State v. Swanson ( 2024 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    STATE OF DELAWARE                   )
    )
    v.                      )     I.D. No. 2301006196
    )
    KESHAUN SWANSON,                    )
    )
    Defendant.              )
    Submitted: October 20, 2023
    Decided: January 5, 2024
    Upon Defendant Keshaun Swanson’s Motion to Declare Defendant Incompetent to
    Stand Trial
    DENIED.
    ORDER
    Stephen McCloskey, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF
    JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State
    of Delaware.
    F. Phillip Renzulli, Esquire, LAW OFFICE OF F. PHILLIP RENZULLI, 615 W.
    18th Street, Lower Level, Wilmington, DE 19802, Attorney for Defendant
    Keshaun Swanson.
    WHARTON, J.
    This 5th day of January 2024, upon consideration of Defendant Keshaun
    Swanson’s Motion to Declare Defendant Incompetent to Stand Trial, it appears to
    the Court that:
    1.     Defendant Keshaun Swanson (“Swanson”) is charged by indictment
    with Robbery First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a
    Felony (“PFDCF”), Conspiracy Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm by a Person
    Prohibited (“PFBPP”), and Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a
    Felony.1 The offenses are alleged to have occurred on January 23, 2023.2 On May
    17, 2023 Swanson moved to transfer his charges to the Family Court.3 His birthday
    is January 24, 2003, making him 17 years and 11 months old at the time of the
    offenses.4 The State then moved for a psychological/psychiatric examination of
    Swanson.5 The motion was granted,6 and a report filed on July 24, 2023.7 A
    Commissioner of this Court directed the parties to confer and advise the Court
    whether the evaluation would be contested and how the parties desired to proceed.8
    Meanwhile, a reverse amenability hearing was scheduled for October 18 th.9 At a
    teleconference prior to the scheduled reverse amenability hearing, it was determined
    1
    Indictment, D.I. 1.
    2
    Id.
    3
    D.I. 3.
    4
    Id.
    5
    D.I. 7.
    6
    D.I. 8.
    7
    D.I. 9.
    8
    D.I. 10.
    9
    D.I. 12.
    2
    that the hearing would be converted to a competency hearing.10 The Court held the
    hearing on October 18th, reserved decision, and allowed the defense to supplement
    the record with Family Court records relevant to Swanson’s competency.11 The
    defense provided those supplemental materials, consisting of Family Court records
    related to competency, on October 20th.
    2.     Testifying at the hearing on behalf of Swanson was Laura Cooney-
    Koss, Psy.D.; M.C.J. (“Dr. Cooney-Koss”). Testifying for the for the State was
    Jonathan P. Tan, Psy.D. (“DR. Tan”). The Court received reports authored by Dr.
    Cooney-Koss and Dr. Tan into evidence. The doctors disagree on the issue of
    competency, with Dr. Cooney-Koss opining that Swanson is not competent and Dr.
    Tan that he is.
    3.     Dr. Cooney-Koss has some familiarity with Swanson, having evaluated
    him in conjunction with prior charges in the Family Court in 2019 and 2020. 12 In
    both reports, she opined that he was incompetent to stand trial.13 Then, as now, she
    thought is unlikely Swanson would achieve adjudicative competence at any time in
    the foreseeable future.14 In Dr. Cooney-Koss’ opinion, the primary impediments to
    competency are related to his intellectual deficiencies – he has “limited factual
    10
    D.I. 13.
    11
    D.I. 14.
    12
    Cooney-Koss Report at 1.
    13
    Id.
    14
    Id.
    3
    knowledge, greater inferiority in his rational knowledge, and deficient reasoning
    abilities.15
    5.      In contrast, Dr. Tan opined that Swanson is competent to stand trial.16
    In his view, Swanson “appeared to have a rational and factual understanding of his
    charges, legal options, and roles of the participants in the courtroom.’17 He has
    confidence in his lawyer and trusts him to defend him.18
    6.      The State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence,
    that Swanson is presently competent to stand trial .19 Further, “Competency is a legal
    concept, not a medical one.”20 It is a “fact-specific inquiry that takes into account
    the totality of the circumstances and does not necessarily turn upon the existence or
    nonexistence of any one factor.”21 The court must be satisfied that the defendant “has
    sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
    rational understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as a factual
    15
    Id. at 18.
    16
    Tan Report, at 6.
    17
    Id.
    18
    Id.
    19
    See, e.g., Diaz v. State, 
    508 A.2d 861
    , 863 (Del. 1986) (“The prosecution must
    prove the defendant's competence by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Smith v.
    State, 
    918 A.2d 1144
    , 1148 (Del. 2007) (“The prosecution bears the burden of
    proving a defendant's legal competency by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
    20
    Feliciano v. State, 
    2017 WL 897421
     (Del. Mar. 3, 2017); Harris v. State, 
    1996 WL 769482
    , at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2016)
    21
    See also, State v. Shields, 
    593 A.2d 986
     (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (citing Dusky v.
    United States, 
    362 U.S. 402
    ); State v. Reed, 
    2004 WL 2828043
     (Del. Super. Ct. Apr.
    21, 2004).
    4
    understanding of the proceedings against him.”22 This competency test is codified
    in 11 Del. C. 404(a).23
    7.    Legal competency is not an exacting standard.24 In fact, “[F]rom a legal
    standpoint, the competency threshold is quite low.”25 This Court has held that “due
    process requires that a defendant be afforded a fair, not a perfect trial, and that he be
    able to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable, not a perfect degree of rational
    understanding.”26 This Court has also observed:
    Competency is, to some extent a relative matter arrived at
    by taking into account the average level of ability of
    criminal defendants. We cannot, however, exclude from
    trial all persons who lack the intelligence or legal
    sophistication to participate actively in their own defense.
    That is not the standard by which we measure competency.
    Should we do so, we would preclude the trial of a number
    of people who are, indeed, competent to stand trial as
    understood in the law. The accused need not understand
    every legal nuance in order to be competent.27
    Delaware Courts have identified two sets of criteria that are instructive in
    determining competency – the McGarry factors and the Guatney28 factors, both
    22
    Dusky v. United States, 
    362 U.S. 402
     (1960).
    23
    11 Del. C. § 404(a).
    24
    See, State v. Shields, 
    593 A.2d at 1012
    .
    25
    
