Thomas H. Fletcher v. State of Florida ( 2022 )

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC20-1862
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THOMAS H. FLETCHER,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
July 7, 2022
PER CURIAM.
Thomas H. Fletcher appeals his judgment of conviction of first-
degree murder and his sentence of death. We have jurisdiction.
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons below, we affirm
Fletcher’s conviction and sentence of death.
I. Background
In September 2018, while serving a life sentence for the 1994
first-degree murder of Milton Grossman, Fletcher strangled his
cellmate Kenneth Davis to death in their cell at the Blackwater
River Correctional Facility. Fletcher, who confessed to killing Davis
to a Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) special agent
and in letters he wrote to the trial court, was indicted for first-
degree premeditated murder in March 2019. As explained in the
trial court’s sentencing order:
On August 29, 2019, [Fletcher] pled guilty to first-degree
murder in open court, which the Court accepted. At the
same time, [Fletcher] informed the Court of his decisions
to waive a penalty phase jury, to not challenge the
imposition of the death penalty, and to refuse to present
mitigation, a position that he has consistently
maintained throughout these proceedings. The Court
found that [Fletcher]’s waivers were knowingly and
voluntarily made and directed the Department of
Corrections to prepare a comprehensive presentence
investigation report (PSI) in accordance with Muhammad
v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 363-64 (Fla. 2001). After
reviewing the PSI and other mitigating evidence
submitted by the State and defense counsel, the Court
appointed special counsel to represent the public interest
in bringing forth all available mitigation for the Court’s
benefit . . . .
Following Fletcher’s guilty plea, the case proceeded to a
penalty phase. On June 18, 2020, the court confirmed Fletcher’s
waiver of a penalty-phase jury and his wish for his appointed
counsel not to present evidence in mitigation. The State presented
the testimony of several witnesses and introduced several exhibits
in support of the following aggravators it sought to establish: (1)
“capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a
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felony and under a sentence of imprisonment”; (2) Fletcher “was
previously convicted of another capital felony”; (3) “capital felony
was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” (HAC); and (4) “capital
felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification” (CCP).
Among the State’s witnesses was the FDLE special agent who
conducted the interview—published in court with no objection—
during which Fletcher confessed, “I did kill Kenny Davis. I
strangled him.” The State also presented testimony from the
pathologist, who performed Davis’s autopsy, identified possible
defensive wounds on several parts of Davis’s body, and concluded
that Davis’s cause of death was manual asphyxiation.
The State’s exhibits included three letters written by Fletcher
addressed to various individuals at the Santa Rosa County
Courthouse confessing to Davis’s murder. These letters were
received and read into the record without objection.
The special counsel, whom the trial court appointed,
summarized the mitigation contained in the record regarding
Davis’s murder, including from Department of Corrections (DOC)
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records and an FDLE investigative report. Special counsel also
summarized relevant mitigation from Fletcher’s 1995 trial for the
murder of Milton Grossman in 1994. Among the evidence
summarized, special counsel indicated that as a minor Fletcher
experienced (1) physical and sexual abuse; (2) physical and
emotional neglect; and (3) drug addiction. Special counsel also
noted that, as an inmate, Fletcher regularly tested positive for drugs
and was suicidal.
After the State rested, Fletcher elected not to present a closing
argument and both the State and Fletcher agreed that a Spencer 1
hearing was unnecessary.
As the trial court explained in the sentencing order, the
penalty-phase evidence established that:
[Fletcher] determined that he wanted to escape the hard
life of prison. Because he was unable to commit suicide,
[Fletcher] decided that the easiest way to accomplish his
“retirement plan” was to kill [Davis] a fellow inmate and
have the death penalty imposed on him. [Fletcher]
accomplished this through careful planning, choking his
cellmate to death despite his cellmate’s obvious attempts
to escape death. [Fletcher] does not lack intelligence or
an ability to understand the nature of his actions.
1. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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The trial court sentenced Fletcher to death for the first-degree
murder of Davis on November 24, 2020. In so doing, the trial court
found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all four
of its proposed aggravators—under sentence of imprisonment, prior
violent felony, HAC, and CCP—and assigned great weight to each
aggravator.
