State of Florida v. Tony Garcia ( 2022 )


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  •           Supreme Court of Florida
    ____________
    No. SC19-1870
    ____________
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Petitioner,
    vs.
    TONY GARCIA,
    Respondent.
    August 25, 2022
    COURIEL, J.
    We have for review the decision of the Fourth District Court of
    Appeal in Garcia v. State, 
    279 So. 3d 148
    , 149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019),
    which affirmed the Respondent’s conviction for arson but found
    that his due process rights were violated because his sentence may
    have been based, at least in part, on a factor the trial court was not
    permitted to consider: Garcia’s misconduct while out on bond.1
    Finding that the trial court committed no fundamental error, we
    1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
    quash the Fourth District’s decision to the extent that it requires
    the trial court to resentence the Respondent.
    I
    On June 11, 2014, Tony Garcia’s mortgage lender sent him
    notice that, in a month, his home would be sold at foreclosure.
    Seventeen days later, Garcia’s neighbor saw the house go up in
    flames and called 911. The State charged Garcia with arson for
    setting fire to the place. Garcia’s first trial ended in a hung jury,
    and, with his second trial pending, a judge released him on bond.
    As the evidence later heard by the sentencing judge would
    establish, Garcia made a menace of himself while out on bond. On
    one occasion, while driving with a suspended license, he left the
    scene of a car crash and was arrested. Another day, shaking and
    crying as he did, Garcia aimed a gun in the face of a neighbor who
    had stopped by Garcia’s house to pick up some tools and have a
    beer; the neighbor did not call the police. Just two days after that
    episode, the police were summoned to Garcia’s ex-wife’s house,
    where Garcia had gone to retrieve guns from a safe. They found
    him banging on her door, acting in a manner that to them
    suggested intoxication, mental disturbance, or both. Garcia
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    denounced an officer on the scene with a racial epithet; the officer
    deescalated the situation and gave Garcia a ride home.
    No sooner had Garcia gotten out of the officer’s car than he
    struck up an argument with his neighbor, threatening to shoot him
    and the officer who had driven him home. The officer, at that point
    having heard enough, took Garcia to a mental health facility and
    sought to have him involuntarily examined under the Baker Act. 2
    Not an hour later, Garcia had walked out of the facility and was on
    the street again. Another officer, having received a tip about
    Garcia’s whereabouts, found him eating chicken wings and drinking
    beer at a local bar and returned him to the mental health facility.
    Learning all this, the trial court expressed its concern for the
    safety of Garcia and of the community and revoked Garcia’s bond.
    He would await retrial on his arson charge in jail. While there, as
    the trial court would later learn, his threatening conduct continued.
    2. Section 394.463, Florida Statutes, allows a law
    enforcement officer to take into custody and deliver to an
    appropriate facility any person displaying specified signs of mental
    illness, including signs that “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that
    without care or treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm
    to himself or others in the near future.” § 394.463(1)(b)(2), Fla.
    Stat. (2014).
    -3-
    On a call with his ex-wife, Garcia said that he would break his
    daughter-in-law’s neck if he ever saw her again. On another call,
    he told his ex-wife that he wanted to summon a gang to his
    daughter-in-law’s house but was hesitant to do so knowing they
    would also “take out” his grandson.
    Garcia proceeded to his second trial and was convicted of first-
    degree arson. 3 The judge ordered a presentence investigation
    report. The report showed that Garcia had a 12th-grade education;
    that he was unemployed due to disability; that he had a criminal
    history (one conviction for battery and one for the time he drove on
    a suspended license while out on bond); and that his minimum and
    maximum permissible sentences were 34.8 months and 360
    3. In both trials, the jury heard evidence about the foreclosure
    of the home and about how the fire may have been started;
    evidence, for example, that firefighters found a leaking propane
    tank in the living room—the valve left open—and gas cylinders lying
    around the kitchen, one of which was in a closed toaster oven. In
    the second trial, however, the jury also heard that Garcia had given
    up on keeping the home, supported by evidence that he made no
    effort to pay the mortgage. They also heard from the officer who
    first notified Garcia of the fire. As the officer entered a local bar
    where he heard he might find Garcia, Garcia raised his hand and
    said, “I’m here,” suggesting Garcia knew that the police would be
    looking for him. According to the officer, Garcia seemed
    unsurprised when the officer told him there was an “incident” at his
    house.
