Feaster v. Tyler ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GENINE FEASTER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No.: N22C-08-090 FWW
)
DANIEL TYLER, and )
CW TRANSPORT, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
Submitted: August 12, 2024
Decided: September 3, 2024
Upon Plaintiff Genine Feaster’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Liability:
DENIED
ORDER
Kenneth M. Roseman, Esquire, KENNETH ROSEMAN, P.A., 1300 N. King Street,
P.O. Box 1126, Wilmington, DE 19899, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Wade A. Adams III, Esquire, LAW OFFICES OF WADE A. ADAMS III, Christiana
Executive Campus, 111 Continental Drive, Suite 309, Newark, DE 19713, Attorney
for Defendants.
WHARTON, J.
This 3rd day of September 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiff Genine
Feaster’s (“Feaster”) Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability,1 the
Response of Defendants Daniel Tyler (“Tyler”) and CW Transport, LLC (“CW”)
(collectively, “Defendants”),2 Feaster’s Reply,3 and the record, it appears to the
Court that:
1. An accident occurred between motor vehicles operated by Tyler and
Feaster. The front of Tyler’s vehicle allegedly struck the rear of Feaster’s vehicle
while it was stopped at a red light.4 It is admitted that Tyler was an employee of CW
and that the accident occurred on July 7, 2021.5
2. Feaster filed her complaint on August 9, 2022, alleging that Tyler: (1)
failed to maintain a proper lookout; (2) failed to maintain control over a motor
vehicle; (3) operated a motor vehicle in a careless and inattentive manner; (4)
followed a motor vehicle too closely; and (5) operated a motor vehicle at a high rate
of speed.6 Defendants answered the complaint on September 2, 2022, denying
liability and asserting various affirmative defenses.7
1
D.I. 34.
2
D.I. 38.
3
D.I. 39.
4
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ J. at ¶ 1, D.I. 34.
5
Defs.’ Ans. ¶¶ 4-5, D.I. 4.
6
Compl. at ¶ 6(a-e), D.I. 1.
7
Defs.’ Ans., D.I. 4.
2
3. Feaster moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on July
17, 2024.8 Defendants responded on August 6, 2024.9 Feaster replied in support of
her motion on August 12, 2024.10
4. In moving for summary judgment, Feaster contends that the following
are undisputed facts: (1) Feaster’s vehicle was stopped at a red light; (2) Tyler’s
vehicle was stopped to the rear of Feaster’s vehicle; (3) while stopped to the rear of
Feaster’s vehicle, Tyler’s foot eased off of the brake pedal; and (4) when Tyler’s foot
eased off of the brake pedal, Tyler’s truck moved forward and struck the rear of
Feaster’s vehicle.11 Feaster argues that Tyler failed to maintain control of his motor
vehicle and that this failure caused his vehicle to strike Feaster’s stopped vehicle.12
Feaster writes: “[s]pecifically, by easing his foot off of the brake pedal when the
Plaintiff’s vehicle was still stopped in front of his vehicle, the Defendant could not
stop or steer his vehicle safely by objects or other vehicles on the highway.”13 Citing
Pattern Jury Instruction 6.2 and 21 Del. C. § 4176, Feaster argues that Tyler violated
his common law and statutory duty to maintain control of the vehicle.14 Ultimately,
Feaster concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to her assertion
8
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 34.
9
Defs.’ Resp., D.I. 38.
10
Feaster’s Reply, D.I. 39.
11
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3, D.I. 34.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
3
that Tyler’s failure to maintain control of his vehicle caused the impact with Feaster’s
vehicle.15 For that reason, she asks the Court to grant her summary judgment on the
issue of liability.
5. Defendants contend that it is premature for the Court to determine
negligence.16 Defendants state that Tyler has not been deposed.17 Further, Tyler has
not yet fully explained the facts and circumstances regarding the easing of his foot
off of the brake nor has he explained what that means in regard to the truck he was
driving.18 Defendants argue that the reasonableness of Tyler’s actions is a question
of fact for the jury to decide.19 Specifically, the jury can decide whether a reasonable
person in Tyler’s position would anticipate the set of facts that led to his foot easing
off of the brake and whether a reasonable person in a similar situation would have
expected the vehicle to move.20 Lastly, Defendants argue that the jury is entitled to
hear the facts of the accident through Tyler’s testimony and/or expert testimony to
determine if the accident was the proximate cause of any injuries alleged by
Feaster.21
15
Id. at 4.