As for mitigating factors, the trial court found no statutory
mitigators; however, the trial court found and assigned the noted
weight to the following ten nonstatutory mitigating circumstances
proved by the greater weight of the evidence, namely that Fletcher
was: (1) physically and sexually abused as a child (some weight); (2)
raised by an alcoholic mother (slight weight); (3) raised in an
unstable home life (slight weight); (4) protective of his sister who
was being abused (some weight); (5) a provider for his sister (slight
weight); (6) exposed to alcohol and illegal drugs at a young age and
became an addict (some weight); (7) found to possess an artistic
talent and has demonstrated a desire to develop this ability in the
past (very slight weight); (8) found to have lost all hope (very slight
weight); (9) cooperative with law enforcement (very slight weight);
and (10) respectful and courteous in court (very slight weight).
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As to the sufficiency and weighing findings, the trial court
found that “sufficient aggravating factors exist to warrant the death
penalty . . . that the aggravating factors far outweigh the mitigating
circumstances and that a sentence of death, rather than life, is
appropriate.”
Fletcher now appeals.
II. Analysis
In this direct appeal, Fletcher argues that the trial court erred
in sentencing him to death for two reasons: (1) the trial court failed
to ensure that all available mitigation was developed and presented,
and (2) the trial court failed to determine beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating factors were sufficient to justify death
and outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Though not raised
as an issue, we also review Fletcher’s guilty plea to first-degree
murder.
1. Mitigation
Although Fletcher instructed his appointed counsel not to
present mitigation below, he now argues on appeal that even
though the trial court followed the “formalities of a presentence
investigation report and the appointment of special counsel,” it
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erred in “ensur[ing] that all available mitigation was considered.”
Because this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, we
review the trial court’s rulings regarding mitigation for fundamental
error. See Craft v. State, 312 So. 3d 45, 56 n.6 (Fla. 2020)
(explaining that unpreserved errors are reviewed for fundamental
error).
We have “repeatedly recognized the right of a competent
defendant to waive presentation of mitigating evidence.” Koon v.
Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 249 (Fla. 1993). However, we have also
held that a capital defendant’s mitigation waiver “does not eliminate
the court’s responsibility to consider mitigating evidence in the
record.” Bell v. State, 336 So. 3d 211, 217 (Fla. 2022) (citing Sparre
v. State, 164 So. 3d 1183, 1196 (Fla. 2015)). And, in cases like
Fletcher’s where a capital defendant entirely waives the
presentation of mitigation, we require the trial court to order a
“comprehensive” PSI that “include[s] information such as previous
mental health problems (including hospitalizations), school records,
and relevant family background.” Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363;
see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.710(b) (adopting the Muhammad
standard). We have further left it within the trial court’s discretion
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to appoint special counsel. See Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464,
491 (Fla. 2015) (holding that “[i]f the PSI and the accompanying
records alert the trial court to the probability of significant
mitigation, the trial court has the discretion . . . to appoint an
independent, special counsel”); Robertson v. State, 187 So. 3d 1207,
1214 (Fla. 2016) (“[A]ppoint[ing] special counsel [is] a matter within
the court’s discretion.”) (citing Sparre, 164 So. 3d at 1198-99).
Here, Fletcher argues that special counsel presented outdated
mitigation from the proceedings related to Fletcher’s 1994 murder
of Grossman and failed to explore Fletcher’s “drug use and suicidal
ideation” as it relates to Davis’s murder. Fletcher faults the trial
court for failing to order further development of the mitigation
concerning his adverse childhood experiences and his “drug use
and suicidal ideation.” We disagree that fundamental error
occurred.
The record shows that, faced with Fletcher’s election not to
present mitigation, the trial court complied with our precedent. The
trial court ordered a comprehensive PSI, which contained required
information like Fletcher’s “criminal, educational, work, and family
history” and referenced Fletcher’s prior suicide attempt,
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notwithstanding Fletcher’s refusal to participate in the PSI’s
preparation. See Bell, 336 So. 3d at 215 n.7 (finding that even
though “the PSI was not particularly thorough, it included the type
of information a comprehensive PSI requires”). Further, as the
sentencing order explicitly states, the trial court considered the
mitigating evidence from the PSI. See Hojan v. State, 3 So. 3d 1204,
1216-17 (Fla. 2009) (finding that the trial court “consider[ed] the
PSI report as it was required to do” since the “sentencing order
specifically states that a PSI was ordered”).
