Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 19-409 Re: Barbara Kaye Hobbs ( 2022 )

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC20-605
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INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE NO. 19-409 RE: BARBARA
KAYE HOBBS.
May 19, 2022
PER CURIAM.
We review the findings and recommendations of the Hearing
Panel of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (Hearing
Panel) concerning Circuit Judge Barbara Kaye Hobbs. See art. V,
§ 12, Fla. Const. Following an evidentiary hearing on seven
paragraphs (including subparagraphs) of charges, the Hearing
Panel found Judge Hobbs guilty of the three charges for which she
had conceded guilt and one additional charge, and recommended
that she be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office without
pay for sixty days, and compelled to attend an employee
management program. Before this Court, the Judicial
Qualifications Commission (JQC) argues that the Hearing Panel
should have found Judge Hobbs guilty as to all of the charges and
that the seriousness of her misconduct warrants harsher discipline,
up to removal from the bench. As explained below, we conclude
that the Hearing Panel should have found Judge Hobbs guilty of
one additional violation. Although removal is not appropriate, we
agree with the JQC that the recommended discipline is insufficient
for the serious misconduct at issue. Consequently, in addition to
imposing the Hearing Panel’s recommended discipline, we order
Judge Hobbs to pay a fine in the amount of $30,000.
BACKGROUND
Judge Hobbs has served as a circuit judge for the Second
Judicial Circuit since 2012 and has no history of prior judicial
misconduct. On February 19, 2021, the Investigative Panel of the
Judicial Qualifications Commission (Investigative Panel) filed the
Amended Notice of Formal Charges (Amended Notice) against her
that is at issue in this proceeding, alleging violations of article V,
section 13 of the Florida Constitution and multiple Canons of the
Florida Code of Judicial Conduct addressed below.
The charges against Judge Hobbs stemmed in part from
events relating to her adult son. In 2018, Judge Hobbs’s son was
charged with misdemeanor DUI in Leon County, which is located
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within the Second Judicial Circuit. Judge Hobbs retained an
attorney to represent her son. Shortly thereafter, Judge Hobbs
assumed another judge’s docket, and on that docket were two cases
where her son’s attorney was the attorney of record. When the
cases and her son’s attorney appeared before her, Judge Hobbs did
not recuse herself nor did she disclose her connection with the
attorney. In one case, she granted an agreed motion for
continuance. In the other, the parties announced they had agreed
to enter a deferred prosecution agreement, and she set a new court
date to ensure the agreement had been signed.
On the evening of July 29, 2019, Judge Hobbs’s son was
arrested after allegedly shooting a person in his home. After
learning of the arrest, Judge Hobbs went to the police station where
her son was being held. Upon arrival, she asked to see her son but
was told that only her son’s lawyer could meet with him. Judge
Hobbs responded to this by saying that she was her son’s lawyer
and was then permitted to enter the interrogation room where her
son was being held. Judge Hobbs and her son had a nineteen-
minute conversation which was unrecorded due to its privileged
nature. Judge Hobbs also stayed with her son while he was
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interviewed by police, and at several points interjected to ask
clarifying questions or to advise her son. At the end of the
interview, Judge Hobbs asked the officers to release her son into
her custody and expressed concerns about his safety because she
had sentenced inmates in the same jail where he otherwise would
be detained. The officers stated that it would be impossible to
release her son into her custody due to the nature of the charges
against him, but that they were aware of the potential safety issues.
After leaving the police station, Judge Hobbs contacted the attorney
who represented her son in his DUI matter, and he agreed to
represent him again. Although Judge Hobbs’s representation of her
son ended at that point, Judge Hobbs’s legal assistant attended,
and sat at counsel table during, his first appearance.
