Malik Jimer Williams v. State of Florida ( 2018 )


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  •           Supreme Court of Florida
    ____________
    No. SC16-2170
    ____________
    MALIK JIMER WILLIAMS,
    Petitioner,
    vs.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Respondent.
    [April 19, 2018]
    QUINCE, J.
    Malik Jimer Williams seeks review of the decision of the Second District
    Court of Appeal in Williams v. State, 
    203 So. 3d 1020
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), on the
    ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of this Court on
    questions of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the
    following reasons, we affirm in part and quash in part the decision of the Second
    District and remand with instructions to remand to the trial court for proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    FACTS
    On the night of February 15, 2013, Williams and his cousin, Kito Felton,
    were riding Williams’ bicycle home from a friend’s house on 23rd Avenue in
    Tampa, Florida. Williams pedaled and Felton rode on the handlebars. Williams
    and Felton rode down 23rd Avenue, made a right on 34th Street, made a left on
    22nd Avenue, made a right onto 37th Street and then made a left onto 21st Avenue
    heading towards 40th Street near where Williams resided with his brother at 46th
    and Sand Dune.
    Also in the vicinity were Reginald Johnson and John Edward Brown, III.
    Johnson and Brown were leaving the residence of Rosa Santos on their “Big
    Ripper” bicycles to go to Johnson’s residence on 35th Street to prepare for a
    birthday party. Johnson stated that he would typically take 26th Avenue to cross
    50th Street to get to 49th Avenue and 26th Street, where he would turn until he got
    to 21st Avenue and continue on 21st until he got to 35th Street. Johnson and
    Brown were heading west on 21st and stopped on Arrow, which was before 40th,
    still heading towards Johnson’s mother’s house. After stopping at Arrow to speak
    to Venda Hayward, Johnson and Brown went back the way they came. Johnson
    testified that he and Brown were “thinking about going to Shells” and that they
    wanted to go to that particular store rather than one closer to his mother’s house
    “[b]ecause Shell is like a neighborhood store.”
    -2-
    Williams testified that he saw Johnson and Brown at the intersection of 21st
    and 40th heading the opposite direction. He did not previously know Brown, but
    did know Johnson from middle school. Williams testified that Johnson asked them
    if they were straight and that he replied he did not want any problems. Williams
    testified that he knew they were from Grant Park and that Grant Park and his own
    neighborhood, Jackson Heights, do not get along. Williams told Felton to prepare
    to fight and “we fitting to get our ass whooped.” Williams then testified that he
    saw Johnson and Brown turn their bikes around and that, eventually, Johnson
    maneuvered to cut Williams off and that Brown was behind him with a gun in his
    right hand in his lap.
    Williams testified that, at this point, he slammed his brakes and jumped off
    his bike in an attempt to either run away or fight and that his maneuver caused
    Brown to fall off of his bike. Johnson testified that, after turning and returning
    eastbound and passing Williams and Felton, all the boys except Johnson fell off
    their bikes. Williams testified that Brown flipped over his handle bars and dropped
    the gun in front of the bicycle, that both he and Brown reached for the gun, that he
    was able to pick it up before Brown, and then they fought over it. All the
    testimony agrees, and video evidence corroborates, that however three of the boys
    ended up off their bikes, Johnson dismounted, ran back, and joined the altercation.
    -3-
    Both Williams and Johnson testified that Johnson took Felton near the Hartline
    gate while Williams and Brown stayed in a relatively static location.
    During the course of the altercation, Williams shot Brown twice—once in
    the head and once in the chest. Williams then turned and shot Johnson, who
    received one gun shot in his hand. Williams and Felton then fled, Felton taking
    Brown’s bicycle and Williams on his own bicycle.
    Williams testified that when he arrived at his brother’s, his brother took him
    to their mother’s house who then encouraged Williams to talk to the police.
    The jury found Williams guilty of first-degree premeditated murder for the
    death of Brown. The jury did not convict Williams of robbery but did find that he
    was guilty of the lesser included offense of theft.
    On direct appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal, the district court
    first issued a per curiam affirmance (PCA). Then, after the court denied Williams’
    motion to stay mandate and motion for reconsideration, on its own motion the
    court withdrew the PCA and substituted a written opinion. The court dispensed
    with Williams’ claims on appeal in one sentence: “[Williams] raises two issues in
    this appeal, neither of which require reversal.” Williams, 203 So. 3d at 1021. The
    district court then explained that Williams’ sentence for first-degree murder did not
    violate Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
     (2012), and that his sentence for the
    -4-
    attempted first-degree murder did not violate Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    (2010). The district court therefore affirmed Williams’ convictions and sentences.
