Raymond Bright v. State of Florida ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •           Supreme Court of Florida
    ____________
    No. SC17-2244
    ____________
    RAYMOND BRIGHT,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    April 2, 2020
    PER CURIAM.
    In 2009, Raymond Bright was convicted of the first-degree murders of
    Derrick King and Randall Brown and sentenced to death for each murder. This
    Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Bright v. State
    (Bright I), 
    90 So. 3d 249
    , 265 (Fla. 2012). In subsequent postconviction
    proceedings, Bright was granted a new penalty phase proceeding on the basis that
    his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in investigating and presenting
    mitigating evidence. State v. Bright (Bright II), 
    200 So. 3d 710
    , 736 (Fla. 2016).
    Bright now appeals from the second penalty phase at which a death sentence was
    imposed for each murder following jury verdicts unanimously recommending
    death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons that
    follow, we affirm the sentences.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Trial and Direct Appeal
    This Court previously set forth the relevant facts in Bright I:
    On February 18, 2008, Michael Majors went to the home of
    fifty-four-year-old defendant Raymond Bright in Jacksonville,
    Florida. Twenty-year-old Derrick King, sixteen-year-old Randall
    Brown, and Bright were in the house. At approximately 8 p.m.,
    Majors and Brown both left the home.
    Brown returned to his mother’s home and, after receiving a
    phone call, borrowed his mother’s rental vehicle and left her house
    between 9 and 9:30 p.m. At approximately 11 p.m., Brown spoke
    with his mother by phone and advised that he would be home shortly;
    however, he never returned. At around 8 a.m. the next morning,
    Majors attempted to call Brown on his cellular phone, but there was
    no answer. Majors called Brown’s mother and was advised that
    Brown had not returned. Majors then went to Bright’s house and,
    having no response to his knock at the door, Majors climbed into the
    house through an open window. Upon entering the family room,
    Majors discovered the bodies of King and Brown.
    Derrick King was lying face down on the carpet next to a sofa,
    partially wrapped in a sleeping bag or comforter. The sofa was
    saturated with blood on one end, which was adjacent to where King’s
    head rested on the floor. The wall behind the sofa and the ceiling
    above the sofa evidenced blood. An evidence technician testified
    during trial that the blood on the ceiling was cast-off blood, [n.1] and
    the pattern was consistent with someone being on the couch and
    swinging his arm back.
    [N.1] Cast-off blood is defined as droplets of blood
    that are flung from a weapon so as to make a trail of
    blood where it lands.
    -2-
    Randall Brown was found seated sideways in a recliner with his
    head leaning up against a wall and a blanket covering his head. The
    wall against which Brown’s body rested presented a pattern of blood
    that radiated from his head, and there was also blood on the ceiling.
    When crime scene technicians moved the recliner away from the wall,
    a pool of blood was discovered on the floor. Above Brown’s head
    was a framed picture with one side of the frame broken away. That
    one side was indented, consistent with having been struck by
    something round, such as a hammer.
    Outside the house, the crime scene technicians located a loaded
    nine-millimeter Smith & Wesson pistol, a loaded assault rifle, and a
    pair of mechanic’s gloves. During a subsequent search of Bright’s
    yard, technicians recovered a hammer that had been buried. DNA
    testing on the hammer revealed two separate DNA profiles, one of
    which was a major contributor and the other of which was a minor
    contributor. During trial, the parties stipulated that the DNA of the
    major contributor matched the known profile of Derrick King.
    Randall Brown could not be excluded as the minor contributor. The
    gloves did not test positive for blood. Further, no latent fingerprints
    of value were found on the hammer, the nine-millimeter handgun, the
    assault rifle, or their magazines or ammunition. No foreign DNA was
    detected on the fingernail clippings of either victim.
    At 7:30 a.m. on the morning of February 19 (the day that the
    victims were discovered), Bright’s ex-wife picked him up at a church
    near his home. The ex-wife testified that she and Bright had made
    plans to secure the admission of Bright to a United States Department
    of Veterans Affairs clinic for treatment of his cocaine addiction. She
    testified that they had agreed to meet at the church because she “was
    in fear of what was going on” at Bright’s house. During the Spencer
    hearing, see Spencer v. State, 
    615 So. 2d 688
    (Fla. 1993), the ex-wife
    testified that she and Bright had previously made multiple calls to law
    enforcement—including the narcotics division of the Jacksonville
    Sheriff’s Department and Crime Stoppers—to report that Bright
    wanted certain individuals removed from his house because they had
    essentially taken over the house for the purpose of selling drugs.
    While one officer suggested that Bright accompany the police to the
    house and identify the persons who were allegedly dealing drugs,
    -3-
    Bright and his ex-wife refused to agree to this proposal because they
    feared retaliation. [n.2]
    [N.2] Bright’s sister, Janice Jones, also testified
    during the Spencer hearing as to her efforts to remove
    individuals who were staying in Bright’s house. When
    asked what their names were, she replied Lavelle and
    Derrick. During the guilt phase, Michael Majors testified
    that Bright rented a room to an individual named Lavelle
    Copeland, who was friends with Majors and King. Jones
    managed to convince Copeland to call her and, when he
    called, she informed him that she was coming to
    Jacksonville and would bring the police with her.
    Copeland responded that he would not leave until Bright
    paid the money owed to him. When Jones offered to pay
    the money so that Copeland would leave the house, he
    responded, “You need to stay out of this. You don’t
    know what you’re getting into. It’s between me and your
    brother.” Copeland was not at Bright’s house on the
    night of the murders because he was in jail.
    After the ex-wife met Bright at the church on the morning of
    February 19, she called a lawyer and arranged for Bright to speak with
    homicide detectives the next day. However, at 1:45 a.m. on February
    20, law enforcement arrived at the home of the ex-wife and Bright
    was placed in custody. Subsequent to the arrest, the ex-wife disposed
    of Bright’s bloody clothes because she did not want them in her
    house.
    Bright made statements to separate individuals with regard to
    what allegedly occurred on the night of the murders. Prior to his
    arrest, Bright informed friend and former coworker Benjamin Lundy
    that he had “screwed up” and may have killed two people. Bright told
    Lundy that the murders occurred after a confrontation erupted when
    one of the victims accused Bright of stealing drugs. After his arrest,
    Bright also described the events to Mickey Graham, who was in jail at
    the same time with Bright on unrelated charges. According to
    Graham, Lavelle Copeland had moved in with Bright, and he and
    others were running a crack cocaine operation out of the house. [n.3]
    Bright was afraid of them and felt threatened because they possessed
    -4-
    guns. Bright did not want them there and had called the police in an
    attempt to remove them from the premises.
    [N.3] On a table in the home, an evidence
    technician found scales, money, and a “push rod,” which
    is used to pack drugs into a pipe or a bong. However, no
    drugs were found in the house other than 4.6 grams of
    marijuana, which was discovered inside Derrick King’s
    sneaker.
    Bright told Graham that he went into the kitchen at 2 a.m. on
    February 19. King was on the sofa and Brown was in the recliner.
    Brown had a nine-millimeter handgun in his hand and started waving
    it around. King rose from the sofa and removed the gun from
    Brown’s hand. Bright saw an opportunity and attempted to take the
    gun away from King. The men struggled and the gun discharged.
    [n.4] The gunshot startled King and caused him to release the
    handgun. Bright then pointed the gun at King and attempted to shoot
    him, but the gun misfired. Bright dropped the weapon and attempted
    to run out of the house, but he tripped and fell. He grabbed a hammer
    that was within reach, turned around, and commenced striking King,
    knocking him back toward the sofa where King had previously been
    lying down. When Bright turned around, he saw that Brown was
    about to pick up the handgun. Bright then began to strike Brown with
    the hammer. The next time Bright turned toward the sofa, he saw
    King reaching for an assault rifle. At that time, Bright again struck
    King with the hammer. When Bright stopped, he could still hear King
    and Brown breathing and gurgling, but then the room became silent.
    Bright described his actions to Graham as having “lost it.”
    [N.4] In the vicinity of King’s body was a section
    of carpet that appeared to be stained with gunshot
    residue. Testing on the carpet was positive for gunshot
    residue, and a firearms expert testified that, based upon
    the location of the residue, a weapon had been fired
    within six inches of the carpet. From that stain, the
    evidence technicians traced a bullet trajectory and
    ultimately discovered a bullet lodged in the wall near the
    front door of the house. However, neither of the victims’
    hands tested positive for gunshot residue. A firearms
    -5-
    expert confirmed that the bullet lodged in the wall had
    been fired from the nine-millimeter handgun that had
    been discovered in the 
    yard. 90 So. 3d at 252-54
    . The jury found Bright guilty of two counts of first-degree
    murder and ultimately recommended a sentence of death for the murders of King
    and Brown by a vote of eight to four.
    Id. at 256.
    After conducting a Spencer1
    hearing, the trial court found the same aggravating and mitigating circumstances
    for each victim and concluded that the established aggravating 2 factors
    substantially outweighed the mitigating3 
    circumstances. 90 So. 3d at 256-57
    . The
    1. See Spencer v. State, 
    615 So. 2d 688
    (Fla. 1993).
    2. The trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt the following statutory aggravators: (1) previous conviction of a felony
    involving the use or threat of violence to the person (a 1990 conviction for
    robbery) (great weight); (2) previous conviction of a felony involving the use or
    threat of violence to the person (the contemporaneous murder of the other victim)
    (great weight); and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
    (HAC) (great 
    weight). 90 So. 3d at 256-57
    .