After the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit learned
that Judge Hobbs’s son had been arrested, he contacted Judge
Hobbs to arrange a meeting. During this meeting, Judge Hobbs
explained that she had acted as her son’s attorney on the night of
his arrest, and the Chief Judge advised her to report herself to the
JQC, which she did on the same day. The Chief Judge also
explained to Judge Hobbs that he had viewed the video recording of
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her son’s first appearance and directed her to counsel her judicial
assistant regarding the appearance of impropriety created by her
presence at counsel table. He also suggested that Judge Hobbs
take some time off, and she agreed to do so.
Before taking her leave of absence, Judge Hobbs attempted to
arrange a visit with her son. Believing that in-person visitation was
neither wise nor practical, the Court Administrator offered—with
the approval of the Chief Judge—to help Judge Hobbs find a means
of visiting her son. During this process, a program that would allow
for video visitation was discussed, and Judge Hobbs asked the
Court Administrator if he thought the visits would be recorded.
Concerned by the question, the Court Administrator ceased
assisting Judge Hobbs and alerted the Chief Judge as to what had
happened. The record shows that after these events, which
occurred on August 1 and 2, 2019, Judge Hobbs began
communicating with her son using a different program, which is
monitored and available to other members of the public.
On August 4, 2019, Judge Hobbs took her leave of absence.
Before doing so, however, she failed to admonish her judicial
assistant as directed by the Chief Judge. The next day, August 5,
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2019, the judicial assistant attended a second hearing in Judge
Hobbs’s son’s case and sat at counsel table for a second time.
Upon Judge Hobbs’s return on August 12, both she and her
judicial assistant were summoned to the Chief Judge’s office for
counseling. After the meeting, the Chief Judge told Judge Hobbs
that she should counsel her judicial assistant. Judge Hobbs
declined and asked the Chief Judge to do it for her, and he agreed.
During the counseling session between the Chief Judge and
the judicial assistant, the judicial assistant made a series of
remarks, including that the Chief Judge was only “pretend[ing] to
be sensitive to Judge Hobbs,” but then later “kick[ing] [her] in the
butt.” The Chief Judge told Judge Hobbs that he believed her
judicial assistant’s conduct during the meeting was grounds for
termination. Judge Hobbs declined to terminate her judicial
assistant but did counsel her on her conduct during the meeting.
On August 20, 2019, the mother of Judge Hobbs’s grandson
visited Judge Hobbs in her office at the Leon County Courthouse.
Such visits were common and typically of a social nature because
this individual worked in the public defender’s office, which is in
the same building as Judge Hobbs’s chambers. However, this time,
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the visitor brought a petition for injunction, which she had already
completed and intended to file against the victim in the attempted
murder case that was pending against Judge Hobbs’s son. Judge
Hobbs’s judicial assistant accompanied the visitor to the clerk’s
office and showed her where the petition could be filed. While at
the clerk’s office, the judicial assistant also explained to the deputy
clerk that the matter would need to be forwarded to a judge in the
Third Judicial Circuit because of Judge Hobbs’s personal
connection with the case.
The last incident involving Judge Hobbs’s judicial assistant
related to Judge Hobbs’s son occurred on October 3, 2019, while
Judge Hobbs was in Orlando appearing before a JQC investigative
committee. On October 3, Judge Hobbs’s son, who was out on bail,
came to Judge Hobbs’s office looking for his grandfather’s health
insurance papers. Judge Hobbs’s son stated that he believed the
papers were in Judge Hobbs’s office, which was in a secure part of
the building. The judicial assistant then gave her all-access
security badge to Judge Hobbs’s son, who used the private elevator
to access the restricted area, where he encountered an “unnerved”
clerk who reported the incident. Upon her return, Judge Hobbs
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learned of what happened and counseled her judicial assistant on
the seriousness of her mistake—but allowed her to keep her job.
The rest of the charges stem from Judge Hobbs’s handling of
certain emergency matters in family law cases and her related
interactions with a case manager.
