Corteva Agriscience LLC v. Monsanto Company ( 2024 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    CORTEVA AGRISCIENCE LLC          )
    and AGRIGENETICS, INC.,          )
    )
    Plaintiffs, )
    )
    v.                          )               C.A. No. N22C-10-293
    )                        PRW CCLD
    MONSANTO COMPANY and             )
    BAYER CROPSCIENCE LP.,           )
    )
    Defendants. )
    Submitted: August 13, 2024
    Decided: September 16, 2024
    Upon Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
    DENIED.
    Upon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
    GRANTED.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Chad S.C. Stover, Esquire, BARNES & THORNBURG LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
    Craig A. Thompson, Esquire, VENABLE LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Frank C.
    Cimino, Jr., Esquire (argued), and Charles J. Monterio, Jr., Esquire, VENABLE LLP,
    Washington, District of Columbia, Attorneys for Plaintiffs Corteva Agriscience LLC
    and Agrigenetics, Inc.
    Rodger D. Smith II, Esquire, Ryan D. Stottman, Esquire, and Rachel R. Tunney,
    Esquire, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
    Amanda J. Hettinger, Esquire (argued), Anthony F. Blum, Esquire, and Daniel A.
    Garcia, Esquire, THOMPSON COBURN LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, Attorneys for
    Defendants Monsanto Company and Bayer Cropscience LP.
    WALLACE, J.
    Over twenty years ago, Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a licensing
    agreement to sell corn containing a patented gene. Under the agreement, Plaintiffs
    agreed to pay Defendants royalties based on a specified sales percentage. The
    agreement didn’t identify an end date for those royalty payments but did provide a
    term of life for the agreement at-large. According to that term’s language, the
    licensing agreement would expire when the last patent expires.
    Some of those patents have now expired. Yet, Defendants still ask for
    royalties even on those now-expired patents. They say that the agreement’s royalty
    provisions survive so long as the agreement survives. Plaintiffs think not. They say
    the licensing agreement calls for royalties on a country-specific basis such that
    royalties are no longer owed on expired patents. Both sides have now moved for
    summary judgment urging adoption of their preferred reads.
    It’s evident that these parties intended for one royalty rate calculation to apply
    to all worldwide patents. That means that the patents are treated collectively for
    royalty purposes. And since the agreement’s term ends when the last patent expires,
    the royalty provision thus extends royalties owed on all patents until that final
    expiration occurs.
    But, Plaintiffs insist, if that is so—if the licensing agreement’s term does
    apply to the royalty provisions—then the agreement is unlawful under certain United
    States Supreme Court precedent. It isn’t. The precedent Plaintiffs rely on is
    -1-
    inapplicable here. The agreement is a latest-running-patent agreement, and Plaintiffs
    paid for the privilege to use both the patents and certain corresponding research for
    the agreement’s entire term.
    Accordingly, and for the reasons now further explained: Defendants’ Motion
    for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
    is DENIED.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. THE PARTIES
    Monsanto is a Delaware corporation with its principal offices in St. Louis,
    Missouri.1 Bayer CropScience is a Delaware limited partnership.2 “Monsanto and
    Bayer CropScience are wholly owned by Bayer AG and part of its Crop Science
    Division.”3
    Corteva Agriscience is a Delaware limited liability corporation with a place
    of business in Wilmington, Delaware.4 Agrigenetics is a Delaware corporation with
    its principal offices in Indianapolis, Indiana.5 Agrigenetics is a subsidiary of Corteva
    Agriscience.6
    1
    Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (“Compl.”), Ex. A (“Agreement”) § 1.01 (D.I. 1).
    2
    Compl. ¶ 9.
    3
    Id. ¶ 16. For ease of reference, Defendants are hereafter collectively referred to as “Bayer.”
    4
    Id. ¶ 6.
    5
    Agreement § 1.02.
    6
    Compl. ¶ 15.     For ease of reference, Plaintiffs are collectively hereafter referred to as
    -2-
    B. THE NK603 EVENT
    In the late 1990s, Bayer developed an herbicide-resistant corn product.7
    Numerous global patents were awarded to Bayer based on “the biotech corn event
    known as the NK603 event.”8 In 2000, the United States deregulated the “use of the
    glyphosate tolerant corn event NK603.”9 It was commercialized in 2001.10
    C. THE NK603 LICENSE AGREEMENT
    In September 2002, Bayer and Agrigenetics entered into the “Roundup Ready
    (NK603) Corn License Agreement” (the “Agreement”). The Agreement provided
    Agrigenetics with a license “of certain patent rights and proprietary technology of
    MONSANTO for use in producing Corn plants that are tolerant to Glyphosate
    herbicide” in return for royalty payments.11 As described in Agreement Section 1.05,
    Agrigenetics was “interested in the commercialization of Corn” and sought “to
    obtain a limited license under MONSANTO’s proprietary rights.”12 In turn, Bayer
    “Corteva.”
    7
    Id. ¶ 17.
    8
    Id. ¶ 18 (“When herbicide, specifically glyphosate, is sprayed over the top of glyphosate-
    resistant corn, the herbicide kills harmful weeds that compete with the corn plants but leave the
    herbicide resistant corn unaffected.”).
    9
    Id.
    10
    Id.
    11
    Agreement at 1; see also id. §§ 1.01-1.05. Agrigenetics is the designated “LICENSEE” in the
    Agreement. Id. § 1.02. The Agreement was subsequently amended three times. See Compl., Exs.
    B-D. For ease of reference, the Court will herein refer to the Agreement and its amendments as a
    singular agreement unless noted otherwise.
    12
    Agreement § 1.05.
    -3-
    “desire[d] to grant such license[.]”13
    The Agreement defines certain terms.           Most importantly, “Territory” is
    defined as “the United States of America and Canada and all other countries of the
    world, if registration is required in a given country, that country shall not be included
    in the Territory until MONSANTO obtains a registration for Corn Line NK603 in
    the subject country.”14
    Agreement Section 3 is titled “Conveyance of Rights.”15                Under sub-
