Sonny Boy Oats, Jr. v. State of Florida ( 2015 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC12-749
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SONNY BOY OATS, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[December 17, 2015]
PER CURIAM.
Sonny Boy Oats, Jr., appeals an order of the circuit court that denied his
motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203,1 in which he
claimed that he is intellectually disabled2 and thus cannot be sentenced to death. In
1. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of
death, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), of
the Florida Constitution.
2. The term originally used in these proceedings was “mentally retarded.”
This terminology was recently changed to “intellectually disabled,” as recognized
in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5), one of the basic texts used by psychiatrists and other experts. American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 33
(5th ed. 2013). Thus, both the Florida Statutes and the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure modified their relevant provisions to conform to the change in
light of developments in the law since Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), and
because the circuit court erred in its legal analysis regarding the onset of Oats’s
intellectual disability prior to the age of 18 and failed to consider all of the
evidence presented, we reverse and remand for a full reevaluation of whether Oats
is intellectually disabled.
Oats’s intelligence quotient (IQ) has never been in genuine dispute. Based
on numerous psychological tests, Oats’s IQ is between 54 and 67, well within the
range for an individual who has an intellectual disability. Up until the current
litigation, expert after expert consistently recognized that Oats has an intellectual
disability as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM)—a fact the State previously conceded in 1990 when litigating whether trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to present mental mitigation, including Oats’s
intellectual disability. Recent records from prison also show that the Florida
Department of Corrections is concerned that Oats may be intellectually disabled.
Despite this evidence, the circuit court denied finding Oats to be
intellectually disabled, on the basis that Oats was unable to establish that his
intellectual disability manifested before the age of 18—one of the three required
terminology. There is no difference in the meaning of these two terms.
Accordingly, throughout this opinion, we use the term “intellectually disabled.”
See also Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (using the new
terminology).
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prongs in Florida’s statutory test for determining an intellectual disability. See §
921.137, Fla. Stat. (2015). In support, the circuit court relied on the lack of a full
childhood IQ test, even though an initial screening test performed by Oats’s
elementary school showed that Oats’s IQ was 70—a score that likewise would be
within the range of IQ scores for a person who has an intellectual disability—and
even though Oats presented significant evidence of childhood difficulties and
injuries consistent with an individual with an intellectual disability.
Our decision to reverse is based on three reasons. First, in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hall, the circuit court’s order should
have addressed all three prongs of the intellectual disability test, rather than
denying the claim solely because Oats allegedly did not present sufficient evidence
to establish that his intellectual disability manifested before the age of 18. As the
United States Supreme Court has stated, “[i]t is not sound to view a single factor as
dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.
The United States Supreme Court’s most recent decision regarding intellectual
disability reaffirms Hall and provides further authority that all three prongs
generally must be considered in tandem. See Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269,
2278-82 (2015).
Second, the circuit court erroneously held that Oats failed to meet his burden
to establish his intellectual disability without even considering or weighing all of
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the testimony that Oats presented, including the evidence submitted in prior
postconviction proceedings from 1990 that both parties agreed was relevant and
should be considered. This error is of particular concern given that Oats presented
so much evidence of an intellectual disability during the 1990 proceedings that the
State actually acknowledged that there was “[n]o doubt” he was “in the mildly
mentally retarded area.”3
Third, the circuit court erroneously conflated the term “manifested” with
“diagnosed” and held that Oats failed to satisfy one of the necessary prongs of the
statutory test for intellectual disability because Oats was not diagnosed as a child,
even though the applicable Florida statute requires only that the intellectual
disability “manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” § 921.137(1),
Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Further, the circuit court relied exclusively on
testimony from a State expert witness that was based on a misreading of this
Court’s precedent in Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007)—a decision that
was subsequently disapproved by the Supreme Court in Hall.
We accordingly reverse the denial of Oats’s rule 3.203 motion and remand
to the circuit court to reconsider whether Oats is intellectually disabled. A remand
3. Even if not legally binding, we note that the State’s experienced Assistant
Attorney General also recognized during the current evidentiary hearing that
manifestation of an intellectual disability before age 18 was so clear that it was
“not really in play” in this case.
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of this proceeding is particularly necessary in light of the dispositive opinion in
Hall, in which the United States Supreme Court disapproved our opinion in Cherry
and provided additional guidance pertaining to the necessary showing under Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), for establishing ineligibility for the death penalty
as a result of an intellectual disability.