    DISCUSSION
    In his first issue on appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in
    denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. The Second District did not discuss
    the merits of this issue but we nevertheless address it here.
    We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo;
    however, all evidence and inferences therefrom are viewed in a light most
    favorable to the State. McDuffie v. State, 
    970 So. 2d 312
    , 332 (Fla. 2007); Pagan
    v. State, 
    830 So. 2d 792
    , 803 (Fla. 2002). A defendant who moves for a judgment
    of acquittal admits the facts in evidence and every conclusion favorable to the State
    that may be reasonably inferred from said evidence. “If, after viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find
    the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient
    evidence exists to sustain a conviction.” Pagan, 
    830 So. 2d at 803
    .
    In a case where a defendant alleges self-defense, the State must prove that
    the defendant did not act in self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cruz v.
    State, 
    189 So. 3d 822
    , 825-26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Brown v. State, 
    454 So. 2d 596
    , 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)). A trial court must grant a judgment of
    acquittal when the State’s case is legally insufficient to rebut a defendant’s prima
    -5-
    facie case establishing self-defense. 
    Id.
     at 826 (citing Fowler v. State, 
    921 So. 2d 708
    , 711-12 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). However, a judgment of acquittal should be
    denied where a jury would reasonably reject the defendant’s explanation of self-
    defense. 
    Id.
     (citing Romero v. State, 
    901 So. 2d 260
    , 265-66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).
    Any inconsistency between the evidence and defense theory must be resolved by
    the finder of fact. Orme v. State, 
    677 So. 2d 258
    , 262 (Fla. 1996).1 But
    “[e]vidence that leaves room for two or more inferences of fact, at least one of
    which is consistent with the defendant’s hypothesis of innocence, is not legally
    sufficient to make a case for the jury.” Fowler v. State, 
    921 So. 2d 708
    , 712 (Fla.
    2d DCA 2006) (quoting Fowler v. State, 
    492 So. 2d 1344
    , 1348 (Fla. 1st DCA
    1986)); see also Stieh v. State, 
    67 So. 3d 275
    , 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
    In order to establish a prima facie case of self-defense, a defendant must
    show that he (1) was attacked in a place where he had a right to be, (2) was not
    engaged in any unlawful activity, and (3) reasonably believed it was necessary to
    1. This is unlike a review of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
    conviction where an appellate court must determine whether, when reviewing the
    facts in the light most favorable to the State, there is competent, substantial
    evidence to sustain the conviction on appeal. Williams did not contest the
    sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for first-degree premeditated
    murder and it is therefore not before this Court for review. Instead, this Court is
    tasked with determining merely whether the question was appropriately presented
    to the jury for consideration notwithstanding the subsequent verdict inconsistent
    with the State’s rebuttal to Williams’ self-defense theory.
    -6-
    use force to prevent death or great bodily harm. See Leasure v. State, 
    105 So. 3d 5
    ,
    13 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (citing § 776.013(3), Fla. Stat. (2008)). However, the jury
    is not required to accept the defendant’s version of the facts and in fact “must
    consider the probability or improbability of the defendant’s credibility in light of
    the circumstances established by other evidence.” Leasure, 
    105 So. 3d at
    14
    (citing Darty v. State, 
    161 So. 2d 864
    , 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Teague v.
    State, 
    390 So. 2d 405
    , 406-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)).
    Below, Williams alleged that he acted in self-defense after Johnson and
    Brown followed him and Felton on 21st Avenue and appeared to be carrying a
    weapon. Williams stated that he knew he was about to be beaten and prepared
    himself to take the beating by getting off his bike. Because Brown lost control of
    the weapon when they all fell from their bikes, Williams alleges he was able to
    fight to get the weapon and use it in self-defense. The evidence found on the scene
    supports Williams’ version of events.
    Law enforcement discovered two unfired .40 caliber rounds2 at the scene
    which is consistent with Williams’ testimony that he was unfamiliar with weapons
    and attempted to cock the gun before each time he fired. Law enforcement also
    2. No firearm was recovered at the scene. However, the ballistics recovered
    from the victims were the same caliber as the fired and unfired rounds recovered at
    the scene.
    -7-
    found a cell phone, currency, a key ring, cigars, and condoms on Brown’s person
    when they arrived on scene, which supports Williams’ assertion that he had no
    intention of robbing the victim.
