at
    *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1999) (finding that omission of a specific term in a contract “speaks
    volumes” about the parties’ intent when construing included terms); see also Fortis Advisors LLC
    v. Shire US Holdings, Inc., 
    2017 WL 3420751
    , at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2017) (analogizing
    counterparties’ omission of specific terms to the statutory canon of expresio unius est exclusio
    alterius, which provides that an omission presumptively is intentional when other terms are
    included instead).
    106
    But see W. Willow-Bay Ct., LLC v. Robino-Bay Ct. Plaza, LLC, 
    2007 WL 3317551
    , at *9 (Del.
    Ch. Nov. 2, 2007) (“The presumption that the parties are bound by the language of the agreement
    they negotiated applies with even greater force when the parties are sophisticated entities that have
    engaged in arms-length negotiations.”), aff’d, 
    2009 WL 4154356
     (Del. Nov. 24, 2009).
    107
    Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 
    872 A.2d 611
    , 624 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d in part,
    rev’d in part on other grounds, 
    901 A.2d 106
     (Del. 2006) (“It is not the court’s role to rewrite the
    contract between sophisticated market participants, allocating the risk of an agreement after the
    fact, to suit the court’s sense of equity or fairness.”); DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., L.L.C., 
    2006 WL 224058
    , at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006) (“[I]t is not the job of a court to relieve sophisticated parties
    of the burdens of contracts they wish they had drafted differently but in fact did not. Rather, it is
    the court’s job to enforce the clear terms of contracts.”).
    -26-
    B. TRANSCORE’S IMPLIED COVENANT COUNT FOR OVERPAYMENT
    STATES A CLAIM.
    The Company has failed to plead an express contractual obligation requiring
    Intermec to refund overpaid royalties. Suspecting this, TransCore alternatively has
    alleged the License contains a gap the Court should fill with the implied covenant.
    Specifically, TransCore contends the License’s purpose, which is to permit
    TransCore’s sale of Licensed Products—i.e., components that “would infringe”
    Intermec Licensed Patents “but for” the License—would be frustrated if Intermec
    could, as well, collect (or refuse to refund) royalties where the Company would not
    infringe those Patents—i.e., sales involving expired Intermec Licensed Patents or
    sales not involving Intermec’s intellectual property at all. It is reasonably
    conceivable that, had the parties considered this issue at the time of contracting, they
    would have agreed that neither has a duty to pay for Licensed Products that are not
    or no longer Licensed Products. TransCore’s implied covenant counterclaim for
    overpayment accordingly stands.
    1. It is Reasonably Conceivable that Intermec Breached
    an Implied Covenant.
    “To state a claim for breach of the implied covenant, a claimant must allege:
    (1) a specific implied contractual obligation; (2) a breach of that obligation; and
    -27-
    (3) resulting damage.”108 The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres
    in all contracts and exists to fill unanticipated gaps in a contract’s express terms.109
    It “preserve[s] the economic expectations of the parties” by “ensur[ing] that the
    parties deal honestly and fairly with each other when addressing” unexpected
    contractual developments.110          Put differently, the implied covenant prevents a
    contracting party from acting “arbitrarily and unreasonably, thereby frustrating the
    fruits of the bargain that the asserting party reasonably expected.”111 Implying the
    covenant, then, is an “occasional necessity . . . to ensure the parties’ reasonable
    expectations are fulfilled.”112 Those “reasonable expectations . . . are assessed at the
    108
    KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 
    2021 WL 2823567
    , at *26 (Del. Super. Ct. June 24,
    2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    109
    Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, 
    155 A.3d 358
    , 367 (Del. 2017).
    110
    Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. DRIT LP, 
    248 A.3d 911
    , 919 (Del. 2021) (citation omitted).
    111
    Nemec v. Shrader, 
    991 A.2d 1120
    , 1126 (Del. 2010).
    112
    Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
    878 A.2d 434
    , 442 (Del. 2005) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    -28-
    time of contracting.”113 So the Court “looks to the past”114 and asks “what the parties
    likely would have done if they had considered the issues involved.”115
    The implied covenant tries to “honor[] the reasonable expectations created by
    autonomous expressions of the contracting parties.”116 It “thus operates only in that
    narrow band of cases where the contract as a whole speaks sufficiently to suggest an
    obligation and point to a result, but does not speak directly enough to provide an
    explicit answer.”117 At the pleadings stage, then, the claimant “must allege facts
    suggesting ‘from what was expressly agreed upon that the parties who negotiated
    the express terms of the contract would have agreed to proscribe the act later
    complained of as a breach of the implied covenant of good faith . . . had they thought
    to negotiate with respect to that matter.’”118 That is because “an obligation may be
    113
    Dieckman, 155 A.3d at 367; see Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 
    67 A.3d 400
    , 419
    (Del. 2013) (“[W]hat is arbitrary or unreasonable—or conversely[,] reasonable—depends on the
    parties’ original contractual expectations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled in part
    on other grounds by Winshall v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 
    76 A.3d 808
    , 815 n.13 (Del. 2013).
    114
    Gerber, 
    67 A.3d at 419
    .
    115
    Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 
    708 A.2d 989
    , 992 (Del.
    1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    116
    E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 
    679 A.2d 436
    , 443 (Del. 1996) (emphasis added)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    117
    Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 
    984 A.2d 126
    , 146 (Del. Ch. 2009).
    118
    Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, 
    2019 WL 4927053
    , at *22 (Del.
    Ch. Oct. 7, 2019) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 
    508 A.2d 873
    , 880 (Del.
    Ch. 1986)).
    -29-
    inferred when, given the terms of the express contract . . ., it is more likely than not
    . . . that if the parties had thought to address the subject, they would have agreed to
    create [the] obligation that is under consideration . . . ex post facto.”119
    Given that “parties occasionally have understandings or expectations so
    fundamental that they did not need to negotiate about those expectations,”120
    Delaware law views the implied covenant as “well-suited” for supplying
    “contractual terms that are so obvious . . . that the [parties] would not have needed
    to include [them] as express terms in the agreement.”121 After all, “[w]hen a contract
    contemplates . . . an on-going relationship . . . the cost of attempting to catalog and
    negotiate with respect to all possible future states of the world would be prohibitive,
    if it were cognitively possible. In such contracts[,] some things must be left to the
    good faith of the parties.”122 “No contract, regardless of how tightly or precisely
    drafted, can wholly account for every possible contingency.”123
    119
    Schwartzberg v. CRITEF Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 
    685 A.2d 365
    , 376 (Del. Ch. 1996).
    120
    Katz, 508 A.2d at 880 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    121
    Dieckman, 155 A.3d at 361; accord Glaxo Grp., 248 A.3d at 919 n.35.
    122
    Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 
    1991 WL 277613
    , at *26
    (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (citation omitted); see Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 
    5 A.3d 1008
    ,
    1018 (Del. Ch. 2010) (observing that even the most skilled and sophisticated parties necessarily
    will “fail to address to address a future state of the world . . . because contracting is costly and the
    human mind is imperfect”).
    123
    Glaxo Grp., 248 A.3d at 919 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    -30-
    Wielding the implied covenant is a “cautious enterprise.”124 Under Delaware
    law, sophisticated parties are presumptively “bound by the [express] terms of their
    agreement” because “[h]olding [them] to their agreement promotes certainty and
    predictability in commercial transactions.”125 So “[i]mplying a term that the parties
    did not expressly include risks upsetting the economic balance of rights and
    obligations that the contracting parties bargained for in their agreement.”126 Indeed,
    the implied covenant “is not an equitable remedy for rebalancing economic interests
    after events that could have been anticipated, but were not, that later adversely
    affect[] one party to a contract.”127 As a result, implying the covenant should be “a
    rare and fact-intensive exercise, governed solely by issues of compelling
    fairness.”128 The Court, then, won’t “re-write” the agreement’s express terms in the
    guise of implying a covenant.129 Nor will the Court fill a gap by “introduc[ing] its
    124
    Nemec, 
    991 A.2d at 1125
    .
    125
    Glaxo Grp., 248 A.3d at 919.
    126
    Murfey v. WHC Ventures, LLC, 
    236 A.3d 337
    , 350 (Del. 2020).