Based on further direction from the United States Supreme Court in Hall,
reaffirmed in Brumfield, courts must be guided by established medical practice and
psychiatric and professional studies that elaborate on the purpose and meaning of
each of the three prongs for determining an intellectual disability. See Hall, 134 S.
Ct. at 1993. In other words, in determining the definition of an intellectual
disability, the informed assessments of medical experts cannot be disregarded. Id.
at 2000. The experts review all three prongs together because determining
intellectual disability is a “conjunctive and interrelated assessment.” Id. at 2001.
FACTS
Sonny Boy Oats, Jr., was tried and convicted of the December 1979 robbery
of a convenience store and the first-degree murder of the store clerk. This Court
affirmed Oats’s conviction on direct appeal but held that the trial court erroneously
found three aggravating factors and remanded to the trial court for entry of a new
sentencing order. Oats v. State, 446 So. 2d 90, 95-96 (Fla. 1984). On remand, the
trial court reweighed the valid aggravators and reimposed the death penalty, a
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sentence that this Court then affirmed. Oats v. State, 472 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1985).
This Court later affirmed the denial of Oats’s initial motion for postconviction
relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Oats v. Dugger, 638 So.
2d 20 (Fla. 1994).
During the 1990 postconviction proceedings, Oats asserted that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present statutory and
nonstatutory mitigation evidence at the penalty phase based on an inadequate
investigation of the available mitigation, including evidence pertaining to Oats’s
intellectual disability. In addition, Oats alleged that he was resentenced when he
was incompetent. Numerous experts presented testimony regarding Oats’s
intellectual disability.
Dr. Robert Phillips testified that Oats “is a man of significantly substandard
intellectual capacity as a result of a degree of mental retardation that is well
documented in evaluations that have been performed by examiners of the State of
Florida and are certainly consistent with the findings of my examination and a
subsequent review of records.” He further discussed Oats’s “longstanding history
of maladaptive behavior to societal expectations which is not inconsistent with
individuals that we find to be mentally retarded.” Dr. Phillips concluded that Oats
“lacks the intellectual capacity to truly formulate with any degree of specificity
well-conceived and executed plans. He rather tends to act far more on impulse
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driven both by his emotion, sometimes overridden by the illicit substances which
he may have on board but, by in large [sic], it’s a moment-to-moment kind of
decision-making process.”
Dr. Joyce Carbonell testified that Oats “scores in the range that’s referred to
in general as mental deficiency. He is in the mildly mentally retarded range of
functioning. His scores place him in the lowest one percent of the population in
terms of his abilities, his intelligence compared to the rest of the population.” She
then opined that Oats’s full-scale IQ score was 61, his performance score was 62,
and his verbal score was 64. Further, Dr. Carbonell detailed how, based on reports
from Oats’s family and his school record, his social and medical history was
likewise consistent with possessing an intellectual disability. Oats failed to timely
reach numerous developmental milestones, including learning how to walk and
talk on time; poor performance in school, with decreasing performance as he aged;
and poor performance on an IQ screening test that was given during elementary
school. Moreover, he had “serious deficits in adaptive functioning,” was able to
communicate at only a very low level, and could read at only a third-grade level.
In addition, Oats was never able to maintain steady employment and always stayed
with family that could take care of him.
Dr. Frank Carrera, who had testified during the penalty phase, previously
evaluated Oats in 1980 to determine Oats’s sanity and competency for the original
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trial. While Dr. Carrera believed that Oats was competent, trial counsel never
requested Dr. Carrera to evaluate whether Oats had an intellectual disability or
whether any statutory mitigation applied. Dr. Carrera thereafter reviewed Dr.
Carbonell’s testing results and did not see any errors as to her findings that Oats
had an intellectual disability. Moreover, he opined that Oats’s IQ testing, which
reflected an IQ of 61, was consistent with what he observed.
The State then called Dr. Charles Mutter, who had been retained by the State
in the original trial proceedings to render an opinion as to several issues: (1)
whether Oats was competent to stand trial in February 1981; (2) whether Oats’s
waiver of his Miranda4 rights in 1979 was knowing and intelligent; and (3) whether
Dr. Carrera’s 1980 competency evaluation was sufficient. Dr. Mutter submitted a
joint report with Dr. Leonard Haber and concluded that Oats was competent. Dr.
