State of Florida v. Zachariah Dorsett ( 2015 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC13-310
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
ZACHARIAH DORSETT,
Respondent.
[February 26, 2015]
CANADY, J.
In this case, we answer a certified question regarding the knowledge element
of Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006). We have
for review, Dorsett v. State, 147 So. 3d 532, 536-37 (Fla. 4th DCA), review
granted, 122 So. 3d 869 (Fla. 2013), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that in the prosecution of a driver for willfully leaving the scene of an accident
involving an injury the statute requires the State to prove that the driver had “actual
knowledge” of being involved in a crash. The district court certified to this Court
the following question: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida
Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of
the crash?” 147 So. 3d at 533 (emphasis in original). We have jurisdiction. See
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. To answer the question, we begin by reviewing the
facts of the case and then examine the statute and the cases construing it to
determine whether a criminal conviction for violation of the hit-and-run statute
requires proof of the driver’s actual knowledge rather than mere constructive
knowledge of being involved in a crash. For the reasons explained below, we
answer the certified question in the affirmative.
I. BACKGROUND
Zachariah Dorsett was charged with leaving the scene of a crash resulting in
an injury under this state’s hit-and-run statute, a third degree felony under section
316.027(1), Florida Statutes (2006). The statute is set out fully in our subsequent
discussion. In brief, however, the statute requires the driver involved in a
vehicular crash to stop, provide assistance to anyone injured, and provide
information to others and the authorities. The district court summarized the
underlying facts presented at Dorsett’s trial as follows:
The defendant was driving a heavy pickup truck northbound on
A1A. According to the defendant, he had his windows rolled up,
windshield wipers and air conditioner on, and was listening to the
[portable] radio at full volume. He saw a lot of people running across
the street from the beach as it began to rain. The people had cleared
the street as he drove through the intersection.
According to the defendant, he was unaware that a young
teenager had lost control of his skateboard and fell as he crossed the
road, hitting the truck’s passenger side undercarriage. The defendant
continued traveling north at a normal rate of speed and did not stop.
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He was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and had no
hearing or health problems.
Law enforcement stopped the defendant approximately three
miles from the accident. When questioned by law enforcement as to
why he did not stop, the defendant explained:
The bottom line is if I would have known I had hit
somebody, I would have definitely stopped this truck;
that’s the bottom line. I didn’t—there was no—at all but
the radio and me driving; I didn’t hear anything else,
nothing was going on. I just found out about this person
getting struck by my truck that I have no idea I had
struck.
The State charged the defendant with leaving the scene of a
crash involving injury. He entered a not guilty plea and proceeded to
trial. There, the officer who stopped the defendant testified that the
victim was on his rear end in the crosswalk when he was hit by the
truck. The victim went underneath the truck and was dragged almost
ninety feet. There was no evidence of braking, skid marks, brake
lights, evasive steering, or a change in speed. There was no damage
to the front of the truck.
Several witnesses testified that they saw the accident. One saw
the truck’s wheels go over the victim’s body and heard the truck ride
over him. A worker testified that he heard the accident from one of
the upper floor patios of a building where he was installing windows;
he saw the victim skateboard into the street, go underneath the truck,
and be dragged down the street. His co-worker testified that he saw
the skateboard being spit out from under the truck’s right rear tire and
heard the skateboard crack in two. He also saw the back right tire of
the truck actually raise up or jump up.
Another eyewitness testified that she was in a car at the light
when she heard a loud noise at impact through her closed window.
Another witness testified that he was about seventy-five to one
hundred yards away from the road when he heard a loud thud and the
sound of cracking wood. Yet another witness testified that she saw
the victim fall off the skateboard and hit the right side of the truck.
A second officer testified that he pulled the defendant’s vehicle
over within minutes of the accident. The defendant immediately
jumped out of the truck and appeared very nervous. He was visibly
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shaking and stuttering. The defendant repeatedly asked why he had
been stopped. According to the second officer, the truck’s windows
were up, but the radio was not on.
Dorsett, 147 So. 3d at 533-34.
Arguing that the hit-and-run statute requires proof that the driver had “actual
knowledge” of involvement in a crash, Dorsett proposed a jury instruction that
required the jury to find as an essential element that he “knew that he was involved
in an accident.” Id. at 534 (emphasis omitted). The trial judge, however, denied
the defendant’s request and read the standard jury instruction, which provided that
the State must prove the defendant “knew or should have known” that he was
involved in a crash. Id. at 535; see Fla. Std. Jury Inst. (Crim.) 28.4. The jury
found Dorsett guilty, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to twenty-four
months in prison for the third-degree felony.
On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Dorsett again argued “that
the standard jury instructions included an incorrect statement of law regarding
section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), because the law requires actual
knowledge of the accident.” 147 So. 3d at 534 (emphasis in original). Citing this
Court’s decision in State v. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), the district court
concluded that proof of a defendant’s actual knowledge of the accident is required
and the jury should be so instructed. Dorsett, 147 So. 3d at 536-37. As a result the
Fourth District reversed and remanded the case for new trial but also certified the
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following question: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida
Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of
the crash?” 147 So. 3d at 533 (emphasis in original).
