Edward Allen Covington v. State of Florida , 228 So. 3d 49 ( 2017 )


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  •           Supreme Court of Florida
    ____________
    No. SC15-1252
    ____________
    EDWARD ALLEN COVINGTON,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    [August 31, 2017]
    PER CURIAM.
    Edward Allen Covington appeals his convictions and death sentences for the
    first-degree murders of Lisa, Zachary, and Heather Savannah Freiberg. We have
    jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons we explain, we
    affirm the convictions and sentences.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In May 2008, Lisa Freiberg lived in Lutz, Florida, with her two children,
    seven-year-old Zachary and two-year-old Heather Savannah, and her boyfriend,
    Edward Allen Covington. Covington met Lisa through an online dating site and
    moved into her home in April 2008. On May 11, 2008, Covington murdered Lisa,
    Zachary, and Heather Savannah. He also killed the family dog, Duke.
    Three days before the murders, Lisa’s mother, Barbara Freiberg, noticed that
    Heather Savannah had a swollen lip. When Barbara asked about it, Covington said
    that he must have caused it by rubbing too hard when wiping Heather Savannah’s
    face. The next day, Friday, May 9, 2008, Barbara noticed that Heather Savannah
    also had hand prints and bruises on her buttocks and that the inside of her swollen
    lip was cut. Barbara photographed Heather Savannah’s injuries and showed them
    to Lisa later that day. Barbara told Lisa that she believed that Covington was
    responsible for the injuries. Zachary and Heather Savannah spent the night with
    Barbara that night. When Lisa picked the children up around noon the next day,
    Lisa told Barbara that Covington said that it had to have been the babysitter who
    caused Heather Savannah’s injuries.
    Around 2 p.m. that Saturday, Covington’s probation officer, Stephanie
    Laureno, stopped by Lisa’s home to see Covington. Covington, Lisa, and the
    children were all home at the time. According to Laureno, Covington appeared
    calm, did not say anything that was alarming or concerning, and his interactions
    with Lisa and the children seemed normal.
    That evening, Tom Fish, who is Lisa’s ex-boyfriend and Heather Savannah’s
    father, asked Lisa to bring the children to his mother’s house for family pictures.
    -2-
    Lisa and Covington brought the children to Fish’s mother’s house, but Covington
    did not go into the house at first. At some point, Covington did go into the house
    and visited with Fish and his family for about forty-five minutes. During the visit,
    when Zachary referred to Fish as “Tom-Tom,” Covington corrected Zachary and
    insisted he address Fish as “sir.” Covington explained that he believed in being
    strict with children. Fish did not observe anything unusual about Covington’s
    speech or demeanor.
    The following day was Mother’s Day, and Barbara was surprised that she
    did not get a call from Lisa. On Monday, May 12, 2008, when Lisa did not drop
    the children off at the babysitter’s house as expected, Barbara and her husband
    drove over to Lisa’s house to check on her. When Barbara opened the door and
    looked into the house, she saw Zachary’s deceased, nude body and called 911.
    Law enforcement responded to the scene and found the home in complete
    disarray. The furniture was turned over and there was blood on the floors, walls,
    and surfaces in every room except the bathroom. In addition to Zachary’s body,
    they found the bodies of Heather Savannah, Lisa, and the dead dog at various
    locations throughout the house. Heather Savannah had been dismembered and
    decapitated. Zachary’s genitals had been mutilated. Lisa’s body was in the
    doorway of the master bedroom, with a bloody handprint on the wall nearby. The
    dog’s body was on the floor in Heather Savannah’s bedroom. Two hammers and
    -3-
    five knives that appeared to have been used in the murders were found and
    collected. A mesh bag containing bloody clothing was found under the mattress in
    the master bedroom.
    Law enforcement found Covington in a closet in one of the bedrooms. He
    indicated that he had taken a number of pills. Depakote and Seroquel pills
    prescribed to Covington were found in the house. Covington was medically
    cleared by paramedics at the scene but transported to the hospital for further
    diagnosis and clearance. As he was being transported to the hospital, Covington
    looked back and stated, “I can’t believe what I’ve done.” After Covington was
    released from the hospital on May 14, 2008, he was transported to the Sheriff’s
    Office, where he was interviewed by detectives and confessed to the murders.
    Covington was indicted for three counts of first-degree murder, three counts
    of abuse of a dead body, and one count of cruelty to an animal. A jury was sworn
    and opening statements were heard on October 22, 2014. On the first day of trial
    testimony, October 23, 2014, Covington announced that he wanted to change his
    pleas to guilty and waive a jury for the penalty phase. The trial court would not
    accept Covington’s guilty pleas at that time but instead appointed two experts to
    evaluate Covington’s competency to plead guilty. The evaluations and the
    doctors’ reports were completed that evening.
    -4-
    When court reconvened the next day, Covington was given time to meet
    with his attorneys and his family. Covington then reaffirmed his desire to plead
    guilty and waive a penalty phase jury. Covington’s counsel supported his
    decisions to plead guilty and waive a penalty phase jury. The court then conducted
    a comprehensive plea colloquy with Covington during which the court thoroughly
    informed him about the rights he was waiving. Covington indicated both verbally
    and in writing that he understood the consequences of his pleas, that although he
    was on psychiatric medications, there was nothing that would impair his
    understanding of his decision, and that he was not being threatened or coerced into
    entering the pleas. The trial court accepted Covington’s pleas of guilty to all seven
    counts as charged in the indictment. Covington reaffirmed his desire to waive a
    penalty phase jury, and the trial court accepted his waiver. The parties stipulated
    that as part of the penalty phase, the trial court should consider the testimony of the
    four witnesses who had testified during the abbreviated guilt phase.
    Covington’s May 14, 2008, interview with detectives was played at the
    penalty phase. In the interview, Covington said that he met Lisa through an online
    dating site in August 2007, and they hit it off. He said that he had been living with
    Lisa on and off but officially started living with her a couple of weeks before the
    murders and everything was going great. He said Lisa and the children loved him.
    He talked about the days leading up to the murders. He said that he and Lisa were
    -5-
    having problems potty-training Heather Savannah and that she had not been eating
    properly. He knew that Barbara had seen marks on Heather Savannah and that she
    thought he was abusing the children. Barbara told Lisa that she did not want Lisa
    to take the children back home while Covington was there. Covington denied
    abusing the children and said it “really, really ticked [him] off” that Barbara
    thought he was. He admitted that he had hit Heather Savannah on the leg when she
    picked up a cell phone a couple of days before the murders but said he did not
    mean to hit her hard. He also admitted that the marks could have occurred when
    he spanked Heather Savannah, but he said he did not realize he spanked her that
    hard.