Based on the events summarized above, the case proceeded to
an evidentiary hearing on seven paragraphs of charges, which are
detailed below. Judge Hobbs conceded guilt with respect to three
charges pertaining to her actions on the night of her son’s arrest,
but she contested the remaining charges. The Hearing Panel found
Judge Hobbs guilty of the three charges for which she had conceded
guilt and another charge related to her failure to supervise her
judicial assistant with respect to the judicial assistant’s presence at
counsel table, and for these violations, recommended the discipline
set forth above.
In response to the JQC’s argument that harsher discipline,
potentially up to removal, is appropriate, Judge Hobbs urges the
Court to approve the recommended discipline. Judge Hobbs also
argues that the evidence does not support a finding of additional
misconduct.
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ANALYSIS
In judicial disciplinary hearings, the charges and conclusions
of the Hearing Panel must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1977). Clear and
convincing evidence is “a standard which requires more proof than
a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ but . . . less than ‘beyond and to
the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.’ ” In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d
744, 753 (Fla. 1997) (quoting In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla.
1994)). If the Hearing Panel’s findings meet this standard of
evidence, we will give them great weight. Graziano, 696 So. 2d at753 (citing LaMotte, 341 So. 2d at 516). However, we “may accept,
reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the commission.” Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const.
Our analysis begins with a review of the Hearing Panel’s
findings relating to the charges alleged in paragraphs 1-7 of the
Amended Notice. We then address the recommended discipline.
Charges 1-3
The charges alleged against Judge Hobbs in paragraphs 1-3 of
the Amended Notice were as follows:
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1. Your son was taken into police custody on or about
the early morning hours of July 30, 2019 as a result of
an incident that occurred in his residence, in which your
son allegedly shot a female acquaintance multiple times
through a closed door. Your son was taken to the
Tallahassee Police Department (TPD) headquarters for an
interview with police investigators. You came to TPD
headquarters and asked to see your son. You were told
by police that you would not be able to see your son
unless you were representing him as his attorney. You
then told police investigators that you were representing
your son as his attorney.
2. Acting as your son’s legal counsel, you requested and
were permitted to consult with your son in the police
interview room outside the presence of investigators and
with the audio recording turned off. You were also able
to be present with your son during his formal interview
with investigators. During the interview, you participated
by asking clarifying questions, and eventually telling your
son to stop speaking.
3. At the time you represented your son, you were serving
as a Circuit Judge in Leon County (Tallahassee), where
you were assigned to preside over felony criminal cases.
Your son’s case has subsequently been assigned to the
Third Judicial Circuit, and the Third Circuit State
Attorney’s Office has charged him with attempted
second-degree murder. Your legal representation of your
son violates Canons 1, 2, 5A(1), 5A(2), and 5G.[1]
1. Canon 1 requires a judge to uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. Canon 2 requires a judge to avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s
activities. Canons 5A(1) and (2) provide that “[a] judge shall
conduct all of the judge’s extra-judicial activities so that they do
not: (1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act
impartially as a judge; [or] (2) undermine the judge’s independence,
integrity, or impartiality.” Canon 5G precludes a judge from
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With respect to all three charges, Judge Hobbs conceded and
the Hearing Panel found, that her representation of her son violated
Canons 1, 2, 5A(1), 5A(2), and 5G of the Florida Code of Judicial
Conduct. Judge Hobbs’s admission that her conduct violated these
canons satisfies the clear and convincing standard of evidence. See
In re Andrews, 875 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that a
judge’s admission of misconduct is clear and convincing evidence).
Accordingly, we approve the Hearing Panel’s findings with respect to
these charges.
Charge 4
The fourth charge against Judge Hobbs was as follows:
4. In spite of being advised to avoid the appearance of
preferential treatment, you later attempted to arrange
unmonitored and unrecorded telephonic and/or video
access to your son while he was in jail.[2]
With respect to this charge, we accept the Hearing Panel’s
finding that the evidence presented below falls short of the clear
practicing law, except for in limited circumstances not relevant
here.