    Because Williams presented a prima facie case of self-defense, it was
    necessary for the State to refute his claim beyond a reasonable doubt. The State’s
    theory of the case was that Williams and Felton attempted to rob Brown and
    therefore could not claim self-defense because the altercation was a result of the
    robbery. To survive the judgment of acquittal, a reasonable jury would have to
    believe the testimony of surviving victim, Reginald Johnson, that he and Brown
    just happened to turn around and ride their bikes in the opposite direction, passing
    Williams and Felton, because they decided to double back and go to a convenience
    store. The jury would also have to accept Johnson’s testimony that Felton told
    Brown to “give it up” meaning he was attempting to rob Brown of his bicycle and
    that either Felton or Williams pulled Brown off his bike, starting the altercation
    that resulted in Brown’s death.
    As to corroborating evidence, none of the eyewitnesses were able to
    corroborate either party’s explanation of what led to the altercation. Symone
    Watts, who worked as a security guard at Hartline where the altercation took place,
    testified that she heard loud voices, which made her look up from her book. Then
    she saw someone hit the ground, get up quickly, and begin firing. Watts’ version
    -8-
    of events does not support either Williams’ or Johnson’s testimony. Williams
    never testified that he had fallen to the ground before getting the gun but it is
    possible that what she saw was Williams bending over to get the gun after it fell
    from Brown’s possession. Her testimony likewise does not support Johnson’s
    testimony because he stated that Brown was the only one who fell from his bike
    after being pulled off. Because both Williams and Johnson testified that only
    Brown fell to the ground, Watts’ testimony would make Brown the shooter, which
    is erroneous. Further, Watts testified that she was unclear that night and even the
    day of the trial who was where within the altercation. She could only testify that
    one of the boys wore a light-colored shirt and the other boys wore dark-colored
    clothing.
    Likewise, the video surveillance, which was played for the jury, is unclear
    enough that it could be interpreted to support either version of events. The
    surveillance videos show, and Johnson and Williams both testified, that Williams
    and Felton rode from left to right on the screen when they were overtaken by
    Johnson on his bike and caught up to by Brown. From there, all the parties agree,
    and the video confirms, that Brown, Williams, and Felton dismounted from their
    respective bicycles. Unfortunately, the video does not confirm how the boys came
    to dismount or who initiated that first contact. The video confirms that Johnson
    turned back after seeing the altercation begin.
    -9-
    Williams’ self-defense theory was only applicable if the jury did not find
    that the altercation began because of a robbery attempt. Accordingly, because the
    evidence was equivocal and ultimately was a credibility determination between
    Johnson and Williams, the trial court properly denied the judgment of acquittal
    before the jury entered its verdict.3
    The second issue presented is whether Williams is entitled to resentencing
    pursuant to chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, and to resentencing pursuant to this
    Court’s decision in Williams v. State, 
    186 So. 3d 989
     (Fla. 2016). The State
    concedes that the answer to both these inquiries is yes. Based on the State’s
    concession, we end our inquiry here and remand with instructions to remand to the
    trial court for resentencing in accordance with Williams, 
    186 So. 3d 989
     and
    Thomas v. State, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S479, 
    2015 WL 5178605
     at *1 (Fla. Sept. 4,
    2015) (
    177 So. 3d 1275
    ) (table).
    It is so ordered.
    PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
    LABARGA, C.J., concurs in result.
    3. Williams moved for a new trial based on the trial court’s ruling to limit
    his cross-examination of Johnson. Counsel did not move for a new trial based on
    the jury’s inconsistent verdict once it became apparent that the jury did not believe
    there was a robbery attempt because they found Williams guilty of the lesser
    included offense of theft based on Felton’s taking of Brown’s bike after his death.
    - 10 -
    CANADY, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which POLSTON and
    LAWSON, JJ., concur.
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
    IF FILED, DETERMINED.
    CANADY, J., concurring in result only.
    Based on the State’s concession of error, I agree that the decision of the
    Second District Court should be quashed to the extent that it affirmed Williams’s
    sentences and that the case should be remanded for resentencing in conformance
    with chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida. I do not disagree with the conclusion that
    the Second District’s decision to affirm Williams’s convictions was correct, but I
    believe that it is unnecessary for this Court to address the issue relating to the
    convictions.
    POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
    Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct
    Conflict of Decisions
    Second District - Case No. 2D14-1732
    (Hillsborough County)
    Christopher E. Cosden, Fort Myers, Florida,
    for Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, John Klawikofsky,
    Bureau Chief, and Elba Caridad Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,
    Florida,
    for Respondent
    - 11 -