Claudio J. Poillot v. State of Florida , 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 370 ( 2016 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC15-1691
____________
CLAUDIO J. POILLOT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[September 8, 2016]
POLSTON, J.
Claudio J. Poillot seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of
Appeal in State v. Poillot, 173 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding that
deviation from work release program establishes a prima facie case for escape), on
the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Second
District in State v. Williams, 918 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that
deviation from work release program does not establish a prima facie case for
escape), on a question of law.1 For the reasons described below, we approve the
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
decision in Poillot and disapprove of the decision in Williams to the extent it is
inconsistent with this decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Claudio J. Poillot was convicted of a felony and sentenced to 48 months in
the State of Florida Department of Corrections (“DOC”). On the date of the instant
offense, July 29, 2014, Poillot was in state custody housed at the Kissimmee
Community Center. As part of a work release program, Poillot began employment
with a construction company, JS & Son Construction Services. The work release
program permitted Poillot to work outside of the correctional facility from 6:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. Poillot, 173 So. 3d at 1071. “On
July 29, 2014, he left the Kissimmee Community Work Release Center and timely
reported to work at JS & Son Construction. Shortly thereafter, Poillot left his place
of employment without permission and was unaccounted for until he timely
returned to the work release center before 6:00 p.m., at which time he was placed
under arrest for escape.” Id. at 1072.
Poillot was charged by amended information with escape pursuant to section
944.40, Florida Statutes. Subsequently, Poillot filed a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). Id. at 1071-72. After a hearing
on the motion, the trial court granted Poillot’s motion to dismiss, and the State
timely appealed. Id.-2-
The Fifth District reversed, “[c]oncluding that the undisputed material facts
are legally sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1071. “In
determining whether the State sufficiently demonstrated a prima facie case of
escape under section 944.40 in the context of this case, [the Fifth District] also
examine[d] section 945.091, Florida Statutes (2014), which authorizes the DOC to
extend the limits of a prisoner’s confinement.” Id. at 1072. The Fifth District
discussed that the language in section 945.091(1)(b) shows that work release is
merely an extension of the place of confinement, so that a prisoner may still be
regarded as “confined” even though not physically present in a state or county
correctional facility. Id. at 1073. The Fifth District concluded that “the work-
release program was an extension of Poillot’s confinement, and his deviation from
the program in the manner asserted by the State establishes a prima facie case for
escape.” Id. Therefore, the Fifth District found that “the trial court erred in
dismissing the amended information.” Id.II. ANALYSIS
Poillot argues that he was absent from work, not escaping from confinement
as contemplated by the applicable statute. Additionally, Poillot argues that the
Fifth District’s statutory interpretation violates due process and the applicable
statute should be construed as requiring either knowledge or notice in order to
sustain an escape charge. Specifically, he argues that even though he may have
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been in violation of the rules of the work release program when he left his place of
employment without permission, and his privilege to participate in the program
may have been withdrawn, he still must have been aware of or notified of his
termination from employment or revocation from the work release program in
order to sustain the charge of escape. We disagree.2
Section 944.40, Florida Statutes, provides that a prisoner who escapes
confinement commits a second-degree felony:
Any prisoner confined in any prison, jail, private correctional
facility, road camp, or other penal institution, whether operated by the
state, a county, or a municipality, or operated under a contract with
the state, a county, or a municipality, working upon the public roads,
or being transported to or from a place of confinement who escapes or
attempts to escape from such confinement commits a felony of the
second degree . . . .
§ 944.40, Fla. Stat. (2014).
Additionally, section 945.091, Florida Statutes, authorizes the DOC to
extend the limits of a prisoner’s confinement:
(1) The department may adopt rules permitting the extension of the
limits of the place of confinement of an inmate as to whom there is
reasonable cause to believe that the inmate will honor his or her trust
by authorizing the inmate, under prescribed conditions and following
investigation and approval by the secretary, or the secretary’s
designee, who shall maintain a written record of such action, to leave
the confines of that place unaccompanied by a custodial agent for a
prescribed period of time to:
2. Our standard of review is de novo. See Hopkins v. State, 105 So. 3d 470,
472 (Fla. 2012).
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...
(b) Work at paid employment, participate in an
education or a training program, or voluntarily serve a
public or nonprofit agency or faith-based service group in
the community, while continuing as an inmate of the
institution or facility in which the inmate is confined,
except during the hours of his or her employment,
education, training, or service and traveling thereto and
therefrom. . . .
...
(4) The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended
limits of his or her confinement or to return within the time prescribed
to the place of confinement designated by the department shall be
deemed as an escape from the custody of the department and shall be
punishable as prescribed by law.
§ 945.091, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added).
Under section 945.091(4), an inmate on authorized work release can be
guilty of escape under section 944.40 in at least two different ways: (1) by
willfully failing to remain within the extended limits of his or her confinement; or
(2) by willfully failing to return within the time prescribed to the place of
confinement. See Atwell v. State, 739 So. 2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
In this case, pursuant to section 945.091, the work release program was an
extension of the limits of Poillot’s confinement, and he was still confined when he
was working as part of a work release program at JS & Son Construction. See §
945.091(1)(b), Fla. Stat. When Poillot left his place of employment without
permission, he willfully failed to remain within the extended limits of his
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confinement and would be guilty of escape pursuant to one of the manners
described in section 945.091(4). Additionally, contrary to Poillot’s assertion,
Poillot need not be aware of the changed conditions of his employment status with
the work release program in order to sustain an escape charge. As explained
earlier, an escape charge requires (1) willfully failing to remain within the
extended limits of his confinement, or (2) willfully failing to return within the time
prescribed to the place of confinement. § 945.091(4), Fla. Stat. Poillot’s
knowledge that he was actually terminated from JS & Son Construction after
leaving without permission does not change the fact that he willfully escaped from
confinement, as defined by statute.
Accordingly, pursuant to the applicable statutes, an inmate is still confined
when he is working as part of a work release program, and leaving without
permission would subject the inmate to a charge of escape.
III. CONCLUSION
We approve the decision in Poillot and disapprove of the decision in
Williams to the extent it is inconsistent with this decision.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY,
JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict of Decisions
Fifth District - Case No. 5D15-353
(Osceola County)
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Steven Neale Gosney, Assistant Public
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Harold Heidt,
Bureau Chief, and Kristen Lynn Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
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