Leroy Pooler v. State of Florida ( 2020 )

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC18-2024
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LEROY POOLER,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
July 2, 2020
PER CURIAM.
Leroy Pooler appeals an order summarily denying his successive motion for
postconviction relief, which was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.851.1 We affirm the denial of relief.
In 1996, Pooler was convicted of the first-degree murder of his ex-girlfriend,
Kim Wright Brown, burglary, and attempted first-degree murder with a firearm.
See Pooler v. State, 704 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Fla. 1997). He was sentenced to death
for the first-degree murder following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote
of nine to three, and on direct appeal, this Court affirmed Pooler’s convictions and
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
sentences. Id. at 1377, 1381. His sentence of death became final in 1998, when
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Pooler v. Florida, 525
U.S. 848 (1998). We also affirmed the denial of Pooler’s initial postconviction
motion. Pooler v. State, 980 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 2008).
In 2015, Pooler filed a successive postconviction motion claiming that he is
intellectually disabled and entitled to relief based on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002), and Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); a claim seeking relief under
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla.
2016); and a claim seeking relief under an alleged Hurst-induced Caldwell2 claim.
In October 2018, the circuit court entered an order summarily denying Pooler’s
successive postconviction motion finding that his intellectual disability claim is
time-barred and that Pooler is not entitled to Hurst relief.
First, Pooler is not entitled to postconviction relief based on his intellectual
disability claim. As this Court stated in Phillips v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S163
(Fla. May 21, 2020), Hall does not apply retroactively. Accordingly, we affirm the
postconviction court’s summary denial of Pooler’s intellectual disability claim.
Second, Pooler is not entitled to Hurst relief. See State v. Poole, 45 Fla. L.
Weekly S41, S48 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020) (“The jury in Poole’s case unanimously
found that, during the course of the first-degree murder of Noah Scott, Poole
2. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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committed the crimes of attempted first-degree murder of White, sexual battery of
White, armed burglary, and armed robbery. Under this Court’s longstanding
precedent interpreting Ring v. Arizona [536 U.S. 584 (2002)] and under a correct
understanding of Hurst v. Florida, this satisfied the requirement that a jury
unanimously find a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt.”); Pooler, 704 So. 2d at 1377 (“[Pooler] was convicted of burglary and
attempted first-degree murder with a firearm.”). We also reject Pooler’s Hurst-
induced Caldwell claim. See Reynolds v. State, 251 So. 3d 811, 825 (Fla. 2018)
(stating that, because it did not violate Caldwell to refer to the jury’s role as
advisory prior to the Hurst decisions, “a Caldwell claim . . . cannot [now] be used
to retroactively invalidate the jury instructions that were proper at the time under
Florida law”).
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial of
Pooler’s successive postconviction motion.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, and COURIEL, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County,
Jeffrey Colbath, Judge - Case No 501995CF001117AXXXMB
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Linda McDermott of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Estero, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee
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