    Covington said that Lisa picked up the children from Barbara’s on Saturday
    afternoon, the day before the murders. Covington prepared lunch for the children
    and dinner for the four of them. They ate dinner around 6 p.m. and then took the
    children to visit with Fish’s family. While the children and Lisa were visiting,
    Covington said he needed to go check his mailbox and left, but he actually went to
    buy and smoke crack cocaine.
    According to Covington, when they got home around 9:30 p.m. or 10 p.m.,
    the children went to bed, and Covington and Lisa had a drink together and had sex.
    Covington then played a computer game. He and Lisa went to bed around
    midnight or 1 a.m. Before bed, Covington said he “took a handful of Seroquel”
    -6-
    because he was “dog tired” and it had not been as effective recently. He said he
    took roughly 1,000 milligrams of Seroquel (including four 200-milligram,
    extended release pills), which he described as “a hundred [milligrams] over the
    max[imum] safe dose.” Covington said when the Seroquel works properly, “it’s
    like turning off a light switch. . . . [A]ll the extra thought . . . shuts off, everything
    goes quiet.” The extended release Seroquel was new to Covington and he said the
    first time he took one 200-milligram pill, the effects lasted twenty-six hours.
    Covington said that Lisa fell asleep in his arms. Covington initially told the
    detectives that he did not know what happened next, but he then admitted that he
    “kind of” remembered what happened the next morning and described what he said
    he remembered about the murders.
    Covington said that Lisa and Zachary were still in bed around 10:30 Sunday
    morning when he found Heather Savannah awake and lying on the couch in the
    living room. Covington asked Heather Savannah “what she was doing up and she
    just started to cry.” He said “that is the last recollection of being in control I know
    of” and the next thing he remembered was all the chaos and killing. He said that
    he killed Heather Savannah first, that he “hurt her the most,” and that he “cut her in
    half” with a bread knife. He said the first thing he did was cut Heather Savannah’s
    throat, “the jugular,” while she was lying on the couch and he was standing over
    her. He used four back-and-forth motions. He said he then “literally ripped
    -7-
    Savannah in half,” “almost like carving a pig.” He said he had to get her undressed
    in order to cut her in half. He believed she was dead at that time but could not be
    sure. He also decapitated Heather Savannah and set her head by the front door.
    Although he initially said Heather Savannah was crying, he later said she never
    yelled or cried. He specifically remembered that the bread knife he used on
    Heather Savannah was bent in the process. When asked about a bite mark on
    Heather Savannah’s arm, he said he may have left that the night before, because
    she was biting Zachary and in order to “break[] her on that[,] . . . we would bite her
    back.”
    After he killed Heather Savannah, Covington remembered choking and
    strangling Lisa. He said he did not remember punching her but thought he might
    have because he remembered her having a bloody face. He said he used a two-
    and-a-half-inch-wide butcher knife and an upward motion to stab her in the chest,
    which he believed “probably perforated the heart and the lung.”
    Zachary was still asleep in his top bunk when Covington stabbed him.
    Zachary did not say anything during the stabbing, and Covington thought that was
    because he stabbed Zachary’s heart. He thought he stabbed Zachary three times,
    once in the back and twice in the chest cavity. He remembered a “chopping knife”
    breaking off inside Zachary when it hit bone. Covington then brought Zachary to
    -8-
    the living room and removed his scrotum and penis. He said that the mutilation
    did not have a sexual basis and that he used pliers to touch Zachary’s penis.
    Covington killed Duke last, by punching him and hitting him with a
    hammer.
    Covington said that after Lisa was dead, he kept hearing her voice, so he cut
    her again. Then he “got what [he] could find of Savannah and Zachary and put
    ’em over by the front door.” He remembered calling his ex-wife, Cheri, twice, but
    she did not answer, and he thought he may have left a message the second time he
    called.1
    Covington said that at some point he thought this must be a nightmare and
    that he better take some more Seroquel. He thought it was at that time that he took
    Depakote, aspirin, Tylenol, and caffeine. He vaguely remembered falling down in
    the closet while he was looking for clothes. The next thing he remembered was the
    police officers telling him to get out of the closet. He did not know how long he
    had been in the closet but remembered that it was daylight when he went in.
    Covington described himself to detectives as a time bomb that had been
    waiting to explode and finally blew up. He said he did not know why he blew up
    because Lisa, Zachary, and Heather Savannah did nothing wrong.
    1. Covington later was able to remember not only that he did leave Cheri a
    message but exactly what he said in the message.
    -9-
    Dr. Leszek Chrostowski, the medical examiner who performed the
    autopsies, testified about the causes of the victims’ deaths and the injuries they
    received.
    Lisa’s death resulted from a knife wound to her neck, which transected her
    trachea, esophagus, and left common carotid artery. It was a gaping wound, eleven
    centimeters long, which appeared to have been made by a back-and-forth sawing
    motion with a knife. Prior to the infliction of the fatal wound, Lisa suffered severe
    injuries to her face, which were likely caused by a beating. Lisa had contusions
    and abrasions to her shoulders and chest, a five-inch cut and stab wound to her left
    breast, a superficial, eight-centimeter laceration across her abdomen, which
    extended into a twenty-eight-centimeter abrasion, and contusions on her right foot,
    all of which were inflicted when she was still alive. She also had multiple cuts to
    her hands and fingers, which were consistent with defensive wounds. She suffered
    a perimortem2 skull fracture, consistent with blows from the smaller hammer found
    at the scene, which caused the whole area at the base of her skull to become
    fragmented. Based on the fact that there were multiple injuries on all of Lisa’s
    body surfaces in different planes, Dr. Chrostowski opined that Lisa was conscious
    2. Perimortem means at or near the time of death or, more specifically,
    while a person is losing blood pressure and in the process of dying.
    - 10 -
    during the attack, moving around and trying to escape the injuries. Stab wounds to
    her abdomen and pubic region were inflicted after her death.
    The cause of Heather Savannah’s death was a cut to the front of her neck.
    Prior to the infliction of the fatal wound, Heather Savannah was severely beaten—
    her cheek was cut down to the bone, the top of her head was cut with a knife in a
    scalping motion, and both of her femurs were fractured. The femur fractures were
    spiral fractures, which Dr. Chrostowski said is “a hallmark of child abuse” that
    results from “jerking” a child. Dr. Chrostowski opined that the leg fractures and
    head trauma occurred when Heather Savannah was “grabbed by the legs and hit
    against something.” After death, Heather Savannah’s body was fragmented. She
    was decapitated and her torso was cut from the genital region through the chest.