    3. The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance—that the
    murders were committed while Bright was under the influence of an extreme
    mental or emotional disturbance (some weight). The trial court also found
    nineteen nonstatutory mitigators:
    (1) a long and well-documented history of drug abuse (some weight);
    (2) Bright repeatedly sought help for his problems (some weight); (3)
    remorse (little weight); (4) Bright was afraid of the victims and took
    steps to remove them from his house (little weight); (5) ten years of
    service in the USMC with two honorable discharges and a third
    discharge under honorable circumstances (considerable weight); (6)
    Bright has skills as a mechanic and served as an aviation mechanic in
    the USMC (some weight); (7) Bright’s actions as a USMC aviation
    -6-
    trial court sentenced Bright to death.
    Id. at 257.
    On direct appeal, this Court
    affirmed the convictions and sentence.
    Id. at 265.
    The United States Supreme
    Court denied Bright’s petition for writ of certiorari. Bright v. Florida, 
    568 U.S. 897
    (2012).
    Postconviction Proceeding
    On November 6, 2013, Bright filed an amended motion to vacate his
    judgment and sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. In
    his motion, Bright claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt
    and penalty phases of his trial and that he was deprived of a fair trial by the
    cumulative effect of any errors. Bright 
    II, 200 So. 3d at 722
    . After conducting an
    evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court held that Bright’s penalty phase
    mechanic likely saved lives (some weight); (8) Bright mentored
    young mechanics (some weight); (9) Bright was a good employee
    (some weight); (10) Bright was a loving and giving boyfriend (slight
    weight); (11) Bright is a good brother (some weight); (12) Bright was
    a good father, and imposition of the death penalty would have a
    serious, negative impact on others (slight weight); (13) Bright shares
    love and support with his family (slight weight); (14) Bright was a
    good friend (slight weight); (15) Bright has been an exceptional
    inmate (some weight); (16) Bright exhibited good behavior
    throughout the court proceedings (slight weight); (17) Bright
    maintained gainful employment (considerable weight); (18) Bright is
    amenable to rehabilitation and a productive life in prison (slight
    weight); and (19) Bright has bonded with another inmate and taught
    him how to read (slight 
    weight). 90 So. 3d at 257
    .
    -7-
    counsel were ineffective but denied Bright’s remaining claims.
    Id. at 723
    . 
    The
    postconviction court entered an order granting Bright a new penalty phase.
    Id. The parties
    cross-appealed the order.
    This Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order granting a new penalty
    phase,4 holding that there was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial
    court’s findings that penalty phase counsel were deficient in investigating
    mitigation evidence concerning Bright’s mental health and that Bright was
    prejudiced by that deficient performance.
    Id. at 732-36.
    This Court remanded for
    a new penalty phase proceeding.
    Id. at 742.
    Second Penalty Phase Proceeding
    The second penalty phase proceeding began on September 5, 2017. The
    State presented much of the same guilt-phase evidence through live witness
    testimony, including Brown’s mother, Carrie Mae Brown Gray; Brown’s friend,
    Michael Majors; and police officers and crime scene investigators from the
    Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office. Victim impact statements were read by King’s
    grandmother, Eartha Jaudon; Brown’s mother, Gray; Brown’s sister, Shannon
    Brown; and King’s mother, Carolyn Jaudon. Retired Pensacola Police Department
    Sergeant Robert Bell testified that on September 6, 1989, he witnessed Bright
    4. This Court also affirmed the denial of Bright’s claims that guilt-phase
    counsel were 
    ineffective. 200 So. 3d at 737
    , 742.
    -8-
    holding a knife while robbing a convenience store clerk. Specifically, Bell
    testified that he saw Bright “standing on the side of the counter, holding the knife,
    leaning over the counter like he was attempting to get money out of the register.”
    Bright ran from the store but was eventually caught and arrested. The State
    introduced a copy of the conviction, judgment, and sentence from 1990.
    The State’s final witness was Dr. Valerie Rao, the Chief Medical Examiner
    for Clay, Nassau, and Duval Counties. With regard to Brown, Dr. Rao testified
    that his cause of death was blunt head trauma. He had more than fourteen injuries
    to the outside of his head, which included lacerations, bruises, contusions, and
    fractures. The fourteen injuries did not include the skull fractures or brain injuries.
    Dr. Rao testified that the lacerations on Brown’s head and skull fractures were
    consistent with a hammer being used to inflict the injuries. Brown had many
    defensive injuries, including a fracture of his left ulna, punctate-type lacerations to
    his left arm, and injuries to his wrists, hands, and thigh. Brown also suffered
    multiple skull fractures. Dr. Rao also testified that Brown was alive when the
    injuries were inflicted, as evidenced by the bruising and swollen face.
    With regard to King, Dr. Rao testified that King also died from blunt impact
    to the head. He had thirty-eight blunt impact injuries to his head and about twenty
    injuries to his extremities. King suffered a laceration through the upper eyelid
    above the right eyebrow, through the left eye. His eye was sunken because of the
    -9-
    trauma. One injury on his head went through his scalp to reveal his underlying
    skull; the injuries on his head showed a parallel pattern received from a claw
    impacting and dragging. King also had circular fractures that caused multiple
    injuries to his brain and bleeding on the surface of his brain. These injuries were
    consistent with being caused by a hammer. Dr. Rao also testified that King was
    alive when these injuries were inflicted and that he suffered. King was covered
    with numerous defensive wounds: bruising on his left arm; a fracture of his left
    ulna; abrasions and bruising of the entire back of his left hand; bruising and
    abrasions on his right forearm and back of his right hand; and an abrasion and
    laceration on his left knee. On redirect, Dr. Rao also testified that King and Brown
    were not unconscious after one blow because each individual had defensive
    wounds.
    The defense then presented its case for mitigation. The first witness for the
    defense was Janice Jones, Bright’s sister. Jones testified regarding her and
    Bright’s impoverished childhood. She also testified that Bright was abused by
    their father during his childhood. Their father would hit Bright two or three times
    a week with items from the junkyard where they lived. Additionally, at least twice
    a month, their father would administer hours-long planned beatings, which were
    for previously unpunished wrongs that the father would add-up. Bright’s father
    would beat him to the point of drawing blood, and sometimes losing
    - 10 -
    consciousness. During the beatings, the father would lecture them from the Bible.
    Bright was also beaten for stuttering and wetting his bed. Bright’s father ran a
    junkyard that surrounded their house. As children, both Jones and Bright were
    forced to work in the junkyard from the time the sun rose until dark. Jones also
    testified that she and Bright witnessed their father abuse their mother and that their
    father would frequently binge drink alcohol.
    Jones also testified about Bright joining the United States Marine Corps and
    training to be an aircraft mechanic. When Bright returned from the military, Jones
    noticed him struggling with alcohol. She also noticed him having problems with
    other substances in 1989. She helped Bright participate in a thirty-day treatment
    program with the Veterans Administration, but he struggled after the program was
    over.
    In November of 2007, three months before the murders, Jones saw Bright
    and believed he was depressed. Jones testified that shortly before the murders she
    tried unsuccessfully to get individuals who were residing in Bright’s house to
    leave. After failing to get the individuals out of Bright’s house, Bright seemed to
    be in distress and in fear. Finally, Jones testified that Bright has taken care of her
    and her children and that they have a positive relationship. Bright also has a
    positive relationship with his grandchildren and Jones’s grandchildren.
    - 11 -
    Bright’s childhood friend and neighbor, Isidore Knight, also testified.
    Knight grew up across the street from Bright and remembers that Bright had to
    work in the junkyard from the age of six or seven, from sunup to sundown, six
    days a week. Bright worked even when injured. Knight saw Bright get “whipped”
    with an extension cord as punishment and characterized Bright’s childhood as
    “torture.”
    Psychologist Dr. Harry Krop testified regarding an assessment and testing
    done for Bright’s original penalty phase. Dr. Krop saw Bright in August of 2008
    to assess Bright’s competency to proceed to trial and again in July of 2009.
    Dr. Krop found Bright competent. His testing revealed no signs of psychopathy or
    malingering. Bright appeared highly anxious, situationally depressed and reported
    having panic attacks. Dr. Krop did not diagnose Bright with Post Traumatic Stress
    Disorder (PTSD).
    The defense also presented the testimony of Dr. Steven Gold, a psychologist
    and expert in trauma psychology who interviewed Bright in 2013. Dr. Gold
    evaluated Bright using risk factors set forth in the Adverse Childhood Experience
    Study (ACES). ACES identifies ten adverse childhood experiences, or factors.
    The greater the number of factors a person has in his or her background the higher
    the rate of psychological and medical problems. Bright experienced all ten ACES
    factors. Dr. Gold diagnosed Bright with PTSD as a result of his childhood abuse.
    - 12 -
    Dr. Gold testified that PTSD played a role in this case. Specifically, Gold testified
    that Bright felt threatened and in constant danger in his home as a child and that
    Bright’s childhood related to the murders because two men had entered Bright’s
    home, destroyed it, and refused to leave. Dr. Gold stated that Bright felt in danger
    over a period of days or weeks before the murders and opined that Bright killed
    King and Brown while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
    disturbance. He also opined that Bright’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of
    his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was
    substantially impaired.
    Finally, the defense presented the testimony of Dr. Robert Ouaou, a
    neuropsychologist. Dr. Ouaou evaluated Bright in 2014. Dr. Ouaou stated Bright
    suffered from severe emotional distress as a result of his abusive parents.
