Brumbley v. Wells ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RALPH BRUMBLEY, by and through )
his Attorney-in-Fact, CAROL )
BRUMBLEY, d/b/a Brumbley Family )
Park, )
) C.A. No. S24C-03-024 CAK
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
JOSEPH WELLS, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: May 20, 2024
Decided: May 30, 2024
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Reconsider Writ and Order of Ejectment
DENIED
ORDER
Dean A. Campbell, Esquire, 703 Chestnut Street, Milton, DE 19968; Attorney for
Plaintiff.
Joseph Wells, a certain recreational vehicle located on Lot 30, Brumbley Family
Park, 25601Amy’s Lane, Milton, DE 19968; Defendant, Pro Se.
KARSNITZ, R.J.
On March 14, 2024, Ralph Brumbley, by and through his Attorney-in-Fact
Carol Brumbley, doing business as Brumbley Family Park (“Plaintiff”) 1 filed a
Petition for Writ of Ejectment against Joseph Wells (“Defendant”) seeking ejectment
of Defendant from certain real property known as Lot 30 in the recreational vehicle
campground owned by Plaintiff known as the Brumbley Family Park (the
“Property”).2 Plaintiff had granted a revocable license to Defendant to park on Lot
30 for a monthly fee. Defendant defaulted in payment of the fee in December, 2023
and Plaintiff revoked the license.3
On May 16, 2024, Defendant requested a continuance which I denied. On May
17, 2024, Defendant failed, without justification, to appear for a Rule to Show Cause
hearing regarding Plaintiff’s Petition for Ejectment. On May 17, 2024, I entered the
Writ and Order of Ejectment.
On May 20, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate or Reconsider (dated
May 17, 2024), In that Motion, which I will treat as a Motion to Vacate under
Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b), Defendant makes two arguments: (1)
Plaintiff has violated certain administrative rules with respect to operation of the
Property, and (2) Plaintiff has been very hostile to him. Neither of these arguments
1
Plaintiff Carol Brumbley is the wife of Plaintiff Ralph Brumbley and has produced a Power of
Attorney appointing her as his Attorney-in-Fact.
2
Carol Brumbley is represented by counsel and thus can sue using the Attorney-in-Fact.
3
Justice of the Peace Court #17 ruled that the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant did
not constitute a landlord-tenant relationship under either the Delaware Landlord-Tenant Code or
the Delaware Mobile Homes Lots and Leases Act.
2
is apposite to an ejectment claim or his failure to pay the license fee.
This is my Order denying the Motion.
Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b) provides in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party
or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4)
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.
In my view, none of these reasons apply in this case. There is no evidence in the
record that Defendant’s failure to timely answer the Petition for Writ of Ejectment
or his failure to appear at the Rule to Show Cause hearing resulted from mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
With respect to excusable neglect, our Supreme Court stated that the Superior
Court must consider three (3) factors in determining whether entry of a default
judgment should be set aside: first, whether culpable conduct of defendant led to the
default and, if so, was it excusable; second, whether defendant has a meritorious
defense; and third, whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced.4 Because the first factor
4
Apartment Cmtys. Corp. v. Martinelli, 859 A.2d 67, 69-70 (Del. 2004).
3
is a threshold, the Superior Court need only consider the second and third factors “if
a satisfactory explanation has been established for failing to answer the complaint,
e.g. excusable neglect or inadvertence.”5 Under Rule 60(b)(1), excusable neglect is
defined as “neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person
under the circumstances.” But a defendant “cannot have the judgment vacated where
[the defendant] has simply ignored the process.”6 I note the second and third factors
as well: Defendant has no meritorious defense, and Plaintiff will be prejudiced by
further delay.
Defendant’s conduct led to the Writ and Order of Ejectment, and there was no
satisfactory explanation established for his failing to answer the Petition for Writ of
Ejectment.
Having heard and considered Defendant’s Motion and Plaintiff’s arguments,
Defendant’s Motion is hereby DENIED.
Under the Writ and Order of Ejectment, Defendant shall vacate the lands and
premises of Ralph Brumbley forthwith.
It is SO ORDERED.
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
Craig A. Karsnitz
cc: Prothonotary
5
Id. at 72.
6
Lee v. Charter Comm'ns VI, LLC, 2008 WL 73720, at *1 (Del. Super., Jan. 7, 2008).
4