    section (a):
    MONSANTO hereby grants to LICENSEE, and LICENSEE hereby
    accepts, on and subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement,
    without the right to sublicense or otherwise transfer, a non-exclusive
    license within the Licensed Field in the Territory under MONSANTO
    Patent Rights, MONSANTO Know-How, Biological Materials and
    Licensed Patent Rights to develop, produce, have produced, and sell
    Licensed Corn Products to Corn growers licensed by MONSANTO and
    to develop, produce, have produced, but not sell, not license or
    otherwise convey rights to, Corn inbred or parent lines required for
    development and production of Licensed Com Products.16
    13
    Id.
    14
    Id. § 2.22.
    15
    Id. § 3.
    16
    Id. § 3.01. Relevant defined terms mentioned therein include:
    “Biological Materials”: “Corn Line NK603 and/or any biological material or
    germplasm based on Corn Line NK603,” which is a “transgenic corn line”
    identified by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Id. §§ 2.02, 2.07.
    “MONSANTO Know-How”: “knowledge and information” relating to the
    Biological Materials “reasonably needed for commercialization of Licensed Corn
    Products.” Id. § 2.16.
    “MONSANTO Patent Rights”: “all patent rights owned by MONSANTO that
    claim priority to a MONSANTO-owned patent application filed on or before the
    -4-
    Agreement Section 4.01 outlines royalty payments. As amended, sub-section (a)
    says that “[t]he base Royalty shall be the lower of the following”:
    (i) In each country of the Territory, LICENSEE’S Corn Line NK603
    Royalty will be the lower of: (1)           percent ( %) of industry-
    standard gross royalty prior to any adjustment for payment of seed
    service fees (IST), but not more than $     /Unit) or (2)       percent
    ( %) of the industry-standard net royalty (i.e. IST less the industry-
    standard seed service fee); provided however that, in the event that
    there is no third party licensing in a subject country of the Territory,
    then LICENSEE’S royalty rate shall be             percent ( %) of the
    Corn Line NK603 (or its current glyphosate tolerant commercial event)
    premium that MONSANTO seed companies charge to growers in the
    MONSANTO corn brand in the subject country.17
    According to sub-section (c):
    On or before March 1 each year, MONSANTO shall notify LICENSEE
    of its plans for the Royalty for the subsequent crop year (e.g., March
    2003 for the 2004 Fiscal Year). The notice provisions of this Subsection
    4.01(c) shall not obligate MONSANTO to charge the Royalty disclosed
    pursuant to Subsection 4.01, but in no event shall the applicable Royalty
    exceed the noticed amount.18
    Effective Date of this Agreement that directly relate to Corn that is tolerant to
    Glyphosate herbicide, including but not limited to, the MONSANTO-owned
    patents and patent applications listed in Appendix A and any and all patents
    maturing from these applications or maturing from applications that are divisionals,
    continuations continuations-in-part of these applications in the Territory and all
    reissues or extensions of any of the foregoing.” Id. § 2.17.
    “Licensed Patent Rights”: “the patents and patent applications listed in Appendix
    A which may be amended by MONSANTO from time to time and any and all
    patents maturing from these applications or maturing from applications that
    applications in the Territory and any and all reissues or extensions of any of the
    foregoing and any patents or patent applications relating directly to Licensed Com
    Products that MONSANTO hereafter licenses with a right to grant sublicenses to
    LICENSEE; provided however, MONSANTO shall have no obligation to obtain
    any such license from Third Parties.” Id. § 2.14.
    17
    Compl., Ex. C (“2007 Amendment”) § 4.01(a)(i).
    18
    Agreement § 4.01(c).
    -5-
    Agreement Section 9.01 defines the Agreement’s “Term.”19 It reads: “The term of
    this Agreement shall begin on the Effective Date of this Agreement and shall end
    upon the expiration of the last to expire of the MONSANTO Patent Rights and
    Licensed Patent Rights.”20
    Agreement Section 3.03 is titled “Marking of Licensed Corn Products” and
    requires the following notice to be marked on those products “to the extent such
    notice is applicable in the respective area”:
    THE     HERBICIDE      RESISTANT         TECHNOLOGIES
    INCORPORATED INTO THESE SEEDS ARE COVERED UNDER
    UNITED STATES PATENTS (To Be Provided By MONSANTO). NO
    LICENSE AND/OR SUBLICENSE IS CONVEYED TO USE THESE
    SEEDS SOLELY BY THE (PURCHASE/BAILMENT/TRANSFER)
    OF SUCH SEEDS. A LICENSE/SUBLICENSE UNDER SAID
    PATENTS MUST FIRST BE OBTAINED FROM MONSANTO
    COMPANY BEFORE THESE SEEDS CAN BE USED IN ANY
    WAY.21
    Section 7.06, titled “Grant-back,” specifies that:
    LICENSEE and its Affiliates agree to grant and hereby grant to
    MONSANTO and its Affiliates irrevocable options to world-wide, non-
    exclusive, royalty bearing licenses (with the right to grant sublicenses
    to their customers) under any patent rights currently owned or
    subsequently acquired by LICENSEE or any of its Affiliates which may
    prohibit or block, under any applicable patent infringement laws or
    regulations anywhere in the Territory, the sale or licensing of Biological
    19
    Id. § 9.01.
    20
    Id.; see also id. § 2.08 (defining “Effective Date”).
    21
    Id. § 3.03 (capitalization and underlining in original).
    -6-
    Materials or Com Line NK603.22
    D. THE U.S AND CANADIAN PATENT EXPIRATIONS AND THIS DISPUTE
    From 2002 to 2022, the Agreement operated smoothly. Bayer provided a
    projected royalty forecast to Corteva for the United States, Canada, and other
    countries around the world for the subsequent fiscal year each March, and a final
    royalty amount owed each July.23
    Monsanto’s worldwide NK603 patents then began to expire.24 Monsanto’s
    last applicable U.S. patent covering the NK603 event, 
    U.S. Patent No. 9,701,980
    (the “U.S. Patent”), expired in November 2022.25                    Monsanto’s last applicable
    Canadian patent expired in April 2022.26 Monsanto’s last applicable NK603 patent,
    located in Brazil, is expected to expire in 2028.27
    In March 2022, Bayer provided Corteva with its forecasted royalties for the
    2023 fiscal year.28 That forecast included royalties for the soon-to-expire U.S. and
    22
    