    Her right leg and hip were entirely removed from the body. Heather Savannah also
    suffered postmortem fractures to her tibia and fibula and multiple stab wounds to
    her chest and abdomen.
    Zachary died as a result of five stab wounds to his neck and back, which
    caused internal injuries to his vessels and organs, including his heart. Prior to his
    death, Zachary’s skull was fractured in a manner consistent with blows from the
    larger hammer found at the scene. Prior to the infliction of the fatal wounds,
    Zachary was also stabbed in the sacral region, during which the knife broke and the
    blade was left embedded in the bone. A different knife was later used to inflict the
    - 11 -
    fatal stab wounds. A large, gaping wound to the front of Zachary’s body, which
    exposed some of his internal organs, was inflicted perimortem. After Zachary was
    dead, his genitals were removed, additional stab wounds were inflicted to his chest
    and back, and decapitation was attempted.
    Dr. Chrostowski also determined that the blows to Duke’s head were
    consistent with the larger hammer found at the scene.
    At the penalty phase, Covington presented mitigation mainly through his
    parents and several experts, including Dr. Daniel Buffington, a clinical
    pharmacologist; Dr. Alfonso Saa, a psychiatrist; Dr. Valerie McClain, a
    psychologist; Dr. Harry Krop, a psychologist; and Dr. Bala Rao, a psychiatrist.
    The evidence presented in mitigation established that when Covington was a
    newborn in 1972, he was given a massive overdose of an antibiotic, which caused
    him to permanently lose thirty percent of his hearing. The hearing loss was
    especially upsetting to Covington because it prevented him from becoming a Navy
    pilot. But Covington received a settlement from the hospital and used the money
    to hire a private flight instructor and obtain a pilot’s license at the age of seventeen.
    Covington was a good student and did not get into trouble in school. He was
    employed with the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) from 1996 to 2006.
    Covington has a long history of mental health issues and substance abuse
    beginning at age fifteen, when he was first hospitalized for mental health
    - 12 -
    treatment, diagnosed with a “chemical imbalance,”3 and prescribed medication.
    He was later diagnosed with bipolar disorder and hospitalized on a number of
    occasions over the years. Covington was not always compliant in taking his
    prescribed medications and would self-medicate with drugs and alcohol. While
    working for the DOC, Covington was abusing cocaine and opiates. Covington
    stopped working for the DOC because he was getting very paranoid due to his
    cocaine use. Covington described cocaine to Dr. Krop as “like a mistress, like a
    siren calling to me.” Covington told Dr. Krop that he spent $200-250 per week on
    cocaine during the same time period in which he complained that his psychiatric
    medications were financially unavailable to him. Covington admitted that he was
    aware for years prior to the murders that every time he used alcohol and cocaine it
    triggered a rage reaction in him and could cause him to lose control, but he drank
    almost a half-liter of alcohol and used crack cocaine the night before the murders
    anyway.
    A few weeks before the murders, in April 2008, Covington was involuntarily
    committed under the Baker Act. Sometime between the end of March and the
    April commitment, Covington had discontinued his prescribed medications, but the
    3. According to Dr. McClain, Covington was not old enough at age fifteen
    to be diagnosed with bipolar disorder and his first bipolar diagnosis was in 2000 at
    the age of twenty-eight.
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    medications, including Seroquel and Depakote, were reinitiated during the April
    commitment. However, Covington admitted during evaluations conducted before
    trial that he had again stopped taking his medications about a week before the
    murders because he was unhappy that they were causing him sexual dysfunction.
    Covington’s mental health records indicated a pattern of providing false
    information to mental health professionals in order to manipulate the system to get
    what he wanted. When Covington was committed in April 2008 after cutting his
    arm, he told the healthcare providers at the hospital that he only hurt himself to get
    his medications and said, “You have to abuse and work the system.” But
    Covington later told Dr. Rao that the hospitalization was actually prompted by a
    crack binge, after which he became psychotic and paranoid.
    Dr. McClain was retained by the defense to evaluate Covington for
    competency, sanity, and mitigation. She diagnosed Covington with bipolar
    disorder I, alcohol dependence or moderate-use alcohol disorder, cocaine use
    disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder. She described Covington as an
    intelligent man. She believed that Covington was self-medicating with cocaine
    and alcohol and noted that his mental health records revealed that virtually every
    time he was hospitalized from the time he was fifteen years old, cocaine or alcohol
    abuse was involved. Dr. McClain opined without elaboration that Covington
    qualified for both mental health statutory mitigators. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla.
    - 14 -
    Stat. (2014) (“The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
    influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat.
    (2014) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her
    conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was
    substantially impaired.”).
    Dr. Krop was also retained by the defense to evaluate Covington. Dr. Krop
    diagnosed Covington with bipolar disorder II, polysubstance abuse disorder, and
    possibly intermittent explosive disorder. Dr. Krop thought Covington might have
    intermittent explosive disorder based on certain violent incidents in his history,
    including a time when Covington broke his sister’s nose, held a gun to her head,
    and slammed her into the wall, an incident with a property manager, and the killing
    and dismembering of his ex-wife’s cats. Dr. Krop conducted neuropsychological
    testing on Covington and found no frontal lobe deficits.
    Covington told Dr. Krop that the morning of the murders, he came out of his
    room to find the phone so that he could make a call and get more drugs and that he
    went into a rage when he saw Heather Savannah playing with a cell phone.
    Covington told Dr. Krop that the rage he felt towards Heather Savannah before the
    murders was so extreme because he was coming down from crack cocaine and
    alcohol. When Dr. Krop asked Covington why he killed Zachary, Covington said
    that he had no motive and “was just a coldblooded killer at the time.”
    - 15 -
    Dr. Krop opined that Covington qualified for both statutory mental health
    mitigators. He stated that Covington’s extreme mental or emotional disturbance
    was due to stress relating to being on felony probation for an unrelated charge, his
    issues with Lisa’s mother, his concern that the Department of Children and
    Families might become involved with Lisa’s family, his unemployment, and his
    substance use.
    Dr. Rao also evaluated Covington for the defense. Dr. Rao diagnosed
    Covington with bipolar disorder II and also opined that he qualified for both
    statutory mental health mitigators. When Covington discussed with Dr. Rao the
    events surrounding the homicides, he admitted that he picked up Heather Savannah
    and threw her at the couch and that she probably hit the wall. He said that Lisa
    then came out of the bedroom because she heard Heather Savannah screaming and
    that was when he attacked Lisa.
