Brinda Coates, etc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ( 2023 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC21-175
____________
BRINDA COATES, etc.,
Petitioner,
vs.
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,
Respondent.
January 5, 2023
POLSTON, J.
In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Coates, 308 So. 3d 1068 (Fla.
5th DCA 2020), the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed as
excessive a punitive damages award that exceeds the net
compensatory damages award by a ratio of 106.7 to 1. In so ruling,
the district court certified a question of great public importance. 1
308 So. 3d at 1076.
In passing upon the certified question, the Fifth District
addressed the Florida and federal standards for evaluating whether
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
a punitive damages award is excessive, and ultimately certified this
question:
When other factors support the amount of punitive
damages awarded, but the award is excessive compared
to the compensatory award, does the amount of punitive
damages that may legally be imposed for causing the
death of a human being depend on the actual amount of
compensatory damages awarded to the decedent’s estate,
even when that compensatory award is modest and the
punitive award would be sustainable compared to awards
in other cases for comparable injuries caused by
comparable misconduct?
Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1076.
Under Florida law, although the trial court has broad
discretion in ruling on a motion for remittitur of a damages award,
that discretion is constrained by statutory criteria that must be
considered in determining whether the award is excessive. See
Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294, 308 (Fla.
2017). Because the Florida Statutes require us to conclude that a
punitive damages award in a wrongful death action must bear a
reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury
suffered by the statutory beneficiaries, we decline to further analyze
the issue as a matter of Florida or federal constitutional law. See In
re Holder, 945 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 2006) (“[W]e have long
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subscribed to a principle of judicial restraint by which we avoid
considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided
on nonconstitutional grounds.”). Accordingly, we rephrase the
certified question as follows:
Does the trial court in a wrongful death action abuse its
discretion by denying remittitur of a punitive damages
award that does not bear a reasonable relation to the
amount of damages proved and the injury suffered by the
statutory beneficiaries?
As explained below, our answer to the rephrased question is
yes, and because no reasonable trial court could have concluded
that the necessary relation exists in this case, we hold that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying remittitur of the excessive
award. Accordingly, we approve the Fifth District’s decision
reversing the punitive damages award and remanding for further
proceedings to the extent the district court’s decision is consistent
with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves a non-Engle2 wrongful death action that is
governed by the 1997 version of the Florida Statutes based on the
2. Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
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date of the decedent’s death. Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1070 n.1, 1071.
In the operative complaint filed in the trial court, the plaintiff
Brinda Coates, individually and as the personal representative of
the estate of her sister, Lois Stucky, alleged that Ms. Stucky died as
a result of lung cancer caused by smoking cigarettes and sought
relief from the defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR)
based on four theories: (1) negligence, (2) strict-liability design
defect, (3) fraud, and (4) conspiracy.
The jury found for Ms. Coates on the strict liability theory but
rejected RJR’s liability under the other three theories. The jury
further found that each of Ms. Stucky’s three adult children
sustained $100,000 in damages, for a total of $300,000. Id. at
1070. The jury’s verdict specified that these were “the total
amount” of damages sustained by Ms. Stucky’s children “for the
loss of parental companionship, instruction[,] and guidance, and
from their mental pain and suffering as a result of Lois Stucky’s
lung cancer and death.” However, the jury also found that Ms.
Stucky’s negligence caused 50% of the damages, which reduced the
total compensatory damages to $150,000. Coates, 308 So. 3d at
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1070. Finally, the jury found that punitive damages were
warranted and ultimately awarded $16 million. Id.
RJR filed a motion for new trial or remittitur, arguing that the
punitive damages award was excessive. Id. In an unelaborated
order, the trial court denied RJR’s motion, id. at 1071 n.3, and then
entered a final judgment against RJR.