    127
    Oxbow Carbon & Min. Holdings, Inc. v. Crestview-Oxbow Acquisition, LLC, 
    202 A.3d 482
    ,
    507 (Del. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nemec, 
    991 A.2d at 1126
     (“Parties
    have a right to enter into good and bad contracts, the law enforces both.”); Aspen Advisors LLC v.
    United Artists Theatre Co., 
    843 A.2d 697
    , 707 (Del. Ch. 2004) (observing that the implied
    covenant cannot be deployed to extract terms a party “failed to secure . . . at the bargaining table”).
    128
    Dunlap, 
    878 A.2d at 442
     (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
    129
    Oxbow, 202 A.3d at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nationwide Emerging
    Managers, LLC v. Northpointe Holdings, LLC, 
    112 A.3d 878
    , 896 (Del. 2015) (The implied
    covenant “does not apply when the contract addresses the conduct at issue.”); Nemec, 991 A.2d at
    -31-
    own notions of what would be fair or reasonable under the circumstances.”130
    Instead, “when the contract is truly silent on the matter at hand,”131 the Court will
    “enforce the parties’ contractual bargain by implying only those terms that the
    parties would have agreed to during their original negotiations if they had thought
    to address them.”132
    The License’s purpose at the time of contracting was to neutralize
    infringement claims so the parties could innovate RFID.                      In exchange for an
    infringement disclaimer, the Company agreed to pay Intermec royalties on revenue
    generated by Licensed Products transactions. Further centralizing the infringement
    disclaimer, Licensed Products are defined as RFID components that, “but for” the
    License, “would infringe” Intermec Licensed Patents.133 By defining Licensed
    1125–26 (“[O]ne generally cannot base a claim for breach of the implied covenant on conduct
    authorized by the agreement.” (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlap, 
    878 A.2d at 441
    )).
    
    130 Allen, 113
     A.3d at 184; see also 
    id.
     at 182–83 (The implied covenant “does not establish a
    free-floating duty that a party act in some morally commendable sense.”).
    131
    Oxbow, 202 A.3d at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    132
    Gerber, 
    67 A.3d at 419
     (internal quotation marks omitted); see Dunlap, 
    878 A.2d at 441
    (“[I]mplied good faith cannot be used to circumvent the parties’ bargain, or to create a free-floating
    duty unattached to the underlying legal document.” (cleaned up)); see ASB Allegiance Real Est.
    Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 
    50 A.3d 434
    , 440–42 (Del. Ch. 2012)
    (explaining that the implied covenant has a “retrospective focus” and so is not about “what duty
    the law should impose . . . at the time of the wrong,” but rather concerns “the parties’ original
    contractual expectations” (citations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 
    68 A.3d 665
     (Del. 2013);
    see also Allen, 113 A.3d at 183 (“If a contractual gap exists, then the court must determine whether
    the implied covenant should be used to supply a term to fill the gap. Not all gaps should be filled.”).
    133
    License § X1-1.8.
    -32-
    Products, in part, based on Intermec’s ownership rights, the parties plainly
    understood that TransCore is obliged to pay royalties only on what would, but for
    the License, amount to infringement of Intermec Licensed Patents. After all, a
    Licensed Product that would not infringe a Licensed Patent is not a Licensed
    Product. And an expired Licensed Patent is not a Licensed Patent anymore.
    Based on the License’s purpose at the time of contracting, it is reasonable to
    infer, at the pleadings stage, the parties reasonably expected TransCore wouldn’t pay
    Intermec for intellectual property that TransCore doesn’t use.                         It is likewise
    reasonable to infer the parties reasonably expected the Company wouldn’t pay for
    Licensed Patents that, “upon . . . expiration,”134 Intermec couldn’t enforce through
    infringement litigation or through Licensed-based claims.
    134
    Id. at Recitals. Though recitals “do not ordinarily form any part of the real agreement,” TA
    Operating, Inc. v. Comdata, Inc., 
    2017 WL 3981138
    , at *23 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2017) (internal
    quotation marks omitted), this part of the recitals does form part of the License because it defines
    the word “Term,” which is used throughout the License, cf. Star Cellular Tel. Co., Inc. v. Baton
    Rouge CGSA, Inc., 
    1993 WL 294847
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 1993) (reviewing recitals to glean
    intent on meaning of undefined term). Regardless, recitals have been regarded as an “obvious
    source for gaining contractual intent . . . because it is there that the parties expressed their purposes
    for executing the” contract. Citadel Holding Co. v. Roven, 
    603 A.2d 818
    , 822–23 (Del. 1992); see
    Urdan v. WR Cap. Partners, LLC, 
    2019 WL 3891720
    , at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2019) (noting
    that recitals “provide background and can offer insight into the intent of the parties”), aff’d, 
    243 A.3d 668
     (Del. 2020). As a result, recitals might be relied upon the agreement’s express terms do
    not conclusively establish the parties’ intent. E.g., Llamas v. Titus, 
    2019 WL 2505374
    , at *16
    (Del. Ch. June 18, 2019). Given that the implied covenant requires the Court to focus
    retrospectively on what the parties would have done at the time of contracting if they had
    encountered the issue sub judice, the recitals are probative of the parties’ thirteen-year-old intent.
    -33-
    It is similarly reasonable to infer, at this stage, that the parties did not think to
    draft express language addressing this issue because it was “so obvious” that the
    License would not regulate patents the parties do not own and so can no longer
    protect.135     Relatedly, the complaint supports a reasonable inference that the
    Company would not have entered the License if it would be required to pay for
    intellectual property Intermec does not have an interest in. There is no need to
    contract for an infringement disclaimer if there is nothing to infringe.
    Taken together, it is reasonably conceivable that there is an implied term in
    the License precluding Intermec from charging (by refusing to refund), with
    impunity, royalties on transactions that would not infringe Intermec Licensed
    Patents. Accordingly, it is reasonably conceivable that this gap should be filled.
    The Company also has pleaded a reasonably conceivable breach of that
    implied term. To reiterate, the License allows the parties to “infringe” each other’s
    Licensed Patents. But the pleadings thus far support a reasonable inference that
    TransCore, on some occasions, overpaid by remitting royalties on non-infringing
    transactions. At the pleadings stage, then, it is reasonable to infer Intermec has acted
    arbitrarily or unreasonably when withholding payments for intellectual property it
    doesn’t own. Such conduct might have the effect of frustrating the Company’s
    reasonable expectations at the time of contracting, e.g., to benefit from intellectual
    135
    Dieckman, 155 A.3d at 361; accord Glaxo Grp., 248 A.3d at 919 n.35.
    -34-
    property rights that Intermec actually possesses.                    Accordingly, if discovery
    establishes the parties would have agreed, at the time of contracting, that there is no
    duty to pay for invalid or unused Licensed Patents, then Intermec will have breached
    an implied covenant in the License by refusing to disgorge the excess.
    The implied covenant counterclaim for overpayment survives dismissal.
    Intermec’s motion against this count is DENIED.
    Having just finished arguing there is no express term in the License
    prohibiting it from retaining overpayments, Intermec now argues there is no implied
    term requiring it to issue a refund either. To Intermec, because the License allows
    the Company to calculate its own royalty payments, there is no gap—TransCore just
    should have checked the Licensed Patents schedules and it wouldn’t have
    overpaid.136 But this conflates separate inquiries: whether an implied covenant
    exists and whether a claimant can recover on its breach.                           That TransCore
    “voluntarily” made payments it was not liable for might support an implied covenant
    breach defense,137 depending on the precise way the gap might be filled.138 But the
    136
    Intermec Dismissal Br. at 17–18.
    137
    See infra. Part IV. Section B.2.
    138
    See Allen, 113 A.3d at 184 (“Assuming a gap exists and the court determines that it should be
    filled, the court must determine how to fill it. . . . Terms are to be implied in a contract not because
    they are reasonable but because they are necessarily involved in the contractual relationship so that
    the parties must have intended them[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    -35-
    Company’s actions at the time of the alleged wrong are not relevant to the question
    of whether an implied term existed at the time of contracting.139 In fact, Intermec’s
    defense-based analysis seems to presuppose that a gap, and a breach of a term that
    might end up filling it, are, at minimum, reasonably conceivable.