II. ANALYSIS
Whether Florida’s hit-and-run statute requires the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the driver had actual knowledge of being involved in a crash
is a question of law that requires interpretation of section 316.027 to give effect to
the Legislature’s intent. “The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and
therefore subject to the de novo standard of review.” Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d
1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006). Accordingly, this “Court looks primarily at the plain
meaning of the statute to determine the legislative intent.” Id. at 1091. However,
when the language of a statute is unclear or ambiguous, we employ rules of
statutory construction to discern that intent. Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803,
811 (Fla. 2008).
The relevant portion of Florida’s hit-and-run statute, subsection 316.027
provides as follows:
(1)(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring
on public or private property that results in injury of any person must
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close
thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he
or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who
willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the third degree,
punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.
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(b) The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public
or private property that results in the death of any person must immediately
stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and
must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the
requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this
paragraph commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
As the statute plainly states, compliance with the law requires “[t]he driver of any
vehicle involved in a crash . . . that results in injury of any person” to “immediately
stop,” “remain at the scene,” and comply with section 316.062, which requires the
driver to provide reasonable assistance to anyone injured and to provide identifying
information as specified. § 316.027(1)(a).
Although section 316.027 does not expressly state that actual knowledge is
required for a violation, the law does expressly provide that a felony criminal
violation requires that the driver “willfully” violate the statute. For the reasons we
explain, we conclude that a willful violation can be established only if the driver
had actual knowledge that a crash occurred.
In Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 370, we addressed a related claim that section
316.027 contained a requirement of actual knowledge that an injury had occurred.
In that case, the defendant was charged under section 316.027 with leaving the
scene of an accident involving a personal injury or death. He “struck two young
women walking on a dark stretch of Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County,” killing
one and injuring the other. Id. Mancuso requested a jury instruction requiring the
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State to prove that he had “actual knowledge” of the injury, i.e., that he “knew that
he was involved in an accident which resulted in personal injury to another” and
“willfully left the scene and willfully failed to render aid or give certain
information.” Id. at 371 (emphasis added). The trial court denied the request and
instead instructed the jury to determine whether Mancuso “knew or should have
known that he was involved in an accident, and that he willfully failed to stop at
the scene.” Id. (emphasis added). Mancuso was convicted and on appeal, the
district court approved the trial court’s instruction and certified the following
question to this Court: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida
Statutes (1991), must the State show that the defendant knew or should have
known of the injury or death; and the jury be so instructed?” Id. at 370; see
Mancuso v. State, 636 So. 2d 753, 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
On review, we relied on our decision in Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141
(Fla. 1980), to answer the question. In that case, we rejected the contention that
section 316.027 created two offenses—the misdemeanor of unlawfully leaving the
scene and the felony of willfully leaving the scene—and held the statute “creates
only the felony of ‘willfully’ leaving the scene of an accident.” 384 So. 2d at 141-
42, 143. Accordingly, in Mancuso, we explained that
[i]n reaching [the determination in Stanfill], this Court implicitly
recognized that knowledge of the accident is an essential element of
section 316.027, for one cannot “willfully” leave an accident without
awareness that an accident has occurred. A majority of jurisdictions
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that have considered similarly worded “hit-and-run” statutes have also
concluded that knowledge of the accident must be read into the
statute.
Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 371 (emphasis added).
With regard to the element of knowledge of the injury, however, we held in
Mancuso that “criminal liability under section 316.027 requires proof that the
driver charged with leaving the scene either knew of the resulting injury or death
or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident and that the jury
should be so instructed.” Id. at 372. In so holding, we relied in part on the
reasoning of other courts analyzing statutes based on the same uniform law that the
“ ‘statute requires an affirmative course of action to be taken by the driver and it
necessarily follows that one must be aware of the facts giving rise to this
affirmative duty in order to perform such a duty.’ ” Id. (quoting Kimoktoak v.
State, 584 P.2d 25, 31 (Alaska 1978)).
In Mancuso, we referred the jury instruction issue to the Supreme Court
Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases for consideration of an
instruction consistent with our holding. Id. The Committee responded with a jury
instruction that required the State to prove that the driver had actual or constructive
knowledge of the injury. See Std. Jury Instrs. in Crim. Cases (95-2), 665 So. 2d
212, 215 (Fla. 1995). However, the instruction also provided—and still provides—
that the driver may have either actual or constructive knowledge of the crash or
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accident. The standard jury instruction currently provides in pertinent part as
follows:
To prove the crime of Leaving the Scene of a Crash Involving Death or
Injury, the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable
doubt:
1. (Defendant) was the driver of a vehicle involved in a crash resulting in
[injury to] [the death of] any person.
2. (Defendant) knew or should have known that [he] [she] was involved
in a crash.
Give 3a if death is charged or 3b if injury is charged.
3. a. (Defendant) knew or should have known of the injury to or
death of the person.
b. (Defendant) knew or should have known of the injury to
the person.
