Daniel Jacob Craven, Jr. v. State of Florida ( 2020 )

Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC18-1643
____________
DANIEL JACOB CRAVEN, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
October 22, 2020
PER CURIAM.
Daniel Jacob Craven, Jr., appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and
his sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For
the reasons below, we affirm Craven’s conviction and sentence.
BACKGROUND
While serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a
conviction of first-degree murder with a weapon, Craven stabbed his cellmate,
John H. Anderson, to death with a homemade knife that Craven had fashioned
from a piece of their cell door. Craven confessed, multiple times, to killing
Anderson and was charged with first-degree premeditated murder. During the
guilt-phase opening statements at Craven’s trial, defense counsel admitted that
Craven had murdered Anderson but argued that Craven was guilty of second-
degree murder.
The evidence presented at trial established that upon Craven’s arrival at
Graceville Correctional Facility in early April 2015, Craven, a white supremacist
with a swastika tattoo, was assigned to share a cell with the victim, who was
African American. Craven almost immediately requested to be reassigned to a
different cell, claiming that he and the victim were not getting along, but ultimately
withdrew the request and indicated that he and the victim would work it out.
On June 25, 2015, three days before the victim’s murder, Craven called his
mother and demanded that she come to visit him. When Craven’s mother stated
that she might not be able to make the trip, Craven told her, “Then don’t plan on it
for about five years.” During their phone call, Craven’s mother advised him to
wait to give himself some time “for whatever is on [his] mind,” to which Craven
responded, “I made up my mind a long time ago.” On June 27, 2015, the day
before the victim’s murder, Craven’s mother visited with him for several hours.
After Craven’s mother left the facility, Craven called her and told her “not to
worry” and that “he loves her.”
At 10:07 p.m. on June 27, after watching the movie Selma, the victim
entered the two-person cell that he shared with Craven. Craven entered the cell
just after 1 a.m. on the morning of June 28, 2015. A corrections officer conducted
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a visual inspection of the cell door at 1:31 a.m. and did not note anything unusual.
At 4:44 a.m., Craven left the cell for breakfast and placed a sign on the window,
purportedly from the victim, that stated “[s]tomach bug, sleeping, please do not
knock or disturb my rest.” Craven entered and exited the cell several times
throughout the morning of June 28. At 12:25 p.m., Craven told a corrections
officer that he had killed his roommate around 2 a.m. that morning.
Corrections officers found Anderson’s body in the cell, and he was
pronounced dead. Craven subsequently confessed multiple times to stabbing
Anderson to death, to cleaning up the cell, and to hiding the murder weapon in a
sock and placing it in a shower grate, where law enforcement later recovered it.
The medical examiner testified that Anderson suffered approximately thirty
wounds to his head, throat, neck, and upper torso, twelve of which were stab
wounds that punctured Anderson’s skin and the remainder of which were incision
wounds that cut Anderson’s skin. Stab wounds to Anderson’s windpipe and
jugular vein were critical, and the cause of death was a combination of significant
blood loss and the inhalation of blood as a result of the stab wounds. The medical
examiner further testified that there were no injuries that would have likely
rendered Anderson unconscious, that there were defensive wounds on Anderson’s
palms and wrists, and that Anderson’s death was not immediate and may have
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taken from minutes to half an hour, during which time Anderson received painful
stab and incision wounds while he essentially drowned in his own blood.
During law enforcement’s investigation, bloodstains on Craven’s socks and
boxer shorts and blood recovered from Craven’s ear matched Anderson’s DNA.
Additionally, a partial DNA match to Anderson was found on the murder weapon,
and blood recovered from a wall in Craven and Anderson’s cell matched
Anderson’s DNA.
Craven’s jury also heard testimony from an inmate who was housed a few
cells away from Craven and Anderson’s cell. On the morning of Anderson’s
murder, the inmate testified that, between 1:30 and 2 a.m., he heard “stumbling”
and someone saying “get off of me” and “help me” from the vicinity of Craven and
Anderson’s cell.
In addition, the jury heard statements that Craven had made to law
enforcement, in which he admitted stabbing Anderson to death and that the killing
was “planned out,” plus letters that Craven had written to government officials, in
which he confessed to killing Anderson and threatened his “personal brand of
justice” unless he was sentenced to death. One of Craven’s letters was titled “Full
Confession to a Capital Murder from the Killer,” and in it Craven described how
he carried out his plan to kill Anderson, who Craven said was asleep in his bunk
for an hour to an hour and a half before he began his attack:
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I, Daniel Craven, stood up and moved my cards as not to get blood on
them, and put up my radio for the same reason, started setting up for
the plan I had for about two days. As I started to carry out the
assassination on J. Anderson, . . . the thought of another walk-through
at 2:00 AM made me hold off. As the officers did their walk, I did my
normal and watched them. They left the dorm, and I turned my
attention to John. Mindful of how far a scream can flow in an open
quiet gym style living condition, I aimed for [his] throat. I walked
over to John, put my hand over his mouth, and before he opened his
eyes, I stabbed him in the thr[o]at once. He instantly started
screaming and kicking and clawing, but I am 300 pounds with
wrestling and cage experience, and also have been some form of
bouncer my whole life, he wasn’t going anywhere. All of my stabs
were intentional aims and placed with purpose. I took my time, none
were accidental or in self defense or wild. I did not count, but I’m
sure it was more than ten but less than 20, 13 to 16 best guess, with
one exception: I tried to see if I could bury the knife through the skull
on the left side top, but he moved and it didn’t catch right.