RJR appealed to the Fifth District, “challeng[ing] the punitive
damages award as excessive, particularly when considered in
relation to the $150,000 net compensatory damages award, and
argu[ing] that the trial court erred in denying its motion for new
trial or remittitur.” Id. at 1071. After concluding that the punitive
damages award is excessive under both Florida and federal law, the
Fifth District reversed the award and remanded “for entry of an
order of remittitur or, if remittitur is rejected by either party, a new
trial solely on the amount of punitive damages.” Id. at 1076. In so
holding, the Fifth District certified to this Court the question of
great public importance that we have rephrased and limited to
Florida law as set forth above.
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II. ANALYSIS
The rephrased question presents a pure question of law that
we review de novo. See Townsend v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 192
So. 3d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 2016). To explain why we answer it in the
affirmative, we first address Florida law requiring a reasonable
relationship between punitive damages and the amount of damages
proved and the injury suffered. Then, we explain why the rule is no
different in a wrongful death action. Finally, we apply Florida law
to the undisputed facts of this case to conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying remittitur of the excessive punitive
damages award.
A. Florida law requires a reasonable relationship between
punitive damages and the amount of damages proved and the
injury suffered.
The rephased question implicates two statutes, sections
768.73 and 768.74, Florida Statutes (1997), that govern review of
the punitive damages award at issue. 3 Therefore, we begin with
3. Since 1997, the first statute, section 768.73, has been
substantially amended. See § 768.73, Fla. Stat. (2021). The second
statute, section 768.74, remains the same. See § 768.74, Fla. Stat.
(2021).
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their text. See Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 308 So. 3d 942,
946 (Fla. 2020) (explaining that in interpreting a statute this Court
“follow[s] the ‘supremacy-of-text principle’—namely, the principle
that ‘[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and
what they convey, in their context, is what the text means’ ”)
(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)).
First, section 768.73, Florida Statutes (1997), addresses
Florida’s limitation on punitive damages, and subject to one
exception, caps a punitive damages award in relation to the
compensatory damages award at a 3:1 ratio:
(1) (a) In any civil action based on negligence, strict
liability, products liability, misconduct in commercial
transactions, professional liability, or breach of warranty,
and involving willful, wanton, or gross misconduct, the
judgment for the total amount of punitive damages
awarded to a claimant may not exceed three times the
amount of compensatory damages awarded to each
person entitled thereto by the trier of fact, except as
provided in paragraph (b). However, this subsection does
not apply to any class action.
(b) If any award for punitive damages exceeds the
limitation specified in paragraph (a), the award is
presumed to be excessive and the defendant is entitled to
remittitur of the amount in excess of the limitation
unless the claimant demonstrates to the court by clear
and convincing evidence that the award is not excessive
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in light of the facts and circumstances which were
presented to the trier of fact.
(c) This subsection is not intended to prohibit an
appropriate court from exercising its jurisdiction under s.
768.74 in determining the reasonableness of an award of
punitive damages that is less than three times the
amount of compensatory damages.
§ 768.73(1)(a)-(c).
Second, section 768.74, Florida Statutes (1997), which is
Florida’s remittitur and additur statute, requires the trial court,
upon a proper motion, to review an award of money damages “to
determine if [the] amount is excessive . . . in light of the facts and
circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact,” §
768.74(1), and to “order a remittitur” if it “finds that the amount
awarded is excessive,” § 768.74(2). The statute establishes five
“criteria” that the trial court “shall consider” “[i]n determining
whether an award is excessive . . . in light of the facts and
circumstances presented to the trier of fact and in determining the
amount, if any that such award exceeds a reasonable range.” §
768.74(5). The rephrased certified question implicates the fourth of
these five criteria, which requires the trial court to consider
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“[w]hether the amount awarded bears a reasonable relation to the
amount of damages proved and the injury suffered.” § 768.74(5)(d).
