Citizens Property Insurance Corp., etc. v. Perdido Sun Condominium Association, Inc., etc. , 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 265 ( 2015 )


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  •           Supreme Court of Florida
    ____________
    No. SC14-185
    ____________
    CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORP., etc.,
    Petitioner,
    vs.
    PERDIDO SUN CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., etc.,
    Respondent.
    [May 14, 2015]
    PARIENTE, J.
    The issue in this case is whether the Florida Legislature intended Citizens
    Property Insurance Corporation, a state-created entity that provides property
    insurance, to be liable for statutory first-party bad faith claims as an exception to
    its statutory immunity from suit. The First District Court of Appeal in Perdido Sun
    Condominium Ass’n v. Citizens Property Insurance Corp., 
    129 So. 3d 1210
    (Fla.
    1st DCA 2014), determined that the “willful tort” statutory exception to Citizens’
    immunity applied to statutory first-party bad faith claims and certified conflict with
    the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Citizens Property Insurance Corp.
    v. Garfinkel, 
    25 So. 3d 62
    (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), disapproved on other grounds by
    Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, 
    104 So. 3d 344
    (Fla.
    2012), which held to the contrary that Citizens is statutorily immune. Additionally,
    the First District passed upon the following question, which it certified to be of
    great public importance:
    WHETHER THE IMMUNITY OF CITIZENS PROPERTY
    INSURANCE CORPORATION, AS PROVIDED IN SECTION
    627.351(6)(s), FLORIDA STATUTES, SHIELDS THE
    CORPORATION FROM SUIT UNDER THE CAUSE OF ACTION
    CREATED BY SECTION 624.155(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES[,]
    FOR NOT ATTEMPTING IN GOOD FAITH TO SETTLE
    CLAIMS?
    Perdido 
    Sun, 129 So. 3d at 1213
    .1
    We conclude, as more fully explained below, that a statutory first-party bad
    faith cause of action under section 624.155(1)(b) is not an exception to the
    immunity granted to Citizens by the Legislature. Accordingly, we quash Perdido
    Sun, approve the reasoning of Garfinkel on this issue, and answer the certified
    question in the affirmative.
    BACKGROUND
    After prevailing in a breach of contract action against its insurance company,
    Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Perdido Sun Condominium Association
    sued Citizens a second time. In the second lawsuit, Perdido Sun alleged a statutory
    1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
    -2-
    first-party bad faith claim, pursuant to section 624.155(1), Florida Statutes (2009),
    which provides in relevant part:
    (1) Any person may bring a civil action against an insurer
    when such person is damaged:
    ....
    (b) By the commission of any of the following acts by the
    insurer:
    1. Not attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all
    the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly
    and honestly toward its insured and with due regard for her or his
    interests[.]
    Specifically, Perdido Sun claimed that Citizens (1) refused to pay the full
    amount owed to Perdido Sun under the insurance policy; (2) refused to take part in
    the required appraisal process and instead used that process in an attempt to
    forestall litigation; (3) delayed payment of the appraisal award and improperly
    attempted to condition payment of the award upon the execution of a universal
    release; and (4) engaged in a pattern and practice of seeking to avoid or delay full
    settlement of claims.
    Citizens moved to dismiss the complaint, citing its immunity from suit under
    section 627.351(6)(s)1., Florida Statutes (2009), which provides:
    There shall be no liability on the part of, and no cause of action
    of any nature shall arise against, any assessable insurer or its agents or
    employees, the corporation or its agents or employees, members of the
    board of governors or their respective designees at a board meeting,
    corporation committee members, or the office or its representatives,
    for any action taken by them in the performance of their duties or
    responsibilities under this subsection. Such immunity does not apply
    to:
    -3-
    a. Any of the foregoing persons or entities for any willful tort;
    b. The corporation or its producing agents for breach of any
    contract or agreement pertaining to insurance coverage;
    c. The corporation with respect to issuance or payment of debt;
    d. Any assessable insurer with respect to any action to enforce
    an assessable insurer’s obligations to the corporation under this
    subsection; or
    e. The corporation in any pending or future action for breach of
    contract or for benefits under a policy issued by the corporation; in
    any such action, the corporation shall be liable to the policyholders
    and beneficiaries for attorney’s fees under s. 627.428.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Perdido Sun relied on the statutory exception to immunity for “any willful
    tort” in asserting that immunity did not apply. The trial court disagreed and
    dismissed the complaint with prejudice, reasoning that a statutory bad faith action
    under section 624.155 was not among the specifically listed exceptions to the
    immunity provided in section 627.351(6)(s). On appeal, the First District reversed,
    concluding that “Citizens’ immunity does not extend to the ‘willful tort’ of failing
    to attempt in good faith to settle claims as provided by section 624.155.” Perdido
    
    Sun, 129 So. 3d at 1213
    . The First District certified conflict with Garfinkel, 
    25 So. 3d
    62, which had held to the contrary—that a cause of action for statutory first-
    party bad faith did not constitute a “willful tort” for purposes of the statutory
    exceptions from Citizens’ immunity. Perdido 
    Sun, 129 So. 3d at 1213
    . The First
    District also certified the question to be one of great public importance. 
