Jeffrey G. Hutchinson v. State of Florida ( 2022 )

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC21-18
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JEFFREY G. HUTCHINSON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
June 16, 2022
PER CURIAM.
Jeffrey G. Hutchinson, a prisoner under sentence of death,
appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his second
successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under rule 3.851 of
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
I. Background
In 1998, Hutchinson shot and killed his girlfriend, Renee
Flaherty, and her three children: four-year-old Logan, seven-year-
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
old Amanda, and nine-year-old Geoffrey. We have described the
events surrounding the murders as follows:
On the evening of the murders, Hutchinson and
Renee argued. Hutchinson packed some of his clothes
and guns into his truck, left, and went to a bar . . . [,]
arriv[ing] [there] around 8 p.m. Hutchinson told the
bartender that “Renee is pissed off at me,” drank one and
a half glasses of beer and then left the bar muttering to
himself. . . .
Approximately forty minutes after Hutchinson left
the bar, there was a 911 call from Hutchinson’s home.
The caller stated, “I just shot my family.” Two of
Hutchinson’s close friends identified the caller’s voice as
Hutchinson’s. Hutchinson said to the 911 operator,
“there were some guys here.” He told the operator that
he did not know how many people were there, he did not
know how many had been hurt, and he did not know
how they had been injured. Deputies arrived at
Hutchinson’s home within ten minutes of the 911 call
and found Hutchinson on the ground in the garage with
the cordless phone nearby. The phone call was still
connected to the 911 operator. Deputies found Renee’s
body on the bed in the master bedroom, Amanda’s body
on the floor near the bed in the master bedroom, and
Logan’s body at the foot of the bed in the master
bedroom. Each had been shot once in the head with a
shotgun. Deputies found Geoffrey’s body on the floor in
the living room between the couch and the coffee table.
He had been shot once in the chest and once in the head.
The murder weapon, a Mossberg 12-gauge pistol-grip
shotgun which belonged to Hutchinson, was found on
the kitchen counter. Hutchinson had gunshot residue on
his hands. He also had Geoffrey’s body tissue on his leg.
Hutchinson v. State, 882 So. 2d 943, 948 (Fla. 2004).
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The State charged Hutchinson with four counts of first-degree
murder. Following trial, a jury found him guilty as charged on all
four counts, and he proceeded to waive a penalty-phase jury.
Ultimately, after the bench penalty phase, the trial court sentenced
Hutchison to death for the murder of each child and imposed a life
sentence for the murder of his girlfriend.
We affirmed Hutchinson’s convictions and sentences, which
became final in 2004, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(A). Since that
time, Hutchinson has sought postconviction relief in both state and
federal court but has had no success in either forum.
See Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696, 704 (Fla. 2009) (affirming
denial of initial postconviction motion); Hutchinson v. State, 243 So.
3d 880, 884 (Fla. 2018) (affirming denial of first successive
postconviction motion).
Hutchinson has now filed his second successive
postconviction motion asserting four claims for relief. All four
claims involve witnesses, Joel and Deanna Adams, who testified at
trial that they recognized Hutchinson’s voice to be that of the 911
caller.
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Prior to Hutchinson’s trial, Mr. and Ms. Adams testified before
a federal grand jury regarding their possible involvement in two
bank robberies unrelated to the murders. Relying on this FBI
investigation, Hutchinson’s defense counsel sought to impeach both
witnesses at trial on the theory that each was biased toward the
prosecution in hopes of obtaining favorable treatment from the
State in relation to the unrelated robberies. Partially accepting
defense counsel’s argument, the trial court allowed counsel to cover
this topic when cross-examining Ms. Adams.
More than ten years after Hutchinson’s murder convictions
became final, he submitted a request to the FBI regarding its
investigation into the bank robberies. In his second successive
postconviction motion, he claimed that the records received from
the FBI constituted newly discovered evidence under Jones v. State,
709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998). He further claimed that the State
committed a Brady 2 violation by not disclosing those records to the
defense. In addition, he asserted that the State violated Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and that a new trial was
2. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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warranted based on cumulative error. According to him, his four
claims were timely as a result of equitable tolling. The circuit court
summarily denied all of Hutchinson’s claims and found equitable
tolling inapplicable to the facts of this case.
This appeal follows.
II. Analysis
Hutchinson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his
postconviction motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing.
We disagree.
“A circuit court should hold an evidentiary hearing on a rule
3.851 motion ‘whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient
claim that requires a factual determination.’ ” Rogers v. State, 327
So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558,
560 (Fla. 2012)).3 In contrast, a circuit court may summarily deny
a claim that is legally insufficient or refuted by the record. Id. at
787-88; McDonald v. State, 296 So. 3d 382, 383 n.2 (Fla. 2020).
With this framework in mind, we now turn to Hutchinson’s claims.