Reading these statutes together, unless the “facts and
circumstances” exception of section 768.73(1)(b) applies, section
768.73(1)(a) caps an award of punitive damages in comparison to
the compensatory damages award at a ratio of 3:1, and section
768.74 provides for further review of an award that is challenged as
excessive, regardless of whether the award falls inside or outside of
the 3:1 cap. Therefore, even when (as the Fifth District held here)
the “facts and circumstances” allow a punitive damages award to
exceed the 3:1 presumptive cap of section 768.73(1)(a), that is not
the end of the analysis. See Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1073. Rather,
the trial court must review the challenged award for excessiveness
under section 768.74. See id.; see also § 768.74(3), Fla. Stat. (“It is
the intention of the Legislature that awards of damages be subject
to close scrutiny by the courts and that all such awards be
adequate and not excessive.”) (emphasis added); Guarino v.
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 88-1087-CIV-MARCUS, 1989 WL
265218, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 1989) (describing section
768.73(1)(a) as imposing a cap on punitive damages and section
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768.74(2) as providing “a further check upon the imposition of
excessive punitive damages”).
When a trial court reviews an award of punitive damages
under section 768.74, the statute plainly requires that the amount
awarded must “bear[] a reasonable relation to the amount of
damages proved and the injury suffered.” § 768.74(5)(d). This
requirement is one of the five “criteria” that the trial court “shall
consider” in determining whether a damages award is excessive, §
768.74(5)(d), and is therefore a condition that must be met for the
award to stand. See Owens v. State, 303 So. 3d 993, 997 n.5 (Fla.
1st DCA 2020) (“The word criteria used by the Legislature is the
plural of criterion. Using the plural shows that the Legislature
intended all [the] conditions to be met . . . .”) (citation omitted); see
also Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Thornton, 241 So. 3d 867, 868 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2018) (remanding for remittitur where the amount of damages
awarded bore no reasonable relationship to the damages proved).
Consistent with the statutory text, our precedent recognizes
that a punitive damage award must bear a reasonable relationship
to the amount of damages proved and the injury suffered.
Specifically, in Schoeff, 232 So. 3d at 308, we applied section
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768.74(5) to “evaluate a denial of remittitur for abuse of discretion,”
and identified the compensatory damages award as relevant to the
statutory inquiry, explaining that “[p]unitive damages must also be
reviewed alongside compensatory damages ‘to ensure a reasonable
relationship between the two.’ ” Id. (quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp.,
Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1264 (Fla. 2006)).
B. The rule is no different in a wrongful death action.
Given the clarity of both the statutory text and our precedent,
it is not surprising that Ms. Coates acknowledges that sections
768.73 and 768.74 make relevant a comparison between punitive
and compensatory damages. She also acknowledges that the dollar
amount of the $16 million punitive damages award in this case
compared to the dollar amount of the $150,000 net compensatory
damages award “might call the punitive award into some initial
question.” However, despite the 106.7 to 1 ratio of the awards, she
argues that the necessary reasonable relationship exists because,
unlike other actions where the compensatory damages reflect the
actual injury suffered, the compensatory damages in a wrongful
death action do not because the statutory beneficiaries do not
recover damages for the decedent’s death. Insisting that the
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uncompensated-for death is really the injury suffered in a wrongful
death action, Ms. Coates urges us to answer the rephrased question
in the negative and uphold the $16 million punitive damages award
as bearing a reasonable relation to Ms. Stucky’s death.
We cannot. The text of Florida’s Wrongful Death Act controls
and precludes us from concluding that death is “the injury suffered”
in a wrongful death action. See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts,
149 So. 631, 632 (Fla. 1933) (“The common law afforded no remedy
for death by wrongful act. Hence the right and remedy are purely
statutory.”). The Wrongful Death Act creates a statutory right of
action, see § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (1997), and provides that the injury
suffered in such an action is to the decedent’s statutory
beneficiaries, not the decedent, see §§ 768.18, 768.21, Fla. Stat.
(1997).
