Hackett v. TD Bank, N.A. ( 2023 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    ISMAA’EEL H. HACKETT,                        )
    )
    Plaintiff,                            )
    )
    v.                                    ) C.A. No. N22C-10-097 MMJ
    )
    TD BANK, N.A. a Delaware corporation,        )
    )
    Defendant.                            )
    Submitted: April 19, 2023
    Decided: May 31, 2023
    On Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
    Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
    GRANTED
    On Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
    DENIED AS MOOT
    OPINION
    Ismaa’eel H. Hackett, Pro Se Plaintiff
    Coleen W. Hill, Esq., Duane Morris LLP, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Defendant
    JOHNSTON, J.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
    Ismaa’eel Hackett (“Plaintiff”) contends TD Bank (“Defendant”) incorrectly
    reported a debt to consumer reporting agencies, lowering Plaintiff’s credit score.1
    Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant under the Delaware’s False Claims and
    Reporting Act (“DFCRA”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),
    and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).2 The Court considers these motions
    on the basis of sparse, but undisputed, facts.
    Defendant reported to credit bureaus an allegedly delinquent debt owed to
    Defendant by Plaintiff. On or about August 16, 2022, Admin Recovery, LLC
    (“Admin Recovery”) sent a letter to Plaintiff stating that Admin Recovery’s
    records showed Plaintiff’s account was paid in full, and that the debt was satisfied. 3
    On or about August 24, 2022, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff.4 The letter
    stated that Defendant’s records reflected that Plaintiff’s account had been charged
    off on December 5, 2019, as a result of no payments having been received in nine
    payment cycles.5 On November 23, 2020, Defendant received a payment of
    $432.91, which reduced Plaintiff’s balance to zero.6 Defendant informed Plaintiff
    1
    Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2.
    2
    Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
    3
    Id. ¶ 3; see also Ex. A.
    4
    Id. ¶ 4.; see also Ex. B.
    5
    Ex. B.
    6
    Id.
    2
    that “[t]he Bank has updated your Account to the credit bureaus as paid in full.
    Please allow 30–60 days for the information to be updated on your credit report.”7
    When Defendant had his credit checked to purchase a property on November
    2, 2022, his “sc[o]re was too low for [him] to get a VA loan.”8 Plaintiff provided
    the Notice of Action Taken from his VA Home Loan Application to the Court with
    the Amended Complaint, which stated the principal reason for the credit being
    denied was that the credit application was incomplete.9 “Late payments for past or
    present debt” was not marked as a reason for credit denial.10
    Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on October 10, 2022. Plaintiff’s
    original Complaint alleged defamation. Defendant filed its original Motion to
    Dismiss on November 22, 2022. On January 9, 2023, a Delaware Superior Court
    Commissioner granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice and
    noted: “The state law claim of defamation based upon reports to credit agencies is
    preempted by the plain language of the [FCRA].”11 The Commissioner gave
    7
    Id.
    8
    Am. Compl. ¶ 5; see also Ex. C.
    9
    Ex. C.
    10
    Id.
    11
    Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss, dated Jan. 9, 2023 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (2018)
    (“No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State with respect to any
    subject matter regulated under section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of
    persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies . . . .”); Purcell v. Universal
    Bank, N.A., 
    2003 WL 1962376
    , at *5 (E.D. Pa.) (discussing preemption under 15 U.S.C. §
    1681t); Cheadle v. Experian, 
    2021 WL 3144843
    , at *4 (D.N.J) (“The weight of authority holds
    that claims for defamation and emotional distress are preempted by the FCRA. . . . [S]everal
    other circuit courts have held that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts all state and common law claims
    against furnishers of information with respect to all subject matter regulated under § 1681s-2.”)).
    3
    Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed his Amended
    Complaint on February 1, 2023. Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss the
    Amended Complaint on February 14, 2023. Plaintiff filed his response on
    February 24, 2023, which requested summary judgment in his favor. Defendant
    filed its reply brief on April 12, 2023. The Court took Defendant’s Motion to
    Dismiss under advisement on April 19, 2023.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    In a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the Court must determine whether the
    claimant “may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances
    susceptible of proof.”12 The Court must accept as true all well-pled allegations.13
    Every reasonable factual inference will be drawn in the non-moving party’s
    favor.14 If the claimant may recover under that standard of review, the Court must
    deny the Motion to Dismiss.15
    ANALYSIS
    DFCRA
    The DFCRA states:
    Any person who . . . knowingly makes, uses, or causes to
    be made or used a false record or statement material to an
    obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
    Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and
    12
    Spence v. Funk, 
    396 A.2d 967
    , 968 (Del.1978).
    13
    