    Dr. Ouaou did not diagnose Bright with PTSD and did not find Bright to have a
    cognitive disability. Dr. Ouaou acknowledged that Bright’s military discharge was
    related to his alcohol problem and that after his discharge, he developed a drug
    addiction. 5
    5. Concerning Bright’s military career, the defense presented the testimony
    of James Hernandez, an attorney and retired Marine. Hernandez testified, as he did
    in Bright’s first penalty phase proceeding, regarding Bright’s personnel records for
    the time Bright served in the Marine Corps. Hernandez testified that during his
    career in the Marines, Bright received two awards for good conduct. Bright also
    received an award called a Meritorious Mast when, while working as a fighter jet
    mechanic, he observed a mechanical difficulty with an aircraft upon take-off and
    - 13 -
    After closing arguments and deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for
    each victim—King (Count I) and Brown (Count II)—unanimously recommending
    that Bright be sentenced to death. As to King, the jury unanimously found that two
    aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Bright was previously
    convicted of a capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a
    person; and (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. With regard
    to mitigators, by a vote of eleven to one, the jury rejected the statutory mitigator
    that the murder was committed while Bright was under the influence of extreme
    mental or emotional disturbance. The jury also unanimously rejected the statutory
    mitigator that the capacity of Bright to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
    to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. By
    a vote of eleven to one, the jury rejected the mitigator that there existed any other
    factors in Bright’s character, background, or life or the circumstances of the
    offense mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty.6 The jury
    relayed to the pilot to come down. Bright’s actions prevented a “tragic mishap.”
    On his last period of active service, Bright received a “general under honorable
    conditions” discharge “by reason of alcohol rehab failure.” The defense also
    presented the testimony of attorney Michael Bossen, who testified that Bright’s
    ex-wife, Bridgett Bright, contacted him early in the morning of February 19, 2008.
    He spoke with both Bridgett and Bright on the phone, and Bright was despondent
    and cried. When Bossen met Bright the next day at his first appearance, Bright
    was very despondent and could not communicate at all.
    - 14 -
    unanimously found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to warrant a
    sentence of death and that those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
    Ultimately, the jury unanimously found that Bright should be sentenced to death
    for the murder of King.
    As to Brown, the jury unanimously found the aggravator that Bright was
    previously convicted of a capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of
    violence to a person was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, unlike
    King, the jury did not find that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
    cruel. By a vote of eleven to one, the jury rejected each of the following statutory
    mitigators: (1) that the murder was committed while Bright was under the
    influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) that the capacity of
    Bright to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
    requirements of law was substantially impaired; and (3) that there existed any other
    factors in Bright’s character, background, or life or the circumstances of the
    offense mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty. The jury
    unanimously found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to warrant a
    sentence of death and that those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
    6. Bright requested one finding as to this catch-all provision and therefore
    the jury voted on this mitigator as a whole, rather than as to each nonstatutory
    mitigating circumstance.
    - 15 -
    The jury unanimously found that Bright should be sentenced to death for the
    murder of Brown.
    The trial court conducted a Spencer hearing on November 1, 2017. Bright’s
    daughter, Tenneka Bright, testified as to the close relationship she has with her
    father and the fact that he has always been there for her. She also testified that in
    the days before the murders she was not able to reach her father by phone and that
    when she called his number someone else answered. A classification officer from
    the correctional institution where Bright is incarcerated testified that Bright had no
    disciplinary reports.
    On December 8, 2017, the trial court entered its sentencing order, imposing
    a sentence of death on Bright for each murder. As to King, the trial court found
    that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravators that
    Bright was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving
    the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) (the
    1990 conviction for armed robbery and the contemporaneous murder) (great
    weight), and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC),
    § 921.141(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2017) (great weight). As to Brown, the trial court
    found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravator
    that Bright was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
    - 16 -
    involving the use or threat of violence to the person (the 1990 conviction for armed
    robbery and the contemporaneous murder) (great weight).
    The trial court rejected the two statutory mitigating circumstances presented
    by Bright with respect to each murder—that the murder was committed while
    Bright was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
    § 921.141(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017), and that Bright’s capacity to appreciate the
    criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
    was substantially impaired, § 921.141(7)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017). The trial court
    considered thirty-eight nonstatutory mitigating circumstances under the catch-all
    provision for the existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that
    would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty, § 921.141(7)(h), Fla. Stat.
    (2017). The trial court grouped the nonstatutory mitigators into six categories,
    found each established, and assigned no or little weight to each category.
    Specifically, the trial court found: (1) Bright was the victim of child abuse and
    - 17 -
    neglect 7 (no weight); (2) Bright’s military career8 (little weight); (3) Bright’s
    history of drug and alcohol abuse9 (little weight); (4) Bright’s positive
    7. This category included the following nonstatutory mitigating
    circumstances: (1) Bright was forced to work long hours as a child in his father’s
    junkyard; (2) Bright was not allowed to play with other children while growing up;
    (3) Bright’s father made him work in the junkyard through injury; (4) Bright
    suffered an eye injury while working in the junkyard that still affects him; (5)
    Bright was a victim of violence and abuse; (6) Bright’s father would beat him for
    hours at a time, drawing blood, leaving welts, and rendering him unconscious; (7)
    Bright grew up extremely poor with no running water, adequate heating, or trash
    collection; (8) Bright would wet the bed and was beaten for it; (9) Bright stuttered
    and was beaten for that; (10) Bright was choked by his older brother until he was
    unconscious; (11) Bright was sexually abused by his older brother; (12) Bright’s
    father fired a gun around the house; (13) Bright’s father beat and raped his mother;
    (14) Bright’s father was an alcoholic; (15) Bright’s father would disappear for days
    and weeks at a time; (16) Bright was a poor student because of his home life; (17)
    Bright’s punctuality at school was poor; and (18) Bright ran away from home after
    high school.
    8. This category included the following nonstatutory mitigating
    circumstances: (1) Bright served in the Marine Corps for nine years as a jet
    mechanic; (2) Bright had multiple promotions in the Marine Corps, including a
    meritorious promotion; (3) Bright received two separate awards for good conduct;
    (4) Bright received a “meritorious mast” for noticing a problem with a jet upon
    take-off; (5) Bright served in the Red Sea and went to Africa for a deployment; (6)
    Bright attended a noncommissioned officer leadership course where he learned
    basic leadership skills and discipline; (7) Bright was presented with a certificate of
    appreciation; (8) Bright achieved the rank of sergeant; and (9) Bright received two
    honorable discharges and one “general under honorable conditions” discharge from
    the Marines.
    9. This category included the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that
    Bright struggled with drugs and alcohol use for decades and has sought help for his
    substance abuse problems on multiple occasions.
    - 18 -
    relationships with others10 (little weight); (5) Bright’s good and mannerly behavior
    during court proceedings (no weight); and (6) Bright’s behavior while incarcerated
    (no weight).
    The trial court found that the “aggravating circumstances heavily outweigh
    the mitigating circumstances, and that death is the proper penalty the Court should
    impose for the murders of Derrick King and Randall Brown.” Bright appeals from
    the trial court’s order imposing sentences of death for the murders of King and
    Brown.
    II. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Bright raises the following five claims: (1) the trial court
    committed fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury that it must determine
    beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravators were sufficient to impose death
    and outweighed the mitigators; (2) the prosecutor made multiple improper
    comments during closing argument constituting fundamental error; (3) there was
    insufficient evidence to support the finding of the especially heinous, atrocious, or
    10. This category included the following nonstatutory mitigating
    circumstances: (1) Bright took care of his sister when she was young; (2) Bright
    repaired a roof on his sister’s house after a hurricane; (3) Bright is a good friend;
    (4) Bright is very close to his daughter; (5) Bright is close with his grandchildren;
    (6) Bright’s family will continue to foster their relationships with him while he is
    incarcerated; (7) Bright encouraged his daughter to go to college; and (8) Bright’s
    daughter loves him unconditionally and is grateful for their relationship.
    - 19 -
    cruel aggravator; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting statutory
    mitigating circumstances and in assigning no weight to the nonstatutory mitigation
    of Bright’s childhood abuse; and (5) the sentences of death are not proportionate.
    We address each claim in turn.
    A. Sufficiency of the Jury Instructions
    Bright argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it
    must determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravating factors were
    sufficient to impose a sentence of death and whether those factors outweighed the
    mitigating circumstances. Bright’s argument has no merit.
    “[S]ubsequent to our decision in Hurst v. State, we already have receded
    from the holding that the additional Hurst v. State findings are elements.” State v.
    Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020). In Rogers v. State, 
    285 So. 3d 872
    , 885-86 (Fla. 2019), we clarified:
    To the extent that in Perry v. State, 
    210 So. 3d 630
    , 633 (Fla.
    2016), we suggested that Hurst v. State held that the sufficiency and
    weight of the aggravating factors and the final recommendation of
    death are elements that must be determined by the jury beyond a
    reasonable doubt, we mischaracterized Hurst v. State, which did not
    require that these determinations be made beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Since Perry, in In re Standard Criminal Jury Instructions in Capital
    Cases [
    244 So. 3d 172
    (Fla. 2018)] and Foster [v. State, 
    258 So. 3d 1248
    (Fla. 2018)], we have implicitly receded from its
    mischaracterization of Hurst v. State. We now do so explicitly. Thus,
    these determinations are not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt
    standard of proof, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury.
    - 20 -
    Thus, because the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury to
    determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravating factors were
    sufficient and outweighed mitigating circumstances, no fundamental error
    occurred, 11 and Bright is not entitled to relief on this claim.
