City of Fort Lauderdale v. June Dhar , 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 61 ( 2016 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC15-359
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CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE,
Appellant,
vs.
JUNE DHAR,
Appellee.
[February 25, 2016]
LABARGA, C.J.
The City of Fort Lauderdale appeals the decision of the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in City of Fort Lauderdale v. Dhar, 154 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
In that decision, the district court held a provision in section 316.0083(1)(d)3.,
Florida Statutes (2012), known as the “Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Program,” to
be invalid as applied to short-term renters of motor vehicles who are detected by a
“red light camera” committing a violation. This Court has mandatory appellate
jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution.1 For the
reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decision of the Fourth District.
BACKGROUND AND FACTS
The facts concerning this “red light camera” violation by Dhar, who was a
short-term renter of an automobile, and the lower court rulings on Dhar’s motion to
dismiss, are set forth in the opinion of the Fourth District as follows:
A vehicle registered to Dollar Rent A Car Systems, Inc.
(“Dollar”) was detected by an automated traffic camera running a red
light, and after review of the violation, Dollar was sent a notice of
violation alleging that the described vehicle violated sections
316.074(1) and 316.075(1)(c)1. of the Florida Statutes. In response,
Dollar sent an affidavit identifying Defendant as the person having
care, custody, or control of the vehicle at the time of the violation.
Thereafter, Defendant was issued a uniform traffic citation.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that as a short-
term renter of the motor vehicle, she was treated unequally as
compared to a vehicle’s registered owner or lessee because she was
not initially issued a notice of violation under section
316.0083(1)(b)l.a., Florida Statutes (2012), and therefore could not
avoid the payment of added court costs by simply paying the statutory
penalty of $158.00. The trial court agreed and granted the
Defendant’s motion.
In finding that the [Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Program]
violated Defendant’s equal protection and due process rights, the trial
court correctly noted that:
There are significant advantages to having a
[notice of violation] issued in one’s name, as opposed to
1. The City also sought discretionary review in City of Ft. Lauderdale v.
Dhar, SC15-399, which arose from the same district court decision. Discretionary
review was denied. Thus, this case is here solely on the ground that the district
court held a statute unconstitutional.
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a [uniform traffic citation]. The cost of a [notice of
violation] is $158.00, whereas the cost of a [uniform
traffic citation] is $263.00. More importantly, the
payment of a $158.00 [notice of violation] buys
anonymity. If the [notice of violation] is paid timely,
there will be no record of the infraction on one’s driving
record. Consequently, once a [uniform traffic citation] is
issued, one’s driving record will be permanently
tarnished, unless the [uniform traffic citation] is
dismissed in court. This distinct difference is to the
detriment of [Defendant]; the option of paying the
$158.00 [notice of violation] does not exist.
Dhar, 154 So. 3d at 367 [some bracketed material added].
The district court concluded that the unequal treatment of short-term renters
violated equal protection. The court explained, “Whether a person owns a vehicle,
leases a vehicle, or enters into a short-term rental agreement, the circumstances
surrounding the infraction remain the same,” and because short-term automobile
renters are similarly situated to registered owners and lessees, there is no rational
basis for the unequal treatment given to defendants such as Dhar. Id. Based on the
facts and the court’s analysis, the Fourth District affirmed the lower court’s order
granting Dhar’s motion to dismiss the traffic citation for violating her equal
protection and due process rights.
The Fourth District correctly noted that section 316.0083(1)(d)3. was
amended by the Legislature in 20132 to allow all individuals charged with
2. Ch. 2013-160, § 5, at 1847, Laws of Fla.
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committing a red light camera violation to pay $158 through the issuance of a
notice of violation. Even though the statute has been amended, we are obliged by
the Florida Constitution to provide appellate review of the district court decision
because it declared a state statute invalid. See article V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
ANALYSIS
The constitutionality of a statute is a pure question of law subject to de novo
review. City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002). “[M]ixed
questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional rights should be
reviewed by appellate courts using a two-step approach, deferring to the trial court
on questions of historical fact but conducting a de novo review of the constitutional
issue.” Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867, 871 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Henry v. State,
134 So. 3d 938, 946 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 605
(Fla. 2001))). As in all constitutional challenges, the statute comes to the Court
clothed with the presumption of correctness and all reasonable doubts about the
statute’s validity must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. “While [the Court]
review[s] decisions striking state statutes de novo, [it] is obligated to accord
legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged
legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.” Crist v. Ervin,
56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of
Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005)).
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When courts consider the constitutionality of a statute that abridges a
fundamental right, they are required to apply a strict scrutiny standard to determine
whether the statute denies equal protection. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC v. Jacobs,
841 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 2003) (citing Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1061 n.2
(Fla. 1993)). “However, where a fundamental right is not at stake, the courts apply
the rational basis test. ‘Under the rational basis standard, the party challenging the
statute bears the burden of showing that the statutory classification does not bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.’ ” Id. Driving is not a
fundamental right, see Lite, 617 So. 2d at 1060; thus, the statute in this case is
reviewed under the rational basis test. With these standards in mind, we turn to the
statute at issue.
