State v. Mariney ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. ) ID Nos. 2008012017
) 2204003380
TARIQ MARINEY, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER DENYING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
INTRODUCTION
On April 26, 2023, Tariq Mariney moved this Court for postconviction relief
(“Motion”) from his June 21, 2022 convictions for Possession of a Firearm by a
Person Prohibited and Drug Dealing.1 Mariney argues he is entitled to relief under
Superior Criminal Court Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) because his December 20, 2021
suppression motion was improperly denied.2 This Court concludes Mariney’s
Motion lacks merit and must be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Probation is an act of grace3 through which a convicted criminal offender,
sentenced to Level V incarceration, is permitted to remain at liberty under the
1
See Docket Item (“D.I.”) 27, 32, 37 in Case ID. Nos. 2008012017/ The facts in this decision
reflect the record developed at the May 18, 2022 suppression hearing. D.I. 34. Citations to the
hearing transcript are in the form “Tr. #.”
2
See D.I. 14, 37.
3
Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006).
1
supervision and rules of the Office of Probation and Parole (“P&P”). Mariney broke
these rules. Despite being subject to intensive supervision, Mariney tested positive
for cocaine and marijuana on several urine screens and provided the wrong home
address to P&P.4 Operation Safe Streets conducts home visits for probationers who
are noncompliant with supervision.5
On the morning of August 25, 2020, probation officer Kevin McClure led a
nine-man Operation Safe Streets Team (“OSS Team”) to conduct a routine curfew
check at 606 North Washington Street, Apartment 2, in Wilmington, Delaware.6
4
Tr. 13:8–18, 14:9–15:8.
5
Id. at. 12:15–20, 69:6–11. The purpose of the visit was to ensure Mariney’s compliance with
conditions of his supervision because of his prior history. Tr. 64:10–14.
OSS is a local crime-reduction initiative, Department of Community Corrections assists
Wilmington police officers in conducting “home visits . . . community contacts, curfew checks,
contacting offenders involved in suspicious activities or violating conditions of supervision,
arresting them when necessary, and doing searches when appropriate.” Id. 5:16–6:18. McClure
testified that “one of the assignments or mandates, if you will, of Safe Streets is we are assigned
to people that are . . . classified high risk based upon curfew or . . . the fact that they’re on intensive
supervision. So it doesn’t necessarily have to be the probation officer assigned to that person to go
out and contact them.” Id. 10:22–11:11.
McClure further explained that Department of Correction Procedure (“DCP”) 7.3 provides
the purpose of home visits is: “[t]o verify the residence, that the person is actually living there[;]”
making a “collateral contact” in the event “you can’t contact the offender in case of an
emergency[;]” to “view the home environment that they’re in” to enforce no-contact orders and
“gather who’s living there[;] . . . to understand the layout of the house . . . for future home visits[;]”
and to “ensure compliance with the supervision conditions that were assigned to that person.” Id.9:14–10:17.
6
Id. 12:15–20. Nine OSS members executed the home visit: probation officers McClure, Collins,
Scioli, and Phelps and police officers Evans, McNamara, Nolan, Wiggins, and Rosaio; each were
assigned individual responsibilities—probation officers were properly trained to do the searching,
and police officers provided security and secured the evidence seized. Id. 29:10–18, 34:14–35:3.
Conducting a home visit requires a minimum of two team members; they typically “ride four . . .
or three deep.” Id.. 65:19–66:2.
2
Mariney, who had been celebrating his birthday the night before, awoke to loud
knocks at his door.7 The OSS Team spotted a man peeking through a window and
Officer McClure motioned and asked to him to come to the door.8 Mariney asked,
“[W]ho’s there[?]”9 Officer McClure identified himself and Mariney replied he
needed to get dressed.10 Moments later, Mariney opened the door wide—which the
OSS Team understood as an invitation to enter the premises.11 Mariney was wearing
shorts but no shirt.12 His mouth was caked with a white substance resembling
cocaine.13 Aside from Mariney’s disheveled look, delay in answering the door, and
the white substance on his mouth, there were other red flags.
7
Mariney submits he was “pretty intoxicated” from celebrating his birthday the day before the
home visit. Tr. 73:11–20.
8
Id. 15:12–16:4. But see id. 70:22–71:3 (Mariney denies peeking through the window).