    B. Improper Prosecutorial Comments in Closing Argument
    Bright next asserts that the State’s prosecutor made multiple improper
    comments during closing argument. As an initial matter, Bright’s counsel did not
    contemporaneously object to the comments Bright now raises as error on appeal.
    Generally, the failure to contemporaneously object to allegedly improper closing
    argument comments waives the issue for review. Card v. State, 
    803 So. 2d 613
    ,
    622 (Fla. 2001) (“As a general rule, the failure to raise a contemporaneous
    objection when improper closing argument comments are made waives any claim
    concerning such comments for appellate review.”); Urbin v. State, 
    714 So. 2d 411
    ,
    418 n.8 (Fla. 1998) (“We have long held that allegedly improperly [sic]
    prosecutorial comments are not cognizable on appeal absent a contemporaneous
    objection.”). “�e sole exception to the general rule is where the unobjected-to
    comments rise to the level of fundamental error.” Walls v. State, 
    926 So. 2d 1156
    ,
    1176 (Fla. 2006); accord 
    Card, 803 So. 2d at 622
    . “�is is a high burden which
    11. Because the trial court did not err, we do not reach the State’s argument
    that Bright waived fundamental error review by agreeing to the jury instructions.
    - 21 -
    requires an error that ‘goes to the foundation of the case or the merits of the cause
    of action and is equivalent to a denial of due process.’ ” Bailey v. State, 
    998 So. 2d 545
    , 554 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Johnson v. State, 
    969 So. 2d 938
    , 955 (Fla. 2007)).
    Fundamental error “has also been described as error that is so significant that the
    sentence of death ‘could not have been obtained without the assistance of the
    alleged error.’ ” Poole v. State, 
    151 So. 3d 402
    , 415 (Fla. 2014) (quoting
    Snelgrove v. State, 
    107 So. 3d 242
    , 257 (Fla. 2012)).
    First, Bright argues that the prosecutor erroneously told the jury to ignore
    evidence of mitigation (i.e., that Bright suffered childhood abuse) in contravention
    of the United States Supreme Court’s mandate in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
    455 U.S. 104
    (1982), that the sentencer in a capital case consider mitigation evidence. See
    id. at 113-14
    (“Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from
    considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as
    a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.”). �e allegedly improper
    comment, to which defense counsel did not object, is as follows:
    Your decision should not be influenced by feelings of prejudice or by
    racial or ethnic bias or sympathy. �at’s not a basis for your decision,
    that he was abused, et cetera. No. You cannot have sympathy for that
    in terms of - - it’s mitigation and aggravation. You can’t have
    sympathy for the victim or the defendant - - for the victims, I should
    say.
    Here, the prosecutor did not instruct the jurors to disregard evidence of
    Bright’s abuse in reaching their decisions, but rather, explained that the evidence
    - 22 -
    of abuse is properly considered as mitigation, and that their decisions may not be
    based upon sympathy. See Zack v. State, 
    753 So. 2d 9
    , 24 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]he
    State’s argument concerning sympathy was a proper admonition for the jurors to
    consider the mitigation evidence without resort to their emotions.” (footnote
    omitted)); see also Saffle v. Parks, 
    494 U.S. 484
    , 493 (1990) (“[N]othing in . . .
    Eddings prevents the State from attempting to ensure reliability and
    nonarbitrariness by requiring that the jury consider and give effect to the
    defendant’s mitigating evidence in the form of a ‘reasoned moral response,’ rather
    than an emotional one.” (citation omitted) (quoting California v. Brown, 
    479 U.S. 538
    , 545 (1987))). Furthermore, the prosecutor’s argument concerning sympathy
    was consistent with the final jury instructions read by the trial court to the jury,12
    which in turn mirrored interim amended jury instruction 7.11(a) Final Instructions
    in Penalty Proceedings—Capital Cases.13 As such, the prosecutor’s comments
    were not error, much less fundamental error.
    12. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
    Your decision must not be based upon the fact that you feel sorry
    for anyone or are angry at anyone.
    ....
    Your decisions should not be influenced by feelings of prejudice,
    racial or ethnic bias or sympathy. Your decisions must be based upon
    the evidence and the law contained in these instructions.
    13. See In re Std. Crim. Jury Instrs. in Capital Cases, 
    214 So. 3d 1236
    ,
    1266 (Fla. 2017) (appendix) (“Rules for deliberation. . . . 3. Your decisions must
    - 23 -
    Second, Bright argues that the prosecutor improperly instructed the jury that
    the only way to follow the law was to vote for death. Bright points to the
    following statement by the prosecutor, to which Bright’s counsel did not object:
    And by the way, as we stressed about in jury selection, you’re never
    compelled to actually vote for death. But I would submit to you that
    this is the case that you should in terms of following the law.
    �is Court has held that it is improper for a prosecutor to assert in closing
    argument that it is a juror’s duty under the law to vote for a sentence of death
    rather than life. For example, in Urbin, the prosecutor argued to the jury that “my
    concern is that some of you may be tempted to take the easy way out, to not weigh
    the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances and not want to
    fully carry out your responsibility and just vote for life,” and “I’m going to ask you
    not be swayed by pity or sympathy. . . . I’m going to ask you to follow the law.
    I’m going to ask you to do your 
    duty.” 714 So. 2d at 421
    . �is Court found the
    comments improper because they “implied that the jury was required by law to
    return a recommendation of death.” Braddy v. State, 
    111 So. 3d 810
    , 851 (Fla.
    2012) (emphasis in original) (quoting Wade v. State, 
    41 So. 3d 857
    , 871 (Fla.
    2010) (addressing the holding in Urbin)); see also Davis v. State, 
    136 So. 3d 1169
    ,
    not be based upon the fact that you feel sorry for anyone or are angry at
    anyone. . . . 6. Your decisions should not be influenced by feelings of prejudice,
    racial or ethnic bias, or sympathy. Your decisions must be based on the evidence
    and the law contained in these instructions.”).
    - 24 -
    1207 (Fla. 2014) (“[T]his Court has concluded that it is improper for the State to
    tell jurors that ‘the only proper recommendation to this court is a recommendation
    of death’ or that the jurors have a legal duty to recommend the ‘appropriate
    punishment’ of death.”). Here, however, the prosecutor’s comment that the jurors
    “should” vote for a sentence of death did not imply that they were required by law
    to do so. Indeed, immediately before the comment, the prosecutor correctly told
    the jurors that they are never compelled to vote for death. �us, the allegedly
    improper comment was not error, much less fundamental error.
    Next, Bright argues that the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof for
    mitigating circumstances. Again, Bright’s counsel did not object to the following
    comment:
    �en you go, okay, what - - what mitigation has been proven? And
    remember, we talked about that mitigation doesn’t have to be proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s just a reasonable certainty.
    �is Court has held that a mitigating circumstance exists where it is
    established by the greater weight of the evidence. See Diaz v. State, 
    132 So. 3d 93
    ,
    117 (Fla. 2013) (stating that established law recognizes “that mitigating factors
    [must] be ‘established by the greater weight of the evidence’ ” (quoting Mansfield
    v. State, 
    758 So. 2d 636
    , 646 (Fla. 2000))); Bolin v. State, 
    117 So. 3d 728
    , 740 (Fla.
    2013) (“�e trial court must find a mitigating circumstance if it ‘has been
    established by the greater weight of the evidence.’ ” (quoting Coday v. State, 946
    - 25 -
    So. 2d 988, 1003 (Fla. 2006))). �us, as the State properly acknowledges, the
    prosecutor’s comment that the mitigation must be proven to a reasonable certainty
    was erroneous.
    In determining whether a comment found to be improper constitutes
    fundamental error, this Court’s consideration “include[s] whether the statement
    was repeated and whether the jury was provided with an accurate statement of the
    law after the improper comment was made.” 
    Poole, 151 So. 3d at 415
    . Here, the
    prosecutor did not repeat the improper burden of proof in closing argument.
    Additionally, the final jury instructions read by the trial court to the jury included
    an accurate statement of the law on the burden of proof regarding mitigating
    circumstances.14 We therefore find that the prosecutor’s single misstatement of the
    law was not so harmful that the sentence of death could not have been obtained
    without the assistance of the error. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s comment does
    14. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
    As explained before these proceedings, the defendant need only
    establish a mitigating circumstance by the greater weight of the
    evidence, which means the evidence that more than likely - - more
    likely than not tends to establish the existence of a mitigating
    circumstance. If you determine by the greater weight of the evidence
    that a mitigating circumstance exists, you must consider it established
    and give that evidence such weight as you determine it should receive
    in reaching your verdict about the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
    - 26 -
    not rise to the level of fundamental error. See Kaczmar v. State, 
    228 So. 3d 1
    , 12
    (Fla. 2017) (finding that prosecutor’s improper characterization of mitigating
    evidence did not rise to the level of fundamental error where comment was made
    only once, and the trial court read the standard jury instructions, which included an
    accurate statement of the law).
    Finally, Bright argues that the prosecutor mischaracterized mitigation as a
    “credit” for Bright. �e comments, to which defense counsel did not object, are as
    follows:
    Defendant’s character? I guess they’re going to say - - and he did. He
    served nine years. We’ve got to give him credit for that. He served
    nine years in the Marines. . . . Defense is going to go, well, hold on.
    At one point, he saved some aircraft that potentially could have
    crashed and potentially saved the life of an airman that was going to
    fly. He should get credit for that.