Mutter noted that Oats had certain intellectual limits and impairments, but nothing
that would affect his competency. While Dr. Mutter was not asked to perform
testing as to whether Oats was intellectually disabled, Dr. Mutter later reviewed his
prior test results and his contact with Oats and opined at the 1990 evidentiary
hearing that Oats was “borderline to very mild retarded.” He further discussed that
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Oats had deficits in adaptive functioning and was unable to learn from past
experiences in certain circumstances.
Dr. Haber, who filed the joint report with Dr. Mutter, disagreed that Oats
should be considered to have an intellectual disability. Although Dr. Haber never
performed any IQ testing to establish Oats’s intelligence, based on his in-person
interview with Oats, Dr. Haber did not believe that Oats’s intelligence testing score
was accurate and estimated that a more accurate IQ score was between 70 and 90.
Dr. Haber was then asked whether, based on the three prongs set forth in the
relevant DSM, Oats would qualify as having an intellectual disability, to which Dr.
Haber testified, “It is fair to say that based on the scores as reported, and the school
record as reported, that Mr. Oats would seem to fit the category.” He further
agreed that if the IQ test results were accepted as accurate, Oats should be
diagnosed with an intellectual disability under the relevant DSM criteria. Dr.
Haber stressed that his focus was more on whether Oats understood the court
proceedings.
In addition to the expert testimony, defense counsel also presented lay
witnesses, Freddie Oats and Idella Russ, who grew up with Oats while he was
being raised by his aunt and uncle, who were his foster parents. They testified as
to Oats’s intellectual abilities as a child, observing that Oats was slow in learning
new information and that they had to help Oats tremendously. Freddie, Oats’s
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younger brother, testified that Oats had been a grade ahead of Freddie until Oats
was retained in the second grade. Even after he was held back, however, Oats was
not able to comprehend the same things as the other children in the class, so the
teachers pulled him to the side and tried to work with him individually.
Throughout their schooling, Freddie was in about half of Oats’s classes, and he
helped Oats with his work. Oats rarely passed tests on his own, so Freddie let Oats
copy his answers. If Freddie was not in his class, Oats would find another student
to copy from and cheat enough to “get by.” At home, Oats had difficulty following
instructions and would then get punished because he did not follow the directions
correctly.
Idella Russ was raised in the same household as Oats and provided similar
testimony, recalling that Oats was slow in learning something new. Even when
Oats tried to memorize Bible verses and would choose the shortest verse possible,
such as “Jesus wept,” his siblings had to remind him of the verse because he kept
forgetting it. When Oats was called upon in class, he seemed as though he had no
idea what the teacher was asking. Oats liked going to school to get away from his
foster mother’s beatings, but his performance in school was very poor. Oats
progressed through school by copying other people’s work and test answers. Oats
needed a person to sit down with him and explain how to do something before he
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understood. He eventually dropped out of school in the tenth grade and did not
return.
Further, while in the care of his foster parents, Oats was beaten severely,
including being hit on the head with an extension cord and a hoe handle, resulting
in scars to his head. Once, in a fall from a tree house, a corner of plywood hit Oats
in the head, causing profuse bleeding. Oats was awake but so drowsy from the
injury that he was unable to get up or move, and after his fall, he suffered terrible
headaches. Following an escape from his aunt’s house at age sixteen, he returned
home to his biological parents, but fell through a porch, leading to another
significant head injury. Although Oats has numerous scars on his head from these
injuries, he was not taken to a doctor for many of them. Testimony established that
these childhood injuries could have caused an intellectual disability.
During the 1990 postconviction proceedings, based on all of this evidence,
the State conceded that Oats without a doubt had an intellectual disability under the
applicable DSM, specifically stating, “Under the DSM-III criteria, the defendant
falls in the mildly mentally retarded area. No doubt about that.” However,
according to the State, this did not entitle Oats to relief on his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim because the jury already heard evidence that Oats had low
intelligence, and it would not have recommended a life sentence even if the
additional evidence had been presented. The postconviction court denied relief on
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the claim that defense counsel was ineffective, finding that there was not a
reasonable possibility that either the jury’s recommendation or the ultimate
sentence would have been different, even if trial counsel had presented all of the
information. These proceedings occurred prior to the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Atkins.
In Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of an individual with an intellectual disability.
Relying on Atkins, Oats filed a timely motion seeking to vacate his death sentence
on the ground that he is intellectually disabled, and, ultimately, the circuit court
held an evidentiary hearing on Oats’s motion.
During the evidentiary hearing in this proceeding, the parties entered into a
stipulation to admit the transcripts from the prior 1990 proceedings, as opposed to
recalling all of the witnesses, and the circuit court agreed. Two additional mental
health witnesses were presented: Dr. Denis Keyes and Dr. Harry McClaren. Dr.