    The State called two psychiatrists in rebuttal—Dr. Wade Myers and Dr.
    Emily Lazarou.
    Dr. Myers diagnosed Covington with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD)
    with traits of sexual sadism and cocaine use disorder. Dr. Myers noted that during
    his relationship with Lisa, Covington told his ex-wife that Lisa and her children
    were a burden and that he would really like to get rid of them and get back together
    with her. Dr. Myers also described examples of Covington’s significant history of
    - 16 -
    violence, including violence toward his sister (breaking her nose), violence toward
    his ex-wife (knocking several of her teeth out and breaking her wrist), the joy he
    got out of hurting people when he played football, and his assault on another
    inmate.
    Dr. Myers believed that Covington’s cocaine abuse was misdiagnosed as
    bipolar disorder. Dr. Myers reviewed Covington’s mental health records and saw
    multiple indications of a history of bipolar disorder, but Dr. Myers took that to
    mean that Covington was telling the healthcare providers that he had bipolar
    disorder and it was his self-report that was documented in the records. Although
    records from many of Covington’s commitments under the Baker Act indicated a
    bipolar diagnosis, Covington tested positive for cocaine during many of those
    admissions, and Dr. Myers explained that bipolar disorder cannot be diagnosed
    while someone has cocaine in his system and appears manic. Dr. Myers stated that
    every time Covington went to the hospital under the Baker Act he was agitated,
    hostile, threatening, angry, and appeared manic, and within a day or two, he was
    polite and cooperative even though mania does not go away within two days.
    Dr. Myers concluded that Covington did not qualify for either statutory
    mental health mitigator. Covington told Dr. Myers that he knew he should not
    have smoked crack the day before the murders but did so anyway. Covington said
    that he can handle cocaine, but when he mixes cocaine and alcohol, he really has
    - 17 -
    problems. While playing his computer game the night before the murders,
    Covington took on a leadership role over other players, which Dr. Myers said
    showed that he had a high degree of cognitive functioning. The only delusion or
    hallucination that Covington described was hearing Lisa’s voice after she was
    dead, at which point Covington said he got a knife and stabbed her some more to
    make sure she was dead. Dr. Myers believed that Covington took an overdose of
    medication after the murders in order to manipulate law enforcement into thinking
    that he was suicidal and mentally ill. Dr. Myers described Covington as “a very,
    very bright man.” Dr. Myers mentioned that as Covington was being led out of the
    house after the murders, he stepped on Lisa’s corpse, which indicates a lack of
    remorse.
    Dr. Lazarou diagnosed Covington with ASPD, borderline personality
    disorder, severe cocaine use disorder, alcohol use disorder, moderate opiate use
    disorder, and psychopathy. Based on her interviews with Covington and review of
    the records and evidence, it was her opinion that Covington does not suffer from
    bipolar disorder. She explained that the basis for her opinion is that mania which
    is not caused by substance use must exist for a bipolar disorder diagnosis, but
    Covington has never had mania that was not substance-induced. She opined that
    Covington’s manic episodes were a side effect of his cocaine use, not a psychiatric
    - 18 -
    illness. Dr. Lazarou did not believe that Covington qualified for either statutory
    mental health mitigator.
    As to the murder of Lisa Freiberg, the trial court concluded that three
    aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the capital
    felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); (2) Covington
    was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use
    or threat of violence (great weight); and (3) the capital felony was committed while
    Covington was on felony probation (minimal weight).
    As to the murder of Zachary Freiberg, the trial court concluded that four
    aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Covington
    was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use
    or threat of violence (great weight); (2) the victim of the capital felony was a
    person less than twelve years of age (great weight); (3) the capital felony was
    committed while Covington was on felony probation (minimal weight); and (4) the
    victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable because Covington stood in
    a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim (great weight).
    As to the murder of Heather Savannah Freiberg, the trial court concluded
    that five aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1)
    the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); (2)
    Covington was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
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    involving the use or threat of violence (great weight); (3) the victim of the capital
    felony was a person less than twelve years of age (great weight); (4) the capital
    felony was committed while Covington was on felony probation (minimal weight);
    and (5) the victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable because
    Covington stood in a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim
    (great weight).
    The trial court found that two statutory mitigating circumstances were
    established: (1) the capital felony was committed while Covington was under the
    influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance4 (moderate weight); and (2)
    Covington has no significant history of prior criminal activity (moderate weight).
    The trial court also found that twenty-four nonstatutory mitigating circumstances
    were established: (1) Covington suffers from bipolar disorder, intermittent
    explosive disorder, and cocaine and alcohol abuse disorder (great weight); (2)
    Covington’s capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was
    diminished due to his mental illness and his voluntary use of cocaine and alcohol5
    4. But the trial court noted that Covington’s “mental or emotional
    disturbance, and his rage and violence, were precipitated by his voluntary use of
    cocaine, alcohol, and his voluntary discontinuing of his psychotropic medications
    because they caused him sexual dysfunction, knowing such would precipitate rage
    and violence.”
    5. Covington proposed the statutory mitigating circumstance that his
    capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
    the requirements of the law was substantially impaired due to his mental illness,
    - 20 -
    (moderate weight); (3) Covington’s mother suffered with gestational diabetes
    during her pregnancy with him and delivered prematurely (no weight); (4)
    Covington suffers a life-long hearing loss due to an antibiotic overdose at the age
    of three weeks (no weight); (5) Covington had two major head injuries resulting in
    loss of consciousness at ages seven and twelve (no weight); (6) Covington was
    diagnosed and treated for sleep apnea due to obesity (no weight); (7) Covington
    went through gastric bypass surgery to improve his physical health (no weight); (8)
    Covington suffered several medical complications following his gastric bypass
    surgery, which led to additional surgeries to repair abdominal obstructions (no
    weight); (9) Covington was a good high school football athlete and graduated with
    average grades (no weight); (10) Covington received a private pilot’s license at age
    seventeen (no weight); (11) Covington was rejected from entering the Navy due to
    hearing loss, which deeply affected his future goals (no weight); (12) Covington
    earned numerous training certificates before and during his ten years of
    employment with the DOC and he was subsequently accepted into an electrical
    apprenticeship program (minimal weight); (13) Covington was awarded a
    but the trial court found that his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
    was not impaired because of his mental illness and that his ability to conform his
    conduct to the requirements of the law was not substantially impaired due to his
    mental illness but was merely diminished due to his mental illness and his
    voluntary use of cocaine and alcohol.