. . . When John finally stopped spitting blood everywhere, I
grabbed his face and told him to go to sleep. His eyes faded. I shoved
him down back on his bed and stripped. I grabbed all his clothes and
my clothes and started cleaning up the blood, not to get away with
anything, just to buy time until I could do a proper farewell to my
brothers. With all the bloody clothes, most of them were slung under
his bunk, the rest stuffed in his drawer, I took a bath in the sink with
his soap. I then rolled about three and a half grams into two sticks
(joints) and smoked and listened [to music], and played [cards] until
the doors were open for chow. Assuming people or officers were
coming to see what the noise was earlier, I made my rounds. No one
came. I grabbed my food and gave it away, locked my door so I could
open it, and went back to hanging out. . . . Then came lunch. I ate,
smoked again, and then tried to go to rec. I couldn’t get on the yard,
and so as I was tired and bored, I went and had to tell the officer hey I
killed my bunkie. This was around 2:00 PM same day.
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On June 28, 2018, Craven’s jury found him guilty of first-degree murder.1
The penalty-phase proceeding was held the following day. After hearing witness
testimony from the prosecutor in Craven’s prior murder case, Craven’s half-
brother, and mental health experts for both Craven and the State, and arguments
from the State and Craven, the jury unanimously found that the State had proven
the following aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Craven was
previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment; (2) Craven
was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use
of violence to another person; (3) the first-degree murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (4) the first-degree murder was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification (CCP). The jury unanimously concluded that the aggravating factors
were sufficient to warrant a possible sentence of death and that the aggravating
factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 2 Ultimately, the jury
unanimously concluded that Craven should be sentenced to death.
1. Craven was charged with, and his jury was instructed on, first-degree
premeditated murder.
2. The penalty phase verdict form includes the jury’s finding that one or
more individual jurors found that one or more mitigating circumstances was
established by the greater weight of the evidence.
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After holding a Spencer3 hearing, at which Craven presented additional
mitigation, including his medical, school, and Department of Corrections records,
the trial court sentenced Craven to death. In so doing, the trial court made its own
findings with respect to the aggravation and mitigation. Specifically, the trial court
found and assigned the noted weight to the following statutory aggravating factors:
(1) the capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony
and under sentence of imprisonment (some weight); (2) prior violent felony based
on Craven’s prior conviction for first-degree murder with a weapon, a capital
felony (very great weight); (3) the first-degree murder of Anderson was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (very great weight); and (4) the first-degree murder of
Anderson was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without
any pretense of moral or legal justification (very great weight). The trial court
found these four aggravating factors “sufficient to warrant the death penalty.”
Under the catchall statutory mitigating circumstance of any factors in the
defendant’s background that would mitigate against the imposition of the death
penalty, see § 921.141(7)(h), Fla. Stat. (2017), the trial court found that the
following mitigating circumstances had been established by the greater weight of
the evidence and assigned them the noted weight: (1) chaotic and dysfunctional
upbringing (significant weight); (2) no evidence of biological father present in
3. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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Craven’s life (some weight); (3) Craven is able to maintain meaningful
relationships (slight weight); (4) Craven has mental health issues (significant
weight); and (5) Craven maintained appropriate courtroom behavior (little weight).
The trial court rejected Craven’s proposed mitigating circumstance that he had
maintained employment prior to his incarceration, finding that Craven failed to
establish this mitigating circumstance by the greater weight of the evidence.
The trial court sentenced Craven to death, finding that “the aggravating
factors far outweigh the mitigating circumstances.” The trial court also compared
Craven’s case to “other factually similar cases” and concluded that “the death
penalty is not disproportionately applied to [Craven].”
ANALYSIS
Craven now appeals his conviction and sentence of death, raising the
following claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for self-
representation; (2) the trial court erred in denying his peremptory challenge to juror
Ford; (3) the trial court fundamentally erred by not instructing the penalty phase
jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravating factors were
sufficient and outweighed the mitigating circumstances; (4) the trial court erred in
admitting statements made by Craven’s prior victim in support of the prior violent
felony aggravator; (5) the trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravator; (6) the
trial court erred in finding the CCP aggravator; and (7) Craven’s death sentence is
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disproportionate. In addition, we review whether the evidence is sufficient to
support Craven’s conviction for first-degree murder.
(1) Self-Representation
Craven first argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for self-
representation. We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, see
Damas v. State, 260 So. 3d 200, 212 (Fla. 2018), and find none.
As we have explained, “[a] criminal defendant has the right to self-
representation, Faretta [v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975)], and a trial court
‘shall not deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself or herself, if
the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.’ Weaver v. State, 894 So. 2d 178,
192 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d)(3)).” Damas, 260 So. 3d at 212
(emphasis added).