Keyes specializes in intellectual disabilities and teaches courses on the subject. He
evaluated Oats in 2005, first administering the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale-
5th edition. On this test, Oats received a nonverbal IQ score of 47, a verbal IQ
score of 64, and a full scale IQ score of 54. Dr. Keyes testified that Oats’s scores
were consistent with having an intellectual disability.
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Dr. Keyes further testified about Oats’s deficits in adaptive functioning,
discussing Oats’s inability to hold a job on a long-term basis, his struggles to read,
and how he always lived with family or friends who were able to assist him. He
concluded that Oats’s adaptive skills were deficient in practical, social, and
conceptual ways and that his problems had existed back to his childhood.
As to the age of onset prong, Dr. Keyes interviewed numerous witnesses
who knew Oats as a child, including Oats’s brother and his cousin. Dr. Keyes also
found and questioned Oats’s fifth grade teacher, Florence McCrae, who described
Oats as having significant intellectual deficits in virtually every area. According to
McCrae, Oats “clearly had difficulty in learning” and needed the one-on-one
attention that was typically available only in special education. He had to be
placed in a special reading program for much younger children.
When Oats was 13, he was given the Slosson Intelligence Test, which
indicated that Oats’s IQ was 70—a score that qualifies as intellectually disabled.
Based on Oats’s score on this screening test, the school district should have
performed additional testing, but none was given. However, as Dr. Keyes noted,
this testing occurred prior to the federal mandate requiring state educational
institutions to provide special accommodations for children with special needs, and
Oats attended a socioeconomically disadvantaged school in the 1960s in Florida.
In addition, Dr. Keyes discussed Oats’s traumatic childhood, his head injuries as a
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child, and how Oats was denied food as a child—all of which, he explained, could
cause an intellectual disability.
On cross-examination, when asking about the manifestation prior to age 18
prong, the State recognized that this prong was “not really in play here,” to which
Dr. Keyes agreed:
Q: And the third component that, you know, is not really in
play here too much either, I suppose, is the pre-18 onset, right?
A: Correct.
In contrast to Dr. Keyes’s testimony, Dr. Harry McClaren reached a
different conclusion. He administered the WAIS-III to Oats in October 2005.
Oats’s scores were similar to his prior intelligence testing scores: his verbal IQ
score was 60, his nonverbal IQ was 72, and his full scale IQ was 62. While Dr.
McClaren recognized that Oats’s IQ scores had been incredibly consistent
throughout the years, only varying by a few points, he was concerned whether the
test was an underestimate.
As to deficits in adaptive functioning, Dr. McClaren recognized that Oats
was never able to maintain employment for more than a few weeks, despite several
attempts, and had always lived with family or friends. Further, Oats was never
able to obtain a driver’s license. All of these factors could be evidence of deficits
in adaptive functioning, which would require concurrent deficits in at least two of
the following areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
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skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills,
work, leisure, health, and safety. Dr. McClaren recognized that while this is the
definition as stated in the DSM, he did not assess this criteria under the DSM to
determine whether Oats had deficits in two out of the ten areas. Dr. McClaren was
sure that Oats currently has some adaptive deficits, but opined that this could be a
more recent decline.
Dr. McClaren’s most significant concern was whether sufficient evidence
existed to establish that Oats’s intellectual disability manifested prior to age 18.
Dr. McClaren recognized that this prong is designed to differentiate an intellectual
disability from other conditions that may also affect an individual’s intelligence
and adaptive functioning but that occur later in life, such as dementia. In this case,
Dr. McClaren stressed that Oats was never “diagnosed” as having an intellectual
disability while he was a child, testifying that there was no “psychiatric evidence
of his subaverage intellect two standard deviations below the norm. The closest
thing we have is a test called the Slosson test, which is not as good, not as suitable
for classification of people as mentally retarded or not as a Wechsler or Stanford-
Binet.”
In discussing this prong, Dr. McClaren relied on a misreading of this Court’s
opinion in Cherry, which is no longer good law after Hall. Dr. McClaren
explained his reasoning as to why the Slosson test was not sufficient to establish
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onset prior to age 18 because, “taking into consideration we have the Cherry
decision that talks about 70 means 70,” Oats had only a “70 on a test that is not
appropriate for the use of diagnosis of mental retardation.” Also, contrary to what
the Supreme Court would later hold in Hall, Dr. McClaren further noted that he
uses more scrutiny in determining whether an intellectual disability exists in capital
litigation.
