State v. Stigile ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) ID Nos. 2001020200 and 2205013206
)
BRIAN M. STIGILE, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: June 13, 2024
Decided: September 30, 2024
COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
SHOULD BE DENIED
Louis F. D’Onofrio, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Brian M. Stigile, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware,
pro se.
Peter W. Veith, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Trial Counsel for Defendant.
SALOMONE, Commissioner
This 30th day of September 2024, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion
for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court as follows:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Case Number 2001020200
On each of December 17, 2019, January 7, 2020, and January 22, 2020, the
New Castle County Police Department responded to calls regarding reports of
burglaries. Each burglary resulted in damages to the victims’ residences as well as
theft of jewelry and other personal property.1 A person fitting the description of
Brian M. Stigile (“Stigile” or the “Defendant”) was spotted at all three of the
burglaries as was the gray Cadillac parked outside the Defendant’s residence.2 A
pawn shop database search revealed that the Defendant had pawned multiple pieces
of jewelry in January 2020, including jewelry reported as stolen from one of the
victims.3 In a post-Miranda interview, the Defendant’s girlfriend, Ashlie Marshall
(“Marshall”), admitted that she would accompany Stigile to the residences and sit in
the car while he entered the dwellings and took jewelry and other property from the
1
These general facts are taken from the Affidavit of Probable Cause, dated February 1, 2020, State
v. Brian M. Stigile, Delaware Superior Court Criminal Docket, ID No. 2001020200 (hereinafter,
“D.I. __”) 1.
2
Id.
3
Id.
1
victims’ homes.4 She also confessed that the two would then go together to pawn
the stolen items.5
On February 1, 2020, the New Castle County Police Department arrested
Stigile in connection with each of the aforementioned burglaries. On August 10,
2020, he was indicted for the following offenses: (i) three counts of Burglary in the
Second Degree, (ii) one count of Theft Over $1500 from a Victim 62 Years or Older,
(iii) two counts of Theft $1500 or Greater, (iv) three counts of Conspiracy Second
Degree, (v) two counts of Selling Stolen Property Under $1500, and (vi) three counts
of Criminal Mischief Under $1000 Property Damage.6 On September 13, 2021,
Stigile failed to appear for his final case review and this Court issued a capias for his
arrest.7
Case Number 2205013206
On May 26, 2022, members of Operation Safe Streets responded to a
Wilmington residence which had been part of an ongoing investigation.8 Stigile was
found at the residence and taken into custody upon officers discovering he had an
active capias.9 Within the bedroom belonging to Stigile and Marshall, officers found
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
D.I. 4.
7
D.I. 12.
8
These general facts are taken from the Affidavit of Probable Cause, dated May 26, 2022, State v.
Brian M. Stigile, Delaware Superior Court Criminal Docket, ID No. 2205013206 (hereinafter,
“D.I.2. __”) 1.
9
Id.
2
a metal safe that the couple denied ownership of.10 Within the safe, officers found
the following: (i) approximately 221 blue wax bags containing a total of 1.547 grams
of heroin or a combination of heroin and fentanyl valued at approximately
$2,210.00; (ii) 6 bags containing a green, leafy plant like substance weighing
approximately 21.0 grams that tested positive for marijuana; (iii) paperwork in the
name of the Defendant; (iv) $2,200.00 in U.S. dollars; and (v) a Visa debit card in
the name of Marshall.11 No needles were found by officers to indicate personal use
of the heroin/fentanyl and neither Stigile nor Marshall were legitimately employed
at the time of arrest.12 In a second post-Miranda statement, Marshall advised the
police that Stigile was actively involved in the street level sale of heroin/fentanyl. 13
On July 22, 2022, the State filed an information against the Defendant for Drug
Dealing for knowingly possessing with the intent to deliver heroin, a controlled
substance under Delaware law.14
On July 28, 2022, Stigile plead guilty to one count of Drug Dealing and two
counts of Burglary in the Second Degree and was sentenced to eight years at Level
5, suspended after two years at Level 5 for one year at Level 3 with respect to both
counts of Burglary in the Second Degree and eight years at Level 5, suspended after
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
D.I.2. 3.