    Yet, Intermec discounts that its position turns on an implied term as well. By
    arguing the License does not impose a duty to issue a refund, Intermec concludes it
    does have a right to keep overpayments. Aside from being logically unsound,
    Intermec’s conclusion ignores that the License does not speak to overpayments, let
    alone rights to them. If anything, Intermec’s insupportable finders-keepers rationale
    furthers the credible inference that it would be arbitrary or unreasonable for Intermec
    to retain “royalties” on assets it doesn’t own.
    As another dispositive basis for denying Intermec’s motion, Intermec’s
    reading of the Payment Provision is not reasonable.                    The Payment Provision
    prescribes the percentages of royalties due on Licensed Products’ Net Sales Value.
    Its language does not clearly govern what happens to “royalties” paid on “Net Sales
    Value” not covered by the License. It may be the case, as Intermec suggests, that by
    not specifying procedures for reconciling over- or mistaken payments, the parties
    intended the risk of loss to fall on TransCore. But, at the pleadings stage, it is
    139
    See, e.g., Gerber, 
    67 A.3d at 419
     (holding that the existence of an implied covenant “depends
    on the parties’ original contractual expectations, not a free-floating duty applied at the time of the
    wrong” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    -36-
    reasonably conceivable that the parties just did not think to address the issue but
    would have drafted a provision specifying how to address it if they had.
    2. The Company’s “Voluntary Payments” Involve a Factual Issue.
    To lay the cornerstone for a future affirmative defense, Intermec invokes the
    “voluntary payment doctrine.”140 The voluntary payment doctrine bars recovery of
    “payment voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts . . .”141 It prevents a
    counterparty from claiming that a “misapprehension of . . . [its] legal rights and
    obligations” caused it to make payments by mistake.142 Conceptually, the voluntary
    payment doctrine derives from the intellection that ignorance of the law is no
    140
    The voluntary payment doctrine evolved from unjust enrichment law. See generally Home
    Ins. Co. v. Honaker, 
    480 A.2d 652
    , 652–54 (Del. 1984). Given unjust enrichment’s equitable
    underpinnings, and that the doctrine concerns restitution, it seems to make the most analytical
    sense in that context too. See W. Nat. Gas Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 
    201 A.2d 164
    , 169 (Del.
    1964) (noting an “absence of a contract to repay” when pronouncing the doctrine).
    Nonetheless, this Court has observed that restitution, though based on “equitable considerations,”
    can be ordered in a “law court[]” and “in the form of a money judgment.” Rufus v. Ramsey, 
    2004 WL 838612
    , at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2004). As a result, this Court has considered the
    doctrine as a defense to non-unjust enrichment claims, including breach-of-contract claims. See
    Winshall v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 
    2019 WL 960213
    , at *15 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2019); Nieves v.
    All Star Title, Inc., 
    2010 WL 2977966
    , at *6–8 (Del. Super. Ct. July 27, 2010). The Restatement
    of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, in comments, also discusses the doctrine’s effect on
    settlements, and separately analogizes to loss-allocation devices through which contract parties
    assume risk of mistaken payments. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
    ENRICHMENT § 6 cmts. d, e & illus. 18–19 (AM. L. INST. 2011). And the parties, too, have argued
    it outside the unjust enrichment count. Intermec Dismissal Br. at 13–16; TransCore Dismissal
    Opp’n Br. at 15–17. So the Court considers it here.
    141
    W. Nat. Gas, 
    201 A.2d at 169
    .
    142
    Winshall, 
    2019 WL 960213
    , at *15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    -37-
    excuse.143 A contract party who pays its counterparty even though it had no
    contractual (legal) duty to do so may be found to have waived an argument in favor
    of recovering those payments.144
    But the voluntary payment doctrine’s negative treatment of mistakes of law
    does not reach all mistakes. When “money [is] paid under a mistake of fact,” even
    if the mistake is unilateral, the errant payment may be excused and recovery
    possible.145 In deciding whether the mistake is one of law or fact, courts look to the
    totality of the circumstances, considering “the circumstances under which [the
    payment] was made, the conduct of the payee and payor, and any other factors
    bearing on whether it would be unjust to permit the retention of the benefit or to
    order its restitution.”146 The payor bears the burden of demonstrating its payments,
    though negligently made, nevertheless were the result of an excusable mistake of
    fact.147
    143
    See Honaker, 
    480 A.2d at 653
     (“As a general rule, money paid due to a mistake of law is not
    recoverable. . . .”).
    144
    See 
    id. at 654
     (noting approvingly that “errant construction of a contract’s terms” would
    preclude recovery as a “mistake of law”).
    145
    See 
    id.
     at 653–54.
    146
    
    Id. at 654
    .
    147
    
    Id.
    -38-
    At this stage, the complaint itself supports a reasonable inference that
    TransCore made a factual mistake. The License lists several hundred Intermec
    Licensed Patents. They had been registered at varied times and so were bound to
    expire at varying rates.148 Given the volume, and lapse differential, the margin for
    error seems high. There also appears to be no express duty to surveil the expiration
    dates. It is reasonably conceivable, then, that the Company might mistakenly pay
    for an expired Licensed Patent or a non-infringing transaction unless TransCore had
    factual knowledge that a particular Licensed Patent or Product is no longer
    royalty-bearing.
    To be sure, the Company’s alleged belt-and-suspenders approach to
    computing Net Sales Value very well may be found, later in the case, to have been
    ill-conceived. It is possible that its errors are legal mistakes about how to interpret
    its payment duties and calculation rights. But at this pleadings stage, the Court has
    none of the circumstances that might endue a review of the totality. The instant
    record is just too undeveloped to find TransCore unequivocally made a mistake of
    law.
    To repel a fact-intensive analysis, Intermec swings a categorical rule. In
    Intermec’s view, TransCore’s equal access to the Licensed Patent schedules
    148
    See License at Attachs. 3, 4 (Schedules of Royalty-Bearing Patents).
    -39-
    precludes, as a matter of law, the Company from arguing it lacked complete
    knowledge of which Licensed Patents and Products required payment, and which
    did not. But “[t]he negligence of the payor in mistakenly compensating the payee,
    alone, is no bar to [recovery] of the sum paid.”149 And “no Delaware court has
    imposed [the voluntary payment] doctrine as a bar to recovery on the basis of
    constructive, rather than actual, knowledge.”150 The inquiry looks to the totality of
    the circumstances and so cannot be resolved on this limited record. Accordingly,
    Intermec’s voluntary payment defense must be rejected for now.
    C. TRANSCORE’S UNJUST ENRICHMENT COUNT FOR OVERPAYMENT
    FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM.
    As a third basis for overpayment relief, TransCore pleads unjust enrichment.
    Unjust enrichment, though, is available only in “the absence of a formal contract.”151
    So “unjust enrichment claims that are premised on an express, enforceable contract”
    fail to state a claim.152 Here, the Company seeks—and may obtain—recovery under
    149
    Honaker, 
    480 A.2d at 654
    .
    150
    Envolve Pharm. Sols., Inc. v. Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., 
    2021 WL 140919
    , at *11 (Del. Super. Ct.
    Jan. 15, 2021); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6 cmt.
    e (cautioning that when the voluntary payment doctrine is applied to “a business setting,” it should
    not be applied to “imput[e] knowledge” of which the payor “is not in fact aware,” as doing so
    would not be “realistic”).
    151
    ID Biomed. Corp. v. TM Techs., Inc., 
    1995 WL 130743
    , at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 1995); see
    also Windsor I, 238 A.3d at 875 (enumerating unjust enrichment elements, one of which being
    “the absence of a remedy provided by law” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    152
    Stone & Paper Invs., LLC v. Blanch, 
    2020 WL 3496694
    , at *12 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2020)
    (internal quotation marks omitted); see Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 
    401 A.2d 932
    , 942 (Del.
    -40-
    the License. Accordingly, the Company fails to state an unjust enrichment claim.
    Intermec’s motion against this count is GRANTED.