    Id.
    26
    State v. Wynn, 
    490 A.2d 605
    , 610 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1985).
    27
    State v. Shields, 
    593 A.2d at 1012
    .
    28
    State v. Guatney, 
    299 N.W.2d 538
     (Neb. 1980).
    5
    recently discussed in State v. Perry.29 The McGarry factors are also known as the
    “Competency to Stand Trial Instrument.”30 The McGarry factors look at:
    (1) The defendant's ability to appraise the legal defenses
    available; (2) the defendant's ability to plan a legal
    strategy; (3) level of manageable behavior; (4) quality of
    relating to his or her attorneys; (5) ability to appraise the
    participants in the courtroom; (6) understanding of court
    procedures; (7) appreciation of the charges; (8)
    appreciation of the range and nature of the penalties; (9)
    ability to appraise the evidence and likely outcome; (10)
    capacity to disclose to his or her attorneys available
    pertinent facts surrounding the offense; (11) capacity to
    challenge prosecution witnesses realistically; (12)
    capacity to present relevant testimony; and (13)
    motivation for a positive outcome.31
    The Guatney factors are similar but more specific:
    (1) That the defendant has sufficient mental capacity to
    appreciate his presence in relation to time, place, and
    things; (2) that his elementary mental processes are such
    that he understands that he is in a court of law charged with
    a criminal offense; (3) that he realizes there is a judge on
    the bench; (4) that he understands that there is a prosecutor
    present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge;
    (5) that he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him
    against the charge; (6) that he knows that he will be
    expected to tell his lawyer all he knows or remembers
    about the events involved in the alleged crime; (7) that he
    understands that there will be a jury present to pass upon
    evidence in determining his guilt or innocence; (8) that he
    has sufficient memory to relate answers to the questions
    posed to him; (9) that he has established rapport with his
    lawyer; (10) that he can follow the testimony reasonably
    well; (11) that he has the ability to meet stresses without
    29
    
    2023 WL 8187300
     (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2023).
    30
    
    Id.
    31
    Id. at n. 44. (citing State v. Silvils 
    2022 WL 17494203
    , at *5 (Del. Super Ct. Dec.
    8, 2022)).
    6
    his rationality or judgment breaking down; (12) that he has
    at least minimal contact with reality; (13) that he has the
    minimum intelligence necessary to grasp the events taking
    place; (14) that he can confer coherently with some
    appreciation of proceedings; (15) that he can both give and
    receive advice from his attorneys; (16) that he can divulge
    facts without paranoid distress; (17) that he can decide
    upon a plea; (18) that he can testify, if necessary; (19) that
    he can make simple decisions; and (20) that he has a desire
    for justice rather than undeserved punishment.32
    8.     In the Court’s view, the differing expert opinions are both well
    considered and articulated. They primarily diverge as to where the competency line
    should be drawn.33 Drawing that line is the Court’s responsibility.34
    9.     There is no doubt that Swanson has significant intellectual deficiencies.
    Dr. Cooney-Koss states that Swanson was evaluated using the Juvenile Adjudicative
    Competency Interview, but due to his age he was asked McGarry questions as well.35
    The responses Dr. Cooney-Koss reports also cover most, if not all of the Guatney
    factors.36 Dr. Tan also administered the McGarry questions and reported the results
    as part of his competency evaluation.37
    10.    In the Court’s view, a fair reading of the totality of Swanson’s responses
    to the questions asked by both doctors demonstrates he has a “sufficient present
    ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding”
    32
    Id. at n. 45.
    33
    See, Silvils, 
    2020 WL 17494203
    , at *6.
    34
    
    Id.
    35
    Cooney-Koss Report at 12.
    36
    Id. at 12-18.
    37
    Tan Report, at 4-5.
    7
    together with a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
    him.” He is able to understand the charges he is facing and their relative gravity,
    provide a limited version of events, understand the role of the prosecutor, defense
    attorney, judge, and jury, trust and work with his attorney, and consider a plea offer.
    Thus, he meets the low threshold of competency relative to the average level of
    ability of criminal defendants.
    11.      None of the foregoing is to say that there is no merit in Dr. Cooney-
    Koss’ concerns – there is, and the parties should take them seriously in attempting
    to fashion a possible resolution of Swanson’s charges. Rather, the Court finds that
    she simply draws the line for competency higher than the law requires.
    THEREFORE, Defendant Keshaun Swanson’s Motion to Declare Defendant
    Incompetent to Stand Trial is DENIED.           The parties are directed to contact
    Chambers to schedule a reverse amenability hearing.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    /s/ Ferris W. Wharton
    Ferris W. Wharton, J.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2301006196

Judges: Wharton J.

Filed Date: 1/5/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/5/2024