2. The Amended Notice does not specify which Canons of the
Code of Judicial Conduct Judge Hobbs allegedly violated in this
charge.
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and convincing standard of proof. See Davey, 645 So. 2d at 404(accepting, as supported by clear and convincing evidence, findings
based on “direct, unequivocal, and consistent” testimony that was
“logical and supported by written evidence” where the conflicting
testimony was “vague, indecisive, and unsupported”). The evidence
presented below was of a highly speculative nature and largely
consisted of the Court Administrator’s assumption that Judge
Hobbs might be attempting to obtain preferential treatment in
visiting her son. In contrast, the record shows that, with the
exception of the events that occurred on the night of her son’s
arrest addressed in charges 1 through 3, Judge Hobbs visited her
son just like any other member of the public and was monitored
when doing so. Accordingly, we accept the Hearing Panel’s finding
with respect to this charge.
Charge 5
The fifth charge against Judge Hobbs consisted of two parts,
as follows:
5. At the time your son was arrested on July 30, 2019, he
had a misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence (DUI)
case pending in Leon county court. Attorney Gary
Roberts filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of your
son in that case on Oct. 4, 2018.
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After accepting representation of your son in the DUI
case, Mr. Roberts appeared before you on behalf of
clients in two separate felony criminal matters:
a. [In the first case,] . . . [o]n May 29, 2019,
Mr. Roberts appeared before you, on behalf of
[the defendant], at a Case Management
Conference. The court records indicate that at
this hearing you set a trial date for September
16, 2019. Shortly after the May hearing, on
June 26, 2019, Mr. Roberts filed a motion to
dismiss the charges. Mr. Robert’s motion and
proposed order were directed specifically to
you, by name, as the presiding judge, however,
prior to ruling on the motion you were
transferred out of the criminal division on
August 2, 2019, by amendment to
Administrative Order 2018-04.
b. [In the second case,] . . . [the defendant] was
charged with the felony offense of organized
scheme to defraud. She was also represented
by Mr. Roberts, who appeared before you on
June 10, 2019 for a Plea Hearing. During this
hearing, it was announced that the State
Attorney and the defendant had agreed to
enter into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(DPA). You set a new court date of July 10,
2019, to make sure the DPA had been signed.
On August 2, 2019 you were transferred out of
the criminal division by amendment to
Administrative Order 2018-04.
Your failure to recuse yourself from criminal cases where
the defendant’s attorney of record was (at the same time)
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also representing your son in a separate criminal matter
was improper, and violates Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), 3E(1). 3
The Hearing Panel found Judge Hobbs not guilty for failing to
recuse herself from these two cases based on its conclusion that her
actions in the cases were de minimis. Because the alleged
misconduct is based upon Judge Hobbs’s failure to recuse herself,
but the record does not clearly and convincingly establish that
recusal was required in either case, we approve the Hearing Panel’s
finding. However, we note that we would have decided this issue
differently had the alleged misconduct been Judge Hobbs’s failure
to disclose that the attorney appearing before her in the two cases
at issue also represented her son. The commentary to Canon 3E(1)
explains that even where a judge’s disqualification is not
automatically required, a judge “should disclose on the record
information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers
might consider relevant to the question of disqualification even if
3. Canons 1 and 2 were addressed in note 1, supra. Canon
3B(1) provides that “[a] judge shall hear and decide matters
assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is
required.” Canon 3E(1) requires a judge to “disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”
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the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification.”
Moreover, where disqualification is required, the plain language of
the rule does not include a “de minimis” exception.
Charge 6
The sixth charge against Judge Hobbs alleged that she had
failed to appropriately supervise her judicial assistant in three
respects, as follows:
6. You have failed to appropriately supervise your
Judicial Assistant (JA) in violation of Canons 1, 2, 3C(1),
and 3C(2).[4] To wit:
a. Your failure to adequately supervise has
allowed your JA to inappropriately interpose
herself in your son’s pending criminal case and
violate security protocols. For example:
i. Your JA was present at counsel
table during a court hearing in your
son’s case.
