Young Bock Shim v. Frederick F. Buechel, etc. ( 2022 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC21-249
____________
YOUNG BOCK SHIM, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
FREDERICK F. BUECHEL, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
May 26, 2022
LABARGA, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Buechel v. Shim, 46 Fla. L. Weekly
D265 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan. 29, 2021). The district court certified that
its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Sargeant v. Al-Saleh, 137 So. 3d 432(Fla. 4th DCA 2014). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4),
Fla. Const.
For the reasons discussed below, we approve the holding in
Buechel that a trial court may order a defendant over whom it has
in personam jurisdiction to act on foreign property pursuant to
section 56.29(6), Florida Statutes (2021), and disapprove Sargeant
to the extent that it holds otherwise.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying cause of action filed by Petitioners Young Bock
Shim and Cellumed Co., Ltd., involves a licensing agreement
between the parties and the proceeds from the sale of a medical
device company. Buechel, 46 Fla. L. Weekly at D266. Respondents
Frederick F. Buechel and Cynthia C. Pappas (Creditors) prevailed at
trial, and the trial court entered a judgment for damages in their
favor. Id.
During proceedings supplementary, Creditors discovered that
Shim “sold his stock in the other Judgment Debtor, [Cellumed], to a
third party” and held a portion of proceeds—approximately
$4,000,000—in a safe “at his home in South Korea in the form of a
negotiable instrument drawn on funds deposited in a Korean bank.”
Shim v. Buechel, No. 2013-CA-1449-O, order at 2 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct.
Nov. 13, 2019). Creditors filed a motion to compel Shim to turn the
proceeds over to Creditors, arguing the trial court could order Shim
to do so pursuant to its in personam jurisdiction over Shim and the
-2-
broad discretion granted to courts under section 56.29(6). Id. at
3-4. The trial court disagreed, reasoning “Florida courts do not
have in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over foreign property.” Id.
at 4 (citing Burns v. State, Dep’t of Legal Affairs, 147 So. 3d 95, 97
(Fla. 5th DCA 2014)). Because Shim’s property was in South Korea,
the trial court denied Creditors’ motion for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
at 6.
On appeal, the district court reversed. Buechel, 46 Fla. L.
Weekly at D266. The court explained that section 56.29(6) plainly
authorizes a trial court to “order a debtor, over whom the court has
in personam jurisdiction, to act on assets located outside of the
court’s territorial jurisdiction” and “in no way limits the court’s
reach to its territorial boundaries.” Id. at D267. The court further
explained that the well-established principles of personal
jurisdiction provide a trial court with this authority:
It has long been established . . . that a court which has
obtained in personam jurisdiction over a defendant may
order that defendant to act on property that is outside of
the court’s jurisdiction, provided that the court does not
directly affect the title to the property while it remains in
the foreign jurisdiction.
. . . [A]lthough a court may not directly act upon
real or personal property which lies beyond its borders, it
-3-
may indirectly act on such property by its assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. at D266 (citations omitted) (quoting Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v.
Advance Petroleum, Inc., 660 So. 2d 1139, 1142-43 (Fla. 3d DCA
1995)).
In contrast, Sargeant held the trial court “lacked jurisdiction
to compel the turnover of property located outside the State of
Florida,” notwithstanding its in personam jurisdiction over the
judgment debtor. 137 So. 3d at 433.
This review followed.
ANALYSIS
Trial courts have broad authority to carry out the execution of
monetary judgments under section 56.29(6), which provides:
The court may order any property of the judgment
debtor, not exempt from execution, or any property, debt,
or other obligation due to the judgment debtor, in the
hands of or under the control of any person subject to
the Notice to Appear, to be levied upon and applied
toward the satisfaction of the judgment debt. The court
may enter any orders, judgments, or writs required to
carry out the purpose of this section, including those
orders necessary or proper to subject property or
property rights of any judgment debtor to execution, and
including entry of money judgments as provided in ss.