    Id.
     § 7.06.
    23
    Compl. ¶¶ 55-56.
    24
    See id. ¶ 58. In the United States, a patent grant “shall be for a term beginning on the date on
    which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent
    was filed in the United States or, if the application contains a specific reference to an earlier filed
    application or applications [such as being designated as a continuation in part of an earlier patent
    application] from the date on which the earliest such application was filed.” Id. (citing 
    35 U.S.C. § 154
    (a)(2)).
    25
    
    Id. ¶ 42
    ; see 
    id.,
     Ex. E (U.S. Patent); 
    id.,
     Ex. F (GEMAA Patent Expiration Notice).
    26
    Compl ¶ 57; 
    id.,
     Ex. G (“Bayer FY2023 Royalty Forecast”).
    27
    Compl. ¶ 41.
    28
    See generally Bayer FY2023 Royalty Forecast.
    -7-
    Canadian patents.29 Corteva responded by informing Bayer that “any attempt by
    Bayer to collect royalties in the United States for the NK603 event beyond
    November 2022 would be an impermissible extension of Bayer’s patent
    monopoly.”30 Bayer maintained its demand for unit royalties for each country under
    the Agreement for fiscal year 2023.31 Corteva filed suit.
    E. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Corteva initiated this action in October 2022, asking for: (i) declaratory
    judgment that Corteva would not breach the Agreement by refusing to pay post-
    patent-expiration U.S. royalties after November 202232 and (ii) if the Agreement is
    construed to require payment of post-patent expiration U.S. royalties beyond
    November 2022, such a claim for royalties constitutes patent misuse under Supreme
    Court precedent.33
    In response, Bayer moved to dismiss the complaint.34 The Court denied that
    motion, finding that Corteva proffered a reasonable enough interpretation to survive
    the pleadings stage.35
    29
    
    Id. at 1
    .
    30
    Compl. ¶ 61; 
    id.,
     Ex. H (Corteva FY2023 Royalty Forecast Objection).
    31
    Compl. ¶¶ 63-65; 
    id.,
     Ex. J (Bayer FY2023 Final Royalty Notice).
    32
    Compl. ¶¶ 70-75.
    33
    
    Id. ¶¶ 76-79
    .
    34
    See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (D.I. 19).
    35
    D.I. 44 (“Order Den. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss”); see D.I. 57 (“Mot. to Dismiss H’rg Tr.”).
    -8-
    Following discovery, both parties now move for summary judgment.36 The
    Court heard the parties at argument, and their cross-motions are now ripe for
    decision.37
    II. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
    Corteva and Bayer both move for summary judgment in their favor. For
    Count I, each party insists that the Agreement’s plain language unambiguously
    supports its posited read.38 Corteva interprets the Agreement’s royalty provisions to
    require royalties to end in a particular country when the NK603 patents in that
    country expire—barring any country-specific post-expiration royalties.39 Bayer
    interprets those same provisions as requiring Corteva to pay royalties—and most
    particularly, U.S. royalties—until the Agreement expires in 2028.40
    Both parties move for summary judgment on Corteva’s alternative Count II
    36
    See generally Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pls.’
    Mot. for Summ. J.”) (D.I. 83); Opening Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary
    Judgment (“Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.”) (D.I. 85).
    37
    After argument, Corteva filed a motion to supplement the record. See D.I. 115 (Plaintiffs’
    Motion to Supplement[] the Summary Judgment Record). The Court received and read that
    motion. But the Court need not, and did not, consider Corteva’s supplemental motion in reaching
    its summary judgment decision here.
    38
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 12-19; Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 7-14.
    39
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 12-16.
    40
    Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 7-13. Bayer also points to Corteva’s royalty payments for an
    Argentinian patent after that patent’s expiration as supposed evidence of Corteva’s course of
    performance. 
    Id. at 14
    . But Corteva’s complaint and briefing make clear that any payments after
    patent expiration were made under protest. Compl. ¶ 69; Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 7; Plaintiffs’
    Reply Brief In Support of its Motions For Summary Judgment (“Pls.’ Re. Br.”) at 12-13 (D.I. 100).
    So, this decision affords no weight to Corteva’s course-of-performance argument.
    -9-
    as well. Corteva contends that—should the Court choose Bayer’s interpretation,
    then—the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.41 renders
    the Agreement’s royalty provision unenforceable.42                  Bayer counters that this
    Agreement differs from that considered in Brulotte, primarily calling upon Kimble
    v. Marvel Ent., LLC43 for support.44
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Summary judgment is warranted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits” show “there is
    no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.”45 The movant bears the initial burden of proving that
    its motion is supported by undisputed facts.46 If the movant meets its burden, the
    non-movant must show there is a “genuine issue for trial.”47 To determine whether
    41
    
