Anamaria Santiago v. Mauna Loa Investments, LLC. , 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 91 ( 2016 )

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC13-2194
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ANAMARIA SANTIAGO,
Petitioner,
vs.
MAUNA LOA INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Respondent.
[March 17, 2016]
CANADY, J.
In this case, Petitioner Anamaria Santiago seeks review of the decision of
the Third District Court of Appeal in Mauna Loa Investments, LLC v. Santiago,
122 So. 3d 520, 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), a premises liability case. Petitioner
correctly contends that the district court’s decision expressly and directly conflicts
with decisions of this Court and other district courts of appeal regarding the
limitations on a court’s review when determining whether a complaint states a
cause of action. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The
district court held that Santiago’s complaint failed to state a cause of action upon
which relief may be granted and reversed. Mauna Loa Inv., 122 So. 3d at 521.
Because the district court improperly considered documents outside the complaint
in determining the complaint’s sufficiency to state a cause of action, we quash the
Third District’s decision.
BACKGROUND
The relevant facts of this case are as follows:
[Petitioner] Santiago leased space for her business in a
commercial warehouse property located at 9325 Okeechobee Road,
Hialeah Gardens (the “property”). In February 2010, Santiago filed
suit against Mauna [Loa Investments, LLC], alleging that she was
injured on July 2, 2008, when she tripped and fell on the property
“due to the walkway surface being in an unsafe condition; specifically
that the concrete walkway was allowed to be in a condition of
disrepair wherein holes and uneven areas where [sic] created and
caused the Plaintiff to lose her footing and fall.” Santiago alleged that
[at all times] Mauna owned, maintained and/or controlled the property
on the date of her injury. The complaint was served on Mauna’s
registered agent, Mawanphy Gil (“Gil”). Although Gil gave the
complaint to Mauna’s attorney, Mauna’s attorney never filed an
answer or response. Santiago filed a motion for entry of default on
May 5, 2010, and the trial court entered a default against Mauna on
May 13, 2010.
Id. at 521. Mauna Loa Investments, LLC (Mauna) sought a number of times to
vacate the default entered on Santiago’s Mauna Complaint but was denied each
time.
In June 2011, Santiago filed a complaint in a separate action against Iberia,
NV, LLC, in which she sought damages for the same injury occurring on the same
property. Santiago alleged three counts of negligence and a fourth count of
fraudulent transfer of the property. The complaint (Iberia Complaint) asserted that
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Iberia, and others, owned, maintained, and/or controlled the property at the time of
the injury. The complaint acknowledged that ownership of the warehouse property
was not conveyed to Mauna by special warranty deed until October 6, 2008, three
months after Santiago’s fall and injury and the three counts for negligence in the
Iberia Complaint did not include Mauna. A copy of the warranty deed was
attached to the complaint. Santiago’s Iberia case was subsequently consolidated
with Santiago’s suit against Mauna in September 2011.
In November 2011, Mauna once again filed an amended motion to set aside
the 2010 default on the Mauna Complaint. Mauna attached to its motion
Santiago’s Iberia Complaint with its attached special warranty deed. The set-aside
motion alleged that Santiago’s previously filed Mauna Complaint misrepresented
that Mauna owned, maintained and/or controlled the warehouse property, and that
the later filed Iberia Complaint thus constituted Santiago’s admission that her prior
allegations in the Mauna Complaint were false. Mauna contended that Santiago
made knowing misrepresentations that provided Mauna with a meritorious defense
and grounds for setting aside the default. Santiago subsequently voluntarily
dismissed without prejudice the Iberia Complaint. Ultimately, the circuit court
denied Mauna’s motion and prohibited Mauna from filing further pleadings to
vacate the default.
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In January 2012, Mauna moved for summary judgment, alleging two bases:
(1) that a default order is void when a default is entered on a premises liability
claim based on a trip and fall for failing to maintain a walkway over which the
corporation has no control; and (2) that Santiago’s complaint incorrectly alleged
her injuries resulted from a trip and fall. Mauna alleged the injuries actually
resulted from a statue that Santiago was transporting falling on her in a common
area outside her business. The new trial judge denied that motion and another of
Mauna’s motions to set aside the default judgment. The court also prohibited
Mauna from filing further motions to vacate the default judgment. After a trial
solely on damages, the jury found for Santiago. Accordingly, in June 2012, the
trial court entered final judgment against Mauna for $1,099,874.48 and denied
Mauna’s remaining motions.