    -4-
    months, respectively. The report concluded that Garcia failed to
    cooperate with the court and the law, and that despite suffering
    from stomach cancer and being confined to a wheelchair, he was a
    threat to himself and society.
    Garcia moved for a downward departure from the lowest
    permissible sentence as calculated under the Criminal Punishment
    Code; he wanted a sentence of probation. He argued that he was
    severely ill with terminal cancer and required significant medical
    attention to maintain his current state of health. The State, for its
    part, recommended a sentence of 84 months. In its sentencing
    submission, it laid out Garcia’s conduct while out on bond,
    including his threats to witnesses, argued that the defendant’s
    conduct had callously endangered the lives of neighbors and first
    responders, and argued Garcia had proffered no evidence that he
    required specialized medical treatment.
    The sentencing court conducted the analysis we required in
    Banks v. State, 
    732 So. 2d 1065
     (Fla. 1999), and declined to depart
    from the minimum sentence. It said:
    I’ve taken into consideration all the evidence, the
    PSI, the state’s argument, the defense’s argument . . . .
    Now, based on all the evidence, the severity of the crime,
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    the issues that were testified to, this is [a] very, very sad
    situation all around, it really is. But even if I could
    depart, I do not believe I should depart and therefore, I’m
    sentencing Mr. Garcia to the 84 months that the state is
    requesting with restitution paid to [the lender], state
    court costs and an adjudication.
    On direct appeal to the Fourth District, Garcia claimed the
    sentencing court imposed a vindictive sentence. Garcia, 279 So. 3d
    at 150. The Fourth District affirmed in part and reversed in part.
    Id. at 151. It found that the trial court committed fundamental
    error by considering an impermissible sentencing factor—“namely,
    incidents of misconduct occurring after the charged offense.” Id. at
    150. The Fourth District held that “although the trial court did not
    impose a vindictive sentence, the State has failed to meet its burden
    to show that the trial court did not impermissibly rely upon
    appellant’s post-arrest misconduct in sentencing him.” Id. at 151.
    For the proposition that a sentencing court may not consider a
    defendant’s postarrest misconduct, the Fourth District relied on our
    decision in Norvil v. State, 
    191 So. 3d 406
     (Fla. 2016). Garcia, 279
    So. 3d at 150. 4 It noted that “[c]ourts applying Norvil have held that
    4. This case provides no occasion to reconsider Norvil. For
    one thing, defense counsel in that case preserved an objection to
    the trial court’s consideration of postarrest misconduct. And, also
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    a trial court may not consider subsequent, uncharged misconduct
    when sentencing a defendant for the primary offense.” Id.
    Declining to find that, as Garcia had argued, the trial court imposed
    a vindictive sentence, the Fourth District nonetheless reversed on
    Garcia’s alternative theory that the trial court committed
    fundamental error when it considered impermissible sentencing
    factors. It found that the State had failed to sustain what the
    Fourth District characterized as the State’s burden “to show that
    the trial court did not rely on impermissible factors in sentencing,”
    even though “the trial court made no comment indicating that it
    had considered appellant’s subsequent misconduct in imposing
    sentence.” Id. at 150 (quoting Strong v. State, 
    254 So. 3d 428
    , 432
    (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)).
    II
    Whether it is fundamental error for a trial judge to consider
    evidence of any postarrest misconduct in fashioning a sentence is a
    pure question of law, which we review de novo. Cromartie v. State,
    
    70 So. 3d 559
    , 563 (Fla. 2011).
    unlike this case, that one turned on an interpretation of chapter
    921, Florida Statutes (2010).