    379 U.S. 29
     (1964).
    42
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 19-26.
    43
    576 US. 446 (2015).
    44
    Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 14-26. Bayer also argues that, if the Court concludes that Brulotte
    makes the royalty obligation unenforceable, then Brulotte-informed federal patent law shouldn’t
    preempt an otherwise enforceable contract under Delaware law. 
    Id. at 26-28
    ; Reply Brief in
    Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Re. Br.”) at 20 (D.I. 101).
    Because Brulotte doesn’t render the Agreement’s royalty obligation unenforceable, the federal
    preemption issue need not be, and isn’t, addressed here.
    45
    Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Options Clearing Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 
    2021 WL 5577251
    , at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2021).
    46
    Moore v. Sizemore, 
    405 A.2d 679
    , 680 (Del. 1979).
    47
    Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e); see also Brzoska v. Olson, 
    668 A.2d 1355
    . 1364 (Del. 1995) (“If
    the facts permit reasonable persons to draw but one inference, the question is ripe for summary
    - 10 -
    a genuine issue exists, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the
    non-movant.48
    The “Court may not be able to grant summary judgment ‘if the factual record
    has not been developed thoroughly enough to allow the Court to apply the law to the
    factual record.’”49 But “[i]f the Court finds that no genuine issues of material fact
    exist, and the moving party has demonstrated [its] entitlement to judgment as a
    matter of law, then summary judgment is appropriate.”50
    “These well-established standards and rules apply in full when the parties
    have filed cross-motions for summary judgment.”51                 Filing cross-motions for
    summary judgment doesn’t act per se as a concession that there are no genuine
    factual disputes.52 “But, where cross-motions for summary judgment are filed and
    neither party argues the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the Court shall
    deem the motions to be the equivalent of a stipulation for decision on the merits
    judgment.”).
    48
    Judah v. Del. Tr. Co., 
    378 A.2d 624
    , 632 (Del. 1977).
    49
    Radulski v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 
    2020 WL 8676027
    , at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 28,
    2020) (quoting CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 
    2015 WL 3863225
    , at *1 (Del.
    Super. Ct. June 8, 2015)).
    50
    Brooke v. Elihu-Evans, 
    1996 WL 659491
    , at *2 (Del. Aug. 23, 1996) (citing Oliver B. Cannon
    & Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 
    312 A.2d 322
     (Del. Super. Ct. 1973)).
    51
    Radulski, 
    2020 WL 8676027
    , at *4 n.35 (collecting cases); see also Zenith Energy Terminals
    Joliet Hldgs. LLC v. CenterPoint Props. Tr., 
    2023 WL 615997
    , at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 23,
    2023).
    52
    United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. TakeCare, Inc., 
    693 A.2d 1076
    , 1079 (Del. 1997).
    - 11 -
    based on the record submitted with them.”53
    IV. DISCUSSION
    A. THE AGREEMENT REQUIRES ROYALTY PAYMENTS ON ALL PATENTS UNTIL
    THE LAST OF THEM EXPIRES.
    Corteva interprets the Agreement to require royalties on a country-by-country
    basis. In Corteva’s view, that means an expired country-specific patent ends royalty
    obligations for that patent, while the last-to-expire patent ends the Agreement at
    large.54 Bayer counters that the Agreement provides for royalties owed on all patents
    worldwide, and that obligation lasts until the Agreement’s Term ends.55 Both parties
    agree that there remains no material factual dispute.56
    Both parties also agree that Delaware law governs the Agreement.                  In
    Delaware, a contract’s proper construction is a question of law.57 “Delaware adheres
    to the ‘objective’ theory of contracts, i.e. a contract’s construction should be that
    which would be understood by an objective, reasonable third party.”58 And “[w]hen
    the contract is clear and unambiguous, [the Court] will give effect to the plain-
    53
    Radulski, 
    2020 WL 8676027
    , at *4 (cleaned up).
    54
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 12-16.
    55
    Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 9-12.
    56
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 1; Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 7.
    57
    E.g., Exelon Generation Acquisitions, LLC v. Deere & Co., 
    176 A.3d 1262
    , 1266–67 (Del.
    2017).
    58
    Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 
    991 A.2d 1153
    , 1159 (Del. 2010) (citation omitted).
    - 12 -
    meaning of the contract’s terms and provisions.”59 But a contract may be deemed
    ambiguous when it is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations.60 When a
    contract is ambiguous, that “rais[es] factual issues requiring consideration of
    extrinsic evidence to determine the intended meaning of the provision[s] in light of
    the expectations of the contracting parties.”61
    In denying Bayer’s previous motion to dismiss, the Court identified four
    provisions that might be viewed as ambiguous: Territory, Royalty, Term, and
    Severability.62     On the limited record before it, and applying Rule 12(b)(6)’s
    reasonable conceivability standard, the Court found Corteva’s proffered
    interpretation sufficient to survive the pleadings stage—a low bar. So, the Court
    denied the motion to dismiss, and the parties moved on to discovery.
    Three of those four provisions remain disputed now. “Territory” is defined
    as “the United States of America and Canada and all other countries of the
    world . . . .”63 The Agreement granted Corteva a “non-exclusive license within the
    Licensed Field in the Territory under MONSANTO Patent Rights, MONSANTO
    59
    