    - 21 -
    certificate of appreciation in 1999 for assisting law enforcement in a domestic
    incident by coming to the assistance of the adult and child victims (moderate
    weight); (14) Covington has the ability to form positive friendships (minimal
    weight); (15) Covington’s parents love and care for him and have been constant
    sources of support and will continue to support him (minimal weight); (16)
    Covington did not resist law enforcement and cooperated with detectives during
    the investigation of the murders (moderate weight); (17) Covington expressed
    remorse during his initial interviews with detectives, to expert witnesses, and
    directly to the Freiberg family (moderate weight); (18) Covington’s risk for
    violence decreases with every year of incarceration based on a published research
    study (minimal weight); (19) Covington’s risk for violence will decrease with
    stabilization of his psychotropic medications (minimal weight); (20) Covington is
    intelligent and can help others through education (no weight); (21) Covington has a
    diagnosis of bipolar disorder and can be helpful to prison medical staff as they treat
    others with similar symptoms (no weight); (22) Covington and his parents want to
    work to increase public awareness of bipolar disorder and the need for access to
    low-cost medications for treatment (no weight); (23) Covington has conformed to
    incarceration and has had no disciplinary actions since 2012 (minimal weight); and
    (24) Covington pleaded guilty and acknowledged responsibility for the deaths of a
    mother and her children, thereby sparing the family of the victims the trauma of a
    - 22 -
    trial (moderate weight). The trial court rejected two proposed nonstatutory
    mitigating circumstances—that a death sentence should not be based on emotions
    and that society can be protected and justice served by a sentence of life without
    parole—finding that they constituted argument rather than mitigating factors.
    In addition to the three death sentences, the trial court sentenced Covington
    to concurrent sentences of fifteen years for each of the three counts of mutilation of
    a dead body and five years for cruelty to an animal. This appeal follows.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. Application of the “Particularly Vulnerable” Aggravator
    Section 921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (2014), provides as an aggravating
    circumstance that “[t]he victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable . . .
    because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodial authority over the
    victim.”6 The trial court concluded that this aggravator was proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt as to the murders of Zachary and Heather Savannah. Covington
    contends that the finding of this aggravator was erroneous because the trial court
    did not make a finding that the children were “particularly vulnerable” but stated
    only that Covington was “in control over the conduct and discipline of both
    children victims for several weeks; in effect he was a parent figure.” We disagree.
    6. The same aggravating factor is now found in section 921.141(6)(m),
    Florida Statutes (2016).
    - 23 -
    “The standard of review this Court applies to a claim regarding the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravating circumstance is that of
    competent, substantial evidence.” Guardado v. State, 
    965 So. 2d 108
    , 115 (Fla.
    2007). “When reviewing a trial court’s finding of an aggravator, ‘it is not this
    Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine whether the State proved
    each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—that is the trial court’s
    job.’ ” Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 
    9 So. 3d 593
    , 608 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Willacy v.
    State, 
    696 So. 2d 693
    , 695 (Fla. 1997)). This Court reviews the record to
    “determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating
    circumstance and, if so, whether competent[,] substantial evidence supports its
    finding.” 
    Id.
    In concluding that the “particularly vulnerable” aggravator was applicable to
    Zachary and Heather Savannah’s murders, the trial court stated:
    At the time of the murders, according to Edward Covington, he
    had been living with Lisa, Zachary and Heather Savannah since the
    end of April, or approximately two weeks. In that period of time, by
    his own description, Edward Covington assumed a parental role with
    the two child victims. According to him ‘‘the kids loved (him).” He
    participated in the “potty training” of Heather Savannah. He cooked
    for Heather Savannah and would withhold bread and vegetables from
    the child to ensure that she would eat her meat first. He participated
    in bathing her. He described having “Zachary in the kitchen with
    (him) as much as possible” in order to teach him how to cook. In
    recounting Zachary’s tendency to run off at events, Edward Covington
    insisted that “we have been having problems with Zachary.” He
    educated Zachary on the dangers of running off by showing him the
    Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s (FDLE) computerized
    - 24 -
    database which showed the locations of pedophiles. Mr. Covington
    admitted warning Zachary that should he keep running off, “we are
    not going to let you go to church . . . (and) we will put you on a leash
    like the kids at the park.” He admitted shouldering some of the
    household duties to lighten Lisa’s burden. According to him, while
    Lisa Freiberg was at work, he cooked for the family and cleaned the
    dishes to give Lisa “a little time off from the kids.” His role as a live-
    in parental figure to Zachary and Heather Savannah heightened their
    vulnerability to his violent character.
    (Alteration in original.)
    There is evidence in the record that at the time of the murder, Covington had
    been dating the children’s mother for about nine months and had been “officially”
    living in the victims’ home for several weeks. Covington had stepped into the role
    of having familial or custodial authority over the children by virtue of the fact that
    he cared for the children while their mother worked, cooked for them, cleaned
    them, disciplined them, encouraged them to eat right, taught Zachary about
    dangerous people in the world, helped potty-train Heather Savannah, and had a
    “parent-like” relationship with them. His role as an authority figure over the
    children explains why Heather Savannah allowed Covington to approach her on
    the morning of her murder even though she knew he was angry with her. And
    Covington was able to approach a sleeping Zachary in his bed and stab him by
    virtue of his role as a parental figure in the home. Thus, there is competent,
    substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that the
    - 25 -
    children were particularly vulnerable to Covington due to the nature of their
    relationship with him.
    B. Application of the HAC Aggravator to Heather Savannah’s Murder
    Covington asserts that there is no competent, substantial evidence to
    establish that Heather Savannah was conscious during the attack and aware of her
    impending death and therefore the trial court erred in finding that the especially
    heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator applied to her murder. We disagree.
    The medical examiner, Dr. Chrostowski, testified that Heather Savannah
    was beaten severely and received multiple injuries while she was still alive,
    including: two broken femurs; a cut to her cheek so deep that it went down to the
    bone; scalping of her head; blunt impact trauma all around her face and head;
    contusions on her face, head, back, buttocks, and thighs; and scattered abrasions on
    top of her head, which indicated she was “impacted by objects on all sides.”
    Contrary to Covington’s statement to the detectives that the first thing he did to
    Heather Savannah was cut her throat, Dr. Chrostowski testified all of these injuries
    were inflicted prior to the fatal neck wound. Dr. Chrostowski was not able to
    discern the order in which the injuries occurred and could not say to a reasonable
    degree of medical certainty that Heather Savannah was conscious throughout the
    attack because the head injury Heather Savannah received would have been
    capable of rendering her unconscious. But Dr. Chrostowski also testified that
    - 26 -
    because the fractures to Heather Savannah’s femurs were spiral fractures, which
    are “a hallmark of child abuse” that results from “jerking” a child, it was his
    opinion that the leg fractures and head trauma occurred when she was “grabbed by
    the legs and hit against something.”