3. “The standard of review here is de novo.” Rogers, 327 So.
3d at 787 n.5.
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We first consider Hutchinson’s newly discovered evidence
claim. To be facially sufficient, a claim of newly discovered evidence
must meet the two-part Jones test. We have described that test as
follows:
First, the evidence must not have been known by
the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial,
and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel
could not have known of it by the use of diligence.
Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such
[a] nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on
retrial.
Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Tompkins v.
State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1086 (Fla. 2008)).
We agree with the circuit court that Hutchinson cannot prevail
on his newly discovered evidence claim. Even before his trial in
2001, Hutchinson knew of the FBI’s investigation of Mr. and Ms.
Adams. Attachments to the second amended postconviction motion
demonstrate that the FBI records were available—upon request to
federal authorities—at least by 2007. However, Hutchinson failed
to request them until 2017. Accordingly, since Hutchinson raised
his newly discovered evidence claim over a year after the records
became available through due diligence, the claim is untimely. See
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Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1287 (Fla. 2021); Dillbeck v. State,
304 So. 3d 286, 288 (Fla. 2020).
However, even if we assumed Hutchinson’s newly discovered
evidence claim was timely, we would still affirm. Based on our
review of the record, we conclude that the FBI records would not
likely produce an acquittal on retrial. This is so for two main
reasons. One, the FBI records do not bolster Hutchinson’s defense
that someone else committed the murders or seriously call into
question that he made the 911 call. 4 Two, the State presented
overwhelming evidence of his guilt—including evidence that the
victims’ blood and body tissue was on Hutchinson’s leg and
clothing; that gunpowder residue was on Hutchinson’s hands; that
Hutchinson had no defensive wounds consistent with a struggle
with unknown intruders; and that he owned the murder weapon, a
Mossberg shotgun, which police found at the scene of the crime.
See Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 952-53 (characterizing State’s
4. Mr. and Ms. Adams’ testimony was not the only evidence
that Hutchinson was the 911 caller. Such additional evidence
includes the words used by the caller and the fact that the cordless
phone that officers found near Hutchinson was still connected with
the 911 operator when they arrived.
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evidence of guilt as “overwhelming”); see also id. at 948-49;
Hutchinson, 17 So. 3d at 698 (discussing trial evidence).
Accordingly, the record refutes the second prong of
Hutchinson’s Jones claim. Cf. Bogle v. State, 288 So. 3d 1065,
1069 (Fla. 2019) (finding second prong of Jones not satisfied where
additional evidence only amplified evidence already presented at
trial and there was overwhelming evidence of guilt). Thus,
Hutchinson’s claim of newly discovered evidence does not warrant
relief.
Hutchinson’s Brady claim fares no better. To prevail on this
claim, Hutchinson must demonstrate that (1) favorable evidence
which is exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was suppressed by the
State, and (3) because the evidence was material, he was
prejudiced. See Sweet v. State, 293 So. 3d 448, 451 (Fla. 2020).
Even assuming that the FBI records were exculpatory to some
extent, Hutchinson fails to allege specific facts showing that the
records were in the possession of or suppressed by the State.
See Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003) (finding that a
defendant must allege specific facts that, if accepted as true,
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establish a prima facie case that the State possessed evidence
favorable to the accused). Thus, Hutchinson’s Brady claim fails.
Hutchinson’s Giglio claim fails for a similar reason. To obtain
relief under Giglio, Hutchinson needs to demonstrate, among other
things, that a State witness gave false or misleading testimony at
trial. Valentine v. State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly S105, S107 n.5 (Fla. Apr.
7, 2022) (citing Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 479 (Fla. 2018)).
However, in his motion below, Hutchinson failed to identify with
specificity any false or misleading testimony by a State witness at
trial. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court that the Giglio
claim is legally insufficient. See Jimenez, 265 So. 3d at 479. 5
Though less than clear, Hutchinson also appears to have
claimed entitlement to a new trial based on the cumulative effect of
the alleged Brady and Giglio violations. However, since we have
found no Brady or Giglio violations, we have no occasion to consider
5. On appeal, Hutchinson renews his argument that equitable
tolling renders his claims timely. Generally, a motion to vacate a
judgment of conviction and sentence of death must be filed within
one year after the judgment and sentence become final. Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). However, based on our resolution of
Hutchinson’s claims, we need not reach his equitable tolling
argument.
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the cumulative effect of any such violations. See Diaz v. State, 132
So. 3d 93, 118 (Fla. 2013) (applying similar logic in rejecting a
cumulative prejudice argument). Thus, like his other claims, this
claim also fails.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s
summary denial of Hutchinson’s second successive motion for
postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ,
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County,
John Jay Gontarek, Judge
Case No. 461998CF001382XXXACX
Robert S. Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Candace
Rechtmann, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, North
Region, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stacy R. Biggart, Special Assistant
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Gainesville, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine Millsaps, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
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