Moreover, after exercising its discretion to appoint special
counsel, see Marquardt, 156 So. 3d at 491, the record is also clear
that the trial court considered the mitigation presented by special
counsel. Specifically, in the sentencing order, the trial court stated
that “most of the mitigation [was] gleaned from special counsel’s
summary.” Indeed, over half of the mitigating circumstances found
by the trial court relate to Fletcher’s traumatic childhood
experiences, which were documented when Fletcher was an adult in
connection with Fletcher’s 1994 murder of Grossman. Additionally,
special counsel discussed and the trial court explicitly considered
Fletcher’s drug use in prison and “the fact that [Fletcher] had told
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other inmates that he wanted to die.” Although Fletcher faults the
sufficiency of special counsel’s presentation and argues that the
trial court erred by not requiring special counsel to do more to
develop mitigation, he does not identify any mitigation that the trial
court failed to consider. See Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363(“emphasiz[ing] the duty of the trial court to consider all mitigating
evidence ‘contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is
believable and uncontroverted’ ”) (quoting Farr v. State, 621 So. 2d
1368, 1369 (Fla. 1993)); see also Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85, 102
(Fla. 2007) (finding that “the appointment of special counsel is
solely at the discretion of the trial court” and “a defendant has no
basis for claiming that special counsel’s presentation of mitigation
evidence was ineffective”). Furthermore, to the extent Fletcher
claims fundamental error because the trial court did not appoint
experts to assist special counsel with developing and presenting
mitigation, Fletcher’s trial counsel stated that there was “no need
for [special counsel] to seek to have experts appointed, because the
defendant simply will not cooperate.”
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Accordingly, because on these facts we find no fundamental
error in the trial court’s rulings regarding mitigation, Fletcher is not
entitled to relief.
2. Sufficiency of Findings
Fletcher also challenges his death sentence on the ground
that, in sentencing him to death, the trial court failed to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors were
sufficient to justify death and outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. However, as Fletcher properly concedes in his
initial brief, we have repeatedly rejected this argument. See
Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 2019) (holding that
sufficiency and weighing determinations “are not subject to the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof”); see also Craft, 312
So. 3d at 57 (finding that this Court has “repeatedly” rejected
arguments that “that the trial court fundamentally erred by failing
to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
factors were sufficient to justify the death penalty”). As in prior
cases, we decline in Fletcher’s case to “revisit what has been settled:
only the existence of a statutory aggravating factor must be found
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beyond a reasonable doubt.” McKenzie v. State, 333 So. 3d 1098,
1105 (Fla. 2022).
3. Guilty Plea
Finally, we review Fletcher’s guilty plea to first-degree murder.
See Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5); Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106, 121
(Fla. 2007). This review requires us “to scrutinize the plea to
ensure that the defendant [1] was made aware of the consequences
of his plea, [2] was apprised of the constitutional rights he was
waiving, and [3] pled guilty voluntarily.” Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d
956, 965 (Fla. 2002). Additionally, we “review the relevant factual
basis for the plea.” Bell, 336 So. 3d at 218 (citing Doty v. State, 170
So. 3d 731, 739 (Fla. 2015)).
Here, the record shows that Fletcher knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. First, Fletcher was made
aware of the consequences of his plea and indicated he understood
the consequences and the conditions of the plea agreement.
Second, Fletcher was apprised of the constitutional rights he was
waiving. The trial court asked and Fletcher affirmed that he “read
over the plea agreement” and “underst[ood] all the terms and
conditions” which stated, among other things, that Fletcher was
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waiving: (1) “the privilege against self-incrimination;” (2) “the right
to a jury trial;” and (3) “the right to confront [his] accusers.”
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397 n.7 (1993) (explaining that
three constitutional rights are waived when defendants plead
guilty). Third, the trial court asked, and Fletcher confirmed, that he
pled guilty voluntarily. Finally, the “factual basis for the plea,”
which was agreed to by Fletcher, is sufficient to support the first-
degree murder conviction. Doty, 170 So. 3d at 739.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Fletcher’s first-degree
murder conviction and sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, LAWSON, COURIEL, and
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (receding from
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proportionality review requirement in death penalty direct appeal
cases), I can only concur in the result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Santa Rosa County,
James Scott Duncan, Judge
Case No. 572019CF000526CFAXMX
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis,
Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Jennifer A. Davis,
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida,
for Appellee
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