State v. Robinson ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. )
) ID No. 2105000951
JACARI ROBINSON, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: June 23, 2023
Decided: August 8, 2023
Upon Defendant Jacari Robinson’s Motion to Suppress Defendant’s Statement,
GRANTED.
ORDER
Joseph S. Grubb, Esquire, Erika R. Flaschner, Esquire, Anthony J. Hill, Esquire
Deputy Attorneys General, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 North French Street,
Wilmington, Delaware 19801, Attorneys for the State.
Megan J. Davies, Esquire, LAW OFFICES OF MEGAN J. DAVIES, 716 North
Tatnall Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801, Attorney for Defendant Jacari
Robinson.
WHARTON, J.
This 8th day of August 2023, upon consideration of Defendant Jacari
Robinson’s (“Robinson”) Motion to Suppress Statement (“Motion to Suppress”),1
the State’s Response to the Motion (“State’s Response”),2 Robinson’s Reply
(“Robinson’s Reply”),3 the State’s Letter Memorandum as its Reply (“State’s
Letter”),4 Robinson’s Letter in response (“Robinson’s Letter”),5 evidence adduced
at a hearing held on June 23, 2023, and the record before it, it appears to the Court
that:6
1. On January 22, 2021, then 17-year-old Robinson was taken into
custody for what he and his mother were told was a violation of probation (“VOP”)
for GPS ankle monitor violations.7 Based on that information, Robinson’s mother
elected to remain at the residence she shared with Robinson.8 One P&P officer
transported Robinson while another remained behind with his mother.9
2. Rather than being taken to Family Court for presentation to a judicial
officer for the purpose of setting bail on the VOP, Robinson was transported to the
New Castle County Police Department (“NCCPD”) and placed in a interrogation
1
D.I. 35.
2
D.I. 38.
3
D.I. 41.
4
D.I. 50.
5
D.I. 51.
6
Only background specifically relevant to the pending Motion is discussed.
7
Mot. Hr’g, D.I. 47.
8
Mot. Hr’g, D.I. 47.
9
Mot. Hr’g, D.I. 47.
1
room where he was questioned by homicide detective David DiNardo (“Det.
DiNardo”).10 During this recorded interrogation, Det. DiNardo and Robinson
discussed several ongoing shooting investigations, including the homicide
investigation in which Robinson is charged here.11 During that interrogation,
Robinson made statements that the State intends to introduce at his trial.12 At the
time, Robinson had not been charged with any of the crimes under discussion.13
3. The Court received Robinson’s Motion to Suppress on September 6,
202214 and the State’s Response on October 13, 2022.15 From there, Robinson filed
his Reply on January 23, 2023,16 the State filed its Letter on February 10, 2023,17
triggering Robinson’s Letter on February 10, 2023,18 which was the parties’ final
submission. On December 13, 2022, after considering Robinson’s Motion to
Suppress, the State’s Response, and the video recording of the interview, the Court
ordered an evidentiary hearing.19 The hearing was originally scheduled for January
27, 2023, but scheduling difficulties delayed it until June 23, 2023.20
10
Mot. Hr’g, D.I. 47.
11
State’s Resp., at 5, D.I. 38.
12
Id. at 5-7.
13
Indictment, D.I. 2 (dated May 10, 2021).
14
Mot. to Supp., D.I. 35.
15
State’s Resp., D.I. 38.
16
Def.’s Reply, D.I. 41.
17
State’s Letter, D.I. 50.
18
Def.’s Letter, D.I. 51.
19
D.I. 39.
20
D.I. 40; D.I. 53; Mot. Hr’g, D.I. 47.
2
4. Delaware law allows peace officers to take a juvenile they believe to be
delinquent into custody.21 However, after taking the juvenile into custody, and
“grounded, in part, on a juvenile’s due process and self-incrimination rights,”22 the
peace officer must “immediately notify the child’s custodian citing the reasons
therefor.”23 Peace officers’ failure to do so is sufficient to warrant suppression.24
5. Robinson’s § 1004 argument as set out in its letter of February 10, 2023
is that:
The defense is asking the Court to require that law enforcement follow
the law that governs them. When taking a juvenile into custody, the
guardian should be notified of the reasons the juvenile is being taken
into custody.25 Here, this would have included advising that the
juvenile was being immediately transported and turned over to
homicide detectives so that detectives could interview the defendant as
a suspect in a homicide investigation.26
Robinson maintains that while the VOP may have been the legal justification for
taking him into custody, the more important reason for his custody was law
enforcement’s admitted desire to interrogate him regarding the NCCPD
21
10 Del. C. §1004.
22
Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358, 1363 (Del. 1993)(citing Vorhauer v. State, 212
A2.d 886, 892–93 (Del. 1965)). Palmer discusses 10 Del. C. §933 and Fam. Ct. R.
5(b). Sec. §933 is now 10 Del. C. § 1004.