    Id. at 1159-60
     (citation omitted); see also Rhone–Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. American
    Motorists Ins. Co., 
    616 A.2d 1192
    , 1195 (Del. 1992) (“Clear and unambiguous language . . . should
    be given its ordinary and usual meaning.”).
    60
    Osborn, 991 A.2d at 1160.
    61
    Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 
    702 A.2d 1228
    , 1229 (Del. 1997).
    62
    Mot. to Dismiss H’rg Tr. at 35-37.
    63
    Agreement § 2.22.
    - 13 -
    Know-How, Biological Materials and Licensed Patent Rights to develop, produce,
    and sell Licensed Corn Products . . . .”64 Per the Agreement’s royalty provisions,
    the “base Royalty” “in each country of the Territory” is calculated using a set percent
    rate.65 And the Agreement’s Term “shall end upon the expiration of the last to expire
    of the MONSANTO Patent Rights and the Licensed Patent Rights.”66
    The Agreement’s core ambiguity lies in the relationship between the Term
    and the royalty provisions. Specifically, the Agreement fails to address how the
    Term applies to Section 4.01’s royalty obligations. Are royalties owed on all patents
    in the Territory until the longest lasting patent expires? Or do royalty obligations
    for a country-specific patent end when that patent expires? Put more simply: when
    do royalty obligations end under the Agreement?
    The evidence unearthed during discovery is of little help. The deposed
    corporate representatives all based their interpretations of the Agreement solely on
    the Agreement’s plain language.67 And there was no unearthing of contemporaneous
    communications between the parties from the time the Agreement was signed.
    If contract language is deemed ambiguous, the Court may consider extrinsic
    64
    Id. § 3.01.
    65
    2007 Amendment § 4.01.
    66
    Agreement § 9.01.
    67
    See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 8 (Corteva 30(b)(6) Dep. Tr.) at 21, 111-24; id., Ex. 9 (Bayer
    30(b)(6) Dep. Tr.) at 20; Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. L (Bayer and Monsanto 30(b)(6) Dep. Tr.)
    at 15-20.
    - 14 -
    evidence.68 Here, one vein of such evidence stands out. Permissible sources of
    extrinsic evidence may include “overt statements and acts of the parties, the business
    context, prior dealings between the parties, [and] business custom and usage in the
    industry.”69        A court might consider “evidence of prior agreements and
    communications of the parties as well as trade usage or course of dealing.” 70 After
    examining the relevant extrinsic evidence, “a court may conclude that, given the
    extrinsic evidence, only one meaning is objectively reasonable in the circumstances
    of [the] negotiation.”71
    The Agreement—originally entered in 2002—was subsequently amended
    multiple times. Importantly, the 2002 version featured different royalty provisions
    in its section 4.01 than the current version.72 In the 2002 version, the “base Royalty”
    amounts were spelled out as follows:
    (i) For the countries of the United States and Canada, the applicable
    Royalty for Fiscal Year 2003 shall be [at specified rates];
    (ii) For other countries of the Territory for all Fiscal Years, the Royalty
    shall be [at specified rates];
    (iii) For the countries of United States and Canada for all Fiscal Years after
    68
    E.g., Salamone v. Gorman, 
    106 A.3d 354
    , 369-70 (Del. 2014).
    69
    
    Id.
     (quoting In re Mobilactive Media, LLC, 
    2013 WL 297950
    , at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2013)
    (alterations in original)).
    70
    Eagle Indus., Inc., 702 A.2d at 1233.
    71
    In re Mobilactive Media, LLC, 
    2013 WL 297950
    , at *15 (quoting U.S. West v. Time Warner
    Inc., 1996 WL307445, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 6, 1996)).
    72
    Compare Compl., Ex. C (“2007 Amendment”) § 4.01, with Agreement § 4.01.
    - 15 -
    2003, the Royalty shall be [at specified rates].73
    In 2007, that section was amended, and the references to different countries at
    different specified rates were removed. The finalized version instead reads, “[i]n
    each country of the Territory, LICENSEE’S Corn Line NK603 Royalty will be the
    lower of (1)               percent ( %) of industry-standard gross royalty . . . or (2)
    percent ( %) of the industry-standard net royalty . . . .”74
    When comparing the changed language, an answer to the ambiguity reveals
    itself. These parties amended the royalty terms by removing references to individual
    countries at different specified rates.         The singular section now encompasses
    royalties “in each country of”75 “United States and Canada and all other countries
    of the world.”76 And the new royalty provision sets one percent rate calculation for
    that defined Territory. It’s thus apparent that the parties intended to include all
    countries under one royalty rate—not to provide for country-by-country royalties at
    different rates. By using one specified percentage to calculate royalties for the
    Territory as a whole, the parties removed the possibility of treating patent expiration
    on a country-by-country basis.            If the royalties for all worldwide patents are
    calculated using a set percent rate, then the royalty obligations can end on one patent
    73
    Agreement § 4.01 (emphasis added).
    74
    2007 Amendment § 4.01 (emphasis added).
    75
    Id.
    76
    Agreement § 2.22 (emphasis added).
    - 16 -
    expiration date.77
    Certain other provisions further clue the Court as to the parties’ intent. “In
    upholding the intentions of the parties, a court must construe the agreement as a
    whole, giving effect to all provisions therein.”78 In Section 7.06, Corteva granted
    Monsanto “irrevocable options to world-wide, non-exclusive, royalty bearing
    licenses . . . .”79 No such reference to a country-by-country royalty bearing license
    exists. What’s more, the Agreement also encompasses “MONSANTO Know-How”
    and “Biological Materials,” not just patent rights. Those licensed non-patent rights
    continue past any country-specific patent’s expiration, so it follows that Corteva’s
    royalty obligations would extend past expiration as well.
    Corteva focuses on the royalty provision’s “in each of” usage to argue that
    royalties are owed on a country-by-country basis. But Corteva’s interpretation
    ignores the “Territory” definitional phrasing “United States and Canada and all other
    countries of the world.” The presumably conjunctive ‘and’ instead of the disjunctive
    ‘or’ combines those listed countries together.80 Further, the Agreement’s Term
    77
    During argument, Corteva posited that the “industry-standard” royalty rate varies from country
    to country, indicating an intent to treat each country differently. See D.I. 116 (Aug. 13 H’rg Tr.)
    at 14-15. But what matters here is the calculation, not the result. Because the enumerated
    percentage calculation treats the countries together, the Agreement treats the royalties together;
    irrespective of the finalized amount after that calculation is employed.
    78
    E.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 
    498 A.2d 1108
    , 1113 (Del. 1985).
    79
    Agreement § 7.06 (emphasis added).
    80
    See Weinberg v. Waystar, Inc., 
    294 A.3d 1039
    , 1045 (Del. 2023) (“ordinarily ‘and’ is
    conjunctive, while ‘or’ is disjunctive . . . courts will construe each word accordingly, absent strong
    - 17 -
    doesn’t include any Territory reference at all; the Agreement simply terminates
    when the last Monsanto patent expires.                  Thus, Corteva’s royalties provision
    interpretation runs afoul of the Agreement’s overall scheme for a worldwide license
    agreement that continues in full until the last patent expiration date.81
    Ultimately, these sophisticated parties agreed to a complex licensing
    arrangement in exchange for royalties owed on patents all around the world. No
    doubt, the parties knew that the patents in question would expire 20 years post-
    creation when entering their arrangement. If the parties intended to contract for
    country-by-country royalties—such that a patent’s expiration ended royalties owed
    only for that country—they were more than capable of including such specific
    language.82 Instead, they contracted for one royalty rate calculation for the entire
    reasons to break from the general rule” (citing Silverman v. Silverman, 
    206 A.3d 825
    , 832 n.35
    (Del. 2019))).
    81
    See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 498 A.2d at 1113 (“the meaning which arises from a
    particular portion of an agreement cannot control the meaning of the entire agreement where such
    inference runs counter to the agreement’s overall scheme or plan” (citing Stemerman v. Ackerman,
    