Section 316.0083, Florida Statutes, also known as the Mark Wandall Traffic
Safety Program, was created in chapter 2010-80, § 5, Laws of Florida. The statute
expressly preempted to the State the regulation of the use of cameras to enforce the
provisions of chapter 316, Florida Statutes. It authorized the Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, counties, and municipalities to use cameras
to enforce violations of sections 316.074(1) and 316.075(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for
a driver’s failure to stop at a red light traffic signal. In 2012, when Dhar
committed the traffic violation, section 316.0083(1), Florida Statutes, provided in
pertinent part:
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(b)1.a. Within 30 days after a violation, notification must be
sent to the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in the
violation specifying the remedies available under s. 318.14 and that
the violator must pay the penalty of $158 to the department, county, or
municipality, or furnish an affidavit in accordance with paragraph (d),
within 30 days following the date of the notification in order to avoid
court fees, costs, and the issuance of a traffic citation. The
notification shall be sent by first-class mail.
....
(c)1.a. A traffic citation issued under this section shall be issued
by mailing the traffic citation by certified mail to the address of the
registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation when
payment has not been made within 30 days after the notification under
subparagraph (b)1.
....
(d)1. The owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation
is responsible and liable for paying the uniform traffic citation issued
for a violation of s. 316.074(1) or s. 316.075(1)(c)1. when the driver
failed to stop at a traffic signal, unless the owner can establish that:
....
c. The motor vehicle was, at the time of the violation, in the
care, custody, or control of another person;
....
2. In order to establish such facts, the owner of the motor
vehicle shall, within 30 days after the date of issuance of the traffic
citation, furnish to the appropriate governmental entity an affidavit
setting forth detailed information supporting an exemption as
provided in this paragraph.
a. An affidavit supporting such exemption under subparagraph
1.c. must include the name, address, date of birth, and, if known, the
driver license number of the person who leased, rented, or otherwise
had care, custody, or control of the motor vehicle at the time of the
alleged violation. . . .
....
3. Upon receipt of an affidavit, the person designated as
having care, custody, and control of the motor vehicle at the time
of the violation may be issued a traffic citation for a violation of
s. 316.074(1) or s. 316.075(1)(c)1. when the driver failed to stop at a
traffic signal. The affidavit is admissible in a proceeding pursuant to
this section for the purpose of providing proof that the person
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identified in the affidavit was in actual care, custody, or control of the
motor vehicle. The owner of a leased vehicle for which a traffic
citation is issued for a violation of s. 316.074(1) or s. 316.075(1)(c)1.
when the driver failed to stop at a traffic signal is not responsible for
paying the traffic citation and is not required to submit an affidavit as
specified in this subsection if the motor vehicle involved in the
violation is registered in the name of the lessee of such motor vehicle.
§ 316.0083, Fla. Stat. (2012).
The statute does not expressly address short-term renters such as Dhar
except to note that if the party who receives the initial Notice of Violation files an
affidavit indicating that they were not the party who had the care, custody, or
control of the vehicle at the time of the violation, the person named in the affidavit
will then be sent a Uniform Traffic Citation. There is no dispute that the effect of
the operation of the statute is to treat short-term renters differently than long-term
lessees. This is because a long-term lessee will be listed in the Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles records as a registrant, and that long-term
lessee will be sent the initial Notice of Violation calling for payment of only $158.
Because short-term renters are not listed there, they are identified only after the
registered owner submits an affidavit identifying them. The 2012 statute then
provides that a Uniform Traffic Citation may be issued to the person identified in
the affidavit.
We agree with the county court and the Fourth District that the unequal
statutory treatment of short-term automobile renters bears no rational relationship
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to a legitimate state purpose. No rational basis justifies treating short-term renters
differently than registered owners and lessees where the gravamen of the
violation—running a red light and being captured on camera doing so—is the same
in each case. We agree that Dhar, as the challenger, had the burden to show that
the statutory classification bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose, and we conclude, as did the lower courts, that she has borne this burden.
See Level 3 Commc’ns, 841 So. 2d at 454. Thus, the district court correctly
affirmed the order of the county court granting the motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that section 316.0083, Florida
Statutes (2012), is unconstitutional as applied to short-term vehicle renters such as
Dhar. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Fourth District in City of Fort
Lauderdale v. Dhar, 154 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and remand for
proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
POLSTON, J., concurs in result.
CANADY, J., dissents.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal – Statutory or Constitutional
Invalidity
Fourth District - Case No. 4D13-1187
(Broward County)
Edward George Guedes and Alicia Hayley Welch of Weiss Serota Helfman
Cole & Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida,
for Appellant
Louis Charles Arslanian, Hollywood, Florida,
for Appellee
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