16
Id. at ¶ 5.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
4
6. Feaster replies that Defendants failed to demonstrate the presence of
any material facts to support a finding that Tyler was not negligent.22 Specifically,
Defendants did not submit an affidavit, nor identify any fact of record to support a
finding that Tyler was not negligent.23 Feaster states that “[a]bsent an affidavit or
the demonstration of a record fact in support of his position, the Defendant failed to
meet the shifted burden to show the presence of material issues of fact to be resolved
by the ultimate factfinder.”24
7. Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is
appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”25 The moving party initially bears
the burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts support its claims or
defenses.26 If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party to show that there are material issues of fact to be resolved by the ultimate
factfinder.27 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court's function
is to examine the record, including “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
22
Pl.’s Reply at 2, D.I. 39.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Buckley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 A.3d
845, 847 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015), aff'd, 140 A.3d 431 (Del. 2016) (quoting Moore v.
Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979)).
26
Sizemore, 405 A.2d at 681.
27
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
5
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether genuine issues
of material fact exist “but not to decide such issues.”28 Summary judgment will only
be appropriate if the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact. When
material facts are in dispute, or “it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into
the facts, to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances,” summary
judgment will not be appropriate.29 However, when the facts permit a reasonable
person to draw but one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter
of law.30
8. The gravamen of Feaster’s argument appears to be that there is no
genuine dispute over whether Tyler failed to maintain control of his motor vehicle;
and then, whether Tyler’s failure to maintain control of his vehicle caused it to strike
Feaster’s stopped vehicle. Feaster bases her argument on interrogatories answered
by Tyler on October 28, 2022.31 The particular questions and answers that Feaster
cites are as follows:
Describe in proper sequence the movements and speed of
your vehicle for the last three minutes immediately
preceding the collision herein.
28
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (Del.
1992).
29
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69, (Del. 1962) (citing Knapp v.
Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957)).
30
Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A. 2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).
31
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. A, D.I. 34.
6
ANSWER: Both parties were stopped at a red light,
Answering Defendant’s foot eased off of the brake
pedal a little bit and the weight of the truck started to
make the truck go forward, Answering Defendant
immediately pressed on the brake to stop; the truck
was in neutral.32
…
What were the points of contact with your vehicle and the
Plaintiff herein.
ANSWER: Answering Defendants front bumper to
Plaintiff’s rear bumper.33
Feaster also cites 21 Del. C. § 4176 and Pattern Jury Instruction 6.2 regarding Tyler’s
statutory and common law duty to maintain control of his vehicle.34
9. This case is still in the discovery phase of litigation. The Court’s Trial
Scheduling Order does not require that discovery be completed until July 15, 2025,
almost a year from now.35 The parties have until August 21, 2025 to file dispositive
motions.36 Tyler points out that he has not yet given a deposition.37 Considering the
limited information given thus far in the interrogatory, Tyler adds that he has not yet
fully explained the facts and circumstances regarding the easing of his foot off of the
32
Id. at Ex. A, ¶ 19.
33
Id. at Ex. A, ¶ 31.
34
Id. at 3.
35
Trial Scheduling Order, D.I. 36.
36
Id.
37
Defs.’ Resp. at ¶ 5, D.I. 38.
7
brake nor has he explained what it means in regard to the truck that he was driving.38
Thus, the Court finds that “it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the
facts, to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances.”39 Summary
judgment is not appropriate at this time. Whether it will be later remains to be seen.
10. Finally, Feaster’s motion is captioned Motion for Summary Judgment
on the Issue of Liability.40 Her Proposed Order simply asks the Court to grant her
“Motion for Summary Judgment.”41 Presumably, she wants the Court to foreclose
the issue of liability from further litigation. But, she asks for too much too soon.
Liability includes not only responsibility for causing the accident here, but also
responsibility for causing any injuries Feaster claims she sustained as a result of the
accident. Nothing in the motion addresses that latter issue.
THEREFORE, Plaintiff Genine Feaster’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
the Issue of Liability is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.
38
Id.
39
Ebersole, 180 A.2d at 468-69.
40
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 34.
41
Pl.’s Proposed Order, D.I. 34.
8