    Covington admitted to the detectives that he “hurt” Heather Savannah “the
    most” of the three victims. Covington also discussed Heather Savannah’s murder
    with a number of mental health professionals who testified at trial. Covington
    consistently reported to them that he was agitated and craving cocaine on the
    morning of the murders. He said he came out of the bedroom to use the phone in
    order to call a drug dealer to get more crack cocaine, and when he saw Heather
    Savannah on the couch playing with a cell phone, he became extremely enraged.
    Covington told Dr. Rao that he picked up Heather Savannah, threw her at the
    couch, and that she probably hit the wall when he threw her. Covington also told
    Dr. Rao that Heather Savannah was screaming.
    We have explained that “the length of the victim’s consciousness is not the
    only factor considered in assessing evidence supporting the HAC aggravator.”
    Beasley v. State, 
    774 So. 2d 649
    , 669 (Fla. 2000); accord Hernandez v. State, 
    4 So. 3d 642
    , 669 (Fla. 2009). “The fear and emotional strain suffered by the victim can
    also be considered in determining whether the murder was heinous, atrocious, or
    cruel.” Lott v. State, 
    695 So. 2d 1239
    , 1244 (Fla. 1997) (holding that although the
    - 27 -
    victim might not have been conscious at the time the fatal slash was inflicted, the
    HAC aggravator was supported by “the physical torture and emotional trauma she
    suffered during the time leading up to her death”); accord Gore v. State, 
    706 So. 2d 1328
    , 1335 (Fla. 1997) (upholding HAC aggravator even though victim’s “death
    by gunshot was most likely instantaneous,” because “the fear and emotional strain
    of the victim from the events preceding the killing may contribute to its heinous
    nature”); James v. State, 
    695 So. 2d 1229
    , 1235 (Fla. 1997) (observing that
    although “the HAC aggravator does not apply to most instantaneous deaths or to
    deaths that occur fairly quickly, fear, emotional strain, and terror of the victim
    during the events leading up to the murder may make an otherwise quick death
    especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”). In determining whether the aggravator is
    present, the focus should be on the victim’s perceptions of the circumstances,
    which may be evaluated in accordance with common-sense inferences from the
    circumstances. See Hernandez, 
    4 So. 3d at 669
    . But “the actions of the defendant
    preceding the actual killing are also relevant.” 
    Id.
    Here, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
    finding of the HAC aggravator. Even if, as Covington initially told detectives, the
    first thing he did to Heather Savannah was stand over her and saw at her neck with
    a bread knife while she cried, then clearly Heather Savannah was conscious and
    aware of her impending death, which would support the aggravator. But the
    - 28 -
    evidence contradicts Covington’s statement to detectives and supports an even
    more heinous, atrocious, and cruel version of events. Dr. Chrostowski testified
    that death would have occurred seconds after Heather Savannah received the fatal
    wound to her throat. It would not have been possible for Covington to have
    inflicted the litany of other antemortem injuries to Heather Savannah in the
    seconds between cutting her throat and her death; thus, the evidence establishes
    that those injuries were inflicted first.7 And even if the first thing Covington did to
    Heather Savannah was pick her up by her legs and throw her into the wall and we
    assume that she was rendered unconsciousness on impact, she still would have
    been conscious prior to impact, she would have been terrified by the extreme rage
    Covington directed toward her and by being picked up by the legs and thrown into
    the wall, and she would have felt extreme pain as her thigh bones broke with the
    force of being jerked and thrown by Covington. Thus, regardless of whether
    Heather Savannah was conscious when Covington cut her throat, there is
    competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that her murder
    was HAC.
    7. Although the fatal wound was a cut to the throat, because Heather
    Savannah was severely beaten before her throat was slashed, we also note that
    “[t]his Court has consistently upheld HAC in beating deaths.” King v. State, 
    130 So. 3d 676
    , 684 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Douglas v. State, 
    878 So. 2d 1246
    , 1261 (Fla.
    2004)); see, e.g., Dennis v. State, 
    817 So. 2d 741
    , 766 (Fla. 2002) (upholding HAC
    where both victims suffered skull fractures and were conscious for at least part of
    the attack).
    - 29 -
    C. Sufficiency of the Sentencing Order
    Covington raises several arguments relating to the sufficiency of the
    sentencing order. He first asserts that the sentencing order must be remanded to
    the trial court for reconsideration because it violates the edicts of Campbell v.
    State, 
    571 So. 2d 415
     (Fla. 1990), receded from on other grounds by Trease v.
    State, 
    768 So. 2d 1050
    , 1055 (Fla. 2000). In Campbell, we articulated the
    requirements regarding the manner in which a trial court must weigh aggravating
    and mitigating circumstances in its written sentencing order. 
    571 So. 2d at 419-20
    .
    We have summarized the requirements for a capital sentencing order under
    Campbell and its progeny as follows:
    In Fennie v. State, 
    855 So. 2d 597
    , 608 (Fla. 2003), we
    reiterated the procedural requirements that a trial court must follow in
    its sentencing order in a capital case. A trial judge must
    (1) expressly evaluate in his or her written order each
    mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to
    determine whether it is supported by the evidence and
    whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of a
    mitigating nature; (2) assign a weight to each aggravating
    factor and mitigating factor properly established; (3)
    weigh the established aggravating circumstances against
    the established mitigating circumstances; and (4) provide
    a detailed explanation of the result of the weighing
    process.
    With regard to mitigating circumstances, “A trial court may
    reject a claim that a mitigating circumstance has been proven provided
    that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the
    rejection.” Moreover, in Trease v. State, 
    768 So. 2d 1050
    , 1055 (Fla.
    2000), we receded from our decision in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d
    - 30 -
    415, 420 (Fla. 1990), and held that trial courts may assign no weight
    to a mitigating factor. In doing so, we recognized that a trial judge
    “may not preclude from consideration any evidence regarding a
    mitigating circumstance that is proffered by a defendant in order to
    receive a sentence of less than death.” However, there are
    circumstances where although a mitigator may be relevant and must
    be considered by the trial judge because it is generally recognized as a
    mitigator, the judge “may determine in the particular case at hand that
    it is entitled to no weight for additional reasons or circumstances
    unique to that case.”
    Orme v. State, 
    25 So. 3d 536
    , 547-48 (Fla. 2009) (citations omitted). “[T]he
    determination of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the respective
    weight assigned to each is within the trial court’s discretion.” Griffin v. State, 
    820 So. 2d 906
    , 913 (Fla. 2002).