    Bright appears to be arguing that the prosecutor improperly told the jury that
    the process of weighing aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances is a
    quantitative analysis. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 
    937 So. 2d 590
    , 601 (Fla. 2006)
    (holding that the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances
    during capital sentencing proceedings is not a quantitative comparison). �e
    prosecutor’s comments, however, are more properly read as the State’s
    acknowledgment that Bright’s service in the Marines, including his action of
    discovering a potentially fatal mechanical problem with an aircraft, constitutes a
    mitigating circumstance. A review of the prosecutor’s entire closing argument
    - 27 -
    shows that no other proposed mitigation was characterized as a “credit” for Bright.
    Accordingly, the prosecutor did not impermissibly argue to the jury that its
    weighing process should be conducted by comparing the number of aggravating
    factors with the number of mitigating circumstances.
    Bright also contends that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s improper
    remarks constituted fundamental error. See 
    Card, 803 So. 2d at 622
    (“We do not
    examine allegedly improper comments in isolation. Rather, the Court examines
    the totality of the errors in the closing argument and determines whether the
    cumulative effect of the numerous improprieties deprived the defendant of a fair
    penalty phase hearing.”). A review of the unobjected-to comments made by the
    prosecutor, however, shows that only one comment was improper—the
    misstatement of law as to burden of proof for mitigators—and that this single error
    did not rise to the level of fundamental error. A single improper comment in
    closing argument does not support a cumulative error analysis. See, e.g., 
    Diaz, 132 So. 3d at 118
    (“[A] cumulative error claim fails when there are not multiple
    errors.”); Johnson v. State, 
    104 So. 3d 1010
    , 1029 (Fla. 2012) (“[�e defendant],
    however, has failed to identify multiple instances of error. And because multiple
    errors did not occur in this case, [the defendant]’s claim of cumulative error must
    fail.”). Accordingly, Bright’s claim of cumulative error fails as well.
    - 28 -
    Because none of the allegedly improper comments—either individually or
    cumulatively—rise to the level of fundamental error, Bright is not entitled to relief
    with regard to this claim. See 
    Braddy, 111 So. 3d at 846
    (“Likewise if any
    unpreserved improper comments do not individually or cumulatively constitute
    fundamental error, we will not reverse [the defendant’s] sentence.”).
    C. Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravating Factor
    Bright argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
    finding of the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” (HAC) aggravator.
    § 921.141(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2017). Specifically, Bright contends that the evidence
    was insufficient to support the finding of the HAC aggravator because there is no
    evidence that King was conscious and aware of his impending death. Because we
    find that there was competent, substantial evidence that King was conscious and
    aware of impending death, Bright’s claim is without merit.
    “When reviewing claims alleging error in the application of aggravating
    factors, this Court does not reweigh the evidence.” McGirth v. State, 
    48 So. 3d 777
    , 792 (Fla. 2010); accord Willacy v. State, 
    696 So. 2d 693
    , 695 (Fla. 1997)
    (“[I]t is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine whether the
    State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—that is
    the trial court’s job.”). Instead, “[i]n reviewing an aggravating factor challenged
    on appeal, this Court’s task ‘is to review the record to determine whether the trial
    - 29 -
    court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so,
    whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding.’ ” Douglas v. State,
    
    878 So. 2d 1246
    , 1260-61 (Fla. 2004) (quoting 
    Willacy, 696 So. 2d at 695
    ).
    This Court has previously defined the HAC aggravator as follows:
    It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or
    shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile;
    and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with
    utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
    What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the
    actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such
    additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital
    felonies—the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
    torturous to the victim.
    Hernandez v. State, 
    4 So. 3d 642
    , 668-69 (Fla. 2009) (quoting State v. Dixon, 
    283 So. 2d 1
    , 9 (Fla. 1973)). The HAC aggravator focuses on the means and manner of
    the victim’s death and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death. See
    Pham v. State, 
    70 So. 3d 485
    , 497 (Fla. 2011); 
    McGirth, 48 So. 3d at 794
    . “[I]n
    order to support a finding of this aggravator, ‘the evidence must show that the
    victim was conscious and aware of impending death.’ ” King v. State, 
    130 So. 3d 676
    , 684 (Fla. 2013) (quoting 
    Douglas, 878 So. 2d at 1261
    ). However, “the
    victim’s perception of imminent death need only last seconds for this aggravator to
    apply.” 
    Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1157
    ; see also Buzia v. State, 
    926 So. 2d 1203
    ,
    1214 (Fla. 2006) (finding that victim was aware of impending death “[w]hether
    this state of consciousness lasted minutes or seconds” and upholding HAC
    - 30 -
    aggravator). Relevant here, “[t]his Court has ‘consistently upheld HAC in beating
    deaths.’ ” 
    Douglas, 878 So. 2d at 1261
    (quoting Lawrence v. State, 
    698 So. 2d 1219
    , 1222 (Fla. 1997)); accord 
    King, 130 So. 3d at 684
    ; see also, e.g., 
    Buzia, 926 So. 2d at 1214
    (upholding the HAC aggravator where victim was struck with a fist
    and an ax and was awake and aware for at least part of the ordeal); Dennis v. State,
    
    817 So. 2d 741
    , 766 (Fla. 2002) (upholding finding of HAC aggravator where
    victims suffered skull fractures as a result of beating and were conscious for at
    least part of the attack); Beasley v. State, 
    774 So. 2d 649
    , 671 (Fla. 2000) (holding
    that competent, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding of the HAC
    aggravator where victim suffered blunt trauma to the head by a hammer and was
    not rendered immediately unconscious as evidenced by defensive injuries).
    Bright contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
    finding of HAC because there is no evidence that King was conscious and aware of
    his impending death. Specifically, Bright relies upon Dr. Rao’s testimony during
    cross-examination that each blow to the head that caused a skull fracture could
    have caused death by itself. Bright’s argument, however, ignores case law from
    this Court explaining that “[t]he existence of defensive wounds is relevant to the
    HAC analysis.” 
    King, 130 So. 3d at 684
    . Where, like here, the sequence of
    injuries cannot be established, this Court has found that evidence of defensive
    wounds indicates that the victim was conscious and aware of impending death.
    - 31 -
    For example, in King, this Court concluded that the trial court’s finding of the
    HAC aggravator was supported by competent, substantial evidence where the
    medical examiner testified that the victim was struck seventeen times with a
    hammer.
    Id. at 686.
    “Three of the blows were to the head, which would have been
    fatal and rendered the victim unconscious.”
    Id. at 680.
    Although the medical
    examiner could not testify to the sequence of the blows inflicted on the victim, this
    Court found that “[t]he defensive wounds to the victim’s hand and arm clearly
    demonstrate that the victim was conscious and aware of her impending death and
    attempting to fend off the attack.”
    Id. at 685.
    Similarly, in Douglas, the medical examiner could not determine the
    sequence of injuries to the victim, who died of blunt head trauma, and testified that
    “if the first injury inflicted was one of the more severe [the victim] could have
    been rendered 
    unconscious.” 878 So. 2d at 1251
    , 1262. On appeal, the defendant
    argued that the evidence left open the possibility that the victim lost consciousness
    after the first blow.
    Id. at 1262.
    This Court upheld the trial court’s finding of the
    HAC aggravator, relying upon the medical examiner’s testimony that it was “not
    likely” that the victim was rendered unconscious by the first blow given that she
    turned her head during the beating and suffered defensive wounds to her hands and
    forearms. Id.; see also Boyd v. State, 
    910 So. 2d 167
    , 191 (Fla. 2005) (finding that
    “[w]hile the exact order of wounds could not be established, there was competent,
    - 32 -
    substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that [the victim] was alive
    and conscious for some of the attack, and was struggling with her attacker” where
    victim sustained defensive wounds); 
    Beasley, 774 So. 2d at 670
    (rejecting
    defendant’s argument that the murder was not HAC because the victim might have
    been rendered immediately unconscious by blows from a hammer where evidence
    of defensive wounds existed).
    Here, there was competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the
    finding of the HAC aggravator. Dr. Rao testified that King received thirty-eight
    blunt impact injuries to his head and about twenty injuries to his extremities and
    that the injuries were consistent with being caused by a hammer. Dr. Rao also
    testified that King was alive when these injuries were inflicted and that he suffered.
    Significantly, King had numerous defensive wounds: bruising on his left arm; a
    fracture of his left ulna; abrasions and bruising of the entire back of his left hand;
    bruising and abrasions on his right forearm and back of his right hand; and an
    abrasion and laceration on his left knee. Although Dr. Rao testified on cross-
    examination that each blow to the head that caused a skull fracture and brain injury
    could have caused death by itself, Dr. Rao also opined that King’s defensive
    wounds evidenced that he was not rendered unconscious after one blow. Thus,
    competent, substantial evidence supports the finding of the HAC aggravator.
    - 33 -
    Bright relies on Williams v. State, 
    37 So. 3d 187
    (Fla. 2010), in support of
    his argument that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding
    of the HAC aggravator. In Williams, this Court struck the HAC aggravator,
    concluding that given the lack of any defensive wounds and the speculative nature
    of other evidence relied upon by the trial court, there was no evidence to support
    the trial court’s finding that the victim was conscious and aware of impending
    death.
    Id. at 200-01.