4. Canons 1 and 2 were addressed in note 1, supra. Canon
3C(1) provides that “[a] judge shall diligently discharge the judge’s
administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice and
maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and
should cooperate with other judges and court officials in the
administration of court business.” Canon 3C(2) provides that “[a]
judge shall require staff, court officials, and others subject to the
judge’s direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and
diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting
bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties.”
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ii. Your JA assisted the mother of
your son’s child with filing an
injunction against the victim in your
son’s pending criminal case, during
work hours.
iii. Your JA provided your son with
her security badge, which permitted
him access [to] secure and/or non-
public parts of the courthouse.[5]
The Hearing Panel found that Judge Hobbs was guilty of
charge 6(a)(i) related to her judicial assistant’s appearance at
counsel table, but not guilty of charge 6(a)(ii) related to her
assistant’s involvement with the filing of an injunction against the
victim in the son’s attempted murder case or charge 6(a)(iii) related
to her judicial assistant’s security badge.
Context is crucial for these charges. The evidence was both
clear and convincing that Judge Hobbs’s judicial assistant used her
position of trust to preferentially promote the individual interests of
the judge’s family and did not appear to understand that her duty
and our ethical rules required that she neither attempt to influence
the outcome of the criminal charges pending against the judge’s son
5. The Amended Notice lists these charges as 6(a)(i)-(iii), even
though there is no charge 6(b).
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nor grant a privilege or courtesy to him that would not be equally
extended to any other criminal defendant. Judge Hobbs knew of
the serious ethical breach by her judicial assistant and took no
steps to counsel her, even after being directed by her chief judge to
do so. Because of this failing, our rules appropriately hold Judge
Hobbs responsible for all of the actions of her assistant that could
have been avoided if she had taken appropriate action—which was
her ethical obligation. See In re Murphy, 181 So. 3d 1169, 1177
(Fla. 2015) (explaining that the high ethical standard to which
judges are held safeguards the public’s confidence in the judiciary).
Regarding charge 6(a)(i), clear and convincing evidence
supports the Hearing Panel’s finding that Judge Hobbs failed to
appropriately supervise her judicial assistant when Judge Hobbs
failed to immediately admonish her judicial assistant regarding her
presence at the first appearance in time to prevent the recurrence of
the same conduct at a subsequent hearing. Although Judge Hobbs
did not concede misconduct below, she no longer disputes the
finding of guilt as to this charge and instead urges the Court to
accept the Hearing Panel’s findings and recommendations. See In
re Diaz, 908 So. 2d 334, 337 (Fla. 2005) (explaining that when “the
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JQC’s findings are undisputed [the] Court will ordinarily conclude
that the JQC’s findings are supported by clear and convincing
evidence”) (citing Andrews, 875 So. 2d at 442).
Regarding charge 6(a)(ii), the record also supports the Hearing
Panel’s finding that Judge Hobbs is not guilty of misconduct related
to the fact that her judicial assistant escorted a visitor to the clerk’s
office to file a petition for injunction. Judge Hobbs testified at the
evidentiary hearing that when the visitor came to her chambers, she
had already filled out the paperwork she planned to file. The only
action Judge Hobbs’s judicial assistant took was to accompany the
visitor to the clerk’s office and point out with which deputy clerk the
visitor should file the paperwork. The court clerk testified below
that she recalled no discussion with either Judge Hobbs or her
judicial assistant regarding the petition for injunction. We agree
with the Hearing Panel that these facts do not present clear and
convincing evidence of misconduct. Cf. In re Holloway, 832 So. 2d
716, 728 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that a phone call to a detective by
the judge did not amount to exploitation of judicial office because
nothing improper was discussed on the call).