9
Id. 15:15–17. This Court gave little credibility to Mariney’s testimony regarding his surprise
when he opened the door to eight officers who purportedly bum-rushed their way into his home
and immediately put him in handcuffs as they searched the apartment. Id. 69:20–70. See Tr. 36:3–
37:19 (the OSS Team was easily identifiable as law enforcement officers because they were
wearing tactical vests and badges), Id. 17:13–18:1 (McClure testified: “It’s odd that you would ask
. . . who’s there when you’ve looked out the window and you’ve seen uniformed law enforcement
officers there. I mean . . . you know who’s there. So that raises a flag for me, number one. I guess
number two, it is odd when you say you’re getting dressed and then you just come to the door and
you just have a pair of shorts on. . . . It’s just in my experience people that delay coming to the
door, it’s usually because they’re trying to hide things.”). Moreover, Mariney was on Level III
probation in August 2020, requiring Mariney to allow officers into his home to conduct a home
visit. Id.. 74:4–8.
10
Id. 15:18–21.
11
Id. 16:14–17:7, 49:11–50:11, 69:13–20.
12
Id. 17:18–21, 69:15–17.
13
Id. 50:1–8
3
The second-story apartment was modest—it had a living room, galley kitchen,
long hallway, and one bed and bath.14 Upon entry, the OSS Team immediately
noticed contraband and drug paraphernalia in plain view. 15 A hookah pipe was in
the living room.16 Ziploc baggies containing green vials commonly used to store
crack cocaine rested in a little cart next to the kitchen.17 A marijuana blunt balanced
on an ashtray.18 A razor blade and a small-cut straw were perched on the
microwave—a white substance blotched the razor blade, indicative of drug use.19
Because of the visible contraband and drug paraphernalia in plain view, the
OSS Team detained Mariney.20 Upon learning there were other occupants in the
14
Id. 19:7–13, 56:16–21.
15
Id. 18:15–17, Tr. 19:7–13, 56:16–21.
16
Id. . 18:20–19:7, 47:12–20 (McClure explained that “a hookah pipe is . . . a water pipe . . . used
to smoke shisha or flavored tobacco, but you can also smoke marijuana out of it. They call it dirty
hookah.”), 19:19–20:4 (the clear plastic baggies “had what they call on the street ‘trash cans’, but
they’re little vials that you open, they’re tiny, and you store drugs in them. Mostly it’s crack
cocaine.”) (internal quotations added), Tr. 51:1–16 (the plastic baggies containing the vials were
in a little cart protruding next to the kitchen).
17
Id. 18:20–19:7, 47:12–20 (McClure explained that “a hookah pipe is . . . a water pipe . . . used
to smoke shisha or flavored tobacco, but you can also smoke marijuana out of it. They call it dirty
hookah.”), 19:19–20:4 (the clear plastic baggies “had what they call on the street ‘trash cans’, but
they’re little vials that you open, they’re tiny, and you store drugs in them. Mostly it’s crack
cocaine.”) (internal quotations added), Tr. 51:1–16 (the plastic baggies containing the vials were
in a little cart protruding next to the kitchen).
18
Id. 21:7–9, 23:4–18 (Mariney t’s probation had several conditions: he was not to consume of
possess any controlled substances or dangerous drugs unless prescribed lawfully, and he was
subject to random testing as directed by his supervising officer). Mariney submits he smoked
marijuana the day before the search. Tr. 73:20–74:3.
19
Id. 20:10–18, 51:22–52:12 (McClure avers that “people either use [the razor blade and small-
cut straw] for . . . cocaine; or if they’re snorting pills, they’ll cut pills as well too.”).
20
Id. 23:19–21, 47:1–16.
4
apartment, the OSS Team also brought Mariney’s girlfriend, Kyssa Allen, who was
holding their baby, into the living room.21
Officer McClure contacted his direct supervisor, Carlos Pini, to get approval
for a search warrant.22 Pini approved the search because of the drug paraphernalia in
plain view and Mariney’s pending violations of probation for missed curfews and
multiple positive urine screens.23
During a subsequent search of the bedroom, pursuant to the warrant, Officer
McClure noticed a blue Nike fanny pack partially sticking out from underneath a
dresser drawer.24 Inside the fanny pack was a loaded 9-mm Jiminez handgun, with a
round in the chamber.25 Mariney’s ID was on the bedroom bureau.26 The OSS Team
took Mariney’s ID, cell phone, razor blade, drug baggies, and fanny pack containing
21
Id. 20:7–9, 45:15–46:20.