23
10 Del. C. §1004.
24
Palmer, 626 A.2d at 1363 (“Deprivation of those rights is enough to warrant the
suppression of [the juvenile’s] statements.”)
25
Custodial notification is mandatory (“shall immediately notify”), not permissive
(“should be notified”).
26
Def.’s Letter, D.I. 51.
3
investigations.27 Since 10 Del. C. §1004 requires disclosure of the reasons that a
juvenile is taken into custody, according to Robinson, the peace officers’ failure to
notify his mother of this more significant reason contravenes the statute.28
6. Robinson argues that the State’s reliance on his mother’s previous
interactions with peace officers does not justify its failure to notify her of the reasons
he was being taken into custody in this case.29 Robinson explains that his mother:
(1) believed her son was only being taken into custody for a violation
of probation and would be receiving a court date, as has happened
in the past …;
(2) did not learn he[] was being taken to NCCPD until well into his
interview; and
(3) did not know her son was being taken in for an interview at all, let
alone for any charge or investigation beyond the VOP.30
Relying in large part on State v. Palmer,31 Robinson argues that peace officers’
failure to fully notify his mother of the additional reason he was taken into custody
violates 10 Del C. §1004, running afoul of the statute’s protection of juveniles’ due
27
Mot. to Suppress, D.I. 35; Def.’s Reply, at 10–11, D.I. 41; Def.’s Letter, D.I. 51.
28
Robinson also argues that peace officers intentionally mislead him and his mother.
The Court need not make that finding to determine whether the requirements of §
1004 were met.
29
Def.’s Reply, at 9, D.I. 41.
30
Def.’s Reply, at 5, D.I. 41.
31
626 A.2d 1358 (Del. 1993).
4
process and self-incrimination rights.32 For these reasons, and others, Robinson
argues that his statements must be suppressed.33
7. The State responds that Robinson’s focus on “reasons” overlooks the
term “custody[.]”34 Specifically, it argues that “[Robinson] was taken into custody
due to [a VOP]. Any secondary or simultaneous reason why law enforcement
wanted to speak with him is irrelevant, as the Defendant could not have been taken
into custody for any reason other than the violation.”35 The State maintains that 10
Del. C. §1004 was not violated simply because “[w]hile in custody, the detectives
took the opportunity to question the defendant about a variety of incidents.”36
Robinson’s mother (having previous interactions with peace officers due to her sons’
conduct) elected not to go to NCCPD,37 and that “there was no ploy.”38 It argues
that officers acted appropriately in their handling of the case and that “[i]nterviewing
32
Def.’s Reply, at 12, D.I. 41.
33
Robinson contends that his Miranda waiver was not made knowingly and
voluntarily and that Det. DiNardo did not honor his requests to terminate the
interview as well.
34
State’s Letter, at 2, D.I. 50.
35
State’s Letter, at 1–2, D.I. 50.
36
State’s Resp., D.I. 38 at 16 (emphasis added).
37
E.g., State’s Resp., at 4, D.I. 38 (“This was not the first time the defendant’s
mother was present or had been informed of an arrest. Each time defendant’s mother
was present or contacted, she encouraged her son to cooperate with law
enforcement.”); State’s Resp., D.I. 38 at 15 (“The defendant’s mother knew her son
was taken into custody, as she had witnessed several times before, and chose to not
go to NCCPD.”)
38
State’s Resp., at 16, D.I. 38.
5
individuals taken into custody for a reason other than why they were in custody is a
legal and ethical practice regularly employed.”39
8. Robinson was arrested on a VOP capias. The violation stemmed from
a curfew violation reported by his mother. When probation attempted to impose the
sanction of GPS monitoring on him, Robinson refused the ankle monitor. It was this
refusal which resulted in the VOP capias being issued. However, at some point prior
to the VOP capias being executed, the GPS monitor was placed on Robinson as he
can be seen to be wearing it in the video of his interrogation. Thus, when Robinson
was taken into custody, as far as his mother knew and was told by probation officers,
he was to be taken to Family Court to have bail set for a VOP hearing for refusing
to wear the GPS monitor he was now wearing and that she would be contacted. It
would have been entirely reasonable for her to have considered Robinson’s arrest to
be a minor matter not requiring her presence.
9. Robinson was not taken directly to Family Court to have bail set on the
seemingly all-but-resolved VOP. Instead the arresting probation officer reached out
to the NCCPD. She did so because, due to her participation in a NorthPak
enforcement action team, she thought NCCPD detectives might want to talk to
Robinson since he was believed to be a member of the NorthPak street gang. She
39
State’s Letter, at 2, D.I. 50.
6
thought that their might be an unexecuted DNA search warrant or a BOLO 40 notice
outstanding. In fact there was no DNA search warrant, but NCCPD detectives did
want to speak with Robinson. Det. DiNardo acknowledged that Robinson was
brought to NCCPD at his request for questioning about other crimes.41 As a result,
the reasons for Robinson’s custody changed significantly from what Robinson’s
mother was led to believe. Robinson was taken to a different location. He was in
40
Be On Look Out.