56.16-56.19 against any person to whom a Notice to
Appear has been directed and over whom the court
obtained personal jurisdiction irrespective of whether
-4-
such person has retained the property, subject to
applicable principles of equity, and in accordance with
chapters 76 and 77 and all applicable rules of civil
procedure. Sections 56.16-56.20 apply to any order
issued under this subsection.
§ 56.29(6), Fla. Stat. (2021).
Citing policy concerns, the Sargeant court rejected the
argument that a court may rely on its exercise of in personam
jurisdiction to order that a judgment debtor’s foreign property be
used to satisfy a judgment debt. See 137 So. 3d at 435. However,
when determining the meaning of a statute, courts do not reach
policy considerations where the statute’s meaning is clear. See
State v. Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728, 730 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Holly v.
Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (“[W]hen the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite
meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory
interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain
and obvious meaning.”)).
Section 56.29(6) unambiguously provides a trial court broad
authority to “order any property of the judgment debtor . . . to be
levied upon and applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment
debt,” including “any property, debt, or other obligation due to the
-5-
judgment debtor, in the hands of or under the control of any person
subject to a Notice to Appear.” § 56.29(6), Fla. Stat. (2021). To this
end, a trial court “may enter any orders . . . necessary or proper to
subject property . . . of any judgment debtor to execution,”
including “entry of money judgments . . . against any person to
whom a Notice of Appear has been directed and over whom the court
obtained personal jurisdiction, irrespective of whether such person
has retained the property.” Id. (emphasis added). While broad, that
authority extends no further than the trial court’s personal
jurisdiction, and our decision today does not speak to judgment
debtors over whom the trial court has no personal jurisdiction. See
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“When
a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application,
it has none.”). Section 56.29(6), however, clearly contemplates that
the trial court shall have obtained personal jurisdiction over the
judgment debtors to whom the statute is being applied.
Moreover, as the Buechel court explained, it is well-established
that a court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant gives the court
the “power to require a defendant ‘to do or to refrain from doing
anything beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction which it
-6-
might have required to be done or omitted within the limits of such
territory.’ ” Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 8 (1909) (quoting French v.
Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250, 252-53 (1874)). A court may “decree a
conveyance of land situated in another jurisdiction, and even in a
foreign country, and enforce the execution of the decree by process
against the defendant.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (citing Corbett v.
Nutt, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 464, 475 (1870)). While a trial court has
“no inherent power . . . to annul a deed or to establish a title” for
property outside its jurisdiction, the trial court may indirectly do so
by compelling the defendant to act on such property pursuant to its
in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 10 (quoting Carpenter v. Strange,
141 U.S. 87, 106 (1891) (quoting Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151, 155
(1884))). The court’s “decree does not operate directly upon the
property nor affect the title, but is made effectual through the
coercion of the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Carpenter,
141 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added)). A defendant’s “obedience is
compelled by proceedings in the nature of contempt, attachment, or
sequestration.” Id. at 11. Such penalties are imposed against the
defendant—not the property—and serve to hold the defendant
-7-
accountable and prevent the defendant from relocating assets to
avoid execution of a judgment.
The trial court here undisputedly had in personam jurisdiction
over Shim, and it therefore could compel him to act on his foreign
assets under section 56.29(6).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we approve the holding in Buechel
that section 56.29(6) provides a trial court the authority to order a
defendant over whom it has in personam jurisdiction to act on
foreign property and disapprove Sargeant to the extent that it holds
otherwise.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fifth District – Case No. 5D19-3716
(Orange County)
Christopher V. Carlyle and John N. Bogdanoff of The Carlyle
Appellate Law Firm, Orlando, Florida,
-8-
for Petitioners
Edmond E. Koester and Matthew B. Devisse of Coleman,
Yovanovich & Koester, P.A., Naples, Florida, on behalf of Frederick
F. Buechel, Individually, and as Trustee of the Biomedical
Engineering Trust and Buechel-Pappas Trust; and Vello Veski of the
Law Office of Vello Veski, Palm City, Florida, on behalf of Cynthia C.
Pappas, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael J.
Pappas,
for Respondents
-9-