Dr. McClaren did observe that this was a “very close” case, given the
evidence of Oats’s low IQ scores presently and in the past, his poor grades in
school, and all of the head injuries and malnutrition Oats suffered during
childhood. Dr. McClaren explained that whether Oats was intellectually disabled
was unclear, though, because Oats was “undergoing pretty savage abuse and
neglect” as a child and the environmental turmoil could have been the cause of a
reduced performance on the Slosson Intelligence Test. Dr. McClaren also pointed
out that recently, the Florida Department of Corrections had concerns as to whether
Oats had an intellectual disability and also noted that Oats had a mild to moderate
emotional impairment.
However, Dr. McClaren ultimately concluded that Oats does not have an
intellectual disability, relying on Oats’s lack of diagnosis before the age of 18, his
ability to escape from custody prior to his trial and travel to New York, his letter
writing, and his ability to have a three-month relationship with a woman in New
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York. Dr. McClaren recognized, however, that questions remained as to how
much Oats was able to accomplish by himself, as opposed to whether he was aided
by others in accomplishing many of these tasks. Dr. McClaren acknowledged that
his opinion differed from the prior mental health experts but explained this
discrepancy by saying that there is more scrutiny given now in diagnosing
intellectual disabilities, particularly in “capital litigation.”
The circuit court denied Oats’s motion on the basis that Oats failed to
present sufficient evidence that his intellectual disability manifested before the age
of 18. Oats appealed.
While the appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court vacated this
Court’s decision in Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 711 (Fla. 2012), holding that this
Court erred in applying the definition of an “intellectual disability” too strictly and
that Florida’s definition was unconstitutional because it “create[d] an unacceptable
risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at
1990. This Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing to address
whether the decision in Hall impacted this case in any manner.
After consideration of the record, the briefs, and the supplemental briefs, we
now conclude that the circuit court erred when it determined that Oats did not
establish that his intellectual disability manifested prior to the age of 18.
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for the circuit court
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to make additional findings after applying the recent Supreme Court decision in
Hall and the correct legal standards.
ANALYSIS
Oats raises five issues in this Court: (1) the trial court erred in denying his
challenge to his sentence of death based on his intellectual disability; (2) Oats was
deprived of his constitutional rights when the expert appointed by the trial court
communicated directly with the State and did not act as a “court expert”; (3) the
trial court improperly curtailed Oats’s cross-examination of Dr. McClaren; (4) the
trial court committed fundamental error by failing to act in a neutral manner during
the evidentiary hearing; and (5) the burden of proof in section 921.137,
determining whether a capital defendant is intellectually disabled, is
unconstitutional. Because we conclude that the circuit court erred in its analysis of
the intellectual disability claim and that Oats is entitled to a new evidentiary
hearing with the benefit of Hall, we address only the first issue.
In reviewing the circuit court’s determination that Oats is not intellectually
disabled, “this Court examines the record for whether competent, substantial
evidence supports the determination of the trial court.” State v. Herring, 76 So. 3d
891, 895 (Fla. 2011). We “do[] not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the
circuit court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses.” Brown v. State, 959 So.
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2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007). However, we apply a de novo standard of review to any
questions of law. Herring, 76 So. 3d at 895.
We begin our analysis by reviewing the relevant law and the impact of the
United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hall on Florida’s standard in
determining whether a defendant has an intellectual disability. We then consider
the errors in the circuit court’s order.
I. Atkins & Recent Supreme Court Precedent
Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s 2002 holding in Atkins, Florida
had already implemented a prospective prohibition on imposing the death sentence
upon an intellectually disabled defendant. See ch. 2001-202, § 1, Laws of Fla.
(enacting § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001)). Based on numerous considerations,
including the trend within various legislative bodies to eliminate capital
punishment for intellectually disabled defendants, the United States Supreme Court
declared in Atkins that executing a person with an intellectual disability
contravenes the Eighth Amendment. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. The Supreme Court
further recognized that an intellectual disability consists of three prongs: (1)
subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) significant limitations in adaptive skills;
and (3) manifestation of the condition before age 18. Id. However, the Supreme
Court did not elaborate as to how this standard was to be implemented and left this
determination to the states, including “the task of developing appropriate ways to
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enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” Id. at
317.