    The Company opposes this straightforward conclusion by advancing a few
    unpersuasive arguments. First, TransCore contends the rule requiring dismissal of
    unjust enrichment claims that overlap contract-based claims applies only in the
    Court of Chancery.153 Not so. Under Delaware law—which applies in this Court
    too—“[i]f recovery is possible under the contract,” then the contract controls and a
    duplicative unjust enrichment claim will be dismissed as an attempt to obtain double
    recovery.154
    1979) (“Because the contract is the measure of the plaintiffs’ right, there can be no recovery under
    an unjust enrichment theory independent of it.”); Anschutz Corp. v. Brown Robin Cap., LLC, 
    2020 WL 3096744
    , at *18 (Del. Ch. June 11, 2020) (“[U]njust enrichment claims generally will be
    dismissed as duplicative when there is an enforceable contract that governs a relationship.”); see
    also Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 
    62 A.3d 26
    , 58 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“It is a well-settled
    principle under Delaware law that a party cannot recover under a theory of unjust enrichment if a
    contract governs the relationship . . . that gives rise to the unjust enrichment claim.” (emphasis
    added)); see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 (“A
    valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope, displacing to that
    extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.”).
    153
    TransCore Dismissal Opp’n Br. at 9–10. The Company argues the “underlying logic of the
    decisions” it cites is that an unjust enrichment theory is always transformed into a “legal claim”
    whenever pleaded as an alternative to a breach-of-contract claim. Id. at 9. The Company’s
    position is contradicted by Delaware law. As at least one of those cases recognized, whether an
    unjust enrichment claim is a “legal claim” and so outside equitable jurisdiction depends on the
    allegations pleaded in the breach-of-contract count and whether the most appropriate relief is legal,
    not equitable, in character. See Dickerson v. Vills. of Five Points Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 
    2020 WL 7251512
    , at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2020) (“For example, if the unjust enrichment serves as an
    alternate theory of recovery for a contract claim, and money damages will make the plaintiff whole,
    it is a legal claim.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). There is no per se rule.
    154
    Envolve Pharm., 
    2021 WL 140919
    , at *10.
    -41-
    Next, the Company insists alternative pleading rules allow it to plead an unjust
    enrichment claim alongside a breach-of-contract claim. It is true that, at the
    pleadings stage, the mere existence of a breach-of-contract claim won’t
    automatically foreclose pursuit of an unjust enrichment claim.155                  So in some
    instances, Delaware law does permit unjust enrichment claims to cohabit complaints
    with breach-of-contract ones as alternative theories for recovery.156                     Those
    circumstances are limited to situations where “there is doubt surrounding [the
    relevant contract’s] enforceability or . . . existence.”157 But the Company has not
    alleged here that the License never existed, has been lost, or should be deemed
    unenforceable. To the contrary, it repeatedly urges, throughout its briefing, that the
    License’s existence and validity are not in dispute.158
    Dauntless, the Company says because its express breach-of-contract claim
    might fail, its unjust enrichment claim is a permissible safety net. But just because
    an enforceable contract may not provide the relief a litigant wants does not mean its
    155
    S’holder Rep. Servs. LLC v. RSI Holdco, LLC, 
    2019 WL 2207452
    , at *6 (Del. Ch. May 22,
    2019) (cleaned up).
    156
    BAE Sys. Info. & Elec. Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
    2009 WL 264088
    , at
    *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2009).
    157
    Khushaim, 
    2016 WL 3594752
    , at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    158
    E.g., Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for J. on Pleadings at 2 & n.3, Apr. 1, 2021 (D.I. 42)
    (hereinafter “TransCore JP Reply”).
    -42-
    case is “not controlled by the contract.”159 Courts finding otherwise considered facts
    that were not covered, expressly or impliedly, by the subject agreement.160 At
    bottom, an unjust enrichment claim cannot be used to circumvent an inadequate
    breach-of-contract claim.161 And TransCore’s attempts to do so fail.
    Finally, and slightly differently, the Company insists, “to the extent” the
    License is silent on overpayments, the License does not govern its relationship with
    Intermec and so it needs an unjust enrichment theory to recover.162 The Company
    forgets its implied covenant theory. “Notwithstanding the covenant’s potentially
    misleading moniker . . ., a claim for breach of the implied covenant is a contract
    claim, requires proof of breach-of-contract elements, and yields contract
    remedies.”163 So “[i]f the alleged wrongs underlying [an] unjust enrichment claim
    159
    S’holder Rep. Servs., 
    2019 WL 2207452
    , at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    160
    See, e.g., CLP Toxicology, Inc. v. Casla Bio Holdings LLC, 
    2021 WL 2588905
    , at *15 (Del.
    Ch. June 14, 2021) (allowing unjust enrichment count to proceed alongside breach-of-contract
    count where side agreement on which unjust enrichment had been based may never have been
    executed and was not in the record); Avantix Labs., Inc. v. Pharmion, LLC, 
    2012 WL 2309981
    , at
    *9 (Del. Super. Ct. June 18, 2012) (observing that unjust enrichment claims will not be dismissed
    where the breach is based on a “claim not governed exclusively by the contract at issue” and
    holding an unjust enrichment claim could proceed alongside breach-of-contract claims because
    some alleged services on which unjust enrichment was based were not “addresse[d]” by the subject
    contract’s scope).
    161
    E.g., Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C., 
    971 A.2d 872
    , 891 (Del. Ch. 2009).
    162
    Am. Ans. at Countercls. ¶ 81.
    163
    ASB Allegiance, 
    50 A.3d at
    444–45.
    -43-
    relate[] solely to the same allegations as . . . [a well-pleaded] implied covenant
    claim[],” the unjust enrichment claim will be dismissed.164 Here, the Court has ruled
    the License conceivably contains an implied covenant that regulates overpayments.
    That means the License “governs the relevant relationship between the parties” and
    “provide[s] the measure of [TransCore’s] rights.”165 To be sure, TransCore may
    lose. But the “possibility” that it won’t is all that matters.166
    As the master of its own complaint,167 TransCore chose to plead two
    breach-of-contract claims on top of an unjust enrichment theory without changing
    the allegations supporting each. It thus ran the risk that one of the License-based
    counts would preclude unjust enrichment relief. One did. Because the implied
    covenant count tees up a possible contractual right under the License—an inarguably
    valid and living agreement—the unjust enrichment count is duplicative and
    dismissed.
    164
    CMS Inv. Holdings, Inc. v. Castle, 
    2015 WL 3894021
    , at *17 (Del. Ch. June 23, 2015).
    165
    Stone & Paper, 
    2020 WL 3496694
    , at *12; see S’holder Rep. Servs., 
    2019 WL 2207452
    , at *6
    (“Where a plaintiff pleads a right to recovery not controlled by contract. . ., courts will permit
    unjust enrichment claims to proceed.” (emphasis added) (alterations and internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    166
    Envolve Pharm., 
    2021 WL 140919
    , at *10; see, e.g., Pallisades Collection, LLC v. Unifund
    CCR Partners, 
    2015 WL 6693962
    , at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2015) (“The [claimants] should
    be able to be made whole through a breach[-]of[-]contract claim if [they] can factually demonstrate
    a breach. . . .”).
    167
    Surf’s Up Legacy Partners, LLC v. Virgin Fest, LLC, 
    2021 WL 117036
    , at *9 (Del. Super. Ct.
    Jan. 13, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    -44-
    D. TRANSCORE’S EXPRESS BREACH-OF-CONTRACT COUNT FOR MISUSE STATES
    A CLAIM, BUT ITS IMPLIED COVENANT COUNT FOR MISUSE DOESN’T.
    Last, the Court turns to TransCore’s misuse allegations. According to the
    Company, Intermec has been using Company Licensed Patents, Products, or both,
    in the Transportation Markets, breaching the License along the way. Intermec
    counters: (1) the License does not, expressly or impliedly, prohibit it from operating
    in the Transportation Markets; (2)(i) TransCores’s charges are really patent
    infringement claims over which this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; and
    (2)(ii) if the License prohibits all commercial activity in the Transportation Markets,
    then it is illegal under antitrust law as a horizontal restraint of trade. Given
    Intermec’s reasoning, the issue is not whether TransCore’s misuse allegations are
    reasonably conceivable, but rather, whether it is reasonably conceivable that the
    License’s express terms cover Intermec’s alleged misconduct. As explained below,
    it is reasonably conceivable that the License’s express terms do. Necessarily, then,
    the Company has failed to state an implied covenant claim for misuse.
