Hutchins v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES HUTCHINS, :
:
Appellant, :
:
v. : C.A. No. K23A-03-003 JJC
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE :
APPEAL BOARD, :
:
Appellee. :
Submitted: June 9, 2023
Decided: August 10, 2023
ORDER
On this 10th day of August 2023, having considered Appellant James
Hutchins’ appeal of the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the
“Board” or “UIAB”), and the responses filed by the Division of Unemployment
Insurance (the “Division”) and the Board, it appears that:
1. Mr. Hutchins filed a claim for traditional unemployment insurance
benefits beginning on April 4, 2021, in the weekly amount of $387.1 The Division
then suspended Mr. Hutchins’ payments in the late summer or early fall of 2021 after
alleging that he improperly submitted his claims. Specifically, the Division notified
Mr. Hutchins that it could not process his claims because he “filed weekly claim
certification[s] out of sequence.” (hereinafter “out-of-sequence claims”).2
Nevertheless, Mr. Hutchins continued to file claims certifications as required by
1
Appeals Referee Decision, Ex. 5, R. at 64 [hereinafter the Court will refer to the certified record
before the Board as “R. at . . .”].
2
R. at 29.
Delaware Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations for several weeks after he first
received that notice.3
2. Mr. Hutchins challenged the Division’s decision and prevailed in two
separate out-of-sequence cases after the Division conceded it had mistakenly denied
him benefits.4 He then filed a request for backdated benefits resuming from October
30, 2021.5 A claims deputy denied his request because he had stopped filing
ongoing weekly certifications during the Division’s investigation.6 Mr. Hutchins
then appealed the denial to an appeals referee.7
3. Mr. Hutchins appeared at an appeals referee hearing and testified. He
initially contended that the system prevented him from filing certifications after he
first received “out-of-sequence” notifications.8 Later in the hearing, he revisited his
testimony and admitted that he could have continued to file certifications but did not
because it would have been a “complete waste of time.”9 Finally, he contended that
email communications with a Division employee led him to believe he did not need
to file weekly certifications during the Division’s investigation.10 He submitted
none of those alleged emails into the record, however.
4. The appeals referee then affirmed the claims deputy’s determination.11
She found that Mr. Hutchins’ failure to file continuing claims certifications, after
3
R. at 41.
4
Hutchins v. Delaware Department of Labor, Claims Deputy Decision No. 57096925 (May 13,
2022); Hutchins v. Delaware Department of Labor, Claims Deputy Decision No.67063022 (May
5, 2022). Due to agency error, a claims deputy “canceled” his overpayment in Case No. 57096925.
That determination made the second case moot, with the combined effect of confirming Mr.
Hutchinson’s entitlement to benefits through October 31, 2023.
5
R. at 56.
6
R. at 73.
7
R. at 69.
8
R. at 38–39.
9
R. at 39.
10
R. at 30.
11
R. at 55–59.
2
October 23, 2021, made him ineligible for ongoing benefits.12 In her decision, she
relied upon 19 Del. C. §3315(2), two Department of Labor Regulations, and the
Division’s Claimant Handbook.13
5. Mr. Hutchins next appealed the appeals referee’s decision to the UIAB.
The Board limited the scope of its review to the record and considered no further
evidence or argument.14 Thereafter, it affirmed the appeals referee’s decision.15
6. Mr. Hutchins now appeals the UIAB’s decision. His appeal requires
the Court to review the record to determine if substantial evidence supported the
Board’s decision and if the Board committed legal error.16 Substantial evidence
means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”17 When reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the
Court considers the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.18
On appeal, the Court makes no factual findings, does not assess witness credibility,
and does not weigh the evidence.19 Furthermore, the Court’s review of a
discretionary ruling by the Board is limited to a review for arbitrariness and
capriciousness.20 As to an assertion of legal error, however, the standard of review
is de novo.21
12
R. at 58.
13
R. at 57–58.
14
Hutchins v. Delaware Department of Labor, UIAB Appeal Docket No. 77105528, at 1 (Mar. 6,
2023).
15
Id. at 2.
16
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308, 309 (Del. 1975); Thompson v.
Christiana Care Health Sys., 25 A.3d 778, 781–82 (Del. 2011).
17
Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383
U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).
18
Pochvatilla v. U.S. Postal Serv., 1997 WL 524062, at *2 (Del. Super. June 9, 1997).
19
Sokoloff v. Bd. of Med. Prac., 2010 WL 5550692, at *5 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2010).
20
Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991).
21
Id.3
7. On appeal, Mr. Hutchins raises numerous arguments. At the outset,
two of his arguments focus on the alleged prejudice caused by the time taken by the
Division to resolve his “out-of-sequence” overpayment cases.22 Those cases have
long-since concluded and are not within the scope of review in this appeal. As a
result, any claims related to the Division’s allegedly inappropriate delay in
examining Mr. Hutchins’ out-of-sequence filings are not before the Court.
8. Mr. Hutchins also raises several other contentions that the Court
aggregately considers to be a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Here, the
record provided the UIAB substantial evidence to deny his request to backdate
certifications for retroactive benefits. First, Mr. Hutchins admitted that he stopped
filing contemporaneous certifications because it would have been a “complete waste
of time.”23 He conceded, however, that he had filed them five times after he received
the first out-of-sequence notification.24 Furthermore, the record includes: (1)
testimony from a Division representative that Mr. Hutchins filed his last claim on
October 23, 2021;25 (2) testimony from a Division representative that an out-of-
sequence notice would not prevent a claimant from filing ongoing certifications;26
(3) documentary evidence of Mr. Hutchins’ unemployment benefits payment
history;27 and (4) emails between Mr. Hutchins and a Deputy Attorney General
during the out-of-sequence cases where the DAG mentioned nothing about excusing
his ongoing filings.28 Together, these facts of record provided substantial evidence
to support the Board’s decision.