22
Id. 23:21–24:17. McClure testified that he held a telephonic conference with his supervisor to
discuss whether there was sufficient reason to believe Mariney was in possession of contraband
thus violating probation, whether the information from the confidential informant (“CI”) was
corroborated, and approval for the search. Tr. 23:21–24:10. McClure further testified that
“normally . . . if you had information that you were going to go out and actually do a search, it
would be a different procedure where you would be sitting in an office and you’d be having a
discussion face to face. This was a home visit. There was not a search that we knew was going to
happen, so it was a telephonic conference.” Tr. 25:16–23.
23
Id. 26:12–27:23, 40:21–41:6, 41:12–42:8 (the OSS Team was following up on Mariney because
he had an “outstanding offensive touching charge” and “issues as far as not being home for
curfew”).
24
Id. 54:2–12.
25
Id. 32:19–23 (it was loaded with 11 rounds including the round in the chamber), 55:12–23.
26
Id. 45:5–9.
5
the handgun into evidence.27 Because the owner of the handgun was unclear, they
detained both Mariney and Allen.28
The State indicted Mariney on one count of Possession of a Firearm by a
Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), one count of Possession of Ammunition by a Person
Prohibited (“PABPP”), and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.29
Mariney was later reindicted to add additional charges against him.30
Mariney moved to suppress all evidence from the search of his apartment,
including the drugs, paraphernalia, and DNA evidence, and inculpatory statements
he made during his arrest and interrogation.31 Prior to the suppression hearing,
Mariney who remained at liberty, was arrested a second time on April 8, 2022 and
charged with two counts of Drug Dealing, one count of Conspiracy in the Second
Degree, one count of Endangering the Welfare of a Child and one count of
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.
On May 19, 2022 hearing, following a hearing, this Court denied suppression
because the home visit by the OSS Team was permissible to ensure Mariney’s
27
Id. 56:23–57:8.
28
Id. 57:8–58:3.
29
D.I. 2.
30
D.I. 7.
31
See D.I. 14.
6
compliance with probation and to verify his residence; OSS procedures were
properly followed; and the search was constitutional.32
On June 21, 2022, Mariney pled guilty to one count of PFBPP in Case No.
2008012017 and one count of Drug Dealing in Case No. 2204003380.33 At the same
hearing, Mariney was sentenced to 15 years at Level V followed by lesser levels of
incarceration and probation.34
Following the plea and sentencing hearing, on August 31, 2022, Mariney
moved pro se to modify/reduce his sentence based on ineffective assistance of
counsel.35 This Court denied the motion to modify/reduce his sentence on November
29, 2022, reasoning that by entering into a plea agreement, Mariney understood the
statutory penalty of a mandatory minimum of 10 years for PFBPP.36 Mariney did
not take a direct appeal.
On April 26, 2023, Mariney moved this Court for postconviction relief and
appointment of counsel.37 Mariney contends his plea agreement was the product of
32
Tr. 102:10–104:2,
33
D.I. 32, D.I. 46 at A234 (“. Mariney agrees he is a[] habitual offender and therefore subject to
sentencing pursuant to 11. Del. C. § 4214(c) [sic]. Although eligible to be sentenced as a habitual
offender . . . by accepting this plea the State agrees to not file the habitual offender petition.”).
34
D.I. 33.
35
D.I. 35.
36
D.I. 36.
37
D.I. 37–38.
7
unreasonable search and seizure.38 In November 2023, this Court appointed Ben
Gifford (“Postconviction Counsel”) to represent Mariney.39 On April 15, 2024,
Postconviction Counsel moved to withdraw as counsel under Rule 61(e)(6).40 On
May 8, 2024, Mariney responded to Postconviction Counsel’s withdrawal motion
rearguing issues already decided at the suppression hearing..41 Trial Counsel
responded to Mariney’s Motion later that month.42
DISCUSSION
Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 provides incarcerated individuals
a chance to seek redress from a prior sentence of this Court by “setting aside a
judgment of conviction” because this Court “lacked jurisdiction to enter the
judgment or on any other ground that is a sufficient factual and legal basis for a
collateral attack upon a criminal conviction.”43
To make this determination, this Court must consider procedural bars to relief
before reaching the merits of any such claims: (1) the motion must be filed within
one year after the finality of a conviction or a retroactive right; (2) repetitive motions
38
D.I. 37.
39
D.I. 41.
40
D.I. 45, 46.
41
D.I. 47.
42
D.I. 48.