    1. This is a Breach-of-Contract Claim, Not a Patent Infringement Claim.
    The Company’s allegations sound in patent violations. So Intermec tries to
    make a federal case out of it. According to Intermec, this claim, when reduced,
    concerns patent infringement, stripping this Court of jurisdiction to hear it. When
    properly understood, though, the subject of the agreement may be patents, but the
    claim is for breach-of-contract.
    -45-
    By creating federal courts, Congress “intended division of labor.”168 On their
    side of the ledger, federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases “arising under”
    federal law169 and exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.170 In this context, then,
    “[t]he question [of] whether a claim arises under the patent laws is similar to the
    question [of] whether a claim arises under federal law.”171 So to determine whether
    a claim arises under patent, and therefore federal, law, the Court must start with the
    “creation test.”172 If federal patent law “creates the cause of action asserted,”173
    a state court lacks jurisdiction to resolve the claim.
    A common law breach-of-contract claim “finds its origins” in state law,
    making state, not federal, law its creator.174 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme
    Court has recognized “a special and small category” of claims that—despite their
    state origins—involve “such . . . serious federal interest[s]” as to be deemed
    federally-created.175 Gunn v. Minton explains: “federal jurisdiction over a state law
    168
    Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 
    545 U.S. 308
    , 319 (2005).
    169
    18 U.S.C § 1331 (1980).
    170
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1338
    (a) (2011).
    171
    Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 
    486 U.S. 800
    , 821 (1988).
    172
    Gunn v. Minton, 
    568 U.S. 251
    , 257 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    173
    Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 
    136 S. Ct. 1562
    , 1569 (2016).
    174
    Gunn, 
    568 U.S. at 258
    .
    175
    
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    -46-
    claim will lie if a federal issue is: [(i)] necessarily raised, [(ii)] actually disputed,
    [(iii)] substantial, and [(iv)] capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting
    the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”176 The test is conjunctive177 and a
    finding of federal jurisdiction thereunder, “rare.”178 Indeed, “the mere presence of a
    federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal
    jurisdiction.”179
    Taking all this together, the Court must decide whether this breach-of-contract
    claim fits within the “exemplary” and slim minority of state-based claims that raise
    the “significant federal issues” to which Gunn alludes.180 It doesn’t. Intermec’s
    argument falters on Gunn’s first element, relieving the Court of the rest.
    “A federal issue is ‘necessarily raised’ by a claim if the court must address the
    issue in order to resolve the claim.”181 But here, the Court can eschew federal law
    entirely. To determine whether TransCore has stated a breach of the License’s
    176
    
    568 U.S. 251
    , 258.
    177
    See 
    id.
     (“Where all four of these requirements are met, . . . [federal] jurisdiction is proper. . .
    .”).
    178
    Sanyo Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Intel Corp., 
    2019 WL 1650067
    , at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 17, 2019) (citing
    Manning v. Merrill Lynch Fenner & Smith Inc., 
    772 F.3d 158
    , 163 (3d Cir. 2014), aff’d, 
    578 U.S. 901
     (2016)).
    179
    Merrill Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 
    478 U.S. 804
    , 813 (1986).
    180
    Del. ex rel. Dunn v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 
    2018 WL 1942363
    , at *2 (D. Del. Apr. 25, 2018).
    181
    Sanyo Elec., 
    2019 WL 1650067
    , at *6 (citing Gunn, 
    568 U.S. at 259
    ).
    -47-
    territorial limits, the Court need only interpret the License’s words. Such an
    undertaking doesn’t “turn on . . . construction of federal law.”182 Nor is “federal law
    . . . an essential element” of a breach-of-contract claim.183 Indeed, that is why, not
    long ago, Delaware’s federal district court sent Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. v. Intel
    Corporation184 back to the Court of Chancery. There, the district court found the
    parties’ claims—which, as here, arose from a cross-license—posed the “core
    question” of “whether Intel may rightfully make or sell wireless communication
    models used in [a third party’s] computers” consistent with the license’s
    prohibitions.185 Finding this “purely an issue of state law contract interpretation,”
    the district court held the claims did not “arise under any Act of Congress relating
    to patents” and did not “otherwise require application or interpretation of patent
    law.”186 On remand, the Court of Chancery ruled accordingly. It resolved the case
    on breach-of-contract grounds by interpreting the parties’ license “as written.”187
    The Court has jurisdiction to do the same. And now, it will.
    182
    Dunn, 
    2018 WL 1942363
    , at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    183
    
    Id.
     (citing Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 
    255 U.S. 180
     (1921)).
    184
    
    2019 WL 1650067
     (D. Del. Apr. 17, 2019).
    185
    Id. at *6.
    186
    Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    187
    Sanyo Elec., 
    2021 WL 747719
    , at *6.
    -48-
    2. The License Plainly Prohibits Intermec from Using TransCore’s
    Intellectual Property in the Transportation Markets.
    Under the License, the Company granted Intermec a “royalty-free right” to
    market Company Licensed Patents.188 That privilege came with spatial boundaries.
    Intermec only could deploy Company Licensed Patents “outside the Transportation
    Markets.”189 And it could not “make, . . . use, lease, offer to sell, sell, export [or]
    import . . . Company Licensed Products” inside the Transportation Markets.190 Read
    together, these terms plainly keep Intermec’s implementation of TransCore’s
    intellectual property out of the Transportation Markets.
    What this language intends, neighboring language guarantees. Closing all
    dimensions, the No Rights Inside the Transportation Markets provision declares the
    License “does not expressly, by implication or otherwise confer on Intermec” the
    “right” to “Company Licensed Patents” “in” “the Transportation Markets.”191
    And, because “Company Licensed Products” are those that, “but for” the License,
    “would infringe” “Company Licensed Patents,”192 it follows deductively that this
    188
    License § X1-2.3.
    189
    Id.
    190
    Id.
    191
    Id. § X2-1.13.
    192
    Id. § X1-1.19.
    -49-
    restriction banishes Intermec’s use of Company Licensed Products from inside the
    Transportation Markets as well.
    Read as a whole, these provisions permit Intermec to commercialize
    TransCore’s intellectual property everywhere but inside the Transportation Markets.
    Their plain language, therefore, authorizes a breach claim against Intermec if
    Intermec nevertheless deploys TransCore’s intellectual property inside the
    Transportation Markets. Accordingly, if discovery establishes Intermec’s recent
    “projects” meet the Transportation Markets definition and involve TransCore’s
    Licensed Patents, Products, or both, Intermec may be liable for breach. Intermec’s
    attempt to dismiss this count is DENIED.
    Intermec’s contrary arguments misconstrue TransCore’s allegations. The
    Company doesn’t contend, as Intermec believes,193 that Intermec is totally banned
    from the Transportation Markets, e.g., also from marketing Intermec Licensed
    Patents and Products inside the Transportation Markets. Instead, the Company
    contends the Transportation Markets restrictions block Intermec’s use of TransCore
    Licensed Patents and Products inside the Transportation Markets. As explained, that
    contention is supported by the License’s plain language. Given that Intermec’s
    antitrust theory, too, is based exclusively on this misperception,194 it has offered no
    193
    See Intermec Dismissal Br. at 19–20.
    194
    Id. at 8 nn.18, 20.
    -50-
    alternative explanation as to why a generic contract restriction masks a complex
    trade conspiracy. So the Court need not consider it.
    3. Because the License’s Plain Language Governs the Transportation
    Markets, the Company’s Implied Covenant Claim Fails.
    As a fallback, TransCore pleads an implied covenant claim for misuse. But
    the implied covenant “cannot be used to vary a contract’s express terms.”195
    “[E]xpress contractual provisions ‘always supersede’ the implied covenant,” and so
    “an implied covenant claim will not survive a motion to dismiss” if it, in fact,
    “duplicates” an express breach-of-contract claim.196                        Here, TransCore’s
    Transportation Markets misuse claim is controlled by the License’s plain language—
    so, there’s a viable claim for express breach. TransCore’s implied covenant claim
    is, therefore, impermissibly duplicative.197 Accordingly, Intermec’s motion against
    it is GRANTED.