As explained above, the statutory beneficiaries in this case are
Ms. Stucky’s three adult children. § 768.18(1) (defining
“[s]urvivors” to include the decedent’s children). The Wrongful
Death Act specifies the damages that “may be awarded” to the
statutory beneficiaries, and where the decedent’s survivors are
concerned provides that “[e]ach survivor may recover the value of
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lost support and services from the date of the decedent’s injury to
her or his death, with interest, and future loss of support and
services from the date of death and reduced to present value.” §
768.21(1). Accordingly, because the Wrongful Death Act remedies
injuries suffered “for the living and not for the dead,” Martin v.
United Sec. Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765, 769 (Fla. 1975), we cannot
conclude, for purposes of evaluating a punitive damages award in a
wrongful death action under section 768.74(5)(d), that the
decedent’s death is “the injury suffered.” See § 768.20, Fla. Stat.
(1997) (“When a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no
action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action
pending at the time of death shall abate.”) (emphasis added).
Citing decisions from other states, Ms. Coates cautions that
failing to recognize death as the real injury suffered in a wrongful
death action disregards the sanctity of life by allowing a tortfeasor
to be punished to a lesser extent in a case where the injured person
dies as a result of the tortious conduct than in a case where the
injured person survives. See Schwartz v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
355 P.3d 931, 942-43 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (affirming a punitive to
compensatory damage award ratio of 148:1 in a wrongful death
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action based in part on the court’s conclusions that the $170,000
compensatory award did not, as a matter of Oregon law, “account
for the loss [of the decedent’s] life itself” and “would not serve an
appropriate admonitory function in the circumstances of this case”).
In Florida, however, the Legislature made a policy choice to
exclude death as a cognizable injury in a wrongful death action and
to recognize instead the injury suffered by the statutory
beneficiaries. It is not for us to treat injury differently for punitive
damages in wrongful death actions where the Legislature has not.
Rather, our job is to faithfully apply the law as written. See State v.
Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001) (“[I]t is not this Court’s
function to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature as to
the wisdom or policy of a particular statute.”).
Although the dissent properly observes that the statutes
provide for the estate as a beneficiary, our analysis on punitive
damages is not affected because death is not a cognizable injury for
the estate in a wrongful death action. Section 768.21(6) specifies
the damages that “[t]he decedent’s personal representative may
recover for the decedent’s estate.” Although not part of the
damages awarded in this case, the statute authorizes, subject to
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certain limitations, recovery for injuries to the estate in the form of
lost earnings of the deceased from the date of injury to the date of
death, lost prospective net accumulations of the estate, and medical
or funeral expenses. See id. Nowhere does the statute authorize
recovery on behalf of the estate for the decedent’s death.
Significantly, that is because the Legislature’s choice to exclude
death as a cognizable injury in a wrongful death action equally
applies to all of the statutory beneficiaries, including the estate.
See § 768.20 (limiting the personal representative’s recovery “for the
benefit of the decedent’s survivors and estate” to the damages
“specified in this act” and expressly extinguishing any action for a
personal injury to the decedent that results in death).
Under Florida law, which excludes the decedent’s death as a
cognizable injury under the Wrongful Death Act, we hold that the
trial court in a wrongful death action abuses its discretion by
denying remittitur of a punitive damages award that does not bear a
reasonable relation to the damages proved and the injury suffered
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by the statutory beneficiaries. Therefore, we answer the rephrased
question in the affirmative.4
C. The trial court abused its discretion by denying remittitur.
In this case, we agree with the Fifth District that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying remittitur of the $16 million
punitive damages award. See Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1263 (“Under
Florida law, a trial court’s determination of whether a damage
award is excessive, requiring a remittitur or a new trial, is reviewed
by an appellate court under an abuse of discretion standard.”); see
also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (“If
reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken
by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there
can be no finding of an abuse of discretion.”).