    -7-
    A
    We have maintained a general rule that an appellate court
    should confine parties’ arguments to those raised in the courts
    below. See Ashford v. State, 
    274 So. 2d 517
    , 518 (Fla. 1973) (“It is
    well established that this Court will not consider issues not
    presented to the trial court unless fundamental error can be
    shown.”); Gibson v. State, 
    351 So. 2d 948
    , 950 (Fla. 1977) (“Except
    where the error is fundamental, an appellate court must confine
    itself to a review of those questions which were before the trial court
    and upon which a ruling adverse to the appealing party was
    made.”). We have recognized an exception to the general rule,
    however, where the error complained of for the first time on appeal
    is fundamental error. Ashford, 
    274 So. 2d at 518
    ; Gibson, 
    351 So. 2d at 950
    .
    Nobody disputes that Garcia failed to preserve his claim for
    review with a contemporaneous objection. Garcia’s counsel did not
    object to the State’s discussion of his misconduct while on bond at
    all, let alone on the basis that the court impermissibly considered
    Garcia’s postarrest misconduct. As we have stated previously:
    -8-
    The requirement of a contemporaneous objection is
    based on practical necessity and basic fairness in the
    operation of a judicial system. It places the trial judge on
    notice that error may have been committed, and provides
    him an opportunity to correct it at an early stage of the
    proceedings. Delay and an unnecessary use of the
    appellate process result from a failure to cure early that
    which must be cured eventually.
    Castor v. State, 
    365 So. 2d 701
    , 703 (Fla. 1978). In light of Garcia’s
    failure to preserve the issue, appellate review is conditioned on
    finding that the trial court’s alleged consideration of Garcia’s
    postarrest misconduct constitutes fundamental error.
    In the sentencing context, we have found fundamental error
    very rarely. For example, courts have found such error where
    courts have imposed an illegal sentence. See Bain v. State, 
    730 So. 2d 296
    , 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reversing a fifteen-year mandatory
    minimum sentence as an illegal sentence in excess of the statutory
    maximum despite the lack of objection in the lower court); Parks v.
    State, 
    765 So. 2d 35
    , 35-36 (Fla. 2000) (holding the defendant’s
    sentence of twelve years’ probation illegal despite the lack of an
    objection because it exceeded the statutory maximum for the third-
    degree felonies of which he had been convicted). We have also
    found fundamental error where a judge implemented an arbitrary
    -9-
    policy of rounding up sentences, Cromartie, 
    70 So. 3d at 564
    ; where
    the sentencing guidelines used violated the single subject provision
    of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution, Harvey v. State,
    
    848 So. 2d 1060
    , 1064 (Fla. 2003); and where the court imposed a
    sentence departing upward from the sentencing guidelines but
    failed to give reasons for doing so, Thogode v. State, 
    763 So. 2d 281
    ,
    281-82 (Fla. 2000).