    195
    Buck, 
    2021 WL 673459
    , at *5; see Nemec, 
    991 A.2d at
    1125–26 (“[O]ne generally cannot base
    a claim for breach of the implied covenant on conduct authorized by the agreement.” (alteration in
    original) (quoting Dunlap, 
    878 A.2d at 441
    )).
    196
    Bandera, 
    2019 WL 4927053
    , at *22 (quoting Gerber, 
    67 A.3d at 419
    ).
    197
    E.g., Edinburgh Holdings, Inc. v. Educ. Affiliates, Inc., 
    2018 WL 2727542
    , at *9 (Del. Ch.
    June 6, 2018) (“The implied covenant . . . cannot be invoked to override the express terms of a
    contract. Thus, if the contract at issue expressly addresses a particular matter, an implied covenant
    claim respecting that matter is duplicative and not viable.” (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted)); accord Buck, 
    2021 WL 673459
    , at *5 (dismissing an implied covenant claim that
    “merely repackage[d]” a breach-of-contract claim).
    -51-
    F. INTERMEC’S BREACH-OF-CONTRACT COUNT STATES A CLAIM
    UNLESS IT IS LATER FOUND TIME-BARRED.
    Having resolved Intermec’s dismissal motion, the Court now turns to the
    parties’ cross Rule 12(c) motions.
    Intermec alleges TransCore breached the License by failing to correct the
    underpayments the Auditor revealed.198 Given the FR, it is reasonably conceivable
    that TransCore underpaid Intermec a number of times during the Company’s
    2012–16 fiscal years. As its principal argument in defense, TransCore contends this
    claim is time-barred. Invoking Delaware’s contractual statute of limitations, the
    Company urges the time for litigating its alleged underpayments elapsed at some
    point in 2019—i.e., three years after the last quarter in the 2012–16 Reports ended.
    The question here, then, is whether Intermec waited too long to recover the balance.
    It might have, but disputed terms in the License prevent a decision at this stage.
    198
    Intermec also alleges, in a single sentence, that “[u]pon information and belief,” TransCore
    has, since the audit, “continually failed to pay all royalties.” Compl. ¶ 32. This is a conclusory
    allegation not entitled to truth. See Price, 
    26 A.3d at 166
     (holding that a court need not consider
    “conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts”). As a result, it cannot support a breach
    claim independent of the underpayment allegations discussed below. But because TransCore has
    not moved against this “part” of Intermec’s breach-of-contract count, see generally TransCore JP
    Br., the Court’s rejection of it should have no bearing on the motions’ dispositions. To the extent,
    however, judgment is required, Intermec’s motion for entry of judgment is denied as to this
    unsupported piece of its breach-of-contract claim.
    -52-
    1. This Claim Implicates the Contractual Statute of Limitations.
    The statute of limitations for a breach-of-contract claim is three years.199 The
    clock starts on the date that the cause of action accrued.200 And a breach-of-contract
    claim accrues “at the time the contract is broken, not at the time when the actual
    damage results or is ascertained.”201 Put differently, the statute is triggered as soon
    as the breach occurs, even if the aggrieved plaintiff is ignorant of the breach.202
    “[D]raconian in nature[,]” a court cannot “extend the limitations period out of
    notions of fair play.”203 So when the claim, facially, falls outside the limitations
    199
    Wedderien v. Collins, 
    2007 WL 3262148
    , at *4 (Del. Nov. 6, 2007); see generally DEL. CODE
    ANN. tit. 10, § 8106 (2020).
    200
    Levey v. Brownstone Asset Mgmt., LP, 
    76 A.3d 764
    , 768 (Del. 2013).
    201
    Worrel v. Farmers Bank of State of Del., 
    430 A.2d 469
    , 472 (Del. 1981) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    202
    Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 
    860 A.2d 312
    , 319 (Del. 2004); see SmithKline
    Beecham Pharms. Co. v. Merck & Co., Inc., 
    766 A.2d 442
    , 450 (Del. 2000) (observing that
    Delaware’s contractual statute of limitations “is not a discovery statute” and so, absent tolling,
    constructive knowledge of the breach is enough to trigger the statutory period (internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    203
    Trustwave Holdings, Inc. v. Beazley Ins. Co., Inc., 
    2019 WL 4785866
    , at *4 (Del. Super. Ct.
    Sept. 30, 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Thomas v. Headlands Tech
    Principal Holdings, L.P., 
    2020 WL 5946962
    , at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2020); see Scharf v.
    Edgcomb Corp., 
    864 A.2d 909
    , 920 (Del. 2004) (“All statutes of limitations . . . are, by their very
    nature, harsh. . . . When a plaintiff fails to file a timely complaint, a jurisdictional defect is created
    that cannot be excused.” (cleaned up)).
    -53-
    period, the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts leading to a reasonable
    inference that a tolling exception applies.204
    Though Intermec disputes the statute’s application, it does not contend
    TransCore has invoked the wrong law. Three years, then, will be the measure if the
    statute applies.
    2. At this Stage, the Audit Provision is Ambiguous,
    So TransCore’s Statute of Limitations Defense Must be Deferred.
    Intermec received the FR on March 27, 2017. It filed its complaint less than
    three years later—March 25, 2020—alleging TransCore breached the Audit
    Provision in failing to remit the underpaid total the FR calculated.                        Facially,
    Intermec’s allegations are timely. Ordinarily, that would be the end of this.
    But TransCore insists Intermec’s breach-of-contract claim cannot be based on
    the Audit Provision.205 According to TransCore, the Audit Provision does not create
    a standalone duty to correct underpayments, but rather, just serves to inform
    204
    Laguelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 
    2014 WL 2699880
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 11,
    2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    205
    Apart from its upcoming substantive argument, TransCore contends this claim is barred
    procedurally because Intermec’s complaint does not specifically plead a breach of the Audit
    Provision. TransCore JP Reply at 4–5. But Delaware’s pleading rules do not require the exacting
    detail or magic words TransCore’s technical quibbles wishes they did. Outside contexts not
    pertinent here (e.g., fraud), Delaware accepts notice pleading. See generally Avve, Inc. v. Upstack
    Techs., Inc., 
    2019 WL 1643752
    , at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2019). And here, the complaint’s
    various references to the audit, the FR, and TransCore’s refusal to pay, are more than sufficient to
    put TransCore on fair notice of this claim. E.g., KT4 Partners, 
    2021 WL 2823567
    , at *31 (“A
    plaintiff only has an obligation to put an opposing party on fair notice of its theories.” (citing VLIW
    Tech., 
    840 A.2d at 611
    )).
    -54-
    Intermec of past breaches of the standalone payment duties imposed by the Payment
    Provision. Using that timeframe, TransCore says Intermec’s underpayment claim,
    if true, began accruing in Q2 2016—the last quarter comprising the 2012–16 Reports
    and the last one the FR found short—and so went stale no later than 2019. As
    support for that theory, TransCore focuses on the interaction between the Audit and
    Payment Provisions. In reply, Intermec does too.
    The parties’ contentions boil down to disagreement over whether the Audit
    Provision creates a separate payment duty apart from the Payment Provision.
    Reduced further, they debate the Auditor’s authority to render binding judgments.
    Under the Audit Provision, TransCore has thirty days to imburse Intermec for an
    “underpayment” that the Auditor “demonstrate[s].”206 The License does not define
    “demonstrate.” But dictionaries do. And “[u]nder well-settled case law, Delaware
    courts look to dictionaries for assistance in determining the plain meaning of terms
    which are not defined in a contract.”207
    206
    License § X2-3.5.
    207
    Lorillard Tobacco, 
    903 A.2d at 738
    ; accord In re Solera Ins. Coverage Appeals, 
    240 A.3d 1121
    , 1132 n.67 (Del. 2020).