    As Dr. Rao’s testimony established that King suffered
    defensive wounds, Williams is not analogous. Bright’s reliance on Elam v. State,
    
    636 So. 2d 1312
    (Fla. 1994), is also misplaced. In Elam, this Court held that the
    trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravator where, although the victim suffered
    “defensive wounds, the medical examiner testified that the attack took place in a
    very short period of time (‘could have been less than a minute, maybe even half a
    minute’), the defendant was unconscious at the end of this period, and never
    regained consciousness.”
    Id. at 1314.
    This Court subsequently declined to apply
    Elam in Rolling v. State, 
    695 So. 2d 278
    (Fla. 1997), where the evidence
    demonstrated that the victim, who was stabbed while asleep in her bed, “sustained
    several defensive wounds to her arms and leg, and did not die instantaneously.”
    Id. at 296.
    We find the instant case more akin to Rolling, where King’s defensive
    wounds negate the possibility that he was rendered immediately unconscious after
    in initial blow to the head. Cf. Perez v. State, 
    919 So. 2d 347
    , 378-79 (Fla. 2005)
    - 34 -
    (finding Elam “clearly distinguishable” where victim suffered defensive wounds
    and blunt force trauma to the head, was stabbed ninety-four times, and the medical
    examiner testified that the victim “would have lost consciousness within a matter
    of a few seconds to as much as two minutes” after receiving the fatal stab wound).
    Because competent, substantial evidence supports the finding of the HAC
    aggravator as to the murder of King, Bright is not entitled to relief on this claim.
    D. Mitigating Circumstances
    Bright also argues that the trial court erred in rejecting the two statutory
    mitigating circumstances presented with respect to both murders: (1) that Bright
    committed the murders while he was “under the influence of extreme mental or
    emotional disturbance,” § 921.141(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2107), and (2) that Bright’s
    “capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality of his . . . conduct or to conform his . . .
    conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired,” § 921.141(7)(f),
    Fla. Stat. (2017). Bright further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
    assigning no weight to the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance of his abusive
    childhood. As explained below, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    by not finding that either statutory mitigating circumstance was established or by
    assigning no weight to the nonstatutory circumstance of Bright’s abusive
    childhood.
    - 35 -
    “Where it is clear that the trial court has considered all evidence presented in
    support of a mitigating factor, the court’s decision as to whether that circumstance
    is established will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” Ault v. State, 
    53 So. 3d
    175, 186-87 (Fla. 2010). A trial court’s determinations on the issue will be
    upheld when supported by competent, substantial evidence. Hoskins v. State, 
    965 So. 2d 1
    , 17 (Fla. 2007). “A trial court must find a proposed mitigating
    circumstance when the defendant has established that mitigator through competent,
    substantial evidence.” Oyola v. State, 
    99 So. 3d 431
    , 444 (Fla. 2012). “A trial
    court may reject a defendant’s claim that a mitigating circumstance has been
    proved, however, provided that the record contains ‘competent substantial
    evidence to support the trial court’s rejection of these mitigating circumstances.’ ”
    Nibert v. State, 
    574 So. 2d 1059
    , 1062 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Kight v. State, 
    512 So. 2d
    922, 933 (Fla. 1987)). “A mitigator may . . . be rejected if the testimony
    supporting it is not substantiated by the actions of the defendant, or if the testimony
    supporting it conflicts with other evidence.” 
    Oyola, 99 So. 3d at 445
    . With regard
    to expert opinion testimony, “[e]ven uncontroverted opinion testimony can be
    rejected, especially when it is hard to reconcile with the other evidence presented
    in the case.” Philmore v. State, 
    820 So. 2d 919
    , 936 (Fla. 2002). With these
    principles in mind, we address each of Bright’s arguments in turn.
    1. Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance Mitigator
    - 36 -
    Bright argues that the trial court erred in failing to find the statutory
    mitigating circumstance that he committed the murders while under the influence
    of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 15 Because there is competent,
    substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding, we disagree.
    In support of his argument, Bright relies upon Dr. Gold’s testimony that he
    diagnosed Bright with PTSD. Dr. Gold testified that Bright’s PTSD played a role
    in this case because Bright perceived that he was in danger in his home, which was
    impacted by the trauma of his childhood abuse. Dr. Gold further opined that as a
    result of Bright’s mounting sense of fear in his home, Bright killed King and
    Brown while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
    disturbance. Unlike Dr. Gold, however, Dr. Krop, who evaluated Bright shortly
    after the murders in 2008 and 2009, did not diagnose Bright with PTSD. Dr. Krop
    testified that there were several reasons he did not diagnose Bright with PTSD at
    the time of his evaluation. First, records Dr. Krop reviewed from the time Bright
    received treatment from the Veteran’s Administration contained no indication of
    PTSD. Second, as reflected in a report authored by Dr. Krop in August 2008,
    Bright stated that he had a normal childhood, free from abuse and trauma.
    15. The statutory mitigator of extreme emotional disturbance “has been
    defined as ‘less than insanity, but more emotions than the average man, however
    inflamed.’ ” Foster v. State, 
    679 So. 2d 747
    , 756 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Duncan v.
    State, 
    619 So. 2d 279
    , 283 (Fla. 1993)).
    - 37 -
    Furthermore, the psychological testing Dr. Krop conducted on Bright, including
    the Beck Anxiety Inventory, Beck Depression Inventory, and the MMPI-2, did not
    suggest a basis for a PTSD diagnosis. Thus, the trial court’s finding that the
    extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator was not established was
    supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record that Bright was not
    suffering from PTSD at the time of the murders.
    We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    rejecting this proposed mitigating circumstance. See Foster v. State, 
    679 So. 2d 747
    , 755 (Fla. 1996) (“As long as the court considered all of the evidence, a trial
    judge’s determination of lack of mitigation will stand absent a palpable abuse of
    discretion.”).
    2. Capacity to Appreciate the Criminality of Conduct or
    Conform Conduct to the Requirements of Law
    Bright next argues that he presented unrebutted expert testimony through
    Dr. Gold that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
    conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, and
    that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting this mitigator. Bright’s claim is
    without merit.
    “A mitigator may . . . be rejected if the testimony supporting it is not
    substantiated by the actions of the defendant, or if the testimony supporting it
    conflicts with other evidence.” 
    Oyola, 99 So. 3d at 445
    . Indeed, even “[w]hen
    - 38 -
    expert opinion evidence is presented, it ‘may be rejected if that evidence cannot be
    reconciled with the other evidence in the case.’ ” 
    Williams, 37 So. 3d at 204
    (quoting 
    Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1003
    ).
    In finding that this mitigator had not been proven by a greater weight of the
    evidence, the trial court stated as follows in its sentencing order:
    Defendant took actions immediately after committing the crimes that
    suggest he was attempting to conceal his identity. Defendant used and
    then disposed of gloves in order to conceal his fingerprints, he hid the
    murder weapon, and he fled his home. All of these actions are
    consistent with someone who understands their actions are wrong and
    is attempting to avoid the repercussions of what they have done.
    As this Court explained in Ault, 
    53 So. 3d
    175, a defendant’s purposeful actions
    after the crime indicating that the defendant was aware of the criminality of his
    conduct may be sufficient to reject a defendant’s claim that this mitigator applies.
    In Ault, the defendant admitted that he murdered the victims out of fear of going to
    jail, placed the victims’ bodies in his attic, and lied to the victims’ mother and the
    police regarding his knowledge of the victims’ disappearance.
    Id. at 189.
    This
    Court found that the record demonstrated that the defendant was not substantially
    impaired in his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
    conduct to the requirements of the law, explaining:
    We have upheld a trial court’s rejection of this mitigating
    circumstance when a defendant’s actions during and after the crime
    has indicated that he was aware of the criminality of his conduct. In
    Nelson v. State, 
    850 So. 2d 514
    , 531 (Fla. 2003), for example, we
    upheld the trial court’s ruling where the defendant removed the victim
    - 39 -
    from her home after sexually assaulting her, drove to two separate
    orange groves before killing her, and lied to police about the crime.
    We found that the defendant’s “purposeful actions [were] indicative
    of someone who knew those acts were wrong and who could conform
    his conduct to the law if he so desired.”
    Id. Similarly, in
    Hoskins v.
    State, 
    965 So. 2d 1
    , 18 (Fla. 2007), we found that the trial court
    properly rejected the defendant’s inability “to appreciate the
    criminality of his conduct” as mitigation where, after raping the
    victim, “Hoskins’s purposeful actions in binding and gagging [the
    victim] before placing her in the trunk, driving to his parents’ home
    six hours away, borrowing a shovel, driving to a remote area where he
    killed [the victim], and then telling his brother he hit a possum when
    blood was noticed dripping from the rear wheel well [were] indicative
    of someone who knows his conduct is wrong.”
    
    53 So. 3d
    at 188-89 (alterations in original).
    Here, Bright’s purposeful actions after the murders are indicative of
    someone who knew that his actions were criminal and could conform his conduct
    to the law. Specifically, there was testimony that Bright fled his home after the
    murders. Additionally, there was testimony from a crime scene investigator and
    police officers from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office that Bright concealed the
    murder weapon by burying it deeply in his backyard. Thus, Bright’s purposeful
    actions after the murders constitute competent, substantial evidence to support the
    trial court’s rejection of this mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, we reject
    Bright’s claim on this issue.
    - 40 -
    3. The Existence of Any Other Factors in the Defendant’s Background That
    Would Mitigate Against Imposition of the Death Penalty
    Bright also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning no
    weight to the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that Bright was the victim of
    childhood abuse and neglect. This argument is without merit.