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However, with respect to charge 6(a)(iii), the Hearing Panel
wrongly concluded that there is not clear and convincing evidence
to find Judge Hobbs guilty of misconduct based on her judicial
assistant’s actions regarding the security badge. The Hearing Panel
based this finding on its conclusion that the judicial assistant’s
conduct was “so beyond the mainstream and improbable as to be
unforeseeable by anyone.”
We disagree with this reasoning. Although it may not have
occurred to Judge Hobbs that her judicial assistant would
improperly prefer her son, then a criminal defendant, in this
particular way, it was certainly foreseeable that her assistant’s
failure to understand her own ethical obligations could result in
other similar ethical breaches involving the judge’s son. The record
clearly demonstrates a lack of perspective, sense of propriety, and
professional judgment by the judicial assistant where Judge
Hobbs’s son is concerned. Further, the record shows that Judge
Hobbs was well aware of these problems and failed in her obligation
to properly supervise her judicial assistant. Under these
circumstances, it is appropriate to hold Judge Hobbs accountable
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for her own failure to supervise, even if the specific preference given
to her son may have seemed improbable before it occurred.
Charge 7
The seventh charge against Judge Hobbs consisted of four
parts, as follows:
7. It is also alleged that you have failed to issue timely
orders and decisions on certain emergency matters in
violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3B(8)[6]:
a. In [the first case,] an emergency motion was
filed in a paternity case on September 19,
2019 and an expedited motion was filed on
September 20, 2019. As of October 21, 2019,
you had not issued an order determining
whether or not the motions qualify as
emergencies.
b. In [the second case], an emergency petition
for temporary custody was filed August 29,
2019, and no determination had been made as
of October 21, 2019.
c. In [the third case,] [y]ou determined that the
matter was an emergency and court staff
contacted your JA to schedule the matter for
an emergency hearing. This occurred on
August 21, 2019. Court staff reported that
your JA refused to schedule the matter,
stating, “I don’t have time for this shit,” and
6. Canons 1 and 2 were addressed in note 1, supra. Canon
3B(8) requires a judge to “dispose of all judicial matters promptly,
efficiently, and fairly.”
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explaining that she was not going to look up or
contact the petitioner to obtain addresses for
all parties in order to set a hearing. The JA
indicated to staff that she would have you
review this again and deem it a non-emergency
for referral to a magistrate. Subsequently, the
same emergency motion was filed again with a
stamp indicating that it was not an emergency.
d. After receiving the Commission’s Amended
Notice of Investigation outlining the allegations
in paragraph 7(a)-(c), you summoned a case
manager to your chambers and interrogated
her about the source of the Commission’s
information.
The Hearing Panel found that the evidence presented against
Judge Hobbs with respect to these charges did not clearly and
convincingly establish violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as
Judge Hobbs “was not seeking the source of the investigative
charges, and was actually trying to determine what was happening
in these cases.” We acknowledge the closeness of these issues,
particularly as they largely implicate additional questionable
conduct by Judge Hobbs’s judicial assistant caused by Judge
Hobbs’s failure to supervise her. However, given the superior
vantage point of the Hearing Panel in evaluating the testimony and
weighing the evidence related to these charges, we accept its finding
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that Judge Hobbs is not guilty of any of the misconduct alleged in
paragraph 7.
Discipline
Having analyzed the Hearing Panel’s findings and conclusions,
we now review its recommended discipline. Although the Court
“gives the findings and recommendations of the JQC great weight,”
In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 85 (Fla. 2003), “the ultimate power and
responsibility in making a determination rests with [the] Court,”
LaMotte, 341 So. 2d at 516.