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal addressed the trial court’s
denial of Mauna’s amended motion to set aside the default. In that motion, Mauna
argued that it did not own, control, or maintain the property on the date of
Santiago’s injury. The argument relied on Santiago’s voluntarily dismissed Iberia
Complaint and the special warranty deed, both of which were attached to Mauna’s
motion to dismiss. On Santiago’s motion for rehearing, the Third District
explained its reversal of the circuit court’s order on the ground that Santiago’s
Mauna Complaint failed to state a cause of action as follows:
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At the time Mauna filed the Amended Motion, the trial court
had before it the special warranty deed, which was attached to the
consolidated Iberia Complaint. The special warranty deed established
that Mauna did not own the property on the date of Santiago’s injury.
Santiago also admitted that Iberia owned, controlled and maintained
the property at that time. These facts precluded a claim for relief
against Mauna relating to the property based on the alleged injury on
that date. As the record before the trial court established that Santiago
failed to state a claim for relief against Mauna, the trial court had no
discretion but to grant the Amended Motion and set aside the default
as void. Accordingly, because the final judgment was based upon the
prior invalid default, the trial court erred in failing to grant Mauna’s
motion to vacate the judgment as void.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the order denying Mauna’s
motion to vacate the judgment as void, and remand with directions to
vacate the default and the final judgment and to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Mauna Loa Inv., 122 So. 3d at 522-23 (footnote and citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
In the instant case, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment
and vacated the default upon holding that Santiago’s Mauna Complaint failed to
state a cause of action. Id. at 523. As explained above, the district court reached
this conclusion based on its consideration of the complaint in the Iberia case,
which for a time was consolidated with the Mauna case. We granted review to
resolve a conflict between the Third District’s decision in this case and decisions
from this Court and other district courts of appeal regarding the limitations on a
court’s review of the pleadings in determining the sufficiency of a complaint to
state a cause of action. We resolve the conflict issue presented and reaffirm the
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longstanding limitations on determining the sufficiency of a complaint. We have
jurisdiction to address the conflict issue and any additional issues raised in light of
our grant of review in this case. Cf. Fulton Cty. Adm’r v. Sullivan, 753 So. 2d
549, 553 at n.3 (Fla. 1999) (“Given our jurisdiction on the basis of the certified
question, we have jurisdiction over all of the issues raised in this case.”). We thus
conclude that the district court erred in holding that the Mauna Complaint failed to
state a cause of action. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Santiago failed to establish excusable neglect.
Before we turn to a discussion of these two issues, we also note that the
district court erred in concluding that a judgment based on a complaint that fails to
state a cause of action is void rather than voidable. See Bank of N. Y. Mellon v.
Condo. Ass’n of La Mer Estates, Inc., 175 So. 3d 282, 285 (Fla. 2015).1
Sufficiency to State a Cause of Action
When a court determines the sufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of
action, it applies the so-called “four corners rule” in the analysis. Under this rule,
the court’s review is limited to an examination solely of the complaint and its
attachments. The conflict decisions in this case illustrate the application of this
rule. In Pizzi v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 250 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1971), we
1. The parties have raised various other issues that we decline to discuss.
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examined a complaint de novo to determine whether it satisfied the requirements
of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110 to state a cause of action. In our review,
we applied the standard of “[w]hether, if the factual allegations of the complaint
are established by proof or otherwise, the plaintiff will be legally or equitably
entitled to the claimed relief against the defendant.” Pizzi, 250 So. 2d at 896(quoting Hankins v. Title & Trust Co., 169 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)).
In making the determination, we “ ‘confine[d] [our review] strictly to the
allegations within the four corners of the complaint.’ ” Id. at 897 (quoting Kest v.
Nathanson, 216 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)); see McWhirter, Reeves,
McGothlin, Davidson, Rief & Bakas, P.A., 704 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 2d DCA
1998) (“[I]n ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of
action, the trial court must confine itself strictly to the allegations within the four
corners of the complaint.”). Because the court had not so limited its review in
Pizzi, we quashed the district court’s decision and remanded for further
proceedings. 250 So. 2d at 897.