3
one year at Level 5 for one year at Level 3 with respect to Drug Dealing.15 As part
of the plea agreement, the State enter a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges.16
On September 20, 2022, Stigile filed a notice of appeal of his sentence to the
Delaware Supreme Court.17 The appeal, however, was untimely as it should have
been filed on or before August 29, 2022.18 Stigile asserted the delay in filing his
appeal was due to his being placed on quarantine for COVID-19 after sentencing
and his lack of access to the law library.19 He also requested an extension of time to
file his appeal but sent the request to the Superior Court instead of the Supreme Court
in error.20
At the request of the Supreme Court, defense counsel responded to Stigile’s
contentions and stated that he had met with Stigile via Zoom the day before he pled
guilty and advised him that he needed to notify counsel within thirty days if he
wished to appeal his sentence.21 Stigile failed to do so.22 Having failed to
demonstrate that his failure to file a timely appeal was attributable to court-related
personnel, the Supreme Court dismissed Stigile’s appeal on December 2, 2022.23
15
D.I. 43 (Transcript of July 28, 2022 Guilty Plea Colloquy and sentencing proceedings).
16
D.I. 43 (See fully executed Plea Agreement with Brian M. Stigile, dated July 27, 2022).
17
Stigle v. State, 288 A.3d 690 (TABLE), 2022 WL 17410095 (Del. Dec. 2, 2022).
18
Id.; see also D.I. 47.
19
Id.20
Id.21
Id.22
Id.23
Id.4
MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
On June 26, 2023, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief
and Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to which he asserts five claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.24 Those claims can be fairly summarized as
follows:
Claim 1 – defense counsel inappropriately bargained for resolution of the
Drug Dealing charge (case number 2205013206) with the Burglary charges (case
number 2001020200) in the plea negotiations despite the Defendant informing
counsel that he was not guilty of the Drug Dealing charge and wished to proceed to
trial on that charge;
Claim 2 – defense counsel displayed prejudice towards the Defendant and
coerced him into pleading guilty by stating “nobody likes a thief”;
Claim 3 – defense counsel caused the Defendant to perjure himself by having
him confess to Drug Dealing when he was innocent of that charge;
Claim 4 – defense counsel failed to inform the Defendant of his right to appeal
his sentence; and
24
D.I. 34-35. The Court denied Stigile’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel on October 13, 2023.
See D.I. 41.
5
Claim 5 – defense counsel and the prosecution conspired and coerced the
Defendant into pleading guilty by taking advantage of his alleged learning
disability.25
APPLICABLE LAW FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
Before addressing the merits of a postconviction relief claim, the Court must
determine whether there are any procedural bars to the motion.26 Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) establishes four procedural bars to postconviction
relief. Rule 61(i)(1) requires a postconviction motion to be filed no later than one
year after the judgment of conviction is final.27 Rule 61(i)(2) provides that any
second or subsequent postconviction motion must be summarily dismissed unless
the movant was convicted after trial and he pleads with particularity that new
evidence exists demonstrating his actual innocence or a new, retroactive rule of
Constitutional law applies to his case such that it would render his conviction
invalid.28 Rule 61(i)(3) bars any ground for relief that was not asserted by the movant
in the proceedings leading to the conviction, unless he can show cause for relief from
the procedural default and demonstrate prejudice from violation of the movant’s
25
D.I. 34.
26
Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148 150 (Del.1996). All references to the rule are to the rule in place
at time the Defendant filed his motion for postconviction relief. See Bradley v. State,135 A.3d, 757n.24 (Del. 2016).
27
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (i)(1).
28
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (d)(2).
6
rights.29 And, Rule 61(i)(4) prohibits a movant from raising any ground for relief
that has previously been formally adjudicated in earlier proceedings.30
This is the Defendant’s first motion for Motion for Postconviction Relief and
it was timely filed on June 26, 2023. No other procedural bars prevent the Court
from considering Stigile’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the merits.
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Defendant must
meet the two-pronged Strickland test31 by showing that: (1) counsel performed at a
level ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness’32 and that, (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant.33 To meet the requirements of the first prong,
a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that defense counsel was
not reasonably competent. The second prong requires a defendant to show “that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for the defense counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.”34
A mere allegation is not enough to satisfy these requirements. A defendant must
29
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (i)(3).
30
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (i)(4).
31
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984).
32
Id. at 688.
33
Id. at 694.
34
Id. at 694.
7
indicate faults counsel made that were far removed from reasonable, leading to an
outcome that was measurably worse for the Defendant.35
In the context of a plea challenge, it is not sufficient for the defendant to claim
simply that his counsel was deficient. The defendant must also establish that
counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that there was a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficiencies, the defendant would not have taken a plea but would have
insisted on going to trial.36 For the reasons set forth below, all of the claims raised
in the Motion for Postconviction Relief were waived upon the entry of Defendant’s
guilty plea and are also without merit.