In Craven’s case, the record shows that although Craven initially requested
to represent himself, he had a change of heart before his trial began. Specifically,
toward the end of the second of two Faretta inquiries that the trial court conducted,
in response to the trial court’s question of whether Craven would be “all right with
your attorneys remaining in place so long as they abided by your decisions as to
the presentation of mitigating evidence,” Craven answered, “Yes, sir.” In light of
Craven’s change of heart, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
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discretion in denying Craven’s request for self-representation as equivocal. See
Brown v. State, 45 So. 3d 110, 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (recognizing that, absent
deliberate manipulation of the proceedings, “a defendant may change his mind
about self-representation at the beginning of any crucial stage of a criminal
prosecution”); see also Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1988)
(recognizing that “vacillation on the question of self-representation has been held a
sufficient grounds for denying the request”), superseded on other grounds as
stated in Hooks v. State, 286 So. 3d 163, 169 (Fla. 2019); cf. Weaver, 894 So. 2d at
193 (“A defendant who persists in discharging competent counsel after being
informed that he is not entitled to substitute counsel is presumed to be
unequivocally exercising his right of self-representation.”) (emphasis added).
(2) Peremptory Challenge
Craven next argues that the trial court erred in denying his peremptory
challenge to juror Ford, an African American, on the ground that Craven failed to
provide a race-neutral reason for striking Ford.4 We review the trial court’s ruling
for abuse of discretion. See Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 942 (Fla. 2017).
4. Although Craven also argues that the trial court confused his peremptory
challenge to juror Ford with a for-cause challenge, it is clear from the record that
the trial court knew a peremptory challenge was at issue and found that Craven’s
proffered reason for challenging juror Ford was pretextual.
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“Under Florida law, a party’s use of peremptory challenges is limited only
by the rule that the challenges may not be used to exclude members of a
‘distinctive group,’ ” such as race. San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343
(Fla. 1997). The following three-step test applies in determining whether a
proposed peremptory challenge is race-neutral:
A party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory
challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that
basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial
group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for
the strike. If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the court must
ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike.
At this point, the burden of production shifts to the proponent
of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2).
If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court believes that,
given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is
not a pretext, the strike will be sustained (step 3). The court’s focus in
step 3 is not on the reasonableness of the explanation but rather its
genuineness. Throughout this process, the burden of persuasion never
leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial
discrimination.
Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (footnotes omitted).
Craven’s case involves step 3 of Melbourne. As we have explained with
respect to that step,
“[t]here are no specific words which the court must state to satisfy
step three of the Melbourne analysis.” Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108,
1119 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Simmons v. State, 940 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla.
1st DCA 2006)). “Rather, the most important consideration is that the
trial judge actually ‘believes that given all the circumstances
surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext.’ ” Id. at 1120
(quoting Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 40 (Fla. 2000)).
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Guzman v. State, 238 So. 3d 146, 155 (Fla. 2018). Moreover, “[t]he trial court’s
decision in ruling on the genuineness of the race-neutral basis for a peremptory
challenge should be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.” Dorsey v. State, 868 So.
2d 1192, 1200 (Fla. 2003).
To analyze whether the trial court erred in finding that Craven’s proffered
reason for the strike was a pretext, we review the alleged race-neutral reasons
given and the relevant circumstances in which they were made. Nowell v. State,
998 So. 2d 597, 604 (Fla. 2008). Circumstances relevant to our analysis include,
but are not limited to, the following: “the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes
exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally
applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.”
Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8.
In this case, Craven, who is white, had clear racial motivations for
murdering Anderson, who was black. The record indicates that only six members
of the approximately seventy-five-member venire were black. Only one black
juror served on the jury without objection by Craven. By the time Craven
proposed a peremptory strike against juror Ford, Craven had successfully exercised
a peremptory strike as to one other black prospective juror (Hunter), and he had
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also proposed a peremptory strike against a second black prospective juror
(Holden). 5
Craven’s alleged race-neutral reason for striking juror Ford was that,
although rehabilitated, juror Ford “was one of those whose original impulse was if
[the murder] was found to be premeditated, then [the sentence] would be the death
penalty.” Although Craven argues, and the dissent concludes, that the trial court
failed to undertake the required genuineness inquiry of defense counsel’s alleged
facially race-neutral reason for the strike, we disagree. The record demonstrates
that the trial court was clearly taken aback by Craven’s proffered reason because
Craven had not previously argued that juror Ford was predisposed to the death
penalty. In contrast to defense counsel’s treatment of juror Ford, the record shows
that Craven had raised unsuccessful for-cause challenges, based on alleged
predisposition to death, to non-black prospective jurors whose voir dire responses
regarding their views of the death penalty were similar to juror Ford’s responses.6
5. After the trial court ruled that Craven’s proffered reasons for his
proposed strike of prospective juror Holden were not race-neutral, the State
withdrew its objection to Craven’s peremptory strike as to Holden. However, the
withdrawal occurred after the challenged ruling with respect to juror Ford.
6. Specifically, Craven raised for-cause challenges to at least two non-black
prospective jurors (Forehand and J. Sims), arguing that they were predisposed to
death, even though they had been rehabilitated. The trial court denied the for-
cause challenges, and Craven subsequently successfully exercised a peremptory
challenge with respect to both prospective jurors.