    184 A.2d 28
    , 34 (Del. Ch. 1962))).
    Corteva also argues that, if the Agreement’s Term applies to all provisions, then it makes the
    Agreement’s Marking provision unlawful. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 17-19. That’s because,
    Corteva says, the Marking provision would require Corteva to mark products with expired patents
    in violation of federal law. 
    Id.
     But the Marking provision states that marking is required only “to
    the extent such notice is applicable in the respective area[.]” See Agreement § 3.03(a). So, the
    required notice simply wouldn’t remain or be “applicable” for expired patents.
    82
    More likely, the parties knew that the licenses for some patents would continue after expiration
    of other countries’ patents under the Agreement and set the royalty rate accordingly. Scholars and
    courts alike have recognized this key component of licensing agreements and royalty payments—
    that royalty rates are based on the value of the patents during the entire agreement period, including
    post-expiration—in their criticism of Brulotte. See Scheiber v. Dolby Lab’ys, Inc., 
    293 F.3d 1014
    ,
    1017-18 (7th Cir. 2002):
    - 18 -
    Territory, and for the Agreement to end “upon the expiration of the last to expire of
    the MONSANTO Patent Rights and the Licensed Patent Rights.”83 The Court will
    enforce the Agreement and those terms as written.84 When considering extrinsic
    evidence and the Agreement as a whole, the Agreement imposes royalty payment
    obligations on all patents until the last one expires.
    Accordingly, Bayer’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and
    Corteva’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Corteva’s Count I.
    The Brulotte rule incorrectly assumes that a patent license has significance after the
    patent terminates. When the patent term ends, the exclusive right to make, use or
    sell the licensed invention also ends. Because the invention is available to the
    world, the license in fact ceases to have value. Presumably, licensees know this
    when they enter into a licensing agreement. If the licensing agreement calls for
    royalty payments beyond the patent term, the parties base those payments on the
    licensees’ assessment of the value of the license during the patent period. These
    payments, therefore, do not represent an extension in time of the patent
    monopoly . . . .
    Courts do not remove the obligation of the consignee to pay because payment after
    receipt is an extension of market power—it is simply a division of the payment-for-
    delivery transaction. Royalties beyond the patent term are no different. If royalties
    are calculated on post-patent term sales, the calculation is simply a risk-shifting
    credit arrangement between patentee and licensee. The arrangement can be no
    more than that, because the patentee at that time has nothing else to sell.
    (emphasis added) (quoting Harold See & Frank M. Caprio, The Trouble with Brulotte: the Patent
    Royalty Term and Patent Monopoly Extension, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 813, 814, 851 (1990) and citing
    Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72
    VA. L. REV. 677, 709–12 (1986)).
    83
    Agreement § 9.01 (emphasis added).
    84
    See Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. DRIT LP, 
    248 A.3d 911
    , 919 (Del. 2021) (“Even if the bargain they
    strike ends up a bad deal for one or both parties, the court’s role is to enforce the agreement as
    written . . . ‘parties have a right to enter into good and bad contracts, the law enforces both.’
    Holding sophisticated contracting parties to their agreement promotes certainty and predictability
    in commercial transactions.” (quoting Nemec v. Shrader, 
    991 A.2d 1120
    , 1126 (Del. 2010))).
    - 19 -
    B. BRULOTTE DOESN’T RENDER THE AGREEMENT UNLAWFUL.
    Corteva presses on, positing that if the Agreement is construed to require
    payment of post-patent expiration U.S. royalties beyond November 2022, such a
    royalties scheme constitutes patent misuse under Brulotte v. Thys Co.85 Corteva
    contends that the Brulotte decision “established a bright-line rule that a licensor of
    U.S. patent rights cannot require the payment of U.S. royalties after expiration of the
    licensed U.S. patents . . . .”86 So, says Corteva, paying royalties on the expired U.S.
    patent is per se unlawful.87
    Federal law governing patent misuse is well-settled. A patentee has the
    exclusive right to manufacture, use, and sell her invention.88               The heart of a
    patentee’s legal monopoly is the right to invoke the State’s power to prevent others
    from utilizing her discovery without her consent.89 The law also recognizes that the
    patentee may assign or license others to practice her invention.90 But there are
    established limits that the patentee must not exceed in employing the leverage of her
    85
    Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 19.
    86
    