Stigile’s Claims Were Waived Upon the Entry of His Guilty Plea
A defendant is bound by his answers on the guilty plea form and by his
testimony at the plea colloquy in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.37 In the subject action, the Plea Agreement, plea colloquy, and Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form indicate that Stigile knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently entered a guilty plea.38
During the guilty plea colloquy, the Defendant provided sworn testimony that
(1) he reviewed each of the Waiver of Indictment, Plea Agreement, Immediate
35
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
36
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Hickman v. State, 1994 WL 590495(Del.) (applying Strickland to guilty pleas).
37
State v. Harden, 1998 WL 735879, *5 (Del. Super.); State v. Stuart, 2008 WL 4868658, *3 (Del.
Super. 2008).
38
D.I. 43.
8
Sentencing Form, and the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea, (2) he gave his attorney
authority to sign the foregoing documents on his behalf, (3) his attorney addressed
any issues, questions, or concerns he had, and (4) he had not been threatened or
forced to plead guilty.39 Stigile further represented that he understood the
Constitutional rights he was giving up by entering the plea and admitted his guilt to
the three charges comprising the Plea Agreement.40 The Court thereafter found
Stigile’s plea to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.41
Stigile has not presented any clear, contrary evidence to call into question his
testimony at the plea colloquy or answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea
Form. Accordingly, Stigile’s valid guilty plea waived his right to challenge any
alleged errors, deficiencies or defects occurring prior to the entry of his plea, even
those of constitutional proportions.42 Although the query could conclude at this
point, the Court will, nonetheless, address Stigile’s individual claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
39
D.I. 43 (pgs. 8-12).
40
D.I. 43 (pgs. 12-14).
41
D.I. 43 (pg. 14).
42
Smith v. State, 841 A.2d 308 (TABLE), 2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004); Somerville
v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997); Modjica v. State, 2009 WL 2426675 (Del. 2009); Miller
v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2004).
9
Claim I: Resolving Charges from Two Cases in One Plea Agreement
The Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting
to the inclusion of the Drug Dealing charge as part of the Plea Agreement.43 Contrary
to Stigile’s assertion, however, defense counsel could not have simply “informed the
prosecution to strike the [Drug Dealing] charge from the plea agreement . . .” 44
Rather, only the State is permitted to generate plea deals and is the only actor with
authority to offer them. Had defense counsel rejected the proposed global plea offer,
the State would have had no obligation to offer a different plea under the terms the
Defendant was suggesting.45
Moreover, the Defendant has failed to establish how he was prejudiced by the
global plea deal or otherwise demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been more beneficial to him had he rejected the global plea offer. The
Defendant was sentenced to eight years at Level 5, suspended after two years with
respect to both counts of Burglary in the Second Degree and eight years at Level 5,
suspended after one year with respect to the sole count of Drug Dealing. With the
sentences running consecutively, Stigile was facing a total of five years of Level V
time.46 Whereas, all the crimes charged in case number 2001020200 alone carried
43
D.I. 34 at 3.
44
D.I. 34 at 7.
45
See D.I. 34 at 3 (“The Defendant informed Veith that he would plead guilty to two counts of
Burglary in criminal case N 2205013206”).
46
D.I. 43 at 5.
10
potential maximum sentences of more than third-nine years at Level V.47 When
coupled with the Drug Dealing charge in case number 220501320, which carried the
possibility of another eight years at Level V, the Defendant was facing a potential
sentence of more than forty-seven years at Level V if convicted of all charges.
And, had Stigile rejected the State’s global plea, the alternative of going to
trial would have likely produced a much less favorable result for him as the
probability of his being convicted in both cases was exceedingly high. As defense
counsel discussed with Stigile in advance of the guilty plea, the evidence of
Defendant’s guilt in both felony cases against him was overwhelming.48 It included
two post-Miranda statements from his girlfriend implicating him in both cases as
well as substantial circumstantial evidence.49 With respect to the burglary charges,
the Defendant and his car were seen in the vicinity of the burglaries and he was found
to have pawned many items identified as stolen shortly after they were taken. With
respect to the Drug Dealing charge, a large quantity of illegal narcotics and cash
were found in his residence amongst his personal papers.