41
JACARI ROBINSON: I thought I got picked up for VOP because I refused to put
[the ankle monitor] on.
DETECTIVE DINARDO: Yeah. And I asked them to bring you here. Why would
VOP bring you to New Castle County Police Station unless I asked for you to come
here? Because you have a side of the story that only you can tell.
Tr. at 73:19–30.
JACARI ROBINSON: I’m just saying, why did you let probation come get me?
When people on -- when people are being looked for for murder, they -- they come
and like -- y all come in that (inaudible). And I --
DETECTIVE DINARDO: There’s -- there’s -- there’s reasons why I do. I’ve already
turned your mom’s apartment or room upside down. I don’t want your mom to lose
her job.
JACARI ROBINSON: Yeah.
DETECTIVE DINARDO: If probation can very respectfully bring you down here,
then I’m going to do that. I -- I -- I -- believe it or not, I care about your mom, right?
Her and I had a conversation back in November when we had the incident.
…
DETECTIVE DINARDO: Why would I [flip the Robinson’s home] if you’re on an
ankle monitor and probation says, yeah, we ll pick him up for you?
JACARI ROBINSON: But like --
DETECTIVE DINARDO: And nobody gets hurt. We don’t have to kick in any
doors. We don’t have to bring a bunch of police to your mom’s hotel room and risk
getting her in trouble with work. Why would I?
Tr. at 86:30–87:10, 87:35–88:5. Def.’s Reply, at n.3 and associated text, D.I. 41.
7
the custody of a different law enforcement agency. And, the purpose of his custody
changed from being presented to a judicial officer for the purpose of setting bail to
being questioned by a homicide detective about shooting investigations. His mother
was advised of none of these changes. The net effect, of course, is that Robinson’s
mother was not fully informed of the reasons for his custody, and, therefore, was
unable to make a knowing and intelligent decision as to what she should do to protect
his interests.
9. The Court finds, at a minimum, that the statute requires that law
enforcement officers are required to disclose to a juvenile’s custodian any material
changes in the reasons the juvenile was taken into custody. The failure of law
enforcement to notify Robinson’s mother of these very substantial and material
changes in the reasons for his custody deprived Robinson of significant rights under
§ 1004, “rights which are grounded, in part, on a juvenile’s due process and self-
incrimination rights.”42 “Deprivation of those rights is enough to warrant
suppression of his statement.”43
10. The argument, expressed in the State’s Letter that “Any secondary or
simultaneous reason why law enforcement wanted to speak to him is irrelevant, as
the defendant could not have been taken into custody for any reason other than the
42
Palmer, 626 A.2d, at 1363 (citing Vorhauer v. State, 212 A.2d 886-893 (Del.
1965)).
43
Id.8
violation”44 confuses the legal justification for arresting Robinson with the purpose
of the notification requirement of § 1004. The legal justification for taking Robinson
into custody was the VOP. But, purpose of the requirement in § 1004 that a
juvenile’s custodian be notified of the reasons the juvenile was taken into custody is
so that the custodian may make an informed decision about protecting the juvenile’s
due process and self-incrimination rights. The failure to notify Robinson’s mother
of the “secondary or simultaneous” reason he was taken into custody deprived her
of that opportunity.
11. The Court is unpersuaded by the State’s argument that it should take
into account Robinson’s mother’s past conduct. The facts and circumstances of each
custody are different and a failure of a custodian to assist a juvenile on a prior
occasion cannot act as a permanent waiver to provide assistance on future occasions.
It is true that Robinson’s mother had previous contact with law enforcement officers
stemming from her son’s behavior. Here, however, the circumstances are materially
different - she was only informed of his VOP with no mention that he would be
interrogated about a first degree murder investigation. The Court cannot assume that
her past deference to law enforcement would continue under these circumstances.
12. Similarly, the Court is unpersuaded that requiring law enforcement to
notify a custodian of a substantial and material changes in the reason for a juvenile’s
44
State’s Letter, at 1-2, D.I. 50.
9
custody fails to take into account the fluid nature of interrogations. The Court is not
presented with a case where a custodian was told an interrogation was to be
attempted on a given subject and the interrogation veered off unexpectedly into
different areas. Here, Robinson’s mother was not even told there would be an
interrogation, much less afforded the opportunity to advise him whether to agree to
speak to Det. DiNardo. Nor, did she have an opportunity to be present in order to
avoid dangerous subjects or end the interrogation entirely.
13. Because the Court suppresses Robinson’s statement on the issue of
informing his custodian of the reasons for his custody, it finds it unnecessary to
address Robinson’s contention that his statement was not made knowingly and
voluntarily for the reasons set out in his motion.
THEREFORE, Defendant Jacari Robinson’s Motion to Suppress
Defendant’s Statement is GRANTED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.
10