Once the Atkins ruling extended this protection to all capital defendants, this
Court immediately implemented procedures to ensure that defendants could
present evidence to establish whether they were intellectually disabled. In
determining what constituted an intellectual disability, this Court looked to the
statutory definition set forth in section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2002), and
held that in considering whether a defendant had “subaverage intelligence,” a
defendant must establish an IQ score of 70 or less. Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 712-14.
This Court further held that courts were precluded from considering the application
of the standard error of measurement as to the IQ score. Id. at 712-13.
This Court was asked to reconsider Cherry’s holding in Hall, 109 So. 3d at
707-08, a case that is substantially similar to the one before us now. In that case,
Freddie Lee Hall had been previously found to have an intellectual disability, but
since his crime occurred prior to Florida’s statutory prohibition on imposing a
sentence of death upon the intellectually disabled, such evidence was considered
only as a mitigating circumstance. Id. at 706. Relying on the prior determination
by the trial court that found Hall to be intellectually disabled, Hall sought relief
after Atkins. Id. at 706-07. However, the postconviction court determined that
Hall could not be considered intellectually disabled under Florida’s statutory
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definition of the term because Hall’s IQ scores varied between 71 and 73 and thus
did not constitute “subaverage intelligence.” Id. at 707. In a 4-2 decision, this
Court affirmed the postconviction court’s finding of no intellectual disability based
on the strict cut-off score of 70, as set forth in Cherry. Id. at 709-10.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall and held that the
manner in which Florida defined an intellectual disability for capital litigation
violated the Eighth Amendment because it “disregards established medical
practice” and “creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability
will be executed.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990, 1995. Specifically, the Supreme Court
stated that Florida’s bright-line rule
disregards established medical practice in two interrelated ways. It
takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s
intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other
evidence. It also relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the
defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while refusing to recognize that the
score is, on its own terms, imprecise.
Id. at 1995. In determining whether an interpretation of intellectual disability
violates the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court relied on psychiatric and
professional studies that elaborated on the purpose and meaning of the prong at
issue. Id. at 1993. In addition, the Supreme Court stressed that a single factor
should not be considered dispositive because the three factors must be considered
together in an interrelated assessment. Id. at 2001 (relying on the DSM-5, at 37
(“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior
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problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of
individuals with a lower IQ score.”)).
The United States Supreme Court emphasized these same principles in its
most recent decision pertaining to the intellectual disability analysis, in which the
Court held that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
intellectual disability claim. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2279. The Supreme
Court first reiterated that an IQ test result of 75 is “entirely consistent with
intellectual disability,” relying on its prior decision in Hall. Id. at 2277. The
Supreme Court then addressed the next two prongs, determining that the record
contained “substantial grounds to question [the defendant’s] adaptive functioning,”
based on numerous examples from the defendant’s childhood, including his low
birth weight, that he was placed in special classes in the fifth grade, and that he had
difficulty processing information. Id. at 2280. Further, the Supreme Court noted
that the evidence pertaining to his low birth weight and his intellectual
shortcomings as a child provided “ample evidence” that the defendant’s disability
manifested before adulthood and thus required an evidentiary hearing so that the
trial court could hear all relevant evidence and determine whether the defendant is
intellectually disabled. Id. at 2283.
II. Errors in the Circuit Court’s Order
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Considering the circuit court’s order in light of this precedent, we reverse for
three reasons. First, while we recognize that the circuit court did not have the
benefit of Hall, the Supreme Court has now stated that courts must consider all
three prongs in determining an intellectual disability, as opposed to relying on just
one factor as dispositive. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001. We conclude that the circuit
court erred in relying solely on the third prong in denying Oats’s claim.
We caution, however, that our decision should not be interpreted as
establishing that this will necessarily constitute a per se reversible error. But as the
Supreme Court has now recognized, because these factors are interdependent, if
one of the prongs is relatively less strong, a finding of intellectual disability may
still be warranted based on the strength of other prongs. Id. (holding that this is a
“conjunctive and interrelated assessment” and relying on the DSM-5, which
provides as an example that “a person with an IQ score above 70 may have such
severe adaptive behavior problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is
comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score”).
Second, the circuit court erred in concluding that Oats failed to meet his
burden without even considering or weighing all of the testimony that Oats
presented. The circuit court agreed to the parties’ stipulation to consider the
mental health evidence presented in the 1990 proceedings pertaining to whether
Oats had an intellectual disability, as opposed to requiring the parties to recall all
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of those witnesses who testified previously regarding Oats’s intellectual disability.