47
Each of the three counts of Burglary in the Second Degree carried a potential sentence of up to
8 years at Level V; Felony Theft from a Victim 62 Years or Older carried a potential sentence of
up to 3 years at Level V; each of the two counts of Felony Theft carried a potential sentence of up
to 2 years at Level V; each of the three counts of Conspiracy Second Degree carried a potential
sentence of up to 2 years at Level V; each of the two counts of Selling Stolen Property carried a
sentence of up to 1 year at Level V; and each of the two counts of Criminal Mischief carried a
potential sentence of up to 30 days at Level V. See D.I. 45 at 4.
48
D.I. 42.
49
Id.; See Hoey v. State, 689 A. 2d 1177, 1181 (Del. 1997) (finding that evidence of a defendant’s
constructive possession may be proven exclusively through circumstantial evidence).
11
Likewise, had the Defendant been convicted of the burglary charges in case
number 2001020200, the State was prepared to petition the Court to have him
sentenced as a habitual offender as he had multiple prior felony burglaries when
arrested.50 Had the State’s petition been granted, even if the Defendant were
convicted of only one count of Second Degree Burglary, the Defendant could have
been sentenced to up to twenty-four years at Level V supervision without the
possibility for parole as a habitual offender.51
Based on the weight of evidence against the Defendant and the potential
sentences he was facing, it was objectively reasonable for defense counsel to
conclude that a global plea was the most prudent defense strategy in this case. “If
an attorney makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options’ that decision is ‘virtually unchallengeable’ . . .”52 In
view of the totality of the circumstances, defense counsel’s representation of Stigile
was effective in securing a plea deal which inured to his benefit. The Defendant has
failed to show how “striking” the Drug Dealing charges from the plea agreement
would have resulted in his receiving a lesser sentence. Nor has he shown that there
was a reasonable probability that he would not have taken the global plea but would
50
D.I. 42.
51
11 Del. C. §§ 4212 (d), (e).
52
Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 840, 852 (Del. Super. 2013) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 690-91 (1984).
12
have insisted on going to trial when considering all the facts and circumstances. As
such, the Defendant’s first claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is without
merit.
Claim 2: Coercion by Defense Counsel
Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective because he displayed
prejudice towards him and coerced him into taking the plea.53 Specifically, Stigile
alleges that defense counsel, when discussing his options, threatened him by saying
“nobody likes a thief” and this alleged statement forced Stigile into accepting the
plea agreement.54
For his part, defense counsel does not recall making such a statement.55
However, even if trial counsel had stated that “nobody likes a thief,” such a statement
would not be tantamount to coercion. Rather, the statement appears to reflect
defense counsel’s assessment of the potential effect that Stigile’s prior burglary
convictions would likely have on a jury if presented as impeachment evidence at
trial.56 And, if Stigile’s prior convictions were coupled with the overwhelming
evidence against him in, it further increases the likelihood that a jury would have
convicted him.
53
D.I. 34.
54
Id.55
D.I. 42.
56
See D.I. 42 at 2 (stating that “this was probably stated to make a point that a jury may not be
very sympathetic to someone who is alleged to be committing day-time residential burglaries.)
13
Moreover, the Defendant did not complain of coercion during his plea
colloquy.57 Instead, Stigile expressly denied that anybody had threatened or forced
him into pleading guilty.58 That statement was made under oath and the Court found
his plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In light of the foregoing, the Court
finds Defendant’s second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
coercion to be without merit.
Claim 3: Coerced Perjury Caused by Defense Counsel
Like his second claim, the Defendant also argues defense counsel caused him
to perjure himself by having him confess to Drug Dealing when he was innocent of
that charge.59 Stigile claims that he expressed his innocence to his counsel and his
desire to stand trial for that specific charge, but counsel failed to follow his wishes
in that regard.60
In his affidavit, counsel acknowledged that Stigile expressed hesitancy about
pleading guilty to Drug Dealing but denies forcing or coercing him to take the plea.61
Rather, counsel states that he only advised Stigile of the pros and cons of his case
and the plea offer in light of the evidence against him.62 The Court finds this
statement to be credible and consistent with good criminal defense practice.
57
D.I. 43.
58
Id.59
D.I. 34.
60
Id.61
D.I. 42.
62
Id.14
Moreover, the record does not support Stigile’s assertion that he perjured
himself in pleading guilty to Drug Dealing. The evidence in case number
2205013206 was substantial and included, among other things, (i) a safe located in
the Defendant’s bedroom which contained 221 bags of heroin/fentanyl packaged for
retail sale accompanied by paperwork with the Defendant’s name and (ii) a post-
Miranda statement by his co-defendant girlfriend indicating that the Defendant was
involved in the street-level sale of heroin/fentanyl. Again, had the Defendant
proceeded to trial on the Drug Dealing charge based on this evidence, there is a
strong likelihood that he would have been convicted and facing a sentence of up to
eight years at Level V for this conviction alone. A global plea for a total of five years
at Level V is a far better outcome for the Defendant.