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Accordingly, when Craven proffered predisposition to death as the race-neutral
reason for the proposed peremptory strike of juror Ford, the trial court looked to its
notes, which did not reflect that juror Ford “would automatically sway to death or
that he felt strongly in favor of death or that he didn’t think he could be fair.”
The trial court’s conclusion is not without record support. Although juror
Ford’s initial response to the question of how he “feel[s]” about the death penalty
does lend some support to Craven’s argument that, at least initially, juror Ford
believed the death penalty to be an appropriate punishment for first-degree
premeditated murder, that is not tantamount to being predisposed to the death
penalty. 7 Instead, the record shows that juror Ford never firmly equated the death
penalty with first-degree premeditated murder and that he clarified any confusion
created by his initial answer through responses to follow-up questions, including
by stating that he would not automatically vote for the death penalty if Craven was
convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and that he would listen to all of the
evidence and consider all of the proposed mitigation.
7. When the State questioned juror Ford, who stated that he had never
thought about the death penalty before voir dire, as to how he “feel[s]” about the
death penalty, juror Ford initially responded, “Well, if it’s deserved, for instance, if
he had premeditated, just did it, yes, the death penalty. But if he was under some
kind of influence, alcohol, drugs, anything like that and did it, maybe life, that’s
how I feel.”
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Moreover, like the trial court, the State represented that its notes did not
reflect that juror Ford was predisposed to the death penalty. The State also argued
that defense counsel had confused juror Ford’s voir dire responses with the
responses of another prospective juror (Glisson) who had been questioned at the
same time as juror Ford and stricken for cause after stating that she would
automatically vote for the death penalty if Craven was convicted of first-degree
premeditated murder. Although the burden to prove purposeful racial
discrimination remained with the State as the opponent of the strike, defense
counsel did not dispute the State’s argument that she had confused the two
prospective jurors’ responses or otherwise attempt make a record on this issue, and
the State accurately described prospective juror Glisson’s responses. Nor did
defense counsel argue below that the trial court had failed to comply with step 3 of
Melbourne in denying the peremptory strike to Juror Ford. Cf. State v. Johnson,
295 So. 3d 710, 714-16 (Fla. May 21, 2020).8
8. This case was briefed prior to our decision in Johnson, where we held in
the context of a Melbourne claim that the objecting party, not the trial court, has
the obligation to preserve the record. 295 So. 3d at 715. Neither party raised the
issue of whether defense counsel preserved the specific challenge to the trial
court’s alleged noncompliance with Melbourne that Craven now raises—i.e.,
whether the trial court failed to conduct a genuineness inquiry—and we do not
decide that issue.
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Nevertheless, the dissent would reverse based on its conclusion that the trial
court never reached the genuineness of Craven’s proffered facially race-neutral
reason. In support, the dissent cites our decision in Hayes v. State, 94 So. 3d 452,
463 (Fla. 2012), for the proposition that we cannot assume that the trial court
conducted the genuineness inquiry required by step 3 of Melbourne “where the
record is completely devoid of any indication that the trial court considered
circumstances relevant to whether a strike was exercised for a discriminatory
purpose.” Dissenting op. at 34 (quoting Hayes, 94 So. 3d at 463). However, in
Johnson, where we disapproved of dicta in Hayes, we explained that “there will be
some cases in which the trial judge does not believe the proffered reason to be
genuine despite the contrary presumption, in which case the correct ruling under
Melbourne would be to sustain the opponent’s objection and disallow the strike.”
295 So. 3d at 715. Although Johnson certainly did not relieve trial courts of the
obligation to comply with all three steps of Melbourne, “there are no magic words
that must be uttered by the trial judge in order to fulfill the Melbourne
requirements.” Washington v. State, 773 So. 2d 1202, 1204 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA
2000). In Craven’s case, even assuming that Hayes remains good law on the point
cited by the dissent, we disagree with the dissent’s assessment that the record is
“devoid” of any indication that the trial court conducted Melbourne’s step-3
genuineness inquiry. Rather, it is clear that the trial court did not believe Craven’s
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proffered race-neutral reason was genuine, in part because Craven had failed to
raise the allegation of juror Ford’s predisposition to death in the same manner that
Craven had raised that allegation with respect to non-black prospective jurors.
Indeed, as we have explained, the record indisputably shows that Craven did, in
fact, treat juror Ford differently.
Given the totality of the circumstances, and mindful of the deference owed
to the trial court’s resolution of the genuineness inquiry, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s finding that Craven’s proffered reason for striking
juror Ford was a pretext. See Guzman, 238 So. 3d at 155. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s denial of Craven’s peremptory challenge to juror Ford.
(3) Penalty Phase Jury Instructions
Craven next argues that the trial court fundamentally erred in instructing his
penalty phase jury in accordance with the standard jury instructions, which do not
require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors are
sufficient and outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr.
(Crim.) 7.11. We have repeatedly rejected this argument. See, e.g., Newberry v.
State, 288 So. 3d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 2019) (rejecting fundamental-error claim
because the sufficiency and weighing determinations “are not subject to the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard of proof”) (citing Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 886
(Fla. 2019)); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (“Under
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Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616(2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant
death eligible. But importantly, in a capital sentencing proceeding, just as in an
ordinary sentencing proceeding, a jury (as opposed to a judge) is not
constitutionally required to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or
to make the ultimate decision within the relevant sentencing range.”); State v.
Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. Jan. 2020) (“reced[ing] from Hurst v. State [202
So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016)] except to the extent it requires a jury unanimously to find
the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt”).
Accordingly, because the trial court did not err in instructing the penalty phase
jury, let alone fundamentally so, Craven is not entitled to relief on this claim.
(4) Prior Violent Felony
Craven next argues that the trial court erred by admitting statements made
by Craven’s prior victim in support of the prior violent felony aggravator.
Specifically, over Craven’s objections, the trial court allowed the prosecutor from
Craven’s prior first-degree murder case to testify that, during Craven’s murder of
his prior victim, the prior victim begged Craven to let him go, told Craven that he
would leave, and asked Craven to remember that the victim had two children.
Craven argued that the prior victim’s statements were irrelevant and that their
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
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We review the trial court’s admission of this evidence over Craven’s objections for
abuse of discretion, see Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 96 (Fla. 2007), and find
none.
As we have explained, “it is appropriate in the penalty phase of a capital trial
to introduce testimony concerning the details of any prior felony conviction
involving the use or threat of violence to the person rather than the bare admission
of the conviction.” Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1204 (Fla. 1989). Such
testimony “assists the jury in evaluating the character of the defendant and the
circumstances of the crime so that the jury can make an informed recommendation
as to the appropriate sentence.” Id.; see also § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2017)
(providing that during the penalty phase proceeding “evidence may be presented as
to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the
character of the defendant . . . regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary
rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut
any hearsay statements”). “In determining whether a trial court has abused its
discretion in admitting evidence of prior violent felony convictions, this Court
looks at the tenor of the witness[’s] testimony and whether this testimony became a
central feature of the penalty phase.” Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 96.
Below, in three lines of her six-page testimony, the prosecutor in Craven’s
prior first-degree murder case testified to statements made by Craven’s prior victim
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during the murder. She did so, without editorializing, as part of a nineteen-line
response to the State’s request to describe the circumstances of the prior murder.
During the penalty phase closing argument, the State did not repeat the prior
victim’s statements in arguing that the prior violent felony aggravator had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and was entitled to great weight. Rather, the
State argued that jury had heard the prior prosecutor’s testimony and “the details,
the nature and circumstances of [the] prior capital felony and how violent it was.”
On these facts, the prior victim’s statements did not impermissibly become a
central feature of the penalty phase. See Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 716-17 &
n.12 (Fla. 2002) (concluding there was “no basis to reverse the ruling of the court
below admitting testimonial evidence of the appellant’s prior violent felonies”
where the “evidence was not emphasized to the level of rendering the prior
offenses a central feature of the penalty phase” and the record instead showed that
each witness “simply relat[ed] [the defendant’s] crimes against him or her” without
“emotional displays or breakdowns”).
Accordingly, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the challenged testimony, Craven is not entitled to relief on this claim.
(5) HAC
Craven next claims that the trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravator.
When reviewing claims alleging that the trial court erred in finding an aggravating
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factor, we do not reweigh the evidence. McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 792 (Fla.
2010). “Rather, this Court’s role on appeal is to review the record to determine
whether the trial court applied the correct rule of law for each aggravator and, if so,
whether competent, substantial evidence exists to support its findings.” Id. In
reviewing the record for competent, substantial evidence, which “is tantamount to
legally sufficient evidence,” State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 133 (Fla. 2003), we
“view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing theory,” Wuornos v.
State, 644 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1994).
Regarding the HAC aggravator, we have explained
that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that
atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means
designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or
even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be
included are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the
capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the
crime apart from the norm of capital felonies—the conscienceless or
pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973), superseded in part on other grounds by
ch. 74-383, § 14, Laws of Fla., as stated in State v. Dene, 533 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla.
1988).
Craven first argues that the trial court applied an incorrect rule of law
because it supported its finding of the HAC aggravator in part with the conclusion
that Craven intended to inflict a high degree of pain upon the victim and was
indifferent to the victim’s suffering. Craven argues that, rather than looking to his
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intent, the trial court was required to limit its analysis to the means and manner
used to inflict death and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death from
the victim’s perspective. We have explained that “[t]he HAC aggravator is proper
‘only in torturous murders—those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as
exemplified by either the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference
to or enjoyment of the suffering of another.’ ” Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 551
(Fla. 2009) (quoting Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998)). We
have recognized that “the HAC aggravator does not necessarily focus on the intent
and motivation of the defendant, but instead on the ‘means and manner in which
death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death.’ ”
Orme, 25 So. 3d at 551 (quoting Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998)).
And we have similarly explained that “if a victim is killed in a torturous manner, a
defendant need not have the intent or desire to inflict torture, because the very
torturous manner of the victim’s death is evidence of a defendant’s indifference.”
Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 2002). However, our precedent does
not preclude the trial court from finding that the defendant actually intended to
inflict a high degree of pain or was indifferent to the victim’s suffering, where
competent, substantial evidence supports it.