In urging us to impose a harsher sanction than the Hearing
Panel’s recommended discipline, the JQC suggests that Judge
Hobbs’s misconduct demonstrates unfitness to hold judicial office
that warrants removal. We disagree. Removal is the most severe
form of discipline a judge may face, and it is typically reserved for
when a judge intentionally commits “serious and grievous wrongs of
a clearly unredeeming nature.” Id. at 517; see, e.g., In re McMillan,
797 So. 2d 560, 566-67, 572-73 (Fla. 2001) (removing a judge for
violating the “fundamental principles of judicial ethics” when he
explicitly and implicitly stated that he would show favor to certain
groups and made false and disparaging comments about his
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opponent in the race for the judgeship); Graziano, 696 So. 2d at
746-47 (removing a judge with a history of prior discipline when she
used her office for personal gain and interfered with courthouse
operations); In re Henson, 913 So. 2d 579, 594 (Fla. 2005)
(removing a judge who agreed to represent a client while a sitting
judge and then for advising that client to flee the country in order to
evade justice); In re Hawkins, 151 So. 3d 1200, 1213 (Fla. 2014)
(removing a judge who was found guilty of evading taxes, exploiting
her judicial office to promote her business, and making false and
misleading statements during a deposition while being investigated
for judicial misconduct).
However, we do agree with the JQC that the recommended
discipline is insufficient. Although we are not unsympathetic to
Judge Hobbs’s family situation, her violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct demonstrate a failure of judgment and a lack of
appropriate boundaries between her judicial office and her personal
life that cannot be tolerated in members of our judiciary. See In re
Frank, 753 So. 2d 1228, 1241 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] ‘judge is a judge 7
days a week, 24 hours a day.’ ” (quoting JQC’s findings)).
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Our constitution affords us great leeway in determining the
appropriate discipline, see art. V, § 12, Fla. Const., and we have
previously imposed fines in addition to suspensions in other cases
where serious misconduct warranted “something less than removal
from office.” In re Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 2002); see
also James R. Wolf, Judicial Discipline in Florida: The Cost of
Misconduct, 30 Nova L. Rev. 349, 391 (2006) (“Suspension and fines
are imposed in those tough cases where the misconduct is serious
but where the standards for removal have not been met.”).
As Judge Hobbs’s misconduct goes to the heart of the public’s
ability to trust Florida’s judges to separate their personal lives and
relationships from their official duties, in addition to imposing the
Hearing Panel’s recommended discipline, we order Judge Hobbs to
pay a fine of $30,000.
CONCLUSION
We approve the findings of misconduct made by the Hearing
Panel. Additionally, contrary to the Hearing Panel’s finding, we
further conclude that clear and convincing evidence establishes
that Judge Hobbs failed to properly supervise her judicial assistant,
which resulted in the judge’s son improperly accessing restricted
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areas of the courthouse while serious criminal charges were
pending against him.
Regarding discipline, in light of the serious nature of the
misconduct at issue, we add a fine to the Hearing Panel’s
recommendation. Specifically, Judge Hobbs is suspended for sixty
days without pay and ordered to pay a fine of $30,000. The fine
shall be paid to the Office of the State Courts Administrator within
180 days from the issuance of this opinion. The effective date of the
suspension shall be on a date within thirty days of the issuance of
this opinion as determined by the Chief Judge of the Second
Judicial Circuit. Once the effective date of the suspension is
determined, the Court Administrator for the Second Judicial Circuit
shall submit a personnel action request (PAR) form to the Personnel
Office of the Office of the State Courts Administrator for processing.
We further order Judge Hobbs to attend an employee management
program to be completed within one year of the date of the issuance
of this opinion. We also command Judge Hobbs to appear before
this Court for the administration of a public reprimand at a time to
be set by the Clerk of this Court.
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It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ,
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding – Judicial Qualifications Commission
Honorable Michelle Morley, Chair, and Alexander J. Williams,
General Counsel, Judicial Qualifications Commission, Tallahassee,
Florida; and Lauri Waldman Ross of Ross & Girten, Counsel to the
Hearing Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, Miami,
Florida,
for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner
Roosevelt Randolph and Errol H. Powell of Knowles & Randolph,
P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,
for Judge Barbara Kaye Hobbs, Respondent
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