And, as previously mentioned, the Defendant is bound by his sworn testimony
during the plea colloquy. For these reasons, the Court finds the Defendant’s third
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be without merit.
Claim 4: Failure to Inform the Defendant Regarding His Right to Appeal
Stigile asserts that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise
him of the deadline to file an appeal of his sentence.63 This claim is without merit
because it contradicts the statements and arguments Stigile raised to the Delaware
Supreme Court when attempting to justify his untimely appeal.
63
D.I. 34.
15
In his response to the notice to show case, Stigile stated that the reasons for
the delay in filing his appeal were due to his (i) being quarantined for COVID-19
post-sentencing, (ii) limited access to the law library, and (iii) initially filing his
request for an extension to the wrong court.64 He raised no argument that his defense
counsel neglected to inform him of the deadline to file an appeal at that time.65
Defense counsel, on the other hand, stated that when he met with Stigile to complete
the guilty plea paperwork he advised him that he needed to notify counsel’s office
within thirty days of sentencing if he wished to appeal.66
Based on his actions, Stigile was clearly aware that there was a deadline for
filing his appeal with the Supreme Court since he sought an extension, albeit with
the wrong court. Given his actions and previous statements to the Supreme Court, a
claim at this juncture that his counsel never informed him of the filing deadline is
not credible. The Court finds Defendant’s fourth claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel to also without merit.
Claim 5: Collusion and Coercion Due to Defendant’s Alleged Disability
The Defendant’s final claim of ineffective assistance of counsel concerns his
alleged learning disability.67 Stigile asserts that his defense counsel and the State
64
D.I. 47; Stigle v. State, 288 A.3d 690 (TABLE), 2022 WL 17410095 (Del. Dec. 2, 2022) at 2.
65
Cƒ. D.I. 34.
66
D.I. 47.
67
D.I. 34.
16
colluded to exploit his learning disability by threatening him with lengthy
imprisonment to coerce him into taking a plea.68 He further claims that the “Court’s
colloquy was insufficient to evaluate the disability, and to uncover why the
Defendant was pleading guilty to [Drug Dealing] when that charge was not before
the Court . . .”69
However, the Defendant never explains in his motion the nature of his alleged
disability and only describes it as “[a] disability that is obvious by just looking and
talking with the Defendant.”70 But the record suggests that is not the case. Counsel
states that he did not have any difficulty in discussing the plea with Stigile and that
the Defendant answered all the questions on the plea documents appropriately.71
Likewise, the Court conducted the standard plea colloquy with Stigile and found no
issue with the Defendant’s responses. Nor did Stigile mention that he had any type
of learning disability during the plea colloquy at any point.72 The Court is not
obligated to evaluate a disability that was never mentioned or is not readily apparent.
Nor was the Court required to question why the Defendant was pleading guilty to
the charges set forth in his signed plea agreement as the Defendant asserts.73
68
Id.69
D.I. 34.
70
Id. at 6.
71
D.I. 42.
72
D.I. 43.
73
D.I. 34
17
Nor does the record reflect that defense counsel and the prosecution were
conspiring and threatening Stigile with a lengthy sentence if he did not take the plea.
Any purported statements made regarding the potential prison time the Defendant
was facing if convicted of all or only a portion of the charges he was indicted for
accurately reflected Defendant’s circumstances.74 The Defendant’s options were
straight forward – either take the global plea and serve five years at Level V or risk
a far lengthier prison sentence if convicted of only a fraction of the indicted charges.
Having failed to explain the nature of his alleged learning disability or the
manner in which it effected his guilty plea, the Court cannot find any prejudice to
the Defendant for counsel’s failure to bring this unknown disability to the Court’s
attention. Therefore, the Court also finds Defendant’s fifth claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel to be meritless.
74
Skyes v. State, 2012 1413958, at *5 (stating that “it is entirely appropriate for Defendant’s
counsel to explain that if the offered plea was rejected, Defendant was unlikely to be successful at
trial and could receive a possible life sentence”).
18
CONCLUSION
After a thorough evaluation of the record, the Court concludes that the claims
set forth in Stigile’s Motion for Postconviction Relief are without merit and should
be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
_____________________________
The Honorable Janine M. Salomone
19