    -55-
    Merriam-Webster208 defines “demonstrate” as “to show clearly” and “to prove
    or make clear by reasoning or evidence.”209 Black’s, in lieu of “demonstrate,”
    defines “show,” a legal synonym, as “to make [facts, etc.] apparent or clear by
    evidence; to prove. . .”210 Central to both is the principle that nothing can be
    demonstrated unless it is proven. Because of that, TransCore argues the License
    does not empower the Auditor to make a final, uncontestable determination that
    establishes a legal duty to pay for what the Auditor unilaterally views as an
    underpayment. Otherwise, TransCore continues, the Auditor would assume the role
    of an arbitrator who presides over payment dispute proceedings that are not
    referenced in the Audit Provision’s plain language.
    TransCore’s reading finds support in other License provisions. For example,
    in the License’s indemnification provisions, the parties drafted “final determination”
    language, establishing the prospect of a dispute resolution mechanism.211 So the
    208
    Delaware courts, including the Supreme Court, have used Merriam-Webster to define
    undefined contractual terms. E.g., Spintz v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 
    228 A.3d 691
    , 700 (Del. 2020);
    USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Carr, 
    225 A.3d 357
    , 360 (Del. 2020); Aveanna Healthcare, 
    2021 WL 3235739
    , at *32. So, for purposes here, the Court does the same.
    209
    Demonstrate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (online ed.), www.merriam-
    webster.com/dictionary/demonstrate (last visited Aug. 4, 2021).
    210
    Show, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
    211
    License § X2-5.2.
    -56-
    parties knew how to ground the Audit Provision on a finality requirement if they
    wanted. They apparently did not. TransCore’s reading is a reasonable one.
    Intermec, however, has responded with a reasonable reading of its own.
    Intermec contends the Audit Provision’s thirty-day deadline makes clear that
    TransCore has a legal duty to pay the sum the Auditor computes. Otherwise,
    Intermec says, the Audit Provision would have no teeth; TransCore would be free to
    ignore the Auditor, eliminating Intermec’s bargained-for audit rights. In line,
    Intermec contends the absence of “final determination” language indicates
    TransCore agreed the Auditor’s “demonstration” would be conclusive (i.e., de jure
    “proved”) or, at least, would serve as a benchmark for calculating damages should
    the parties, after TransCore pays, engage breach litigation involving the correct
    calculation methodology. A “nonwaiver” provision supports this reading. Under
    that provision, the parties agreed breach arguments would not be waived just because
    a party had been forced to acquiesce to a demand (e.g., the FR) it believes is
    wrongful.212
    The parties’ positions on how the Audit Provision interacts with the Payment
    Provision entrench the ambiguity more deeply.
    According to TransCore, the Auditor cannot “demonstrate” royalties are
    “underpaid” unless TransCore underpaid when it imbursed the royalties originally.
    212
    Id. § X2-10.3.
    -57-
    In other words, given that, in TransCore’s view, the Auditor is limited to “verifying”
    quarterly reports, the parties agreed the Auditor’s sole task is to reveal past breaches
    of the Payment Provision, litigation on which could have occurred only until
    Q2–Q3 2019. TransCore adds that, to the extent the Audit Provision, as applied
    here, revives long overdue breach claims, it violates Delaware public policy by
    effectively extending the statute of limitations beyond three years.
    Intermec fights TransCore’s premise, observing the Audit Provision is not
    necessarily dependent on the Payment Provision. For example, TransCore could
    breach the Payment Provision by not timely paying. The Audit Provision, however,
    does not target timeliness breaches, but rather, targets amount-based breaches. The
    Audit Provision, Intermec adds, also remedies breaches based on the contents of
    quarterly reports, which the Payment Provision does not capture. In short, Intermec
    argues the Audit Provision can be separately breached without also breaching the
    Payment Provision, separating the two and thereby, not extending its Audit
    Provision breach claim beyond three years.
    Both parties have offered reasonable readings of these contested Provisions.
    At this stage, the Court can’t choose.213 That means the Court also can’t decide
    TransCore’s statute of limitations defense yet. Given the parties’ arguments, it is
    reasonably conceivable that this defense hinges on a disputed fact. Namely, did the
    213
    Vanderbilt Income, 
    691 A.2d at 613
    .
    -58-
    parties, when contracting, intend that (1) the Audit Provision could be breached
    independently, in which case Intermec’s claims are timely; or (2) the Audit Provision
    could not be breached independently, in which case Intermec’s claims are really
    based on the Payment Provision and so may be untimely.
    If discovery establishes that the second option reflects the only reasonable
    reading, then Intermec bears the burden of showing a tolling exception applies.
    Though the parties have spent considerable energy briefing the tolling issue now, it
    would be premature for the Court to pass on it before the Provisions are properly
    interpreted. Conversely, if discovery establishes that the first option reflects the only
    reasonable reading, the tolling issue will be moot.
    The parties’ dueling motions for judgment on this point are DENIED.214
    214
    Through its motion, Intermec also seeks judgment on a “breach-of-contract claim” for
    TransCore’s alleged failure, since 2019, to deliver quarterly reports. See Intermec JP Br. at 13–14.
    This “claim,” however, is not alleged in Intermec’s breach-of-contract count, which focuses
    instead on underpaid royalties alone. See Compl. ¶¶ 41–48. The sole sentence alluding to missing
    quarterly reports merely is incorporated by reference and not mentioned again outside Intermec’s
    declaratory count. Compare Compl. ¶ 31, with Compl. ¶ 41, and Compl. ¶¶ 33–39. Indeed,
    TransCore’s motion does not address the reports outside the declaratory context. See TransCore
    JP Br. at 19–21; cf. TransCore Opp’n JP. Br. at 23–24.
    Briefs and motions do not amend or expand pleadings. See Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15(a). And it
    would be a strain to read Intermec’s underpayment allegations as a discrete complaint about a
    failure to deliver quarterly reports. But see Malpiede, 
    780 A.2d at 1083
     (relieving courts of
    interpretive straining). So the Court won’t.
    Since this theme will recur, see infra note 228, the Court cautions claimants who include multiple
    “sub-theories” within one count, instead of pleading them as separate counts. Not only are
    sub-theories easy to miss, but also this Court has held that motions to dismiss (or to trim) parts of
    claims are invalid. See inVentiv Health Clinical, LLC v. Odonate Therapeutics, Inc., 
    2021 WL 252823
    , at *4–6 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2021). By logical extension, the same could be said, in
    the appropriate case, for pleading those “parts” in the first place. If a defendant must attack whole
    -59-
    G. INTERMEC’S DECLARATORY COUNT FAILS TO A STATE CLAIM.
    Finally, Intermec seeks declaration that TransCore is obligated: (1) to make
    past royalty payments; (2) to make ongoing royalty payments; and (3) to deliver
    quarterly reports. None supports a declaratory judgment.
    The Court’s power to issue a declaratory judgment derives from the
    Declaratory Judgment Act.215 A declaratory judgment “is designed to promote
    preventative justice.”216       It is “[b]orn out of practical concerns,”217 providing
    efficient relief where a traditional remedy is otherwise unavailable.218 To that end,
    the Act may be invoked “to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
    with respect to rights, status and other legal relations.”219
    counts, a defendant should have whole counts to attack. Otherwise, a plaintiff could be insulated
    from dismissal by embedding weak theories into strong ones and then claiming they all fall or
    none fall.
    In short, Intermec has not adequately pleaded this “claim” and so the Court doesn’t consider it. To
    the extent judgment is nevertheless required, Intermec’s motion is denied in this respect.
    215
    DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6501 (2020).
    216
    Schick Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 
    533 A.2d 1235
    , 1237–38 (Del.
    Ch. 1987) (quoting Stabler v. Ramsey, 
    88 A.2d 546
    , 557 (Del. 1952)).
    217
    Id. at 1238.
    218
    See id. (“The notion laying behind [declaratory judgments] is that legitimate legal interests are
    sometimes cast into doubt by the assertion of adverse claims and that, when this occurs, a party
    who suffers practical consequences ought not to be required to wait upon his adversary for a
    judicial resolution that will settle the matter.”).
    219
    Town of Cheswold v. Cent. Del. Bus. Park, 
    188 A.3d 810
    , 816 (Del. 2018) (quoting DEL. CODE
    ANN. tit. 10, § 6512)).
