State v. Tingle ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE : Def. I.D. No.: 2304008374,
: 2306001803
vs. :
:
DALLAS TINGLE, :
:
Defendant. :
:
OPINION & ORDER
Submitted: August 21, 2024
Decided: September 16, 2024
Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief – DENIED.
CONNER, J.
On February 7, 2024, Dallas Tingle (“Defendant”) pled guilty to Carrying a
Concealed Deadly Weapon, Aggravated Menacing, and Strangulation. The State
entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining eleven charges. The Defendant was
sentenced to five years at Level V, followed by decreasing levels of subsequent
incarceration and probation. There was no direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme
Court.
On May 23, 2024, the Defendant timely filed his first Superior Court Criminal
Rule 61 petition. It stated four grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of
counsel; (2) “forced” truth in sentencing plea and/or “misunderstood options”; (3)
“inability to confront witnesses and credibility”; and (4) lack of physical evidence.
On June 18, 2024, defense counsel, Jefferey P. McLane, Esq. (“Mr. McLane”),
filed an affidavit in response to the motion for postconviction relief. On July 8,
2024, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a response in opposition to the motion
for postconviction relief. On August 21, 2024, the Defendant filed a reply letter.
Before assessing claims for relief, the Court must address the four procedural
bars to relief under Rule 61. First, “[a] motion for postconviction relief may not be
filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final.”1 The Defendant
entered a guilty plea on February 7, 2024. Thirty days later, on March 08, 2024, the
1
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
2
conviction became final. The motion for postconviction relief was filed May 5,
2024, well within the one-year period required under Rule 61(i)(1). Therefore, the
motion is not barred by the one year limitation.
Second, “[n]o second or subsequent motion is permitted under this Rule
unless that second or subsequent motion satisfies” certain requirements.2 This is the
first motion for postconviction relief, therefore the motion is not barred by this
provision.
Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction” are barred unless the movant shows both “(A) [c]ause for
relief from the procedural default and (B) [p]rejudice from violation of the movant's
rights.”3 This provision bars the third and fourth grounds for postconviction relief.
The Defendant failed to assert in the proceedings leading to the guilty plea either
that insufficient evidence existed to convict or that the State’s witnesses against the
Defendant were incredulous. Therefore, these claims are barred.
Finally, “[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction
proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred.”4 As
2
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
3
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
4
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
3
stated above, the Defendant accepted a plea deal, therefore no trial occurred for the
adjudication of issues raised in this motion. As such, the motion is not barred by this
provision.
The first ground for postconviction relief is ineffective assistance of defense
counsel, Mr. McLane. Delaware courts assess ineffective assistance of counsel
claims under the two-part standard established in Strickland v. Washington.5 Under
Strickland, the Defendant must show that Mr. McLane’s representation (1) “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness”6, and (2) that his “deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.”7 Additionally, under Strickland, the Court
“indulge[s] a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance….”8 Further, “[t]he defendant’s
representations at the plea colloquy, as well as any findings made by the judge
accepting the plea, constitute a ‘formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral
proceedings.’”9
The thrust of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that Mr. McLane
did not have “proper time to prepare.” This claim contradicts the Defendant’s
5
466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984).
6
Id. at 688.
7
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
8
Id. at 689.
9
State v. Melendez, 2003 WL 23095688 at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 19, 2003) (quoting Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977)).
4
representations to the Court during the plea colloquy where the Defendant affirmed
that he had enough time to talk to Mr. McLane about his cases. In the reply brief,
the Defendant makes the conclusory allegation that had Mr. McLane filed a
suppression motion, the charges would have been dropped.10 This allegation is
purely speculative and contradicts the representations to the Court during the plea
colloquy that he was satisfied with Mr. McLane’s representation.11 Additionally,
raising new issues in the reply brief is not permitted without leave of the court and
therefore barred.12
The Court’s inquiry into defense counsel’s performance must consider
“whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”13
Before Mr. McLane was assigned to the Defendant’s cases, his prior attorney at the
Office of Defense Services requested a continuance in his cases. Mr. McLane
became the Defendant’s attorney on January 4, 2024, the same day that the
continuance motion was denied. While it is not contested that Mr. McLane first met
with the Defendant on January 30, 2024, eight (8) days before the Defendant entered
the plea, this alone does not mean that he did not have adequate time to prepare.
10
Pet’r Reply Br. at 1.
11
Tr. at 6.
12
Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(2) and 61(b)(6); State v. Whittington, 2022 WL 1740764 at *2 (Del.
Super. May 27, 2022).
13
Strickland, at 688 (emphasis added).
5
As for prong one, the arguments that Mr. McLane’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness are inadequate. He did not represent the
Defendant for one week but one month. By the time he took the Defendant’s cases,
prior counsel’s continuance motion had been denied and Mr. McLane was bound to
operate within the confines of that denial. During that time frame, he met with the
Defendant twice to discuss the cases. He made a strategic decision to not file a
suppression motion. A decision that falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. A decision that may have prevented the plea bargain,
negotiated by the Defendant’s prior counsel, from being taken off the table.
As for the second prong, the Defendant provides no support that Mr. McLane’s
performance prejudiced the defense. For Defendant’s crimes, he was facing up to
21 years of incarceration at level V. Mr. McLane maintained a plea bargain,
negotiated by prior counsel, wherein the defendant was only required to serve five
years at level V. This is indicative of an adequate defense and demonstrates that
Defendant was not prejudiced by Mr. McLane’s representation. Considering the
totality of the circumstances surrounding Mr. McLane’s representation, including
the time frame, the Court finds that Mr. McLane neither fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness nor prejudiced the defense in any way. Finally, it bears
repeating that at the plea colloquy, the Defendant asserted that he had enough time
6
to discuss his cases with Mr. McLane and that he was satisfied with his
representation.
The second ground for postconviction relief is that the Defendant was
“forced” into the plea agreement because it was his “only” option. To support this
contention, the Defendant asserted again that defense counsel lacked adequate time
to prepare, that the continuance was denied, and that insufficient evidence existed to
convict the Defendant. The transcript from the plea colloquy shows otherwise. As
stated above, “[r]epresentations at the plea colloquy, as well as any findings made
by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a ‘formidable barrier in any subsequent
collateral proceedings.’”14
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the Defendant is bound
by his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and by his testimony
prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea.15 At the February 7, 2024 plea colloquy,
when asked if anyone was “forcing you to enter this plea…” the Defendant
answered, “[n]o, sir.”16 Likewise, the Defendant affirmed that he had adequate time
to talk with Mr. McLane and that he was satisfied with his representation.17 These
representations to the Court indicate that the Defendant was not forced into the plea
14
Melendez at *3.
15
Kimbrough v. State, 2024 WL 1847998 (Del. Apr. 26, 2024).
16
Tr. at 6.
17
Id.7
agreement. Further, the Defendant’s affirmative waiver of his right to a trial at the
colloquy further demonstrates that pleading guilty was his choice of how to resolve
his cases.18
For the foregoing reasons the Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Mark H. Conner
Mark H. Conner, Judge
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Nichole Gannett, Deputy Attorney General
Jeffery McLane, Esquire
Dallas Tingle, Pro Se
18
Id. at 5.
8