Scott Mansfield v. State of Florida ( 2016 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC15-411
____________
SCOTT MANSFIELD,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[August 25, 2016]
PER CURIAM.
This case is before this Court on appeal from an order denying Scott
Mansfield’s motion to vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and
a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have
jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons below, we affirm.
Mansfield was convicted of the first-degree murder of Sara Robles and
sentenced to death. Evidence against Mansfield included “the testimony of
convicted felon Michael Derrick Johns who recounted a . . . conversation [in a
courthouse holding cell] with Mansfield in which Mansfield confessed to Robles’
murder.” Mansfield v. State (Mansfield I), 758 So. 2d 636, 641-42 (Fla. 2000).
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Mansfield’s conviction and death sentence.
See id. at 649. We also affirmed the denial of Mansfield’s initial motion for
postconviction relief. See Mansfield v. State (Mansfield II), 911 So. 2d 1160 (Fla.
2005).
On October 7, 2013, Johns wrote a letter to the State Attorney’s Office that
is the subject of this postconviction motion and appeal:
[T]his is to inform you of my intention to contact the parties captioned
above [Scott Mansfield and Wilfredo Collado], in order to provide
them with sworn and notarized affidavits detailing a full and complete
recantation of all testimony elicited from me in those cases. In
addition, I also intend to detail certain schemes that both the Osceola
County S.O. [sic], and State Attorney’s Office employed in these
cases—particularly Mansfield’s—where my involvement was
concerned, that would constitute egregious and invidious due process
violations, that, if proven at an evidentiary hearing based upon newly
discovered evidence would more than likely require a reversal of the
conviction.
On September 7, 2014, Mansfield filed a successive postconviction motion,
claiming that the letter constitutes newly discovered evidence that entitles him to a
new trial.
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on December 16, 2014, at
which both Johns and William Cordova, investigator for the Capital Collateral
Regional Counsel, testified. Johns and Cordova both testified that Cordova
interviewed Johns at the Blackwater Correctional Facility. Cordova testified that
he showed Johns the letter during the interview. When counsel for Mansfield
-2-
asked Cordova about his conversation with Johns at Blackwater, the circuit court
refused to allow the testimony on hearsay grounds. Johns invoked his right against
self-incrimination with regard to questions concerning the letter. Johns also
testified at the hearing, “My testimony [from Mansfield’s trial] is unchanged today.
I have nothing further to say about this matter . . . . I testified truthfully [at
Mansfield’s trial], and my testimony remains unchanged.” The circuit court
excluded the letter itself from evidence on hearsay grounds.
In its written order denying Mansfield’s postconviction motion, the circuit
court found that Johns’ letter did not constitute a recantation, but at most his
intention to recant. Because the letter was not given under oath and was not even
an actual recantation, the order explained, the letter is even less reliable than an
actual, sworn recantation, which are themselves notoriously unreliable. Therefore
the court found that, “[t]he unsworn letter is neither admissible nor sufficient,
standing alone, to warrant collateral relief.” The circuit court also determined that,
assuming the letter was admissible evidence, it was insufficiently credible to
justify requiring a new trial in the absence of a sworn, in-court recantation subject
to cross-examination. Finally, the circuit court determined that, even if the letter
were admissible, a retrial would not probably result in either an acquittal or a lesser
sentence, in light of the circumstantial evidence of Mansfield’s guilt and the fact
that Johns had been thoroughly impeached. The circuit court also denied
-3-
Mansfield’s motion for rehearing, explicitly finding that Johns’ hearing
testimony—affirming his testimony at trial—negated any written recantation.
Mansfield appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether Johns’ recantation letter
constitutes newly discovered evidence that entitles Mansfield to a new trial or,
alternatively, a new penalty phase, and (2) whether the judicial decisions in
Mansfield’s prior direct and postconviction appeals, which relied on Johns’
testimony, are now invalid in light of Johns’ letter.
Since the postconviction court came to the legal conclusion that Mansfield is
not entitled to a new trial because Johns’ letter does not amount to a recantation or
newly discovered evidence, we review the trial court’s application of the law to the
facts de novo. Cf. Hendrix v. State, 908 So. 2d 412, 423 (Fla. 2005) (reviewing de
novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts in ruling on a
postconviction claim that the government withheld material evidence); Gore v.
State, 846 So. 2d 461, 468 (Fla. 2003) (reviewing de novo the application of the
law to the facts on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel); see also
Pittman v. State, 90 So. 3d 794, 814 (Fla. 2011) (citing Preston v. State, 970 So. 2d
789, 798 (Fla. 2007)).
Mansfield’s first argument is that Johns recanted his trial testimony and that
this recantation entitles Mansfield to a new trial. We reject this argument because
nothing in the record supports Mansfield’s argument. Johns testified at the
-4-
evidentiary hearing that his trial testimony was “truthful[]” and remained
“unchanged.” No record evidence contradicts this testimony. Therefore, Johns did
not recant and there is no newly discovered evidence.