    Id.
    87
    
    Id.
    88
    See, e.g., Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 
    186 U.S. 70
    , 88-9 (1902).
    89
    See, e.g., Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 
    210 U.S. 405
    , 423-24 (1908);
    Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 
    261 U.S. 24
    , 33-9 (1923).
    90
    See, e.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 
    138 U.S. 252
    , 255 (1891).
    - 20 -
    patent to control or limit the operations of the licensee.91 Among other restrictions,
    the patentee may not condition the right to use her patent on the licensee’s agreement
    to purchase, use, or sell, or not to purchase, use, or sell, another article of commerce
    not within the scope of the patent monopoly.92 And the patentee’s right to set the
    price for a license does not extend so far as “to exact royalties as high as [s]he can
    negotiate.”93
    The Brulotte decision Corteva references involved a hop-picking machine
    with several patents.94 Brulotte purchased the machine from Thys Co. on a license,
    requiring Brulotte to pay specified royalties.95 Thys’s patents then expired. But the
    license agreement continued.96 Brulotte challenged the license, arguing that it was
    patent misuse to collect any royalties after the patents’ expiration.97
    The United States Supreme Court agreed, ruling that “a patentee’s use of a
    royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful
    per se.”98 In so ruling, the Brulotte court noted that “[t]he present licenses draw no
    91
    Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 
    395 U.S. 100
    , 135 (1969).
    92
    E.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 
    309 U.S. 436
    , 455-59 (1940); International Salt
    Co. v. United States, 
    332 U.S. 392
    , 395-96 (1947).
    93
    Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33.
    94
    Id. at 29.
    95
    Id. at 30.
    96
    Id.
    97
    Id.
    98
    Id.
    - 21 -
    line between the term of the patent and the post-expiration period.”99 The Brulotte
    court characterized the licensing agreement in question as “a bald attempt to exact
    the same terms and conditions for the period after the patents have expired as they
    do for the monopoly period.”100             That conflicted with patent law’s policy of
    establishing a “post-expiration . . . public domain.”101
    As Brulotte exemplifies, the United States Supreme Court “has carefully
    guarded the significance of [a patent’s] expiration date, declining to enforce laws
    and contracts that restrict free public access to formerly patented, as well as
    unpatentable, inventions.”102 But more recently in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment,
    the high court described how “parties can often find ways around Brulotte, enabling
    them to achieve those same ends.”103
    Corteva’s attempt to invoke Brulotte falls short for the reasons identified by
    99
    Id. at 32.
    100
    Id.
    101
    Id. at 33.
    102
    Kimble, 576 U.S. at 447 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 
    376 U.S. 225
    , 230 (1964)
    and Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 
    326 U.S. 249
    , 255–56 (1945)).
    103
    
    Id. at 453
    . Notably, the subject agreement in Kimble didn’t set an end date for royalties either.
    See 
    id. at 450
     (“The parties set no end date for royalties, apparently contemplating that they would
    continue for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-Man (by doing whatever a spider can)”). But
    that agreement was only for one patent, not multiple patents. See 
    id. at 449
    . When those parties
    came across Brulotte, litigation ensued in an attempt to render “the royalty provision . . .
    unenforceable after the expiration of the Kimble patent.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Kimble v. Marvel
    Enterprises, Inc., 
    692 F. Supp. 2d 1156
    , 1161 (D. Ariz. 2010)). As the Kimble court clarified—
    and as about to be discussed—the royalty provision on the Kimble patent likely would have been
    enforceable if one of the enumerated exceptions applied.
    - 22 -
    Kimble. First and foremost, the operative agreement is a latest-running-patent
    agreement. The Kimble court stated that, “[u]nder Brulotte, royalties may run until
    the latest-running patent covered in the parties’ agreement expires.”104 In Brulotte,
    the Court dealt with a U.S. royalty license on seven subject patents.105 All seven
    expired, but the issued licenses continued beyond each agreed-upon patent’s
    expiration.106       Under that factual circumstance, the Court deemed the license
    agreement unlawful.107 Contrarily, the subject license agreement between these
    parties involves a royalty license that lasts until the latest-running patent covered.
    As the Kimble court identified, and other courts have confirmed,108 royalties under
    a latest-running-patent license agreement differ from the licensing agreement
    interpreted in Brulotte and are lawful.109 That’s just what we have here.110
    104
    Id. at 454.
    105
    Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 30.
    106
    Id.
    107
    Id. at 32.
    108
    See Ares Trading S.A. v. Dyax Corp., 
    2023 WL 2456437
    , at *24 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2023)
    (stating that, “since ‘under Brulotte, royalties may run until the latest-running patent covered in
    the parties’ agreement expires,’ Brulotte would not apply” until the latest running patent in the
    subject licensing agreement—the ‘743 Patent—expires in 2028 (cleaned up) (quoting Kimble, 576
    U.S. at 454)); PNY Techs., Inc. v. Netac Tech. Co., 
    2019 WL 459245
    , at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2019)
    (“The Settlement Agreement is a licensing agreement which covers multiple patents. Under
    Kimble and Brulotte, ‘royalties may run until the latest-running patent covered in the parties’
    agreement expires.’” (quoting Kimble, 576 U.S. at 454)), aff’d, 
    800 F. App’x 110
     (3d Cir. 2020).
    109
    Kimble, 576 U.S. at 454.
    110
    In its motion, Corteva says that Kimble’s latest-running-patent exception doesn’t apply because
    the Agreement’s latest-running patent is a foreign patent while the expired patent here is a U.S.
    patent. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 20 (citing Scheiber, 
    293 F.3d at
    1014 and Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell,
    