However, in reaching its decision, the circuit court stated that it “accept[ed]” the
1990 postconviction court’s ruling and was “not in a position to reevaluate the
credibility of the witnesses who testified or the evidence” the postconviction court
considered in those prior proceedings. The circuit court then denied Oats’s claim,
concluding that “[t]here is no competent evidence that the defendant suffered from
any mental retardation prior to the age of 18.”
The circuit court’s refusal to consider the 1990 evidence of Oats’s
intellectual disability was error. The prior proceedings did not determine whether
Oats is intellectually disabled under the statutory definition and thus ineligible for
the death penalty, as the circuit court itself recognized. The case was in a different
procedural posture at that time, particularly since the bar against the execution of
an intellectually disabled individual did not then exist. If the circuit court, after
reviewing the transcripts, determined that it was unable to evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses or consider the evidence submitted in the prior postconviction
proceedings, it was required to permit the parties to recall those witnesses in a new
proceeding and submit the evidence so that all of the relevant evidence could be
considered and weighed.
In fact, in the 1990 postconviction proceedings, Oats submitted so much
evidence establishing his intellectual disability that the State, in its written closing
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argument to the postconviction court, stated, “Under the DSM-III criteria, the
defendant falls in the mildly mentally retarded area. No doubt about that.” Thus,
this evidence clearly should have been considered in the current proceeding.
Finally, reversal is warranted because the circuit court applied the incorrect
legal standard in analyzing whether Oats’s intellectual disability “manifested
during the period from conception to age 18.” § 921.137, Fla. Stat. As the
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities explains, an
intellectual disability is a developmental disability and thus this prong ensures that
there was “evidence of the disability during the developmental period.” Am. Ass’n
on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual Disability
http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.VNDqAyvF-JQ (last visited
December 2, 2015). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that this prong simply requires that a defendant demonstrate that his “intellectual
deficiencies manifested while he was in the ‘developmental stage’—that is, before
he reached adulthood.” Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2282.
In concluding that “[t]here is no competent evidence that the defendant
suffered from any mental retardation prior to the age of 18,” the circuit court rested
solely upon the testimony by the State’s expert witness, Dr. McClaren, that Oats
had a “[l]ack of diagnosis before 18”—testimony that the circuit court quoted in
denying relief:
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Well, because, first look at the onset prior to age 18. We don’t
have any psychiatric evidence of his subaverage intellect two standard
deviations below the norm. The closest thing that we have is a test
called the Slosson, S-l-o-s-s-o-n, test, which is not as good, not as
suitable for classification of people as mentally retarded or not as a
Wechsler or Stanford-Binet.
Also, that test was given at age 13, when he was by all
accounts, undergoing pretty savage abuse and neglect and probably
questioning his paternity and who his mother and father were.
....
Lack of diagnosis before 18, even though there was some
evidence that he had been identified with the screening tests with an
IQ of 70. He is able to progress through school, despite having a very
physically abusive and probably very confusing upbringing.
(Emphasis added.) The circuit court did not reject the expert witness testimony
presented by Oats in this proceeding or find that any of that testimony was not
credible. Instead, the circuit court simply accepted Dr. McClaren’s position that,
although the intelligence test given to Oats as a child produced an IQ score of 70,
this test could not be relied upon to establish the manifestation of intellectual
disability before age 18 because this test was “not as good . . . as a Wechsler or
Stanford-Binet” and was not suitable by itself to diagnose a person as having an
intellectual disability.
Contrary to the circuit court’s decision, section 921.137 requires a showing
only that an intellectual disability “manifested during the period from conception
to age 18.” § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The term “manifest” means
“[t]o show or demonstrate plainly.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1067 (5th
ed. 2011). Accepting the position that “manifested” equates to “diagnosed” would
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render the first two prongs of the statutory test for an intellectual disability moot,
as the only way to find an intellectual disability would be if the diagnosis already
existed by the age of 18.
Moreover, this Court has never held that the defendant must have been given
a specific IQ test prior to the age of 18 in order to find an intellectual disability.
That inflexible view would not be supported by the United States Supreme Court’s
recent enunciations in Hall and Brumfield. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2282
(stating that this prong merely requires that a defendant demonstrate that his
intellectual deficiencies manifested “before he reached adulthood”); Hall, 134 S.