    Id.
    14
    Wilmington Sav. Fund. Soc’v, F.S.B. v. Anderson, 
    2009 WL 597268
    , at *2 (Del. Super.) (citing
    Doe v. Cahill, 
    884 A.2d 451
    , 458 (Del.2005)).
    15
    Spence, 396 A.2d at 968.
    4
    improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or
    transmit money or property to the Government shall be
    liable to the Government for a civil penalty. . . .16
    A claim under the DFCRA requires that Plaintiff allege Defendant knowingly
    made a false record to the government. Plaintiff’s allegations do not involve a
    false record or statement to the government. Rather, Plaintiff alleges Defendant
    made a false record to consumer reporting agencies17—TransUnion, Equifax, and
    Experian.18 A consumer reporting agency is not a government entity.19
    Therefore, the DFCRA is inapplicable to the alleged facts. The Court finds
    Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the DFCRA. Plaintiff’s claims under the
    DFCRA are hereby DISMISSED.
    16
    6 Del. C. § 1201(a)(7) (emphasis added).
    17
    See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2018) (“The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person
    which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole
    or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other
    information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and
    which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or
    furnishing consumer reports.”); Chuluunbat v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 
    4 F.4th 562
    , 565 (7th
    Cir. 2021) (listing the main three credit reporting agencies as: Experian, TransUnion, and
    Equifax); Kidd v. Thomson Reuters Corp., 
    925 F.3d 99
    , 101 (2d Cir. 2019) (listing examples of
    consumer reporting agencies as: Equifax, Transunion, and Experian).
    18
    See Ex. C (listing Plaintiff’s credit scores from Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion).
    19
    Mowrer v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, 
    2019 WL 4418747
    , at *5 (D.D.C.), aff’d sub nom.
    Mowrer v. United States Dep’t of Transportation, 
    14 F.4th 723
     (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“Courts have
    consistently concluded that government entities are not ‘consumer reporting agenc[ies]’ because
    they do not collect information for the purpose of furnishing it to third parties.”). The Court
    notes that this case concludes a government entity is not a consumer reporting agency.
    Therefore, if an entity is a government entity, then it is not a consumer reporting agency. Thus,
    the contrapositive conditional statement must also be true: if an entity is a consumer reporting
    agency, then it is not a government entity.
    5
    FDCPA
    The purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices
    by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using
    abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to
    promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection
    abuses.”20 A debt collector is “any person who uses any instrumentality of
    interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is
    the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly
    or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”21
    Defendant cannot be considered a debt collector when the alleged debt was
    owed to Defendant itself. As Defendant pointed out in its briefing, “[t]he only way
    [Defendant] could possibly be subject to FDCPA is if it used a deceptive name to
    attempt to collect Plaintiff’s debt.”22
    Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant attempted to collect the debt.
    Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant used a deceptive name to collect the debt.
    Admin Recovery, LLC—the collection agency allegedly involved in this case—is
    not a party to this case. Plaintiff does not allege Admin Recovery, LLC used
    “abusive debt collection practices.”23
    20
    
    15 U.S.C. § 1692
    (e) (2018).
    21
    
    Id.
     § 1692(a)(6).
    22
    Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss 5 (citing Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc., 
    147 F.3d 232
    , 235 (2d
    Cir. 1998).
    23
    