43
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
8
are prohibited unless certain requirements are met; (3) issues not raised before
conviction are deemed waived unless cause or prejudice is shown; and (4) claims
already finally adjudicated on the merits are precluded.44
Defendant seeks postconviction relief for “conduct that the lawyer knows to
be illegal or fraudulent.”45 This is Defendant’s first postconviction relief motion and
it is timely, but his claim has already been decided on its merits; thus, it is precluded
from being re-heard because it has already been adjudicated on the merits. Indeed,
Defendant’s claim ineffective assistance of counsel appears to be a rehashing of his
motion to suppress rather than a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because
the motion to suppress was already decided at the suppression hearing, Defendant’s
claim for postconviction relief is precluded from being heard on its merits. And even
if Defendant clears that procedural bar, he still loses on the merits.
The Motion again challenges the reasonableness of the search and seizure that
led to his conviction. Mariney argues the probation officers acted outside the scope
of their duties. Put differently, was the evidence seized from Mariney’s residence
fruit of the poisonous tree? This issue sounds familiar because it has already been
raised, argued, and decided. The instant Motion argued that 11 Del. C. § 4321 is
unambiguous and limits a probation officer’s search to the person, not their home.
44
Id. at (i)(1–4)
45
D.I. 36.
9
Delaware courts have consistently recognized the authority of probation
officers to search individuals’ homes under 11 Del. C. § 4321 and Parole and
Probation Procedures 7.19 and 7.3. Subsection 4321(d) provides that probation
officers may direct searches of individuals on probation—particularly offenders.46
Procedure 7.19 explains that probation officers should undergo a conference with
their supervisor before conducting a search for exigent circumstances.47 Procedure
7.3 states that probation officers may organize a home visit to monitor compliance
with the conditions of supervision or to verify their residence, among other things.48
46
11 Del. C. § 4321(d) (“Probation and parole officers shall exercise the same powers as constables
under the laws of this State and may conduct searches of individuals under probation and parole
supervision in accordance with Department procedures while in the performance of the lawful
duties of their employment and shall execute lawful orders, warrants, and other process as directed
to the officer by any court, judge or Board of Parole of this State[.]”
47
Del. Dep’t of Corr. Bureau of Cmty. Corrs. Prob. & Parole Proc. (“Procedure”) No. 7.19
(explaining that an arrest-search checklist is “a form used to facilitate a case conference between
the Officer, who is seeking an arrest or search action and his immediate Supervisor[,]” which
“contains the following sections: Arrest Decision Factors, Arrest Strategy, Decision to Search, and
Search Strategy[;]” and exigent circumstances exist when “unexpected or urgent event which did
not allow an opportunity for prior planning, and which requires immediate action to achieve a
successful resolution”); D.I. 14 at Ex. D. See also Walker v. State, 205 A.3d 823, 824–25
(“Procedure 7.19 requires the following: The officer and supervisor will hold a case conference. .
. . During the case conference the supervisor will review the ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ responses of the officer
to the following search decision factors: (1) Sufficient reason to believe the offender possess
contraband[;] (2) Sufficient reason to believe the offender is in violation of probation[;] (3)
Information from a reliable informant, indicating offender possesses contraband or is violating the
law[;] and (4) Information from the informant is corroborated.”) (citing Culver v. State, 956 A.2d
5, 10 (Del. 2008)). See also State v. Groce, 2024 WL 1463417, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 4, 2024)
(denying a motion to suppress where the search of the defendant’s home was authorized by
Subsection 4321(d)).
48
Procedure No. 7.3(H)(2)(a–i) (“The purpose of a home visit is to: verify the offender’s residence;
observe the home environment; identify the interpersonal relationships of residents; identify any
relationships not permitted; meet the residents of the home and explain why the home visit is
necessary; solicit the residents support for the offender; establish a collateral contact, if possible;
10
This Court’s recent holding in State v. Young is instructive.49 There, the
defendant, who was on Level III probation, was detained for violating curfew.50 An
approved administrative search of his home revealed large amounts of drugs,
paraphernalia, and cash.51 Following indictment, the Mariney moved to suppress the
evidence found at his residence, arguing that Subsection 4321(d) unambiguously
limited warrantless searches to individuals.52 This Court reasoned that Subsection
4321(d) was ambiguous, but denied the motion to suppress, following Delaware
precedent which establishes that “searches of individuals” includes “probationer’s
homes as well as their persons.”53 Likewise, in State v. Swiggett, this Court denied a
get familiar with the layout of the house and the neighborhood for future visits; and monitor
compliance with the conditions of supervision and sentencing order.”); D.I. 14 at Ex. C.