This Court has repeatedly rejected similar claims of newly discovered
evidence based on out-of-court recantations that were not repeated under oath at
the evidentiary hearing. See Duckett v. State, 918 So. 2d 224, 232-33 (Fla. 2005)
(rejecting a newly discovered evidence claim where a recanting witness invoked
her privilege against self-incrimination at the evidentiary hearing rather than recant
under oath); Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1998) (“The absence of
direct testimony by the alleged recanting witness is fatal to this claim.”). Likewise,
because Johns did not recant his trial testimony under oath at the evidentiary
hearing, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Mansfield’s motion for
postconviction relief.
Mansfield’s second argument is that Johns’ letter constitutes newly
discovered evidence warranting a new trial because Mansfield could use the letter
as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach Johns at retrial. The letter, Mansfield
argues, would either substantially impair Johns’ credibility or prevent him from
testifying at all, thereby weakening the State’s case against Mansfield. However,
Mansfield’s argument fails because the State introduced other evidence of
-5-
Mansfield’s guilt, and thus, the letter would probably not result in an acquittal or a
lesser sentence.
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must
meet two requirements:
First, the evidence offered must not have been known by the trial
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that
the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the
use of due diligence. Second, the newly discovered evidence must be
of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.
See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998). Newly
discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of this test if it
“weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a
reasonable doubt as to his culpability.” Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v.
State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).
Duckett v. State, 148 So. 3d 1163, 1167-68 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Walton v. State, 3
So. 3d 1000, 1008 (Fla. 2009)). If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence,
the second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence would probably yield
a less severe sentence. See Reed v. State, 116 So. 3d 260, 264-65 (Fla. 2013)
(quoting Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d 769, 774 (Fla. 2012)); Jones v. State (Jones I),
591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991).
Because Johns did not send the letter attempting to recant his prior testimony
until after Mansfield’s trial, it is clear that Mansfield has satisfied the first showing
of newly discovered evidence. However, in light of the evidence presented at trial,
Mansfield is unable to show that the letter gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to his
culpability.
-6-
At trial, the State introduced evidence of witnesses who saw Mansfield with
the victim on the night of the crime. The first witness, a clerk at the Winn-Dixie
adjacent to where the victim’s body was found, testified that the victim,
accompanied by a man, purchased groceries shortly before the murder. The clerk
also saw the victim and the same man together outside the Winn-Dixie when the
clerk took her break around 3:00 a.m. They were gone by the time she returned to
Winn-Dixie at 3:30 a.m. The clerk eventually identified the man from a photo
array as Mansfield. The clerk also confirmed that items later found scattered on
the ground near the victim’s body and listed on a receipt also found near the victim
were the items that the victim purchased. The second witness, a bartender at
nearby Rosie’s Pub, saw Mansfield, the victim, and a second man all exit a bar
together shortly before 2:00 a.m.
Further, Mansfield’s ten-year-old niece recalled that Mansfield returned on
the night of the murder at 4:30 a.m., shirtless, soaking wet, and carrying his shoes,
ninety minutes after the projected 3:00 a.m. time of death. Mansfield’s niece also
observed a small bloodstain on Mansfield’s shorts when he returned on the night of
the murder. Police later recovered a host of items from Mansfield’s room,
including some with bloodstains, but the DNA on each of these items was
consistent with Mansfield’s DNA and could not have come from the victim.
-7-
Moreover, Mansfield’s pager was found near the victim. “All of the law
enforcement officers who testified at the hearing remembered the pager being
within twenty feet of the body. Mansfield offered no evidence to support his
postconviction contention that the pager was not in the same area as the body.”
Mansfield II, 911 So. 2d at 1173.
The State also introduced evidence that the police found food stamps in
Mansfield’s room thought to have belonged to the victim. The victim was a food
stamps recipient, while Mansfield and those living with him were not. Police also
found a knife in Mansfield’s room, the blade of which was consistent with multiple
wounds on the victim.
The ring Mansfield was wearing at the time of his arrest contained a
distinctive “Grim Reaper” pattern which was consistent with an injury on the
victim’s neck. However, the medical examiner testified that the pattern was
consistent with a host of other items, such as a belt buckle. Police did not detect
any blood on the ring.
In light of the above evidence remaining against Mansfield, we affirm the
portion of the circuit court’s order denying Mansfield a new guilt phase trial.
Mansfield next argues that Johns’ letter would have resulted in a lesser
sentence. We disagree: Johns’ letter would not probably result in a lesser sentence
at resentencing because Johns’ testimony played only a minimal role in the
-8-
sentencing phase. The sentencing order cited Johns’ testimony only twice: when
discussing the aggravating circumstance that Mansfield committed the murder
while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a sexual battery, and
when discussing the mitigating circumstance that Mansfield was an alcoholic and
was under the influence of alcohol during the commission of the murder.
Because we find that Johns did not recant his trial testimony and that further
impeachment of Johns with his inconsistent statement would not have produced an
acquittal or lesser sentence at retrial, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of
Mansfield’s motion for postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON,
and PERRY, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County,
Frederick James Lauten, Jr., Chief Judge –
Case No. 491995CF002078XXCRXX
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle
Region, and James Lawrence Driscoll, Jr. and David Dixon Hendry, Assistant
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle Region, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Katherine Maria
Diamandis, Assistant Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorney
-9-
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee
- 10 -