4. In so holding, we reiterate that the rephrased question is
limited to the facts of this case where the compensatory damages
award reflects the damages proved and the legally cognizable injury
suffered by the statutory beneficiaries. Therefore, we need not
reach RJR’s argument that section 768.74(5)(d), on its face and as
interpreted by this Court in Schoeff, should be read to require
remittitur of a punitive damages award based solely on the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages, without regard to the injury
suffered. Nor do we express any opinion as to whether the damages
proved will always be coextensive with the injury suffered in every
case to which the remittitur statute applies.
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Although we cannot say it was unreasonable to conclude that
the facts and circumstances support departing from the 3:1 cap of
section 768.73(1), see Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1073, as we have
explained above, that is not the end of the inquiry. Rather, section
768.74(5)(d) imposes a further check against an excessive punitive
damages award that turns on “[w]hether the amount awarded bears
a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the
injury suffered.” Looking to the undisputed facts in this record, no
reasonable trial court could have concluded that the $16 million
punitive damages award survives that check. See Canakaris, 382
So. 2d at 1203.
Here, the damages proved were $300,000, reduced by Ms.
Stucky’s 50% comparative fault to a net of $150,000. Although the
Fifth District described these damages as “modest,” Coates, 308 So.
3d at 1076, they are not merely nominal damages awarded in a
case where compensatory damages were not proven. See Land &
Sea Petroleum Holdings, Inc. v. Leavitt, 321 So. 3d 810, 816 (Fla.
4th DCA 2021) (“[N]ominal damages are in effect zero damages and
are defined as those damages flowing from the establishment of an
invasion of a legal right where actual or compensatory damages
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have not been proven.”) (quoting Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456
(Fla. 1989)). Rather, the injury suffered by the survivors in this
wrongful death case is the injury reflected in the compensatory
damages award that the jury found to represent “the total amount”
of the damages that Ms. Stucky’s survivors sustained “for the loss
of parental companionship, instruction[,] and guidance, and from
their mental pain and suffering as a result of Lois Stucky’s lung
cancer and death.”
Finally, Ms. Coates correctly notes that higher dollar awards of
punitive damages have been approved in other tobacco cases. See
Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1076 (collecting tobacco cases with punitive
damages awards of $20 million or more). However, the statutory
analysis of whether a punitive damages award bears a reasonable
relation to the amount of damages proven and the injury suffered is
necessarily case-specific. See § 768.74(5)(d). The damages findings
in this case sit in stark contrast to other wrongful death cases
where the proof of more significant injury to the statutory
beneficiaries resulted in much larger compensatory damages
awards that, in turn, supported higher punitive damages awards.
See, e.g., Schoeff, 232 So. 3d at 299, 308-09 (holding the trial court
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did not abuse its discretion by denying remittitur of a $30 million
punitive damages award where the jury found the tobacco company
liable for the decedent’s wrongful death on multiple claims,
including fraudulent concealment, and awarded $10.5 million in
compensatory damages).
In this case, because no reasonable trial court could have
found that the $16 million punitive damages award bears a
reasonable relation to the $150,000 net compensatory damages
award and the injury suffered by Ms. Stucky’s survivors, the Fifth
District correctly reversed the excessive punitive damages award
and remanded for further proceedings.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we hold that a trial court in a wrongful
death action abuses its discretion by denying remittitur of a
punitive damages award that does not bear a reasonable relation to
the damages proved and the injuries suffered by the statutory
beneficiaries. Accordingly, we answer the rephrased certified
question in the affirmative. Further, because the trial court abused
its discretion by not ordering remittitur of the punitive damages
award in this case, we approve the Fifth District’s decision reversing
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the excessive award and remanding for further proceedings to the
extent the district court’s decision is consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ.,
concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
FRANCIS, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., dissenting.