Similarly, in Rhodes v. O. Turner & Co., 117 So. 3d 872, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA
2013), receded from on other grounds in Condominium Ass’n of La Mer Estates,
Inc. v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon Corp., 137 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), Rhodes
filed a complaint for civil theft, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty, and a default
was entered when the defendants did not answer. The trial court, however, vacated
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the default judgment after finding the complaint did not state a cause of action.
Rhodes, 117 So. 3d at 874. On appeal, the Fourth District Court examined “the
four corners of the complaint” and found that the circuit court committed a gross
abuse of discretion by incorrectly determining that one of the counts in the
complaint failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 877. Accordingly, the district
court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the final judgment on that count.
Although the “four-corners rule” limits a court’s review in determining the
complaint’s sufficiency, it does not limit it only to the body of the written
complaint. Rule 1.130(b), provides that “[a]ny exhibit attached to a pleading shall
be considered a part thereof for all purposes.” See Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla.
Holdings, Inc., 645 So. 2d 490, 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (“When a party attaches
exhibits to the complaint[,] those exhibits become part of the pleading[,] and the
court will review those exhibits accordingly.”). In Paladin Properties v. Family
Investment Enterp., 952 So. 2d 560, 563-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the district court
explained as follows:
It is true that exhibits attached to a complaint become part of
the complaint and will be considered together with it. It is also true
that exhibits attached to a complaint control over the allegations of the
complaint when the two contradict each other. However, the alleged
contradiction must be apparent from the face of the complaint and the
exhibits. Moreover, for exhibits to serve as a basis for dismissing a
complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the exhibits must
actually negate the cause of action—not simply raise possible
defenses to it.
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(Citations omitted.) Thus, review for the sufficiency of a complaint to state a
cause of action is limited solely to the complaint at issue and its attachments.
In this case, the Iberia Complaint with its warranty deed attachment was in
no wise a part of the Mauna Complaint. The two complaints were filed separately
under different case numbers. They were, for a time, consolidated in the trial
court, and apparently for this reason, the district court in review did not limit its
determination of the sufficiency of the Mauna Complaint to state a cause of action
solely to a review of that complaint. Instead, the district court at the same time
examined the separate Iberia Complaint and its attached warranty deed and found
the claims conflicted with the wholly separate Mauna Complaint. The district
court concluded that Santiago admitted in the Iberia Complaint “that Iberia owned,
controlled[,] and maintained the property at [the relevant] time,” thus “preclud[ing]
a claim for relief against Mauna [in the Mauna Complaint] relating to the property
based on the alleged injury on that date.” Mauna Loa Inv., 122 So. 3d at 523.
The district court’s examination of one complaint and its attachments to
determine the sufficiency of a separate complaint to state a cause of action clearly
contravenes the longstanding four-corners rule explained above. And to the extent
that the district court reached this conclusion based on the consolidation of the
cases, the district court also improperly merged the Mauna and Iberia Complaints.
“Consolidation does not merge suits into a single cause or change the rights of the
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parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another. Rather, each
suit maintains its independent status with respect to the rights of the parties
involved.” Shores Supply Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 524 So. 2d 722, 725 (Fla.
3d DCA 1988) (quoting Wagner v. Nova Univ., Inc., 397 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1981)). The separate complaints were no more than an instance of
alternative pleading, a routine practice under the civil rules of procedure. See, e.g.,
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) (providing that “[r]elief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g) (“A pleader may set
up in the same action as many claims or causes of action or defenses in the same
right as the pleader has, and claims for relief may be stated in the alternative if
separate items make up the cause or action, or if 2 or more causes of action are
joined. . . . A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as that
party has, regardless of consistency[.]” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, as the district court acknowledged, Santiago dismissed the Iberia
Complaint before the circuit court’s hearing on Mauna’s motion to dismiss the
Mauna Complaint was held. Mauna Loa Inv., 122 So. 3d at 523 n.4 (“The fact that
Santiago dismissed the Iberia Complaint pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.420(a)(1) (2011) immediately prior to the hearing on Mauna’s
Amended Motion does not affect our analysis.”). Thus, the district court
determined the sufficiency of the Mauna Complaint by looking outside the four
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corners of the complaint at issue to consider a separate complaint that was
dismissed before the trial court ruled on the Mauna Complaint. See id.Within the four corners of the Mauna Complaint, Santiago clearly stated a
cause of action for premises liability against Mauna. And the well pleaded
allegations of that complaint were admitted by Mauna’s default. See Henry J.