Ct. at 1994 (recognizing that, based on a consensus within the medical community,
this prong simply requires the “onset of these deficits during the developmental
period”). As even Dr. McClaren himself recognized, the purpose of requiring the
manifestation of an intellectual disability prior to age 18 is to distinguish an
intellectual disability, which a person must have had as a child, from other
conditions that may cause an individual’s intelligence and adaptive functioning to
decline later in life, such as dementia. In other words, a person cannot acquire an
intellectual disability after childhood.
It appears that Dr. McClaren’s view may have been impacted by a
misreading of this Court’s prior opinion in Cherry. Specifically, when Dr.
McClaren was asked with more specificity as to why he did not find onset prior to
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age 18, Dr. McClaren testified that while Oats was given a Slosson IQ screening
test at age 13, this was not sufficient to establish onset prior to age 18 because he
had to “tak[e] into consideration we have the Cherry decision that talks about 70
means 70.” He concluded that Oats had only a “70 on a test that is not appropriate
for the use of diagnosis of mental retardation.” Of course, our holding in Cherry
did not address onset before age 18, and the inflexible “70 means 70” rule of
Cherry has now been overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Hall.
Accordingly, as a result of these legal errors, the circuit court incorrectly
evaluated Oats’s claim under the wrong standard. In fact, the evidence pertaining
to the onset prior to age 18 prong is comparable to that in Hall, another case in
which all of the parties previously recognized that the defendant suffered from
intellectual disability—a premise that was challenged only after Atkins barred the
execution of those with an intellectual disability.
Specifically, in Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990-91, as it relates to the age of onset
prong, the United States Supreme Court noted that Hall’s teachers identified Hall
as being intellectually disabled on numerous occasions and that his siblings
testified that there was “something ‘very wrong’ with [Hall] as a child” and he was
“slow with speech and . . . slow to learn.” Moreover, in a strikingly similar manner
to this case, Hall bore the brunt of physical abuse within the family and his mother
constantly beat him because Hall was slow and made simple mistakes. Id. at 1991.
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Based on that type of evidence, the Supreme Court noted that the age of onset
factor was not even “at issue” in that case. Id. at 1994. See also Van Tran v.
Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 613-14 (6th Cir. 2014) (remanding for a new evidentiary
hearing because the state postconviction court erroneously relied on the absence of
any test of intellectual functioning before the age of 18 and discounted the fact that
the defendant’s childhood was marked by certain impairments during the
developmental period, including his delay in reaching various milestones, because
a multitude of factors could have caused those delays).
Similarly, evidence presented in this case establishes that Oats was slow to
reach important developmental milestones, and based on accounts from Oats’s
siblings and teachers, Oats was very slow and constantly struggled to understand
basic concepts and needed the type of one-on-one interaction that was available
only in special education. Further, like in Hall, Oats was subjected to abuse based
on his lack of ability to understand requests from his foster parents.
In its decision in Hall, the Supreme Court clarified that the appropriate
definition to use in determining whether an intellectual disability exists is the
definition that is used by skilled professionals in making this determination in all
contexts, including those “far beyond the confines of the death penalty,” such as
special education, medical treatment plans, and access to social programs. 134 S.
Ct. at 1993. Based on certain aspects of Dr. McClaren’s testimony, it is unclear
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whether he employed a heightened standard because this is a capital case, as
opposed to the standard that would normally apply to determine an intellectual
disability in other contexts. However, the record clearly shows that Dr. McClaren
was influenced by his misreading of Cherry and imposed additional requirements
not recognized by the DSM—requirements that have since been explicitly
disapproved. Thus, we direct the circuit court to permit the parties an opportunity
for a new evidentiary hearing so that the parties may present additional evidence,
including whether the experts’ opinions have changed from when they initially
made their conclusions or have been otherwise affected by Hall, Brumfield, and
other developments in the law.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court erred in determining
that Oats failed to establish onset of his intellectual disability prior to the age of 18.
The evidence presented to the circuit court in fact strongly leads to the conclusion
that Oats established both his low IQ and onset of an intellectual disability prior to
the age of 18. However, because the circuit court did not analyze the remaining
prongs, and because neither the circuit court nor the parties and their experts had
the benefit of Hall, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion,
including providing the parties with an opportunity to present additional evidence
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at an evidentiary hearing to enable a full reevaluation of whether Oats is
intellectually disabled.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Marion County,
Hale Ralph Stancil, Judge - Case No. 421980CF000016AXXXXX
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Martin
J. McClain, Special Assistant, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern
Region, and Michael Chance Meyer, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and James Donald
Riecks, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee
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