As a result of today’s decision, a Florida jury’s verdict—that
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (R.J. Reynolds) is liable for
$16 million in punitive damages for the wrongful death of
Lois Stucky—will be drastically reduced to a fraction of what the
jury determined that the circumstances of the case warrant. This
drastic reduction is attributable to the majority’s analysis of the
rephrased certified question, an analysis that unreasonably
concludes that the decedent’s death is not a cognizable injury for
purposes of punitive damages claims.
Although Florida’s Wrongful Death Act does not recognize the
death of the decedent, Ms. Stucky, as a cognizable injury in
awarding compensatory damages, I disagree with the majority’s
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conclusion that under the Act, her death is not a cognizable injury
for the purpose of awarding punitive damages. I respectfully
dissent.
In March 2019, the jury rendered a verdict which read in part:
“Please state whether cigarettes manufactured by R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company and smoked by Lois Stucky were defective by
reasons of their design and, if so, whether the defect was the legal
cause of Lois Stucky’s lung cancer and death.” To this question,
the jury answered: “Yes.” The jury further found “by clear and
convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted against
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company under the circumstances of this
case.”
When evaluating a plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the
jury “focuses on ensuring the correct remedy for the underlying
violation—one that punishes the defendant and deters others from
engaging in similar conduct.” Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
187 So. 3d 1219, 1230 (Fla. 2016). Naturally, this means that in a
wrongful death case, the jury must consider the correct remedy for
the tortious conduct that caused the decedent’s death.
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However, today’s decision guts the impact of punitive damages
in wrongful death cases because the majority concludes that the
most important part, indeed, the basis of a wrongful death claim—
the decedent’s death—may not be considered an injury suffered.
This decision invades the province of the jury in wrongful death
cases because it increases the likelihood that remittitur will be
ordered whenever the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages exceeds the ratio of 3:1.
To arrive at its conclusion that the jury’s punitive damages
award was excessive in this case, the majority relies on a strained
interpretation of one of five factors set forth in section 768.74(5),
Florida Statutes (1997), and it concludes that no reasonable court
could have found that the punitive damages award bears a
reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury
suffered. See majority op. at 18. The majority also narrowly
focuses on Ms. Stuckey’s three adult children as the “statutory
beneficiaries,” although the decedent’s estate is also an enumerated
beneficiary under Florida’s Wrongful Death Act. The majority’s
interpretation raises the question: when evaluating punitive
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damages in a wrongful death case, how can a decedent’s death not
be a cognizable injury?
The Wrongful Death Act, with its focus on compensatory
damages, should not be read to limit the type of injury cognizable in
determining punitive damages. Nor does considering death as an
injury for punitive damages purposes constitute maintaining an
“action for the personal injury,” which is prohibited under the Act.
See § 768.20, Fla. Stat. (1997).
Because R.J. Reynolds’s tortious conduct caused Ms. Stucky’s
death, treating her death as a cognizable injury for the purpose of
awarding punitive damages is necessary to hold R.J. Reynolds fully
accountable for the harm it caused. This rationale was cogently
explained in Schwarz v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 355 P.3d 931, 943
(Or. Ct. App. 2015), where similar to Florida, compensatory
“damages [in Oregon] did not account for the loss of [the decedent’s]
life itself, as ‘Oregon law does not provide for compensatory
damages for loss of life to the person who has died or to her estate
in this type of case.’ ” Id. (quoting jury instruction). As a result, the
court explained, “the compensatory damages did not account for all
of the harm directly suffered as a result of the actions of defendant.
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Rather, defendant’s conduct caused harm for which defendant was
not required to pay.” Id.Acknowledging the inadequacy of this result, the court
concluded that the “less than $170,000” awarded to the plaintiffs
was “a relatively small amount for the death of a human being and
would not serve an appropriate admonitory function in the
circumstances of this case.” Id. The court observed that the
“defendant engaged in particularly egregious acts in this case, but
that conduct resulted in a relatively small amount of compensatory
damages in light of the harm that resulted.” Id.In the present case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal also
identified egregious wrongdoing by the defendant, R.J. Reynolds,
explaining in detail:
The evidence at trial demonstrated significant
reprehensibility by Reynolds in designing its cigarettes.