In Craven’s case, the record supports the trial court’s findings regarding
Craven’s intent and the trial court’s application of the HAC aggravator. According
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to the medical examiner, Craven stabbed the victim approximately thirty times in
the head, throat, neck, and upper torso, twelve of which penetrated deep into the
victim’s skin and the rest of which were incisive wounds, and all of which would
have been painful to the victim. We have, on numerous occasions, upheld HAC
where the victim was repeatedly stabbed. See, e.g., Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d
685, 696 (Fla. 1995) (stabbed thirty-seven times), receded from on other grounds
by Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1258 n.6 (Fla. 2004); Finney v. State, 660 So.
2d 674, 685 (Fla. 1995) (stabbed thirteen times); Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d
415, 418 (Fla. 1990) (stabbed twenty-three times), receded from on other grounds
by Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 2000).
Nevertheless, Craven argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish the
victim’s death was unnecessarily torturous because he intended to speed the
victim’s death by first stabbing him in the windpipe. The record, however, shows
“that the victim was conscious and aware of impending death,” as required to
establish the HAC aggravator. Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Fla.
2004). Craven confessed that he snuck up on the victim with a homemade knife
while the victim was sleeping, that he intentionally aimed for the victim’s throat to
prevent him from screaming, and that the victim “instantly started screaming and
kicking and clawing” and was “spitting blood everywhere.” Craven further
confessed, “All of my stabs were intentional aims and placed with purpose. I took
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my time, none were accidental . . . .” After he had finished stabbing the victim,
Craven told law enforcement he grabbed the victim’s face and watched the
victim’s eyes fade as he told him to go to sleep.
Consistent with Craven’s confession, the medical examiner testified that the
victim was not likely rendered unconscious by any of the wounds and that he had
defensive wounds on his palms and wrists. Thus, even if the victim was asleep
during the first stab, he was conscious and aware of his impending death during at
least part of the murder, which the medical examiner testified was not
instantaneous and could have taken from minutes to half an hour. We have upheld
the application of the HAC aggravator under similar facts. See Hall v. State, 107
So. 3d 262, 276 (Fla. 2012) (“We have repeatedly upheld the HAC aggravating
circumstance in cases where the victim has been stabbed numerous times . . . and
has remained conscious for at least part of the attack. . . . Further, we have held
that when a victim sustains defense-type wounds during the attack, it indicates that
the victim did not die instantaneously and in such a circumstance HAC was
proper.”); Nibert v. State, 508 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1987) (finding HAC where the
evidence established that the victim was stabbed seventeen times, had defensive
wounds, and remained conscious throughout the stabbing). Competent, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding of the HAC aggravator in Craven’s case.
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(6) CCP
Craven next argues that the trial court erred in finding the CCP aggravator,
which applies where the evidence establishes
(1) “the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an
act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold)”; (2)
“the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit
murder before the fatal incident (calculated)”; (3) “the defendant
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated)”; (4) “the
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.”
Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 887 (quoting Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 195 (Fla.
2010)). Craven concedes that the trial court applied the correct rule of law.
However, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support application of the
CCP aggravator. We disagree.
Although Craven has claimed that he possessed the murder weapon, a
homemade shank, for protection, the record establishes that Craven planned to kill
Anderson with that weapon days before he carried out the murder. Prior to
carrying out his plan, Craven even took the time to arrange a visit with his mother
because he knew he would not be permitted to visit with her after killing Anderson.
Although Craven has claimed that he was agitated because Anderson spoke of
having sex with a fourteen-year-old girl, there was no evidence that Anderson’s
criminal history included sexual offenses, and for over a month before Craven
made this claim, he expressed other reasons for killing Anderson, including his
desires to start a race riot and to get on death row. Although Craven has also
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claimed that Anderson made racial slurs against whites a few hours before the
murder after watching the movie Selma and that Anderson had defensive wounds
on his hands, indicating provocation and resistance by the victim, the record shows
that Anderson was asleep and defenseless when Craven began his attack and that
Craven purposely waited to carry out his attack on Anderson until after the
corrections officer had checked their cell so that his planned “assassination” of
Anderson would not be interrupted. Competent, substantial evidence supports the
CCP finding.
(7) Proportionality
Craven next argues that his sentence of death is disproportionate in
comparison to other cases in which the sentence of death has been imposed. Our
precedent requires us to conduct a comparative proportionality review of every
death sentence for the purpose of “ensur[ing] uniformity of sentencing in death
penalty proceedings.” Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 891, and that the death penalty is
“reserved for only the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree
murders.” id. at 892 (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998)); see
also Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5) (providing that the Court shall review
proportionality on direct appeal whether or not the issue is presented by the
parties). Our review does not simply involve comparing the number of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances; rather, we consider the totality of the
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circumstances and compare each case with other cases, accepting the weight
assigned by the trial court to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See
Newberry, 288 So. 3d at 1049.9
In Craven’s case, the trial court found four aggravators to which it assigned
the noted weight: (1) the capital felony was committed by a person previously
convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment (some weight); (2) prior
violent felony based on Craven’s prior conviction for first-degree murder with a
weapon, a capital felony (very great weight); (3) the first-degree murder of
Anderson was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (very great weight); and (4)
the first-degree murder of Anderson was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (very
great weight). The trial court found that the following “catchall” statutory
mitigating circumstances were established by the greater weight of the evidence
and assigned them the noted weight: (1) chaotic and dysfunctional upbringing
(significant weight); (2) no evidence of biological father present in Craven’s life
(some weight); (3) Craven is able to maintain meaningful relationships (slight
9. Although the State questions in its answer brief whether our comparative
proportionality review violates the conformity clause of article I, section 17 of the
Florida Constitution, the State does not ask us to reconsider our precedent.