    “A trial court’s decision with regard to the weight to be assigned to a
    mitigating circumstance that it determines has been established is ‘within the trial
    court’s discretion, and its decision is subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard.’ ”
    
    Perez, 919 So. 2d at 372
    (quoting Kearse v. State, 
    770 So. 2d 1119
    , 1133 (Fla.
    2000)); accord Allen v. State, 
    137 So. 3d 946
    , 967 (Fla. 2013). This includes the
    discretion to assign an established mitigating circumstance no weight. Trease v.
    State, 
    768 So. 2d 1050
    , 1055 (Fla. 2000) (“We hereby recede from our opinion in
    Campbell [v. State, 
    571 So. 2d 415
    , 420 (Fla. 1990] to the extent it disallows trial
    courts from according no weight to a mitigating factor and recognize that there are
    circumstances where a mitigating circumstance may be found to be supported by
    the record, but given no weight.”); accord Mullens v. State, 
    197 So. 3d 16
    , 30 (Fla.
    2016) (stating that a trial court “may conclude that a particular mitigating
    circumstance exists, but assign it no weight”). Under the abuse of discretion
    standard, a trial court’s determination as to the weight assigned to a mitigating
    circumstance will be upheld unless “no reasonable [person] would take the view
    - 41 -
    adopted by the trial court.” 
    Perez, 919 So. 2d at 372
    (alteration in original)
    (quoting 
    Trease, 768 So. 2d at 1053
    n.2.).
    This Court addressed a trial court’s refusal to grant nonstatutory mitigating
    circumstances any weight in Cox v. State, 
    819 So. 2d 705
    (Fla. 2002). In Cox, the
    trial court assigned slight or no weight to the “mitigating nature of [the
    defendant’s] childhood.”
    Id. at 722.
    In finding that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in assigning no weight to certain mitigating circumstances, this Court
    reasoned that the trial court “simply attempted to place the appellant’s mitigation
    evidence in context. The trial court’s holdings regarding certain of the appellant’s
    proffered mitigators resulted from an absolute dearth of evidence contained in the
    record supporting the notion that the cited mitigators are relevant to the defendant
    in the instant case.”
    Id. at 723
    (footnote omitted). The trial court’s “attempt[] to
    place the appellant’s mitigation evidence in context” was demonstrated in the trial
    court’s statement that:
    While the evidence supports the existence of his heightened anxiety in
    dealing with other people, the evidence does not support any
    conclusions or even speculations as to how it contributed to Mr. Cox’s
    decisions and actions that led to [the victim’s] death. . . . Thus, while
    established by Dr. McMahon’s opinion, the court declines to afford
    any weight to this circumstance.
    Id. at 723
    n.15.
    - 42 -
    Here, the trial court found that the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance of
    Bright’s childhood abuse and neglect had been established but assigned it no
    weight, concluding:
    More notably, there is a disconnect between Defendant’s trauma and
    the offenses. Once Defendant left his home and joined the military he
    was a productive member of society and there is no evidence that the
    trauma in his childhood prevented him from living like a normal
    person. Therefore, the Court finds that the non-statutory mitigators
    under this heading have been established, however, the Court assigns
    no weight to these mitigators.
    Thus, as in Cox, the trial court in the present case simply placed the mitigation
    evidence in the context of the other evidence presented. Specifically, the trial court
    considered the mitigating circumstance of Bright’s childhood in the context of
    Bright’s subsequent ability as an adult to serve in the military and function
    productively such that the abuse and neglect Bright suffered as a child were shown
    to have no real bearing on Bright’s action in committing the murders.
    Accordingly, because we cannot conclude that no reasonable person would
    have assigned the mitigating circumstance of Bright’s childhood abuse and neglect
    no weight, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in
    assigning no weight to this mitigating circumstance.
    E. Proportionality
    Finally, Bright argues that the sentences of death are disproportionate
    because his case is not among the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-
    - 43 -
    degree murder cases. We find that the sentence of death is proportionate in both
    murders.
    This Court has explained proportionality review as follows:
    This Court reviews the proportionality of each death sentence
    “to determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the
    most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring
    uniformity in the application of the [death] sentence.” Anderson v.
    State, 
    841 So. 2d 390
    , 407-08 (Fla. 2003) (citation omitted). In
    conducting its proportionality review, this Court does not compare the
    number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Pham v. State,
    
    70 So. 3d 485
    , 500 (Fla. 2011). Rather, “the Court looks at the
    totality of the circumstances to determine if death is warranted in
    comparison to other cases where the sentence of death has been
    upheld.”
    Id. (quoting England
    v. State, 
    940 So. 2d 389
    , 408 (Fla.
    2006)).
    Cozzie v. State, 
    225 So. 3d 717
    , 734 (Fla. 2017). A proportionality review
    therefore entails “a qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for
    each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.” Urbin, 
    714 So. 2d
    at 416.
    Although the same mitigating circumstances apply, the jury found different
    aggravating factors for each murder. Because it has fewer aggravating factors, we
    first address the murder of Brown.
    As to the murder of Brown, a unanimous jury and the trial court found one
    aggravating factor—that Bright was previously convicted of a capital felony or a
    felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person or both (great weight).
    The aggravator was based upon Bright’s contemporaneous murder of King and his
    - 44 -
    1990 conviction for armed robbery. With regard to mitigating circumstances, the
    jury found the nonstatutory mitigator that there existed other factors in Bright’s
    character, background, or life or the circumstances of the offense mitigating
    against the imposition of the death penalty to be established by a vote of one to
    eleven. Within this catch-all mitigator, the trial court found thirty-eight
    nonstatutory mitigating factors were established, grouped them into six categories,
    and assigned each category little or no weight. As explained above, we find no
    abuse of discretion in the trial court finding that no statutory mitigating
    circumstances had been established.
    “[T]his Court has indicated that where only a single valid aggravating
    circumstance exists, a sentence of death may be inappropriate.” Mullens, 
    197 So. 3d
    at 35. However, where the “single aggravator . . . involved a prior murder or
    manslaughter,” this Court has upheld a sentence of death. Green v. State, 
    975 So. 2d
    1081, 1088 (Fla. 2008); accord Almeida v. State, 
    748 So. 2d 922
    , 933 (Fla.
    1999) (“[T]his Court has affirmed the death penalty in single-aggravator cases
    where a prior murder was involved.”).
    For example, in 
    Bolin, 117 So. 3d at 728
    , this Court upheld a death sentence
    based on a single prior violent felony aggravator where that aggravator involved
    another murder, and the mitigation was not substantial. In Bolin, Bolin stabbed
    and beat the victim to death. The death sentence was found to be proportionate
    - 45 -
    where the trial court found one aggravator—previously convicted of another
    capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person—
    and assigned it great weight. The aggravator was based upon Bolin’s conviction
    for another first-degree murder, a kidnapping and rape conviction, and a conviction
    for felonious assault.
    Id. at 742.
    In mitigation, the trial court found:
    (1) age of defendant at time of crime (24)—little weight; and (2) the
    following statutory catch-all mitigator of any other factors in the
    defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the
    death penalty: (a) defendant suffered from the effects of his mother’s
    alcoholism and his own substance abuse—little weight; (b) defendant
    was abused as a child—some weight; (c) defendant had a poor and
    unstable childhood—little weight; (d) defendant had sporadic minimal
    education—little weight; (e) defendant received his GED while
    incarcerated—little weight; (f) defendant developed skills which
    included welding, electrical, plumbing, and small machinery skills—
    little weight; (g) defendant saved the life of another—little weight; (h)
    defendant was gainfully employed at the time—little weight; (i)
    defendant behaved appropriately at trial—little weight; (j) defendant
    has adapted to institutional living and had not received any
    disciplinary reports—little weight; (k) defendant has been married for
    eleven years and he seems to maintain that relationship, considering
    the obvious limitations—little weight; and (l ) defendant’s physical
    and mental medical history indicates several problems—little weight.
    Additionally, the trial court gave some weight to a finding of some
    mental or emotional disturbance.
    Id. at 741.
    After considering the facts underlying the prior violent felony
    aggravator and noting that the aggravator is one of the most weighty, this Court
    characterized the mitigation, which included nonstatutory mitigation similar to that
    of Bright, as well as “some mental or emotional disturbance,” as being of
    “insubstantial effect” and found the death sentence to be proportionate.
    Id. at 742;
    - 46 -
    see also, e.g., Sheppard v. State, 
    151 So. 3d 1154
    (Fla. 2014) (finding death
    sentence to be proportionate where trial court found a single aggravator of violent
    felony conviction based upon an almost contemporaneous murder and earlier
    violent felonies committed as a juvenile, statutory mitigator of age, and fifteen
    nonstatutory mitigators); Rodgers v. State, 
    948 So. 2d 655
    , 672 (Fla. 2006) (finding
    death penalty proportionate where the trial court found a single aggravator of prior
    violent felony conviction based on prior convictions for robbery and manslaughter
    and “insubstantial mitigation” consisting of statutory mitigation based on
    impoverished background and nonstatutory mitigation); Ferrell v. State, 
    680 So. 2d 390
    (Fla. 1996) (finding death sentence proportionate where the trial court found a
    single aggravator of prior violent felony conviction based on second-degree
    murder and several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances).
    This Court has also found the death sentence proportionate where the single
    aggravator was based in part upon a contemporaneous murder and mitigation was
    insubstantial. In Bevel v. State, 
    983 So. 2d 505
    (Fla. 2008), Bevel shot and killed
    two victims, Stringfield and Sims, and attempted to kill a third. As to the murder
    of Stringfield, the trial court found only one aggravating factor, that the defendant
    was previously convicted of a capital offense or of a felony involving the use or
    threat of violence to some person, and assigned it very great weight.