49
314 A.3d 688, 691 (Del. Super. 2024).
50
State v. Young, 314 A.3d 688, 691 (Del. Super. 2024).
51
Id.52
Id.53
Id. at 691– (“Subsection 4321(d) is ambiguous because there are two reasonable, but divergent,
interpretations of its plain language. After reviewing the pertinent legislative history for House
Bill 524, the Court finds that the legislature’s intent was for ‘searches of individuals’ to include
probationer’s homes as well as their persons. This finding is further buttressed by the legal
principle of stare decisis. . . . [B]ecause Procedure 7.19 authorizes warrantless searches of
probationers’ homes and vehicles as well as their persons, the statutory language authorizes such
searches. . . . [D]uring the deliberations, no member of the House expressed an opinion or belief
that the practice of searching probationers’ homes was unconstitutional, nor is there any evidence
to that effect was ever provided to the full chamber. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has judicially
construed Subsection 4321(d) to authorize searches of probationers’ homes . . . [and] there has
been no amendment or material change to Subsection 4321(d) since its enactment in 1990. . . .
[W]hile the General Assembly has been provided the opportunity to consider modifications to
Subsection 4321(d) as it has considered, and enacted, other changes to Section 4321 as a whole, it
has chosen not to do so, thus indicating its acquiescence in the long-standing judicial and
administrative interpretation of the provision.”) (citing State v. Barnes, 116 A.3d 883 (Del. 2015))
(citations omitted). See also Walker v. State, 205 A.3d 823, 826 (Del. 2019) (reversing the lower
11
motion to suppress where the seized evidence was in plain view during a home
visit.54 There, during a walk-through of the defendant’s residence, probation officers
observed and confiscated drug baggies in an uncovered trashcan on the defendant’s
balcony.55 Following indictment, the defendant moved to suppress such evidence.56
This Court denied the suppression motion, holding that “the walk-through permits a
probation officer to observe anything in plain view; such as contraband lying on a
table, pornography on a computer screen, a gun hanging on the wall, or other
reasonable grounds.”57
Here, the record evinces the OSS Team followed proper procedures. Mariney
compelled a home visit by repeatedly violating conditions of his probation. He
invited the OSS Team into his home and paraphernalia and drugs were in plain view,
which raised probable cause to execute an administrative search. McClure contacted
his direct supervisor, and they considered the administrative arrest-search checklist
before Pini granted the search. Following his indictment, Mariney had full
opportunity to challenge the prosecution. Mariney’s claim that Trial Counsel “did
court’s denial of a motion to suppress in a violation of probation proceeding where “there was no
attempt to comply with basic aspects of the probation procedures”); McAllister v. State, 3 A.3d
1098, 1098 (Del. 2010) (TABLE) (denying a postconviction relief claim where the administrative
search procedures were followed)
54
2019 WL 245292, at *3 (Del. Super. Jan. 15, 2019).
55
Id. at *1.
56
Id. at *2.
57
Id. at *3 (quoting Wallace v. State, 62 A.3d 1192, 1196 (Del. 2012)).
12
not put [the State’s] case through a[n] adve[rsar]ial test” is incorrect.58 This Court
held a suppression hearing during which both parties presented evidence, witness
testimony, and closing arguments.59 After this Court denied suppression, Mariney
voluntarily pled guilty. In short, Mariney’s claim for postconviction relief would
fail even if it were addressed on its merits. And if Mariney sought to reargue his
suppression motion, he should have appealed or continued to trial.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Mariney’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks both factual
and legal merit; thus, this Court denies his application for postconviction relief. This
Court recognizes Mariney’s disapproval concerning the length of his sentence, but
rejects Mariney’s claims that he entered the plea agreement unknowingly and
involuntarily. The Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form bearing Mariney’s
signature indicates the minimum penalty range as “10 years” and he “freely and
voluntarily” entered the guilty plea.60 Mariney understood his plea agreement and
his Motion merely rehashes suppression arguments already decided by this Court;
thus, it is procedurally barred from being heard on its merits.
58
D.I. 36.
59
See D.I. 34.
60
D.I. 32. Although no transcript for Mariney’s plea colloquy or sentencing exists, the record
provides sufficient evidence to tackle his claims.
13
This Court finds Trial Counsel was effective in his services. Mariney’s
Motion is, therefore, DENIED. Trial Counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
___/s/ Kathleen M. Vavala
The Honorable Kathleen M. Vavala
14