Give 4a, 4b, or both as applicable.
4. a. (Defendant) willfully failed to stop at the scene of the
crash or as close to the crash as possible and remain there
until [he] [she] had given “identifying information”. . . ;
[or]
b. (Defendant) willfully failed to render “reasonable
assistance” to the injured person if such treatment
appeared to be necessary or was requested by the injured
person.
Fla. Std. Jury Inst. (Crim.) 28.4 (emphasis added).
The standard instruction defines willfully to mean “intentionally and
purposely,” id., and we stated in Mancuso that “one cannot ‘willfully’ leave an
accident without awareness that an accident has occurred.” 652 So. 2d at 371.
These statements are at odds with the instruction’s suggestion that constructive
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knowledge that a crash occurred is sufficient to establish the willfulness of the
defendant in leaving the scene. In State v. Dumas, 700 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (Fla.
1997), we reinforced the principle that the duty imposed by the statute flows from
the driver’s knowledge of the accident or crash. The question presented was
whether in a prosecution under the hit-and-run statute the State must prove the
defendant’s knowledge of the results of the crash. The statute contained two
offenses: the third-degree felony of leaving the scene of an accident involving
injury and the second-degree felony of leaving the scene of an accident involving a
death. Id. at 1224-25. This Court explained that
Florida law imposes an affirmative duty on a driver to stop, render
aid, and provide certain information necessary for an insurance claim
and an accident report whenever there is an injury. § 316.062, Fla.
Stat. (1995). Florida law further makes it a felony to fail to complete
these duties. § 316.027(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). One of the main
purposes of the statute is to ensure that accident victims receive
medical assistance as soon as possible. Herring v. State, 435 So. 2d
865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“It is apparent that the purpose of
sections 316.027 and 316.062 is to assure that any injured person is
rendered aid and that all pertinent information concerning insurance
and names of those involved in the traffic accident is exchanged by
the parties.”). The fact that a death rather than an injury has occurred
does not trigger a different set of duties. Thus, the knowledge element
that triggers the affirmative duty is the same in each circumstance, but
the sanction imposed is determined by the results of the accident.
Id. at 1225-26 (emphasis added). As we stated in Mancuso, the duties imposed in
this statute are triggered by the driver’s actual knowledge of involvement in a crash
or accident. 652 So. 2d at 372.
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Other states with similar hit-and-run statutes require the driver to have actual
knowledge of the crash to support imposition of the attendant duties. In State v.
Medeiros, 997 A.2d 95, 97 n.1 (Me. 2010), for example, the operative section of
the Maine statute provides: “The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident
anywhere that results in personal injury or death to a person shall immediately stop
the vehicle at the scene of the accident . . . .” The provision imposes duties similar
to those in the Florida statute to report and provide assistance. Id. In rejecting
Medeiros’s claim on appeal that insufficient evidence supported the finding that he
had actual knowledge of the accident, the Maine Supreme Court explained that
although “involve[ment] in [an] accident” was not defined by the statute, “because
the statute imposes an affirmative duty to act, actual knowledge of involvement in
an accident is implied within the statute’s structure.” Id. at 100 (citing State v.
Keiser, 807 A.2d 378, 384 (Vt. 2002), and noting that Vermont’s hit-and-run
statute similarly requires actual knowledge of the crash); see State v. Miller, 308
N.W.2d 4, 6-7 (Iowa 1981) (stating proof of the defendant’s “actual knowledge” of
the accident is an essential element of the crime that may be established from
direct proof or “surrounding circumstances”).
Recently, the First District Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion and
certified to this Court the same question we address in the instant case. In Cahours
v. State, 147 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the defendant was convicted of
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leaving the scene of a crash involving a death under the hit-and-run statute and
vehicular homicide. On appeal, Cahours contended that the standard jury
instruction for leaving the scene which requires proof that the defendant “knew or
should have known” of involvement in a crash “misstates the law” and that to
convict the State must prove the driver’s actual knowledge of the crash. Id. at 576.
Citing the Fourth District’s decision in this case, the First District concluded that
“a defendant must have actual knowledge of the crash in order to willfully leave
the scene.” Id. Accordingly, the First District “h[e]ld that a defendant cannot
willfully, intentionally, or purposefully leave the scene of a crash without actually
knowing that the crash occurred.” Id. at 577. The court noted, however, that
proving knowledge or intent “is seldom capable of direct proof[;][it] usually is
established from the surrounding circumstances.” Id. at 576 n.2 (quoting Miller,
308 N.W.2d at 7).
III. CONCLUSION
We agree with the Fourth District’s holding that in a prosecution under
Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the driver had actual knowledge of the crash, an essential
element of the crime of leaving the scene of a crash. We approve the decision on
review and answer the certified question in the affirmative.
It is so ordered.
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LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY,
JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance
Fourth District - Case No. 4D11-1530
(Palm Beach County)
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Consiglia Terenzio,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, James Joseph Carney, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, and Jeanine Marie Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General,
West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Jeanette Anne Bellon of Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent
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