    Id. at 513.
    The prior violent felony aggravator was based upon the contemporaneous murder
    - 47 -
    of Sims, the attempted murder of the third victim, and a prior attempted robbery
    conviction. The trial court found six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and
    assigned most little or very little weight. 16 Even though it was a single aggravator
    case, this Court found the death penalty proportionate given the “minimal
    nonstatutory mitigation” and the facts upon which the aggravator was based, i.e.,
    the contemporaneous murder of Sims, an attempted murder, and a prior robbery.
    Id. at 525.
    Indeed, in reaching its conclusion, this Court stated that in looking at
    the totality of the circumstances, it had to consider the facts upon which the prior
    violent felony aggravator was based. See
    id. at 524.
    Bright argues that his case is analogous to 
    Nibert, 574 So. 2d at 1059
    , where
    this Court found a death sentence based on a single aggravator and substantial
    mitigation to be disproportionate. In Nibert, Nibert stabbed the victim to death
    while the two were drinking.
    Id. at 1059-60.
    The trial court found one aggravating
    factor—that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
    16. The nonstatutory mitigators found were as follows:
    (1) the defendant has religious faith and loves his family members
    (minimal weight); (2) defendant confessed to the crime (little weight);
    (3) defendant has exhibited good behavior in jail (very little weight);
    (4) defendant exhibited good behavior in court (little weight); (5)
    defendant has an IQ of 65 (little weight); and (6) defendant struggled
    with the death of his mother (very little weight).
    
    Bevel, 983 So. 2d at 513
    n.4.
    - 48 -
    manner.
    Id. at 1061.
    The trial court found no statutory mitigating circumstances
    and “possible” nonstatutory mitigation that Nibert had been abused as a child.
    Id. On appeal,
    this Court found that the trial court erred in rejecting the nonstatutory
    mitigating circumstance of childhood abuse, as Nibert presented uncontroverted
    evidence that his mother was an abusive alcoholic who beat him daily.
    Id. at 1062.
    This Court also found that the trial court should have found the statutory mitigating
    circumstances that Nibert lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the
    requirements of the law and that Nibert was under the influence of extreme
    emotional or mental disturbance.
    Id. at 1062-63.
    Concluding that the death
    penalty was disproportionate, this Court noted that “[t]his case involves substantial
    mitigation, and we have held that substantial mitigation may make the death
    penalty inappropriate even when the aggravating circumstance of heinous,
    atrocious, or cruel has been proved.”
    Id. at 1063.
    We find that Nibert is
    distinguishable from the instant case. While, as in this case, the mitigating
    circumstances in Nibert included childhood abuse, unlike the instant case, they
    included additional mitigating circumstances—that Nibert’s capacity to control his
    behavior was substantially impaired and that Nibert was under the influence of
    extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Moreover, in Nibert, the record showed
    that Nibert was drinking when he committed the murder and that Nibert lacked
    control over his behavior when he drank.
    Id. Here, however,
    there is no evidence
    - 49 -
    Bright was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs when he murdered King and
    Brown.
    We hold the death sentence for Brown’s murder to be proportionate.
    Although Bright’s death sentence for Brown’s murder was based on a single prior
    violent felony aggravator, that one aggravator was based on two crimes—the
    contemporaneous murder of King and the 1990 conviction for an armed robbery
    Bright committed with a knife. The circumstances of the contemporaneous murder
    were brutal. Bright beat King to death, causing thirty-eight blunt impact injuries to
    his head and about twenty to his extremities. Dr. Rao testified that King was alive
    when the injuries were inflicted, and King suffered extensive defensive wounds.
    The trial court assigned this aggravator great weight, and this Court has stated that
    the prior violent felony aggravator is one of the most weighty aggravating
    circumstances in Florida’s statutory sentencing scheme. See 
    Bolin, 117 So. 3d at 742
    ; Armstrong v. State, 
    73 So. 3d 155
    , 175 (Fla. 2011). Bright argues that the
    circumstances surrounding the prior violent felony aggravator are not compelling,
    speculating that Bright’s attack may have been provoked because live rounds were
    found on top of the television and in the carpet and gunpowder residue was found
    next to the couch. This argument is not persuasive, however, given that a detective
    from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office testified that neither King nor Brown had
    gunshot residue on his hands. With regard to mitigation, the trial court found that
    - 50 -
    six categories of nonstatutory mitigation were established, but assigned them little
    or no weight: (1) Bright was the victim of child abuse and neglect (no weight); (2)
    Bright’s military career (little weight); (3) Bright’s history of drug and alcohol
    abuse (little weight); (4) Bright’s positive relationships with others (little weight);
    (5) Bright’s good and mannerly behavior during court proceedings (no weight);
    and (6) Bright’s behavior while incarcerated (no weight). This Court has
    considered similar nonstatutory mitigation to be of “insubstantial effect.” See
    
    Bolin, 117 So. 3d at 742
    . Given the totality of the circumstances, including the
    weighty aggravator of a prior violent felony that was based upon a brutal,
    contemporaneous murder and our review of the mitigation, we conclude that the
    death sentence for Brown’s murder is proportionate when compared to other single
    aggravator cases where the single aggravator was weighty and the mitigation was
    not substantial.
    The sentence of death for the murder of King is proportionate as well. As
    with the murder of Brown, the jury and the trial court found the prior violent
    felony aggravator for the murder of King (great weight). This aggravator was
    based in part on the contemporaneous brutal beating death of Brown and Bright’s
    1990 conviction for armed robbery. However, the jury and trial court additionally
    found the HAC aggravator for the murder of King, which the trial court assigned
    great weight. As explained above, there is competent, substantial evidence to
    - 51 -
    support the finding of the HAC aggravator. “Qualitatively, prior violent felony
    and HAC are among the weightiest aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing
    scheme.” Hodges v. State, 
    55 So. 3d 515
    , 542 (Fla. 2010)); accord Jordan v. State,
    
    176 So. 3d 920
    , 936 (Fla. 2015); 
    Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1167
    ; see also Fletcher v.
    State, 
    168 So. 3d 186
    , 220 (Fla. 2015) (“[T]he HAC aggravator is among the
    weightiest of the aggravating circumstances.”). Bright argues that the HAC
    aggravator must be considered in light of the fact that Bright felt fearful of King
    and Brown because they were threatening him in his home. This argument is
    unpersuasive as there was no evidence presented at the penalty phase proceeding
    that Bright was in fear of Brown or King, which Bright’s counsel conceded
    below. 17 Regarding the mitigation, as the mitigating circumstances were the same
    for both murders, our consideration of the mitigating circumstances for the murder
    of Brown applies equally for the murder of King.
    Under the totality of the circumstances, Bright’s sentence of death for the
    murder of King is proportionate in relation to other death sentences this Court has
    17. As defense counsel stated during the conference on jury instructions:
    I’ve agreed that there’s been no evidence presented that [Bright] was
    in fear at all of the victims in this case. There was testimony from
    Miss Jones that she made efforts to get people out of his house, and
    Mr. [sic] Gold was also able to corroborate that. But I’m not going to
    alleged [sic] in any way that it was the victims.
    - 52 -
    upheld with similar aggravation and similar or more substantial mitigation. See,
    e.g., Merck v. State, 
    975 So. 2d
    1054 (Fla. 2007) (finding death sentence
    proportionate for stabbing murder where trial court found prior violent felony and
    HAC aggravators, statutory age mitigator, and several nonstatutory mitigators,
    including a difficult family background, alcohol use the night of the murder, and a
    capacity to form positive relationships); Smithers v. State, 
    826 So. 2d 916
    (Fla.
    2002) (upholding death sentence where victim died from combination of
    strangulation, stabbing, and blunt force trauma to the head and trial court found
    prior violent felony aggravator, based on contemporaneous murder, and HAC
    aggravator, statutory mitigators of under the influence of extreme mental or
    emotional disturbance and capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct or
    conform conduct to the requirements of the law substantially impaired, as well as
    nonstatutory mitigation); Singleton v. State, 
    783 So. 2d 970
    (Fla. 2001) (finding
    death sentence proportionate where defendant stabbed a supine victim and trial
    court found prior violent felony and HAC aggravators and mitigating
    circumstances including under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
    disturbance, capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct or to conform
    conduct to the requirements of law substantially impaired, alcoholism, and
    honorable service in the military); Spencer v. State, 
    691 So. 2d 1062
    (Fla. 1996)
    (holding death sentence proportionate where trial court found prior violent felony
    - 53 -
    aggravator based on contemporaneous convictions for aggravated assault,
    aggravated battery, and attempted second-degree murder; the HAC aggravator;
    statutory mitigating circumstances of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and
    impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to
    requirements of law; and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances including drug and
    alcohol abuse, sexual abuse, and honorable military record).
    Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, and in
    comparison with other death cases, we conclude that the sentences of death are
    proportionate for the murders of Brown and King.
    III. CONCLUSION
    Having considered each of Bright’s claims, we affirm the sentences of death.
    It is so ordered.
    CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur.
    LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
    IF FILED, DETERMINED.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
    Russell L. Healey, Judge - Case No. 162008CF002887AXXXMA
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public
    Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
    for Appellant
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Lisa A. Hopkins, Assistant Attorney
    General, Tallahassee, Florida,
    - 54 -
    for Appellee
    - 55 -