    Id. ANALYSIS -4-
          The issue in this case turns on a question of statutory construction—namely,
    whether the Legislature intended Citizens to be liable for statutory first-party bad
    faith claims. The answer to this question requires us to review the specific
    exceptions that the Legislature provided to Citizens’ statutory immunity and to
    examine whether liability on this ground is included within the statutory phrase
    “willful tort.” Perdido Sun argues, and the First District agreed, that a statutory
    bad faith cause of action constitutes a “willful tort” for purposes of the statutory
    immunity. Citizens counters that a statutory bad faith cause of action is not a tort.
    Both Perdido Sun and Citizens rely on statutory construction principles to support
    their respective positions.
    As the issue presented involves a question of statutory construction, this
    Court’s review is de novo. See Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 
    107 So. 3d 362
    , 367 (Fla. 2013). In applying principles of statutory construction,
    courts must “begin with the ‘actual language used in the statute.’ ” Raymond
    James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 
    126 So. 3d 186
    , 190 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Borden
    v. E.–European Ins. Co., 
    921 So. 2d 587
    , 595 (Fla. 2006)). A court, in construing a
    statute, is required to “give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that
    guides the court in statutory construction.” 
    Id. (quoting Gomez
    v. Vill. of
    Pinecrest, 
    41 So. 3d 180
    , 185 (Fla. 2010)).
    -5-
    In examining the relevant statutory provisions at issue, we find no support
    that the Legislature intended for Citizens to be liable for a breach of the duty to act
    in good faith by allowing its policyholders to bring a statutory first-party bad faith
    cause of action. The clearest expression of legislative intent is found in the listed
    exceptions to Citizens’ immunity. See § 627.351(6)(s)1., Fla. Stat. Although the
    Legislature codified Citizens’ duty to handle claims in good faith, see
    § 627.351(6)(s)2., Fla. Stat., the Legislature never listed statutory first-party bad
    faith claims as one of the exceptions to Citizens’ immunity. To the contrary, the
    Legislature chose to immunize Citizens for “any action taken by [it] in the
    performance of [its] duties or responsibilities under . . . subsection
    [627.351(6)(s)],” which necessarily includes a breach of the duty of good faith.
    If the Legislature had intended to exempt first-party bad faith claims from
    Citizens’ statutory immunity, listing this category within section 627.351(6)(s)1.
    would have been a simple and explicit way to indicate this. Certainly, the
    Legislature knew how to accomplish an exception to the immunity because it
    created a specific exception to the immunity for attorney’s fees, as authorized by
    section 627.428, Florida Statutes. See § 627.351(6)(s)1.e., Fla. Stat.
    As this Court has recognized, where the Legislature made one exception
    clearly, if it had “intended to establish other exceptions it would have done so
    clearly and unequivocally.” Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 
    56 So. 2d 341
    , 342 (Fla.
    -6-
    1952). Accordingly, where the Legislature articulates clear exceptions to a statute,
    “no other exceptions may be implied.” Garfinkel, 
    25 So. 3d
    at 65. As Garfinkel
    observed, “because the Legislature identified five exceptions to its grant of
    immunity, there is no reason to think that another grant would show up in a nearby
    but separate paragraph, unless specifically identified as such.” 
    Id. The Legislature
    has not included statutory first-party bad faith claims among the limited exceptions
    to Citizens’ immunity when it could have easily chosen to do so.
    Besides the failure to include a specific exception for statutory causes of
    action under section 624.155(1)(b)1., we do not agree with the First District’s
    conclusion that the statutory cause of action for first-party bad faith is a tort or
    specifically a “willful tort”—a principle that becomes clear after considering the
    history of first-party bad faith causes of action. Unlike common law causes of
    action for third-party bad faith, first-party bad faith actions are purely a creature of
    statute that did not previously exist at common law. As explained by the Fifth
    District in Garfinkel:
    The reason why first-party bad faith claims are not considered
    to be willful torts is best explained by examining the history of this
    cause of action. A third-party bad faith action (that is, a claim against
    one’s own insurer for failing in good faith to settle a third-party’s
    claim, thus exposing the insured to liability in excess of the available
    insurance coverage), was recognized in Florida as part of the common
    law as early as 1938. The foundation for this claim is found in the
    fiduciary nature of the insurance carrier’s relationship with the
    insured. The carrier was required to act in good faith to negotiate a
    settlement for the benefit of its insured, and not to protect its own
    -7-
    interest alone. Opperman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    515 So. 2d
    263, 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), review denied, 
    523 So. 2d 578
    (Fla.