    Contrary to Covington’s argument, we conclude that the trial court did in its
    sentencing order expressly evaluate each proposed mitigator, decide whether it was
    truly mitigating, assign a weight to each aggravator and mitigator, and weigh the
    aggravators against the mitigators. The trial court also sua sponte found that two
    additional mitigators were established. We therefore conclude that the sentencing
    order is sufficient to satisfy Campbell.
    Covington raises other complaints about the sentencing order as well, which
    we view as merely an expression of his disagreement with the fact-finding properly
    conducted by the trial court. For example, he asserts that “technically, the court
    rejected the [capacity to conform conduct to the requirements of the law]
    mitigator” by finding only that Covington’s capacity to conform his conduct to the
    - 31 -
    requirements of the law was only diminished rather than substantially impaired
    without providing a rational basis for rejecting the testimony of Covington’s expert
    witnesses. This argument is without merit because the trial court was not required
    to accept the testimony of the defense experts, which was controverted and
    rebutted by the State’s experts. The trial court accepted some of the testimony of
    the defense experts and rejected other testimony that was refuted by the State’s
    experts. In doing so, the court properly executed its duty as the factfinder.
    Covington also argues that the trial court’s finding that his ability to conform
    his conduct to the requirements of the law was not substantially impaired due to his
    mental illness but was merely diminished due to his mental illness and his
    voluntary use of cocaine and alcohol “directly conflicts with, and cannot be
    ‘squared’ with, the conclusions of the defense experts.” But again, in reaching this
    conclusion, the trial court was merely exercising its role as the factfinder by
    accepting parts of the testimony presented by the defense experts and rejecting
    other parts of that testimony based on other evidence in the record. In light of the
    other evidence in the record contradicting the testimony of the defense experts, the
    trial court had no obligation to “square” its conclusions with the testimony of the
    defense experts.
    Finally, Covington argues that the trial court improperly accorded the
    extreme emotional or mental disturbance mitigator only moderate weight because
    - 32 -
    the trial court found that his disturbance was caused “by his voluntary use of
    cocaine, alcohol, and his voluntary discontinuing of his psychotropic medication
    because they caused him sexual dysfunction, knowing such would precipitate rage
    and violence.” Covington asserts that it was improper for the trial court to consider
    the fact that Covington’s intoxication was voluntary when evaluating this
    mitigator, but Covington offers no authority to support this argument. We cannot
    agree that the trial court abused its discretion in affording this circumstance
    moderate weight in light of its findings regarding the cause of the disturbance,
    which were supported by competent, substantial evidence.
    D. Parole Ineligibility as a Mitigating Circumstance
    Covington asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to consider and weigh
    his proposed mitigating circumstance that “society can be protected and justice
    served by a sentence of life without parole.” The trial court’s sentencing order
    reveals that it did consider this proposed mitigator but concluded that it was
    “argument, not a mitigating factor” and declined to give it any weight.
    We have previously determined that “[p]arole ineligibility is mitigating in
    nature because it relates to the circumstances of the offense and reasonably may
    serve as a basis for imposing a sentence less than death.” Ford v. State, 
    802 So. 2d 1121
    , 1136 (Fla. 2001). Whether parole ineligibility is mitigating under the
    circumstances in a particular case is for the trial court to determine. 
    Id.
     Here, the
    - 33 -
    State concedes that the trial court erred by not finding Covington’s parole
    ineligibility to be mitigating in nature but argues that the error was harmless.
    In Ford, we concluded that any error in the trial court’s failure to find parole
    eligibility mitigating in nature was harmless for the following reasons: “(a) [this]
    factor[] occup[ies] a minor and tangential position in the present record; (b) the
    present case contains vast aggravation, including multiple execution-style murders;
    and (c) the trial court recognized and gave weight to numerous other mitigators.”
    Id.; accord Tanzi v. State, 
    964 So. 2d 106
    , 120 (Fla. 2007) (concluding that any
    error in the trial court’s failure to decide whether parole ineligibility was mitigating
    under the particular facts of the case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
    because: “(a) the trial court recognized and gave weight to numerous other
    mitigating circumstances; (b) this case involves substantial aggravation, including
    the HAC and CCP aggravating circumstances; and (c) the life without parole
    proposed mitigator is minor and tangential with respect to the record in this case”).
    We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to consider whether Covington’s
    parole ineligibility was mitigating under the circumstances of this case, but, for the
    reasons that follow, we agree with the State that the error was harmless.
    First, the trial court below recognized and gave weight to numerous other
    mitigating circumstances, including two statutory mitigators and twelve
    nonstatutory mitigators, eight of which were accorded at least moderate weight.
    - 34 -
    Second, this case involves substantial aggravation, including the fact that it was a
    brutal triple murder of an entire family, the murders of two of the victims were
    HAC, and two of the victims were defenseless young children. Finally, the life
    without parole proposed mitigator is minor and tangential with respect to the
    record in this case. This is true in light of the circumstances of this triple
    homicide, Covington’s history of noncompliance with medication, and his history
    of self-medicating with alcohol and cocaine despite knowing that these drugs
    precipitate rage and violence from him. This mitigator is also minor in light of the
    fact that the trial court considered and weighed similar mitigators related to
    Covington’s future risk for violence and ability to conform to incarceration.
    Considering the substantial aggravation in this case and the other, similar
    mitigators that were found to be established and weighed, there is no reasonable
    possibility that the parole ineligibility mitigator would have affected the trial
    court’s determinations that death is the appropriate sentence for each murder.
    Thus, any error in the trial court’s failure to consider parole ineligibility as a
    mitigating circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    E. Validity of the Guilty Pleas
    Covington does not challenge the validity of his guilty pleas, but we are
    nonetheless required to review the judgment of conviction in all cases in which a
    sentence of death was imposed. § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (2016). In order to review
    - 35 -
    the judgment of conviction when a defendant has pleaded guilty to capital murder,
    we review the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the plea. Winkles v.
    State, 
    894 So. 2d 842
    , 847 (Fla. 2005); Lynch v. State, 
    841 So. 2d 362
    , 375 (Fla.
    2003); see Koenig v. State, 
    597 So. 2d 256
    , 257 n.2 (Fla. 1992) (stating that in
    order to review the judgment of conviction when a defendant has pleaded guilty
    and been sentenced to death, this Court “must review the propriety of [the
    defendant’s] plea, since it is the plea which formed the basis for his conviction”).