It used a tobacco curing process designed to make the
smoke “smoother” and manipulated the levels of nicotine
and other additives to make its product easily inhalable,
and thus, addictive. Too, its advertising efforts,
particularly those advertisements produced in the early
years of Ms. Stucky’s addiction, were intended to entice
young people to begin smoking and to suggest, if not
convince, consumers that smoking was safe, or
reasonably so. But it was well established that the
inhalation of cigarette smoke is not safe. Stucky paid the
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price for her addiction. The jury determined that
Reynolds must also pay its price.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Coates, 308 So. 3d 1068, 1070 (Fla.
5th DCA 2020). As a result of the jury’s findings, the jury awarded
$16 million in punitive damages for the entirety of the harm caused
by R.J. Reynolds. Id. at 1071.
The exclusion of Ms. Stucky’s death as a cognizable injury for
punitive damages purposes is revealed to be especially unfair when
considering that if she had not died as a result of R.J. Reynolds’s
wrongdoing, but instead was left alive but severely injured, that
injury would be able to be considered in determining punitive
damages. Under today’s holding, however, because Ms. Stucky did
not survive, her death is not a basis for awarding punitive damages.
While the majority emphasizes that a cognizable wrongful
death injury must attach to the statutory beneficiaries, I hasten to
note that a decedent’s estate is also a named beneficiary under the
Wrongful Death Act; indeed, Ms. Coates was successful on her
strict liability claim in her capacity as the personal representative of
Ms. Stucky’s estate. Although a personal injury cause of action
cannot survive the death of the decedent, Ms. Stucky’s death itself
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is a separate injury, and naturally, only cognizable upon her death.
Accordingly, death is the injury suffered to the decedent’s estate as
a statutory beneficiary, and it can be considered for punitive
damages purposes.
It is not hard to imagine a situation under the majority’s
interpretation where the punitive damages awarded to a living
victim will far exceed the punitive damages awarded if a victim dies.
Recognizing death as a cognizable injury for punitive damage
purposes would maintain the Wrongful Death Act’s function of
defining available compensatory damages without robbing punitive
damage awards of their purpose. Because of the untenable results
that will flow from the majority’s interpretation, I respectfully
dissent.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Direct Conflict of Decisions/Certified Great Public Importance
Fifth District – Case No. 5D19-2549
(Orange County)
John S. Mills of Bishop & Mills, PLLC, Jacksonville, Florida,
Courtney Brewer, Jonathan Martin, and Bailey Howard of Bishop &
Mills, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
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Troy A. Fuhrman and Marie A. Borland of Hill Ward Henderson,
Tampa, Florida; Jason T. Burnette and Brian Charles Lea of Jones
Day, Atlanta, Georgia, Charles R.A. Morse of Jones Day, New York,
New York, and Andrew J. Bentz of Jones Day, Washington, District
of Columbia,
for Respondent
Geoffrey J. Michael, John P. Elwood, and Samuel F. Callahan of
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, District of
Columbia,
for Amicus Curiae Philip Morris USA Inc.
Kansas R. Gooden of Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Miami, Florida; and
Cyrus S. Vaziri of Cyrus S. Vaziri, P.A., Fort Myers, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Defense Lawyers Association
William W. Large of Florida Justice Reform Institute, Tallahassee,
Florida; and Joseph H. Lang, Jr. of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa,
Florida,
for Amici Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, the American Tort Reform Association, and
the Florida Justice Reform Institute
Wendy F. Lumish of Bowman and Brooke LLP, Coral Gables,
Florida; and Thomas H. Dupree, Jr. of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Washington, District of Columbia,
for Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.
Cory L. Andrews of Washington Legal Foundation, Washington,
District of Columbia,
for Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Foundation
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