    15 U.S.C. § 1692
    (e) (2018).
    6
    Therefore, the Court finds the FDCPA is not applicable to the alleged facts
    of this case. Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA are hereby DISMISSED.
    FCRA
    The FCRA requires that:
    A person who--
    (A) regularly and in the ordinary course of business
    furnishes information to one or more consumer reporting
    agencies about the person’s transactions or experiences
    with any consumer; and
    (B) has furnished to a consumer reporting agency
    information that the person determines is not complete or
    accurate,
    shall promptly notify the consumer reporting
    agency of that determination and provide to the agency
    any corrections to that information, or any additional
    information, that is necessary to make the information
    provided by the person to the agency complete and
    accurate, and shall not thereafter furnish to the agency any
    of the information that remains not complete or accurate.24
    ....
    After receiving notice pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of
    this title of a dispute with regard to the completeness or
    accuracy of any information provided by a person to a
    consumer reporting agency, the person shall--
    (A) conduct an investigation with respect to the
    disputed information;
    (B) review all relevant information provided by the
    consumer reporting agency pursuant to section
    1681i(a)(2) of this title;
    (C) report the results of the investigation to the
    consumer reporting agency;
    (D) if the investigation finds that the information is
    incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other
    24
    
    Id.
     § 1681s-2(a)(2).
    7
    consumer reporting agencies to which the person
    furnished the information and that compile and maintain
    files on consumers on a nationwide basis; and
    (E) if an item of information disputed by a
    consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or
    cannot be verified after any reinvestigation under
    paragraph (1), for purposes of reporting to a consumer
    reporting agency only, as appropriate, based on the
    results of the reinvestigation promptly--
    (i) modify that item of information;
    (ii) delete that item of information; or
    (iii) permanently block the reporting of that
    item of information.25
    “[I]n order to state a claim under § 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff must allege: (1)
    she sent notice of disputed information to a consumer reporting agency, (2) the
    consumer reporting agency then notified the defendant furnisher of the dispute, and
    (3) the furnisher failed to investigate and modify the inaccurate information.”26 “It
    is only when the furnisher fails to undertake a reasonable investigation following
    such notice that it may become liable to a private litigant under § 1681s-2(b).”27
    Plaintiff alleges: (1) that Defendant incorrectly reported a debt to the credit
    bureaus;28 (2) that Plaintiff contacted Defendant and Admin Recovery, LLC
    regarding the alleged error;29 (3) that Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff that stated
    25
    Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1).
    26
    Crisafulli v. Amertias Life Ins. Corp., 
    2015 WL 1969176
    , at *5 (D.N.J.).
    27
    SimmsParris v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 
    652 F.3d 355
    , 359 (3d Cir. 2011).
    28
    Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2.
    29
    
    Id.
     ¶¶ 3–4; Exs. A–B.
    8
    Defendant had updated Plaintiff’s account “to the credit bureaus as paid in full;”30
    and (4) that Plaintiff was denied a VA loan.31
    Plaintiff has failed to allege: (1) that he sent notice of the dispute to a
    consumer reporting agency; (2) that the consumer reporting agency notified
    Defendant of the dispute; and (3) that Defendant failed to investigate and modify
    the inaccurate information. Defendant’s letter to Plaintiff demonstrates that
    Defendant updated Plaintiff’s account with the credit reporting agencies at
    Plaintiff’s request.32
    The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
    can be granted under the FCRA. The FCRA is not triggered in this case until after
    Plaintiff alleges he sent notice of a dispute to a credit reporting agency. The Court
    finds, as a matter of law, Defendant acted reasonably and promptly to correct the
    alleged error. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims under the FCRA are hereby
    DISMISSED.
    Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
    The Court notes that requesting summary judgment in response to
    Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is procedurally improper. The only time this
    Motion to Dismiss would be converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment is if
    Defendant had relied upon documents not contained within the Amended
    30
    Ex. B.
    31
    Am. Compl. ¶ 5; Ex. C.
    32
    Ex. B.
    9
    Complaint, and the Court considered those documents. See In re Santa Fe Pac.
    Corp. S’holder Litig., 
    669 A.2d 59
    , 69 (Del. 1995). Defendants only relied upon
    factual information and documentation from the Amended Complaint in its Motion
    to Dismiss. Therefore, a Motion for Summary Judgment is procedurally improper
    in this case.
    Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
    MOOT on the basis of the Court GRANTING Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
    CONCLUSION
    The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims under the DFCRA, FDCPA, and
    FCRA are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendant’s Motion to
    Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is hereby GRANTED.
    Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED AS
    MOOT.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    /s/ Mary M. Johnston
    The Honorable Mary M. Johnston
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: N22C-10-097 MMJ

Judges: Johnston J.

Filed Date: 5/31/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/1/2023