    502 F.3d 1014
     (9th Cir. 2007)). But neither cited-to case—both decided before Kimble—stands
    - 23 -
    Second, the patent licenses are tied to additional non-patent rights. The
    Kimble Court pointed out that “parties have still more options when a licensing
    agreement covers . . . additional non-patent rights” and that “post-expiration
    royalties are allowable so long as [they are] tied to a non-patent right—even when
    closely related to a patent.”111 Here, the Agreement granted Corteva a license to
    patent rights—MONSANTO Patent Rights and Licensed Patent Rights—and non-
    patent rights—Biological Materials and MONSANTO Know-How.112 Because the
    post-expiration royalties are tied to non-patent rights, they aren’t precluded by
    Brulotte.113
    In addition, the Agreement bases royalty payments on sales, not use. 114 As
    such, two factually similar U.S. Supreme Court cases aid this analysis: Automatic
    for Corteva’s postulation that U.S. royalties for expired U.S. patents can’t be owed on latest-
    running foreign patents. And Brulotte only addresses U.S. patents, not foreign patents, so it can’t
    be said to stand for that proposition either. See Zila, Inc., 
    502 F.3d at 1023
     (“Nor does Brulotte
    extend its royalty-canceling powers to contracts for foreign patents. Brulotte concerned patent
    rights in the United States . . . .”).
    111
    Kimble, 576 U.S. at 454.
    112
    See Agreement § 3.01.
    113
    According to Corteva, for Kimble’s non-patent rights exception to apply, there must be some
    sort of step-down whereby the remaining non-patent rights garner an eroded royalty rate. Pls.’
    Mot. for Summ. J. at 21-25. But the example provided in Kimble that describes a step-down in
    royalty rate is just that—an example. Contra Dasso Int’l, Inc. v. Moso N. Am., Inc., 
    2023 WL 5349374
     (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2023); Bradley Corp. v. Lawler Mfg. Co., 
    2020 WL 7027875
     (S.D. Ind.
    Nov. 30, 2020); Galbraith Lab’ys, Inc. v. Nanochem Sols. Inc., 
    2016 WL 1421004
     (W.D. Ky. Apr.
    8, 2016). Some lower federal courts have since placed weight on the step-down example, but it is
    not at all settled that is a requirement to avoid Brulotte trouble.
    114
    See Agreement § 4.01; see also 2007 Amendment § 4.01.
    - 24 -
    Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.115 and Zenith Radio Corp. v.
    Hazeltine Research, Inc.116 In both Automatic Radio and Zenith Radio, the subject
    license agreements covered hundreds of patents related to the manufacture of radio
    broadcasting apparatuses.117 In Zenith Radio, those included both foreign and U.S.
    patents.118 And in both cases, the license agreements provided a percentage royalty
    rate based on sales in exchange for the patent and non-patent rights.119 Both
    licensees challenged the respective license agreements, asserting patent misuse.120
    In Automatic Radio, the Supreme Court considered the “payment of royalties
    according to an agreed percentage of the licensee’s sales” reasonable, since “[s]ound
    business judgment could indicate that such payment represents the most convenient
    method of fixing the business value of the privileges granted by the licensing
    agreement.”121 The Court found that, in that type of royalty provision, there is “no
    inherent extension of the monopoly of the patent” because “[w]hat it acquired by the
    agreement into which it entered was the privilege to use any or all of the patents and
    developments as it desired to use them. If it chooses to use none of them, it has
    115
    
    339 U.S. 827
     (1950), overruled on other grounds by Lear v. Adkins, 
    89 U.S. 653
     (1969).
    116
    
    395 U.S. 100
     (1969).
    117
    Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 829; Zenith Radio Corp., 
    395 U.S. at 104-05
    .
    118
    Zenith Radio Corp., 
    395 U.S. at 104
    .
    119
    Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 829; Zenith Radio Corp., 
    395 U.S. at 104
    .
    120
    Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 829-30; Zenith Radio Corp., 
    395 U.S. at 104-05
    .
    121
    Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 834.
    - 25 -
    nevertheless contracted to pay for the privilege . . . .”122 And the Zenith Radio court
    affirmed that analysis, stating that “in licensing the use of patents ‘it is not a per se
    misuse of patents to measure the consideration by a percentage of the licensee’s
    sales.”123 The Zenith Radio court also confirmed that Automatic Radio is “not to the
    contrary” of Brulotte’s ban on post-expiration royalties.124
    The present facts are akin to those in Automatic Radio and Zenith Radio.
    These parties contracted for a global licensing agreement spanning multiple patents,
    along with non-patent ‘know-how’ and ‘biological materials’ rights. And the parties
    agreed to a set sales percentage as consideration for that license. As the licensee,
    Corteva obtained the benefit of that bargain by gaining access to both the patents
    and the corresponding research throughout the Agreement period. Bayer didn’t
    exercise patent leverage in an attempt to extend its patent monopoly; it simply
    contracted for a “convenient method” for royalties based on sale totals.125 As the
    Zenith Radio court observed, “[i]f convenience of the parties rather than patent
    power dictates the total-sales royalty provision, there are no misuse of the patents
    and no forbidden conditions attached to the license.”126 Just so here.
    122
    Id.
    123
    Zenith Radio Corp., 
    395 U.S. at 137-38
     (quoting Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 834).
    124
    Id. at 137.
    125
    See id.
    126
    Id. at 138.
    - 26 -
    At bottom, Corteva’s Brulotte arguments fail because the Agreement is a
    latest-running-patent agreement that is tied to additional non-patent rights. Kimble
    makes it clear that such agreements are enforceable. And the royalty provisions
    grant Corteva the privilege to use its contracted-for rights, whether patent-related or
    not. Payment for that privilege doesn’t constitute patent misuse.
    Bayer’s summary judgment motion is GRANTED and Corteva’s summary
    judgment motion is DENIED as to Corteva’s Count II.
    V. CONCLUSION
    Under the Agreement as it is now in place, one royalty rate calculation applies
    to all worldwide patents. So, those worldwide patents are treated together for royalty
    purposes. Because the Agreement’s term ends when the last country’s patent
    expires, the royalty provision thus extends royalties owed on all patents—whether
    expired in a specific country or not—until that final expiration occurs.
    The Agreement is a latest-running-patent agreement and Corteva contracted
    and has been paying for the privilege to use both the patents and certain
    corresponding research for the Agreement’s entire term. With that (and for the
    reasons mentioned above) the Agreement’s royalty provisions as crafted isn’t
    unlawful under Brulotte.
    Resultingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, in
    whole, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, in whole.
    - 27 -
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    /s/ Paul R. Wallace
    _________________________
    Paul R. Wallace, Judge
    Original to Prothonotary
    cc: All Counsel via File and Serve
    - 28 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: N22C-10-293 PRW CCLD

Judges: Wallace J.

Filed Date: 9/16/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/16/2024