22
See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Br. at 29, 32 (contending that the Division acted improperly by
delaying resolution of the underlying out-of-sequence filing dispute); Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5,
8 (explaining the length of time taken to resolve his initial overpayment dispute).
23
R. at 39.
24
R. at 42.
25
R. at 60.
26
R. at 39.
27
R. at 64.
28
R. at 65–67.
4
9. Mr. Hutchins also contends that the Division should be “estopped by
reliance” because a Division employee failed to tell him during email exchanges that
he should have continued filing certifications.29 In the present appeal, Mr. Hutchins
submits several emails sent between him and a Division employee that he contends
supports that position.30 In an administrative appeal such as this, however, the Court
cannot consider these newly submitted exhibits because he did not make them part
of the record below – they are simply outside the appellate record.31
10. He further contends that the Division should have submitted those
emails into evidence at the appeals referee’s hearing and that the Division violated
his rights by not doing so.32 As a party to that correspondence, however, he had
the opportunity to submit them into evidence but did not. Stated differently, the
Division had no obligation to offer those emails into evidence because Mr. Hutchins
jointly possessed them and could have done so himself.33
11. In addition, Mr. Hutchins raises several fairness-based arguments that
he contends constituted errors of law. One such contention focuses on
circumstances that he believes should have relieved him of the obligation to file
29
Appellant’s Op. Br. at 29; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 8.
30
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9–10.
31
See Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 352 A.2d 761, 763 (Del. 1976) (explaining that
the Superior Court limits its review to the record before the Board). Apart from issues related to
the record, Delaware Courts have consistently rejected the contention that misinformation
provided by a Division employee obviates requirements set by law and the Division’s written
instructions. Scott v. Div. of Unemployment Ins., 2016 WL 6556158, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 4,
2016); see also Hampton v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2016 WL 5867441, at *2–3 (Del.
Super. Oct. 7, 2016) (confirming a claimant’s obligation to repay benefits he received
notwithstanding incorrect advice provided by a Division employee); Morrison v. Unemployment
Ins. Appeal Bd., 2013 WL 5786417, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 18, 2013) (holding that a Division
employee’s improper advice regarding claims requirements was “not a valid excuse” because the
Board’s written claims procedures were readily available).
32
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 30.
33
See Odell v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2023 WL 4307685, at *3 (Del. Super. June 30,
2023) (explaining that the agency’s obligation to provide a claimant a full and fair opportunity to
be heard does not place an obligation on the Division to submit evidence on behalf of a claimant).
5
continuing certifications – namely, the Division’s initial decision to suspend his
benefits for alleged out-of-sequence filings.34 As explained below, however, the
Board followed controlling law when it declined to excuse Mr. Hutchins’ failure to
file weekly claims.
12. The Division’s obligation to pay Delaware unemployment benefits
derives from statute and DOL regulations. Delaware statutes impose administrative
requirements upon claimants and enable DOL to promulgate regulations to
administer the program. First, 19 Del. C. § 3315(2) provides that a claimant is
eligible to receive benefits “only if . . . the individual . . . [h]as made a claim for
benefits with respect to such week in accordance with such regulations as the
Department prescribes.”35 Second, DOL regulations, in turn, provide that a
“claimant shall: . . . [f]ile a continued claim for benefits each week.”36 Third and
finally, Mr. Hutchins signed for and received a copy of the Division’s
Unemployment Insurance Handbook that explained that he had to continue to file
for benefits notwithstanding his ongoing dispute with the Division.37 Namely, the
Handbook provides the following:
[i]f, at any time during your claim, there is an eligibility issue, benefits
will not be paid until the issue is resolved. You must continue to claim
your weekly benefits . . . while the matter is being investigated. If you
stop claiming weekly [benefits], you will not be entitled to any [benefits
for the] weeks that you did not claim and you will have to reopen your
claim.38
34
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 29, 32; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3–6, 8.
35
19 Del. C. § 3315(2) (emphasis added).
36
19 Del. Admin. C. § 1202–6.2.2 (emphasis added).
37
See Delaware Unemployment Insurance Claimant Handbook, at 9 (Revised Apr. 2020) available
at https://labor.delaware.gov/divisions/unemployment-insurance/claimant-handbook/ (explaining
that before a claimant is paid UI benefits, the individual is required to read and sign the
acknowledgment of rights and responsibilities section provided in the Handbook).
38
Id. at 4.
6
Given the General Assembly and the Department of Labor’s clear statutory,
regulatory, and practical guidance, the Board committed no legal error by refusing
his request to backdate his claims.
13. Finally, Mr. Hutchins contends that the Board committed legal error
because it did not permit him an in-person hearing but rather decided his appeal of
the referee’s decision without considering additional argument or evidence.39 The
Board committed no error in doing so because Delaware law provides the UIAB the
discretion to decide an appeal based solely on the evidence previously submitted.40
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board
is AFFIRMED for the reasons explained above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Jeffrey J Clark
Resident Judge
JJC:klc
Via File & ServeXpress
U.S. Mail to Appellant James Hutchins
39
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 30; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2–3.
40
Odell, 2023 WL 4307685, at *3; see also 19 Del. C. § 3320(a) (providing that if the UIAB
determines it has sufficient evidence to formulate a basis for its decision, then it may base its
decision on only the record developed below); Bossert v. Div. of Unemployment Ins., 2022 WL
17249305, *3 (Del. Super. Nov. 22, 2022) (explaining that the Board may provide its decision
without holding an additional hearing).
7