    -60-
    “Not all disputes, however, are appropriate for judicial review when the
    parties request it.”220 The Court has discretion to decline declaratory judgment
    jurisdiction,221 and will do so where a proposed declaration would not advance the
    litigation, but rather, would waste judicial resources.222 To promote those interests,
    “Delaware courts do not address disagreements that have no significant current
    impact.”223 Stated prudentially, a declaration would not advance the litigation if it
    would not resolve an “actual controversy,” e.g., a dispute “‘in which the claim of
    . . . is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting the claim’” and in which
    adversity on the issue exists.224 Delaware law, also, “requires that a dispute not be
    moot . . . to avoid wasting judicial resources on academic disputes.”225 And because
    220
    Id.
    221
    See, e.g., Burris v. Cross, 
    583 A.2d 1364
    , 1372 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990); see also XL Specialty
    Ins. Co. v. WMI Liquidating Tr., 
    93 A.3d 1208
    , 1216 (Del. 2014) (reviewing a court’s decision to
    exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction for abuse of discretion).
    222
    E.g., Stroud v. Milliken Enters., Inc., 
    552 A.2d 476
    , 480 (Del. 1989) (“[J]udicial resources are
    limited and must not be squandered on disagreements that have no significant current impact. . . .
    These judicial concerns are not rendered irrelevant by the declaratory judgment statute and its
    salutary purpose of advancing the stage of litigation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); KLM
    Royal Dutch Airlines v. Checchi, 
    698 A.2d 380
    , 382 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“[T]he objective of [a
    declaratory judgment] action is to advance the stage of litigation between the parties in order to
    address the practical effects of present acts of the parties on their future relations.”).
    223
    Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Dr Pepper Bottling Co. of Tx., 
    962 A.2d 205
    , 209 (Del.
    2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    224
    Town of Cheswold, 188 A.3d at 816 (quoting Rollins Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Hydronics Corp., 
    303 A.2d 660
    , 662–63 (Del. 1973)).
    225
    Crescent/Mach, 
    962 A.2d at 208
    .
    -61-
    declarations provide relief where “a claim . . . would not support an action under
    common law pleading rules,”226 a declaratory claim may not duplicate a
    properly-pleaded affirmative count.227 A declaratory count that “does not add
    anything” will be dismissed.228
    To begin, Intermec’s request for a declaration on TransCore’s duty to remit
    past-due royalties is duplicative. Whether TransCore breached the License
    necessarily will be decided, positively or negatively, in the resolution of Intermec’s
    express breach-of-contract count. And whether Intermec is entitled to damages, too,
    necessarily will be resolved through that count and through TransCore’s implied
    covenant count for overpayment. There is, then, no need for a declaration on this
    issue. Accordingly, TransCore’s motion against this request is GRANTED.
    Next, Intermec’s request for a declaration regarding TransCore’s “ongoing”
    duty to pay royalties fails for the simple reason that this issue is not in controversy.
    Throughout its briefing, TransCore concedes it must pay royalties whenever it sells
    226
    Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, 
    2014 WL 6703980
    , at
    *29 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 2014).
    227
    US Ecology, Inc. v. Allstate Power Vac, Inc., 
    2018 WL 3025418
    , at *10 (Del. Ch. June 18,
    2018), aff’d, 
    2019 WL 24460
     (Del. Jan. 17, 2019); Trusa v. Nepo, 
    2017 WL 1379594
    , at *8 n.71
    (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2017); Great Hill, 
    2014 WL 6703980
    , at *29; Veloric, 
    2014 WL 4639217
    , at
    *20.
    228
    ESG Cap. Partners II, LP v. Passport Special Opportunities Master Fund, LP, 
    2015 WL 9060982
    , at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2015).
    -62-
    a Licensed Product.229 There is, therefore, no “uncertainty and insecurity” as to
    Intermec’s right to receive royalties.230 Accordingly, this request is MOOT.231
    Finally, Intermec requests a declaration that TransCore must continue to
    prepare and deliver quarterly reports. In short, the Court deems this requested
    declaration moot. But, to get there, the Court has had to negotiate some distractions.
    Intermec alleged tersely that TransCore has failed to provide quarterly reports
    for about two years.
    229
    E.g., TransCore JP Opp’n Br. at 18.
    230
    Town of Cheswold, 188 A.3d at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    231
    Intermec purported, through its opening brief, to modify and refine its ongoing-royalties
    declaration so that it might obtain judgment “based on the gross invoice price . . . pursuant to
    Section 2.3 of” the License. Intermec JP Br. at 1, 14. But Section 2.3 does not mention gross
    invoice price calculations. See License § X1-2.3 (Intermec’s Grants); id. § X2-2.3 (Currency
    Conversion). More important, neither does Intermec’s complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 33–39. As
    explained, briefs do not amend pleadings. See supra note 210. To the extent Intermec meant, but
    incorrectly typed, Section 3.2, that section is not a royalty payment provision either. Instead,
    Section 3.2 describes what quarterly reports must contain. See License § X2-3.2 (Content of
    Quarterly Reports). Indeed, Intermec’s complaint purports to acknowledge as much, though it
    consistently repeats the same numerical error. See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 19, 25, 39.
    Morphing again, Intermec, in its reply, says “gross invoice price” comprises part of the definition
    of Net Sales Value, which is mentioned (implicitly) in its complaint through a reference to Section
    3.1 (the Payment Provision). Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for J. on Pleadings at 5 (D.I. 41). To
    be clear, reply briefs do not amend pleadings either. See, e.g., Ethica Corp. Fin. S.r.L v. Dana
    Inc., 
    2018 WL 3954205
    , at *3 & n.37 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2018). Even so, entertaining this
    shape shifting would be a strain. It is difficult to interpret Intermec’s subject allegations, which
    solely relate to a flat duty to pay, as a request to settle any dispute the parties may have over the
    methodology they have used, or the Auditor employed in the FR, to calculate Net Sales Value.
    But see Malpiede, 
    780 A.2d at 1083
    . The Court need not draw unreasonable inferences in
    Intermec’s favor. See Price, 
    26 A.3d at 166
    . Accordingly, the Court will not consider this ever-
    evolving request for relief, as it had not been pleaded in Intermec’s complaint. To the extent
    judgment is required, Intermec’s motion is denied.
    -63-
    TransCore denied it, adding that it did not “owe any duty to provide quarterly
    reports.”232 But later, TransCore produced a screenshot of Intermec’s own quarterly
    report portal. The image depicts transmittal messages that indicate Intermec has
    “received” the very reports (and the royalties they compute) Intermec claimed, in
    one sentence, TransCore has been wrongfully withholding.233 The injudiciousness
    of that filing234 inspired Intermec to intensify its quarterly report declaration claim
    on the (post hoc) theory that TransCore’s double-talk has now caused it uncertainty
    and insecurity. It also led Intermec to argue that: (1) TransCore’s initial denial is a
    232
    Am. Ans. at Ans. ¶ 31.
    233
    
    Id.
     at Countercls. ¶ 39.
    234
    TransCore acknowledged that the Court might “disagree” with its strategy, and explained, if
    granted a Rule 15 amendment, it would “further clarify its denial” by deleting the comment about
    not owing a general duty to provide quarterly reports. TransCore JP Opp’n Br. at 23 n.18.
    -64-
    binding admission; and (2) considering the screenshot, at this stage, would be
    procedural error.
    To the Court, this all now seems to have been truly unnecessary.
    Given that TransCore repeatedly concedes it must provide quarterly
    reports,235—as it seemingly may well have done for the past two years236—the Court
    need not reach the merits of these arguments. The parties’ posturing aside, there just
    is no controversy supporting Intermec’s sought-after declaration anymore.
    Accordingly, the prayer for it is DISMISSED as MOOT.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, Intermec’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion is GRANTED
    IN PART and DENIED IN PART, Intermec’s Rule 12(c) motion is DENIED, and
    TransCore’s Rule 12(c) motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    _________________________
    Paul R. Wallace, Judge
    Original to Prothonotary
    cc: All Counsel via File & Serve
    235
    E.g., id. at 17; TransCore JP Reply at 2.
    236
    See n.233, supra.
    -65-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: N20C-03-254 PRW CCLD

Judges: Wallace J.

Filed Date: 8/16/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/16/2021

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