Trawick, Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure. § 25:4 (2015-2016 ed.).
Indeed, Mauna did not challenge the sufficiency of Santiago’s complaint to state a
cause of action in the trial court, and such an error must be preserved for appellate
review. See Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be
preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the
lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or
review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.”).
Accordingly, the district court erred in addressing this issue.
Setting Aside the Default
In this case, the trial court denied Mauna’s motion to set aside the default
judgment entered against it when Mauna failed to respond to Petitioner Santiago’s
complaint. The district court’s reversal of the trial court was predicated on the
district court’s determination that the complaint failed to state a cause of action,
that the judgment based on the default was therefore void, and consequently that a
showing of excusable neglect need not be made to justify setting aside the default.
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For reasons that the foregoing analysis makes clear, this line of reasoning
collapses. Santiago argues here that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Mauna’s motion to set aside the default and that the trial court’s decision
should be upheld. We agree.
A court has discretion to set aside a default judgment if the moving party
demonstrates: (1) excusable neglect in failing timely to file a response; (2) a
meritorious defense; and (3) due diligence in requesting relief after discovery of
the default. See Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 236
(Fla. 2009); see also Philip J. Padovano, Florida Civil Practice § 9:4 (2015).
Failure to satisfy any of the three elements results in denial of the motion to vacate.
As we have explained, the district court failed to apply this standard when it
reversed the trial court’s order denying Mauna’s motion to vacate.
The Mauna Complaint was filed on February 4, 2010, and served on
Mauna’s president—who was Mauna’s registered agent—on February 17, 2010.
Mauna’s president promptly delivered the complaint to counsel and subsequently
called his office regarding the motion and was assured by a secretary that the
matter was being handled. Nevertheless, Mauna’s attorney did not file a response,
and Mauna’s president never followed up to assure the filing was indeed made.
Finally, on May 5, 2010, Santiago filed a motion for entry of a default, and the
default was entered five days later.
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The facts of the instant case are not unlike the situation in Abel, Tony and
Aldo Creative Group, Inc. v. Friday Night Investors, Inc., (“Abel, Tony & Aldo”)
419 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). There, the district court reversed an order
vacating a default, stating that “[t]he affidavit of the defendant’s president that he
had referred the complaint to an attorney whom he ‘thought’ had responded was
insufficient to demonstrate excusable neglect, particularly since the plaintiff
subsequently gave notice, which was not responded to, of its intention to seek a
default because no answer had been filed.” Abel, Tony & Aldo, 419 So. 2d at
1135-36; see Scherer v. The Club, Inc., 328 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
(“[N]either an affidavit [n]or other proof appear in the record to show excusable
neglect by an officer or agent of the defendant nor was it made to appear that the
defendant had a meritorious defense.”). Here, under similar circumstances, Mauna
did not establish excusable neglect for failing timely to respond to the complaint.
After one call to her attorney’s office, the company’s president took no further
action to assure a timely response to the complaint was filed. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering a default.
Conclusion
Having resolved the conflict regarding the scope of review in determining
the sufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of action, we reaffirm our
longstanding rule that the sufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of action must
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be determined solely by examination of the complaint and its related attachments,
if any. Here, the district court’s scope of review erroneously included a separate
complaint, which was outside the “four corners” scope. We also hold that because
there was no showing of excusable neglect the trial court properly denied the
motion to set aside the default. Accordingly, we quash the district court’s decision
in its entirety.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY,
JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D12-1825
(Miami-Dade County)
Gregory Alan Moore of Gregory A. Moore, P.A., Miami, Florida; Carlos Cruanes
of the Law Offices of Carlos Cruanes, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Celene Harrell
Humphries, Tracy Sue Carlin, and Sarah C. Pellenbarg of Brannock & Humphries,
Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Dorothy Frances Easley of Easley Appellate Practice, PLLC, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent
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