    “Proper review requires this Court to scrutinize the plea to ensure that the
    defendant was made aware of the consequences of his plea, was apprised of the
    constitutional rights he was waiving, and ple[aded] guilty voluntarily.” Ocha v.
    State, 
    826 So. 2d 956
    , 965 (Fla. 2002).
    Before accepting Covington’s guilty pleas, the trial court conducted a
    thorough plea colloquy with Covington during which the court informed him of all
    the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. Covington indicated both orally and
    in writing that he understood the ramifications of his pleas, that although he was on
    psychiatric medications, there was nothing that would impair his understanding of
    his decision, and that he was not being threatened or coerced into entering the
    pleas. We have held that in a capital case where the trial court explained to the
    defendant that he “was entitled to a jury in both phases of the trial, that if he
    elected to waive his right to a jury, the judge alone would determine his sentence,
    - 36 -
    and that the only sentencing options were life or death” and the defendant “stated
    that he understood the ramifications of his plea, that he was not being threatened or
    coerced, and that he was not on any medication that would impair his
    understanding of his decision,” the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily entered
    his plea, and the trial court properly accepted it.” Winkles, 
    894 So. 2d at 847
    . We
    therefore conclude that Covington’s pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and
    voluntarily entered.
    F. Proportionality
    To ensure uniformity of sentencing in death penalty proceedings, this Court
    considers the totality of circumstances and compares each case with other capital
    cases. We do not simply compare the number of aggravating and mitigating
    circumstances. Taylor v. State, 
    937 So. 2d 590
    , 601 (Fla. 2006). “Further, in a
    proportionality analysis, this Court will accept the weight assigned by the trial
    court to the aggravating and mitigating factors.” Hayward v. State, 
    24 So. 3d 17
    ,
    46 (Fla. 2009). “In performing a proportionality review, a reviewing court must
    never lose sight of the fact that the death penalty has long been reserved for only
    the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders.” Urbin v. State,
    
    714 So. 2d 411
    , 416 (Fla. 1998).
    Here, the trial court found that three aggravating circumstances for Lisa’s
    murder (including HAC and prior violent felony), four aggravating circumstances
    - 37 -
    for Zachary’s murder (including prior violent felony), and five aggravating
    circumstances for Heather Savannah’s murder (including HAC and prior violent
    felony) were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. HAC and prior violent felony are
    among the weightiest of the aggravators. Hodges v. State, 
    55 So. 3d 515
    , 542 (Fla.
    2010). The trial court accorded moderate weight to the two statutory mitigating
    circumstances that were established—extreme mental or emotional disturbance and
    no significant criminal history—and found that twenty-four nonstatutory
    mitigating circumstances were established but accorded only one of them great
    weight and twelve of them no weight.
    We have found the death penalty to be proportionate in other similar cases.
    In Aguirre-Jarquin, 
    9 So. 3d at 610
    , the death sentences were affirmed where the
    defendant stabbed to death a mother and daughter who were his neighbors and with
    whom he visited socially. The defendant was drinking and using cocaine prior to
    the murders. 
    9 So. 3d at 599-600
    , 600 n.4. Three aggravators were found as to the
    mother’s murder: prior violent felony, engaged in the commission of a burglary,
    and HAC. 
    Id.
     at 600 n.6. Five aggravators were found as to the daughter’s
    murder: prior violent felony, engaged in the commission of a burglary, avoid
    arrest, HAC, victim particularly vulnerable due to age or disability. 
    Id.
     And the
    mitigation in Aguirre-Jarquin was similar to the mitigation here, including extreme
    mental or emotional disturbance (moderate weight), substantially impaired ability
    - 38 -
    to appreciate the criminality of his conduct (moderate weight), and long term
    substance abuse (moderate weight). 
    Id.
     We concluded that Aguirre-Jarquin’s
    death sentences were proportionate compared to other death sentences we have
    upheld based on the evidence set forth at trial, the aggravators, and the totality of
    the circumstances. 
    Id. at 610
    ; see also Smithers v. State, 
    826 So. 2d 916
     (Fla.
    2002) (upholding both death sentences in double murder where there were three
    aggravators found for one murder and two for the other (HAC and prior violent
    felony for contemporaneous murder found for both) and where there were two
    statutory mitigators as well as seven nonstatutory mitigators); Francis v. State, 
    808 So. 2d 110
     (Fla. 2001) (upholding death penalty for both stabbing murders of
    elderly sisters when trial court found four aggravators for each murder (HAC,
    victims vulnerable due to age, prior violent felony for contemporaneous murder,
    and murders committed during the course of a robbery) and two statutory
    mitigators along with six nonstatutory mitigators); Morton v. State, 
    789 So. 2d 324
    (Fla. 2001) (upholding both death sentences in double murder by gunshot and
    stabbing where trial court found three aggravators with respect to one murder and
    five with respect to the other (prior violent felony for contemporaneous murder and
    CCP found for both) and found two statutory mitigators and five nonstatutory
    mitigators).
    - 39 -
    In light of the presence of two of the weightiest aggravators as to the
    murders of Lisa and Heather Savannah and one of the weightiest aggravators as to
    Zachary’s murder, only two statutory mitigators of moderate weight, and the fact
    that only twelve nonstatutory mitigators were accorded any weight with eleven of
    them being relatively weak, we conclude that the death sentences are
    proportionate.
    G. Hurst
    Covington asserts that he is entitled to relief under Hurst v. Florida, 
    136 S. Ct. 616
     (2016). We disagree. A defendant like Covington who has waived the
    right to a penalty phase jury is not entitled to relief under Hurst. See Mullens v.
    State, 
    197 So. 3d 16
    , 40 (Fla. 2016) (concluding that defendant who waived
    penalty phase jury was not entitled to relief under Hurst because a defendant
    “cannot subvert the right to jury factfinding by waiving that right and then
    suggesting that a subsequent development in the law has fundamentally
    undermined his sentence”), cert. denied, 
    137 S. Ct. 672
     (2017); see also Brant v.
    State, 
    197 So. 3d 1051
    , 1079 (Fla. 2016) (relying on Mullens to deny Hurst relief
    in a postconviction context where the defendant waived a penalty phase jury).
    III. CONCLUSION
    Having reviewed Covington’s claims as well as the sufficiency of his pleas,
    we affirm the judgments of conviction and sentences of death.
    - 40 -
    It is so ordered.
    LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON,
    and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
    IF FILED, DETERMINED.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,
    William Fuente, Judge - Case No. 292008CF009312000AHC
    Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant
    Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
    for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and C. Suzanne Bechard,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
    for Appellee
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