Moreover, the State effectively conceded the issue at oral argument by arguing that
Craven’s sentence is proportionate, without referencing any potential constitutional
problem with conducting a comparative proportionality review of his death
sentence.
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weight); (4) Craven has mental health issues (significant weight); and (5) Craven
maintained appropriate courtroom behavior (little weight).
“We have held that both the HAC and CCP aggravators are ‘two of the most
serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.’ ” Buzia v. State,
926 So. 2d 1203, 1216 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95
(Fla. 1999)). “Similarly, the prior violent felony aggravator is considered one of
the weightiest aggravators.” Silvia v. State, 60 So. 3d 959, 974 (Fla. 2011).
Craven’s case involves all three.
We have upheld death sentences for first-degree murders that were both less
aggravated and more mitigated than Craven’s murder of Anderson. See, e.g.,
Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1283, 1287-88 (Fla. 2009) (death sentence
proportionate where defendant sexually battered and strangled the victim in her
home and the trial court found the statutory aggravators of HAC and during the
course of a sexual battery; three statutory mitigating circumstances, including that
the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and numerous
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, including the defendant’s borderline verbal
intelligence, the defendant’s family history of mental illness, that the defendant had
diminished impulse control and exhibited periods of psychosis due to
methamphetamine abuse, that the defendant recognized his drug dependence
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problem and sought help for his drug problem, that the defendant used
methamphetamine before, during, and after the murder, and the defendant’s
diagnosis of chemical dependence and sexual obsessive disorder and symptoms of
attention deficit disorder).
We have upheld the death penalty in similar prison murders. See, e.g.,
Robertson v. State, 187 So. 3d 1207, 1209, 1211, 1218 (Fla. 2016) (death sentence
proportionate where defendant strangled his cellmate with a garrote and the trial
court found the aggravators of prior violent felony, under sentence of
imprisonment for a previous felony conviction, HAC, and CCP; the statutory
mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and several
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, including a family history of alcoholism
and substance abuse disorders, the defendant’s own drug use and long criminal
history, and childhood exposure to poverty, substance abuse, and domestic
violence).
We have also found death sentences proportionate in cases where the prior
violent felony aggravator was based on the defendant’s commission of a prior
murder. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State, 846 So. 2d 440, 442-45, 445 n.8, 455 (Fla.
2003) (death sentence proportionate in planned execution-style murder where the
trial court found the aggravators of CCP and prior violent felony, which was based
in part on a prior murder; five statutory mitigating circumstances, including both
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statutory mental health mitigating circumstances; and several nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances, including the defendant’s model behavior).
Accordingly, we hold that Craven’s death sentence is proportionate.
(8) Sufficiency
Finally, even though Craven does not argue that the evidence is insufficient
to support his conviction for first-degree murder, “this Court independently
reviews the record in death penalty cases to determine whether competent,
substantial evidence supports the conviction.” Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 891 (citing
Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5)). In conducting this review, we view “the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 674 (Fla. 2006).
The State charged Craven with the first-degree premeditated murder of
Anderson, which required the State to prove: (1) Anderson is dead; (2) Anderson’s
death was caused by the criminal act of Craven; and (3) Anderson’s death was a
result of Craven’s premeditated killing. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2. At
trial, it was undisputed that Anderson is deceased, and Craven admitted to killing
Anderson in opening statements. The evidence presented at trial established that
Craven was the only person who had access to Anderson during the time he was
murdered. Blood found on Craven’s person, effects, and prison cell matched
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Anderson’s DNA profile, and corrections officers recovered the murder weapon
from the location where Craven told them he had hidden it. Craven also confessed,
multiple times, to planning and following through on his plan to assassinate
Anderson, both verbally and in writing, including identifying his desires to start a
race riot and to get on death row as motivations for the murder. The evidence
showed that Craven and Anderson had a turbulent relationship, and Craven
arranged a hasty visit with his mother the day prior to the murder, warning her that
if she did not visit him immediately, she would not be able to see him again for
several years. After the murder, Craven confessed that the killing was “planned
out,” and before the murder, when his mother asked him to wait to give himself
some time “for whatever is on [his] mind,” Craven responded that he had “made up
[his] mind a long time ago.” Competent, substantial evidence supports Craven’s
conviction for first-degree murder under the theory that the killing was
premeditated.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Craven’s conviction and sentence of
death.
It is so ordered.
POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ.,
concur.
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANADY, C.J., dissenting.
Because I would conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s
objection to Craven’s exercise of a peremptory strike on prospective juror Ford, I
would reverse Craven’s conviction and remand for a new trial. I therefore dissent.
As an initial matter, the majority has misinterpreted the trial court’s ruling.