    1988). Because of the perceived absence of the fiduciary relationship,
    however, there was no first-party bad faith action by an insured
    against the insurer recognized at common law. See Allstate Indem.
    Co. v. Ruiz, 
    899 So. 2d 1121
    (Fla. 2005); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
    Co. v. Laforet, 
    658 So. 2d 55
    , 58-59 (Fla. 1995); Baxter v. Royal
    Indem. Co., 
    285 So. 2d 652
    (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); cert. discharged,
    
    317 So. 2d 725
    (Fla. 1975). Thus, unless the insured could allege an
    independent tort such as fraud, the only relief available on a first-party
    claim was a cause of action for breach of contract. Butchikas v.
    Travelers Indem. Co., 
    343 So. 2d 816
    (Fla. 1976); Rubio v. State
    Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
    662 So. 2d 956
    , 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995),
    review denied, 
    669 So. 2d 252
    (Fla. 1996); Opperman; Allstate Ins.
    Co. v. Kelley, 
    481 So. 2d 989
    (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
    The Legislature addressed this issue in 1982 by the adoption of
    section 624.155, Florida Statutes. As our Supreme Court has
    indicated, “[t]hrough this statute, the Legislature created a first-party
    bad faith cause of action . . . .” 
    Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 59
    .
    Garfinkel, 
    25 So. 3d
    at 68. Thus, as the Fifth District succinctly stated, statutory
    first-party bad faith causes of action “now exist in Florida not because they are
    torts, but because they are a statutory cause of action. Accordingly, a first-party
    bad faith claim cannot be wedged into the statutory exception for willful torts
    because it is not a tort of any variety.” 
    Id. at 68-69.
    Citizens also argues that subjecting it to statutory first-party bad faith claims
    would reduce the funds available to pay insureds’ claims for property damage so
    that further amounts that might be awarded would be borne by the taxpayers.
    Citizens asserts that is “antithetical to its enabling statute, which provides that
    Citizens have the maximum financial resources to pay its claims.” A competing
    -8-
    argument made by Perdido Sun is that unless Citizens is liable for amounts in
    excess of the policy limits, the statutory obligation to act in good faith would be
    meaningless. However, legislative intent must be determined primarily from the
    language of the statute and not from this Court’s view of the best policy. See, e.g.,
    Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 
    761 So. 2d 294
    , 299 (Fla. 2000) (“An interpretation of a
    statutory term cannot be based on this Court’s own view of the best policy.”); State
    v. Ashley, 
    701 So. 2d 338
    , 343 (Fla. 1997) (“[T]he making of social policy is a
    matter within the purview of the legislature—not this Court.”).
    In this case, Perdido Sun’s complaint does not allege that Citizens
    committed a “willful tort.” As we have previously recognized, “where a plaintiff
    claims a defendant engaged in egregious and outrageous actions, bad faith can be
    elevated to a willful tort, an issue that could turn on the facts of the case.” Citizens
    Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, 
    104 So. 3d 344
    , 355 n.7 (Fla. 2012).
    Perdido Sun’s complaint is based solely on the statutorily created first-party bad
    faith cause of action under section 624.155. No additional allegations of willful
    misconduct outside of the statutory bad faith claim are alleged. Although the
    complaint contains allegations that the conduct was “intentional, willful, wanton
    and malicious or done in a reckless disregard for Perdido Sun’s rights,” these
    allegations were made to preserve Perdido Sun’s right to add a count for punitive
    damages and not to allege a separate willful tort. Because specific allegations of
    -9-
    willful misconduct are not contained in the complaint, the trial court properly
    dismissed the complaint.
    CONCLUSION
    Perdido Sun brought a first-party bad faith claim pursuant to section
    624.155(1). That claim is a statutory cause of action and does not fall within the
    willful tort exception to Citizens’ immunity under section 627.351(6)(s)1.
    Therefore, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the First
    District’s decision in Perdido Sun, and approve the Fifth District’s reasoning in
    Garfinkel on this issue. We remand this case to the First District with instructions
    to reinstate the trial court’s order of dismissal.
    It is so ordered.
    LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., concur.
    LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
    IF FILED, DETERMINED.
    Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
    Direct Conflict of Decisions
    First District - Case No. 1D13-1951
    (Escambia County)
    Kara Berard Rockenbach of Methe & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach,
    Florida; Raoul G. Cantero, III, David P. Draigh, and Ryan Andrew Ulloa of White
    & Case LLP, Miami, Florida,
    for Petitioner
    - 10 -
    Charles S. Liberis, Jr. and Thomas F. Condon of the Liberis Law Firm, P.A.,
    Pensacola, Florida,
    for Respondent
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Allen C. Winsor, Solicitor General, and
    Rachel Erin Nordby, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida,
    for Amicus Curiae State of Florida
    Mark Lawrence Zientz of the Law Offices of Mark L. Zientz, P.A., Miami,
    Florida,
    for Amicus Curiae Florida Workers’ Advocates
    - 11 -