    This case is different. The sentencing judge heard argument
    on a motion for downward departure seeking a sentence of
    probation. In considering the defendant’s amenability to such a
    sentence, the court considered “all the evidence”—admittedly
    including evidence about incidents that it previously considered in
    revoking Garcia’s bond. Garcia, 279 So. 3d at 150. The sentencing
    judge gave no indication of having given weight to any arrest or
    charge supported merely by probable cause. 5 The court had before
    5. The U.S. Supreme Court long ago decided that a
    defendant’s conduct, proven by a preponderance of the evidence,
    may be considered by a sentencing court. United States v. Watts,
    
    519 U.S. 148
    , 156 (1997) (“[W]e have held that application of the
    preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due
    process.” (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 
    477 U.S. 79
    , 91-92
    (1986) (“Like the court below, we have little difficulty concluding
    that in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due
    - 10 -
    it, in addition to the evidence that is the subject of this appeal,
    Garcia’s previous conviction for aggravated battery and adjudication
    of guilt for driving with a suspended license. It had heard, having
    sat through two trials, evidence about the care with which Garcia’s
    home had been primed for combustibility—and thus maximum
    danger to his neighbors and first responders. It heard from
    Garcia’s ex-wife regarding his medical issues and about the fact
    that she had called the police because of his having made
    process.”)), overruled on other grounds in Alleyne v. United States,
    
    570 U.S. 99
     (2013)). Thus the federal courts of every circuit allow a
    sentencing judge to consider a defendant’s conduct—even if it has
    been the subject of an acquitted charge—as long as the conduct
    itself is established by a preponderance of the evidence. See Steven
    M. Salky and Blair G. Brown, The Preponderance of Evidence
    Standard at Sentencing, 
    29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 907
    , 913 n.33 (1992)
    (collecting cases); see, e.g., United States v. Barakat, 
    130 F.3d 1448
    ,
    1452 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Relevant conduct of which a defendant was
    acquitted nonetheless may be taken into account in sentencing for
    the offense of conviction, as long as the government proves the
    acquitted conduct relied upon by a preponderance of the
    evidence.”). This reliance on facts supported by a preponderance of
    the evidence speaks to why consideration of an arrest, standing
    alone, raises due process concerns: an arrest—again, standing
    alone—is supported only by a determination of probable cause.
    Here, of course, the sentencing court did not consider an arrest of
    Garcia’s on any charge, standing alone; it considered his conduct
    while out on bond, and had indeed made a ruling on evidence
    relating to that conduct in revoking his bond, prior to sentencing.
    - 11 -
    intoxicated threats at her door. In light of all these considerations,
    looking at a sentencing range between 34.8 and 360 months, the
    court reasoned that a sentence of 84 months was appropriate. We
    cannot say that this determination reflects the trial court’s having
    committed fundamental error on the order of an illegal sentence.
    See Provence v. State, 
    337 So. 2d 783
    , 786 (Fla. 1976) (“We
    recognize that the constitutional parameters of the trial judge’s
    discretion in the area of sentencing are wide indeed.”). That
    conclusion would fit oddly indeed with settled—and recently
    reaffirmed—federal law. See Concepcion v. United States, 
    142 S. Ct. 2389
    , 2398 (2022) (“There is a ‘long’ and ‘durable’ tradition that
    sentencing judges ‘enjo[y] discretion in the sort of information they
    may consider’ at an initial sentencing proceeding.” (citing Dean v.
    United States, 
    581 U.S. 62
    , 66 (2017))); Williams v. New York, 
    337 U.S. 241
    , 246 (1949) (“[B]oth before and since the American
    colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England
    practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a
    wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist
    him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be
    imposed within limits fixed by law.”); United States v. Booker, 543
    - 12 -
    U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of a
    judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a
    statutory range.”).
    III
    Because we do not find fundamental error in Garcia’s
    unpreserved claim, we quash the decision of the Fourth District to
    the extent it requires that the Respondent be resentenced.
    It is so ordered.
    MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, LAWSON, and
    GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
    LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
    AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
    LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
    While judges are appropriately vested with latitude in the
    discretion used to determine appropriate sentences, their discretion
    is by no means unfettered and must always be exercised subject to
    proper sentencing considerations and within the applicable
    sentencing parameters.
    In this case, the trial court improperly considered the post-
    arrest misconduct that Garcia committed while out on bond.
    - 13 -
    However, I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Garcia is not
    entitled to relief because the trial court’s error did not amount to
    fundamental error, a more stringent standard of review than the
    harmless error standard that would have applied had a
    contemporaneous objection been made when the improper evidence
    was presented.
    Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
    Direct Conflict of Decisions
    Fourth District – Case No. 4D17-3751
    (Palm Beach County)
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia A.
    Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Paul Patti, III, Assistant Attorney
    General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
    for Petitioner
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Claire V. Madill, Assistant
    Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach,
    Florida,
    for Respondent
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