The majority “analyze[s] whether the trial court erred in finding that Craven’s
proffered reason for the strike was a pretext,” majority op. at 12, and concludes
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the proffered reason
for the strike was a pretext. In so doing, the majority has analyzed and upheld a
ruling that never occurred; the trial court never made a finding that Craven’s
reason for the strike was a pretext. Instead, after Craven provided his race-neutral
explanation for attempting to strike Ford, the trial court stated, “I’m going to deny
that as a race neutral basis, I don’t find that that is,” and disallowed the strike.
Under Melbourne, once the proponent of a challenged peremptory strike
asserts an explanation for the strike, the trial court is first tasked with determining
whether the explanation is facially race-neutral. Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d
759, 764 (Fla. 1996). Only after the court determines that the strike is facially
race-neutral, and the opponent of the strike contests the genuineness of the
proffered explanation, State v. Johnson, 295 So. 3d 710, 714 (Fla. 2020), does the
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court proceed to conduct a genuineness analysis to determine whether it believes
the explanation is a pretext for excluding a member of a distinct racial group from
the jury. Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764.
Here, the State never contested the genuineness of Craven’s explanation.
And the trial court—because its inquiry ended upon making the finding that the
explanation was not facially race-neutral—never reached the question of whether
the explanation was a pretext, never conducted a genuineness analysis of the
explanation, and never ruled that Craven’s proffered reason for the strike was a
pretext. See id. at 764 n.7 (“If the explanation is not facially race-neutral, the
inquiry is over; the strike will be denied.”). The trial court denied the strike solely
on the basis that it was not race neutral. It is crystal clear from the words used by
the trial court—“I’m going to deny that as a race-neutral basis”—that the court was
assessing the facial neutrality of Craven’s explanation rather than its genuineness.
See Hayes v. State, 93 So. 3d 427, 429 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“[A]lthough a trial
court is not required to follow a specific script or incant particular words in
conducting the Melbourne analysis, we have to assume that the trial court in this
case said what it meant and meant what it said in ruling that the reason for the
strike was not gender-neutral.” (citation omitted)).
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that in denying Craven’s
strike, the trial court did not consider any of the relevant circumstances
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surrounding the strike that should be considered by a court conducting a
genuineness inquiry. 10 As this Court has stated, “where the record is completely
devoid of any indication that the trial court considered circumstances relevant to
whether a strike was exercised for a discriminatory purpose, the reviewing court,
which is confined to the cold record before it, cannot assume that a genuineness
inquiry was actually conducted in order to defer to the trial court.” Hayes v. State,
94 So. 3d 452, 463 (Fla. 2012), disapproved of on other grounds by Johnson, 295
So. 3d at 716. Thus, the majority has completely missed the mark by reviewing a
genuineness inquiry that did not occur and upholding a phantom finding that the
strike was a pretext for discrimination.
The trial court’s finding that Craven’s explanation for the strike was not
race-neutral was clearly erroneous. Of assessing the facial validity of a party’s
explanation for a peremptory strike, the Supreme Court has said that this “step of
this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible”
and “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [party]’s explanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768
(1995) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)). This Court
10. Under Melbourne, those relevant circumstances “may include––but are
not limited to––the following: the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes
exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally
applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.”
Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8.
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has held that peremptory challenges may be used “to peremptorily strike ‘persons
thought to be inclined against [the proponent’s] interests.’ ” San Martin v. State,
717 So. 2d 462, 467-68 (Fla. 1998) (quoting San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337,
1343 (Fla. 1997)). Indeed, “[p]eremptory challenges . . . can be used to excuse a
[prospective] juror for any reason, so long as that reason does not serve as a pretext
for discrimination.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 99 (Fla. 2004).
When initially asked how he felt about the death penalty, prospective juror
Ford responded, “Well, if it’s deserved, for instance, if he had premeditated, just
did it, yes, the death penalty. But if he was under some kind of influence, alcohol,
drugs, anything like that, and did it, maybe life, that’s how I feel.” Based on that
response, Craven’s asserted basis for the strike was that Ford’s “original impulse
was [to say] if it [the murder] was found to be premeditated, then [his verdict]
would be the death penalty.” Regardless of what the prosecutor or the trial judge
may have thought, the factual ground for this asserted basis concerning the juror’s
original impulse is unequivocally supported by the record. Craven explained that
he thought Ford was inclined against his interests because of that original impulse.
Because there was no discriminatory intent inherent in that explanation, it was
facially race-neutral. Craven having clearly and specifically presented his racially
neutral explanation—an explanation undeniably based on facts established by the
record—nothing in our law required that he engage in argument with the trial court
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concerning the matter. And the trial court’s misapprehension of the relevant facts
is by no means a basis for sustaining the trial court’s decision. Thus, the trial
court’s conclusion that Craven failed to provide a race-neutral explanation for the
strike was erroneous.
Because our precedents treat an erroneous determination that a proffered
explanation for a peremptory strike is not facially race-neutral as per se reversible
error, Craven is entitled to relief. See Hayes, 94 So. 3d at 461 (“Compliance with
each step [of the Melbourne procedure] is not discretionary, and the proper remedy
when the trial court fails to abide by its duty under the Melbourne procedure is to
reverse and remand for a new trial.”). I would therefore reverse Craven’s
conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Jackson County,
Christopher N. Patterson, Judge - Case No. 322016CF000451CFAXMX
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
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