State v. Carroll ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
)
v. ) ID No. 1703008054
)
) Cr. A. No. IN17-04-0119R1
KIYOHN M. CARROLL, )
Defendant. )
Submitted: January 4, 2024*
Decided: January 26, 2024
Upon Defendant Kiyohn M. Carroll’s Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 26th day of January, 2024, upon Defendant Kiyohn M. Carroll’s Motion
for Postconviction Relief (D.I. 25), and the record in this matter, it appears to the
Court that:
(1) Kiyohn M. Carroll was indicted in April 2017 for two counts of Rape
in the First Degree, seven counts of Rape in the Second Degree, one count of Rape
in the Fourth Degree, two counts of Assault in the Third Degree, one count of
Terroristic Threatening, and one count of Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second
Degree.1 The incidents that brought about these charges occurred in 2012 and 2016
* See n.4, supra.
1
D.I. 1.
when he sexually assaulted two different men in events that began in Philadelphia
and ended in Delaware motel rooms. In November 2020—after he had completed a
Pennsylvania kidnapping sentence related to one of those attacks—Mr. Carroll was
transferred to Delaware to answer his charges here.
(2) Mr. Carroll eventually pleaded nolo contendere to a single count of
fourth-degree rape (as a lesser of first-degree rape) in May 2022. He did so in
exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and the State’s favorable sentencing
recommendation—a time-served Level V sentence.2 His sentencing occurred
several months later, on December 2, 2022, and Mr. Carroll was sentenced to fifteen
years at Level V suspended after two years and one month (served under the
provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4202(k)) to be followed by six months at Level IV (DOC
Discretion) and an extended Level III term.3
(3) Mr. Carroll docketed no direct appeal from his conviction or sentence.
(4) Several months later, in March 2023, Mr. Carroll was before the Court
for a violation of his Level IV term.4 That violation was resolved.5 And Mr. Carroll
has now finished the Level IV portion of this sentence and is presently serving his
2
D.I. 14.
3
D.I. 17.
4
D.I. 18-21.
5
See D.I. 20 and 22.
-2-
community supervision at Level III.6
(5) Mr. Carroll filed the instant motion for postconviction relief under
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on January 4, 2024.7 In sum, Mr. Carroll says he
is entitled to postconviction relief because his counsel was ineffective in the
investigation and preparation of his case and “[he] thus was forced into taking the
plea.”8
(6) The Court has engaged in the preliminary consideration of Mr. Carroll’s
application required under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d). The Court finds
that, consistent with Rules 61(i)(1) and (d)(5), his should be SUMMARILY
DISMISSED because it is an unexcused untimely motion.
(7) When considering applications for postconviction relief under its
criminal rules, this Court addresses any applicable procedural bars before turning to
the merits.9 This policy protects the integrity of the Court’s rules and the finality of
its judgments.10 As the Court has observed, addressing the merits of a case that does
6
See D.I. 22.
7
Mr. Carroll stamped his postconviction motion at 5:33 p.m. on January 4, 2024, at the all-
courts’ “night drop” clock in the lobby of the Leonard L. Williams Justice Center. D.I. 25. It was
clocked in and docketed by this Court’s Prothonotary the next morning, January 5, 2024, at
8:56 a.m. Id. Assuming without deciding that Mr. Carroll’s night-clocking was sufficient, the
Court uses the earlier of two potential filing dates—January 4, 2024.
8
Def. Rule 61 Mot., at 3-4.
9
See, e.g., Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 2002). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d
1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) (citing Harris v. Reed,
489 U.S. 255 (1989)).
10
State v. Caldwell, 2009 WL 3069680, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept 14, 2009).
-3-
not meet procedural requirements effectively renders our procedural rules
meaningless.11
(8) Mr. Carroll’s motion for postconviction relief is controlled by
Rule 61(i)(1)’s time limitation.12
(9) Thereunder, “[a] motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more
than one year after the judgment of conviction is final.”13 Mr. Carroll’s rape
conviction became final on January 3, 2023.14 He then had one year from that date—
or until January 3, 2024—to file his postconviction motion. He did not file until
January 4, 2024—that is, a day too late. Accordingly, Mr. Carroll’s postconviction
motion is plainly procedurally barred as untimely under Superior Court Criminal
Rule 61(i)(1).
11
See State v. Chao, 2006 WL 2788180, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2006) (“To protect the
integrity of the procedural rules, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim
where a procedural bar exists.”); State v. Jones, 2002 WL 31028584, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept.
10, 2002) (citing State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1995)) (same).
12
This Court’s Criminal Rule 61(i)(1) states in relevant part: “Time limitation. A motion for
postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final
. . .”
13
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
14
See Jackson v. State, 654 A.2d 829, 833 (Del. 1995) (“A defendant who does not take a direct
appeal within thirty days of the time of sentencing is subject to a ‘finality’ date which begins when
the time for direct appeal has expired. For such defendants the [one-]year period under
Rule 61(i)(1) begins thirty days after sentencing.”); see also Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 45(a)
(allowing that when the last day of a period prescribed or allowed by the Court’s criminal rules
falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or other legal holiday, the prescribed period shall run until the end of
the next day on which the prothonotary is open).
-4-
(11) Now, the time bar does not “apply either to a claim that the court lacked
jurisdiction or to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs
(2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d)” of Rule 61.15 But Mr. Carroll doesn’t claim that
this Court lacked jurisdiction, that “new evidence exists that creates a strong
inference” of actual innocence,16 nor that “a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the
Delaware Supreme Court, applies to [his] case and renders [his] conviction . . .
invalid.”17 Instead, Mr. Carroll’s is a run-of-the-mill ineffectiveness claim that his
counsel’s alleged failings prompted his plea. As such, his untimely motion is
undoubtedly procedurally barred by Criminal Rules 61(i)(1).
(12) Having engaged in the preliminary consideration of his motion
expected under Rule 61(d), the Court finds that “it plainly appears from the motion
for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that
[Mr. Carroll] is not entitled to relief.”18
15
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
16
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i); id. at (i)(5). See State v. Madison, 2022 WL 3011377,
at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 29, 2022), a’ffd, 2022 WL 17982946 (Del. Dec. 29, 2022) (explaining
Rule 61’s “new evidence standard” adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court the year before in
Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053 (Del. 2021)).
17
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii). See also id. at (i)(5).
18
Id. at (d)(5).
-5-
(13) Accordingly, Mr. Carroll’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.19
SO ORDERED this 26th day of January, 2024.
Paul R. Wallace, Judge
Original to Prothonotary
cc: Mr. Kiyohn M. Carroll, pro se
Diana A. Dunn, Deputy Attorney General
19
Id. (“Summary dismissal. If it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and
the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may
enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified.”).
-6-